Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.     

宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

儿童作为权利主体在人权理论上的证成与限度

西方学者对于儿童是否可以拥有权利的理性反思最初是在人权维度上展开的,他们依据人权的论证逻辑来论证儿童是人,因为他们是人,他们就应该享有人之为人的权利,儿童权利乃是一种不可剥夺的道德权利.无可否认,儿童作为权利主体在人权理论上的证成对于发掘儿童的内在价值、认真对待儿童权利、丰富人权理论具有十分重要的意义.但是由于这种论证过于简单和粗糙,其存在着对于人权理论中“人”的含义的重大误解,缺失对儿童这一群体特殊性的关注及其对儿童权利认识的有限性和不充分性等问题.     

论现代公共法律服务多元化规范体系建构

公共法律服务体系建设现代化的核心问题是满足人民群众追求美好生活日益增长的法律服务需求,为实现共同富裕发展目标提供全方位的法治保障。现代公共法律服务体系建设的地方立法例中,均集中体现出对公共法律服务基本概念和调整范围的反思与分歧,为此亟待厘清公共法律服务应然规范构造理论,这是未来形成公共法律服务全国统一立法的法学理论基础。公共法律服务专门立法在整个公共法律服务规范体系中具有纲领性地位,公共法律服务体系建设改革实践不仅具备基本服务与非基本服务二元结构架构特征,而且越来越多地呈现出多元和多维架构的本质特征。现有二元规范构造理论已经不能全面解释和解构现有的公共法律服务体系建设实践发展的全样本和多维度、多元化样态,只有建构多元化的现代公共法律服务规范体系才能根本解决现有公共法律服务地方立法例实践及理论研究中出现的关于基本概念、规范类型、规范属性、调整方式、权利属性等诸多基本争议,从而确定公共法律服务的权利义务主体、事项范围、模式与程序、标准与评价指标、监督管理等主要体系建构的基本规范要素,进而归纳整合公共法律服务立法规范构造的本质特征,为将来形成区域协同一体化立法或全国统一立法提供立法规范要素的基本构造理论支撑。     

法律论证中的权威与正确性——兼论我国指导性案例的效力

法律论证既需要运用权威理由,也需要运用实质理由来证立法律命题。法律渊源是最重要的权威理由,它通过说明法律命题之来源的方式来证明后者的初步有效性。制定法与先例构成了法律论证之权威性框架的主要部分,制定法属于规范权威,而先例属于事实权威,它们在司法裁判中一般只需被指明。同时,法律论证的正确性宣称决定了法律论证也必须运用有效的实质理由,即对法律命题内容的正确性进行证立。这种论证既可以是法律体系内的论证,也可以是超越体系的论证。法律论证旨在于平衡权威与正确性,其中权威论证具有初步的优先性但并非不可推翻,权威性的强度与相关正确性论证的负担成正比。以此来分析,我国的指导性案例介于规范权威与事实权威之间,它的效力是一种"准制度拘束力"。     

Universal Legal Concepts? A Criticism of “General” Legal Theory

Abstract. General theory of law (general jurisprudence, allgemeine Rechtslehre) has often claimed to deal with general or universal concepts, i.e., concepts which are deemed to be common to any legal system whatsoever. At any rate, this is the classic determination of such a field of study as provided by John Austin in the nineteenth century—a determination, however, which deserves careful analysis. In what sense, indeed, can one assert that some legal concepts are common to different legal systems? And, above all, in what sense can one assert that some concepts are common to different languages and cultures? My paper sets out to discuss such questions—although, obviously, they are too complicated to be answered in a single paper. The first section reconstructs the Austinian argument for general jurisprudence by placing it in its historical context. The second section tries to apply to legal concepts some suggestions derived from the contemporary debate on conceptual relativism. The third section, returning to the Austinian problem, comes to the following conclusion: Even if conceptual relativism were true and there were no general or universal legal concepts, this would not invalidate in any way the didactic and scientific value of (general) theory of law.     

Human Rights: Existential,Not Metaphysical

My paper consists of four sections. The first is concerned with the distinction and connection between fundamental and human rights. Here I shall just introduce a few conceptual notions and definitions that are more or less widely used, but that may help us to frame the issue and better focus on the most relevant question of the foundation or justification of human rights. In the second and third sections I will present what I believe to be the four fundamental normative situations that shape our understanding and use of human rights. In the second section attention will focus on what in my opinion is the most basic of these four normative situations, which I call the “existential” situation. This is intended to offer a strong foundation for human rights as “not metaphysical,” without appealing to or relying on heavy metaphysical assumptions. I will try to stick more or less to an argumentative strategy based on common sense. The third section, dealing with the three other normative situations, will to some extent be an exercise in eclecticism, trying to combine different approaches to (and schools of thought on) the question of normativity. Here eclecticism will not be trivial, or at least I hope not. In the fourth and final section I will briefly conclude with a general overview on the issue of the “existence” of normativity and human rights.     

The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

Why Interpret?

Abstract. My article is about legal interpretation, but not about the question: how to interpret the law. Rather its aim is to make us consider seriously the question: Why is interpretation central to legal practices? After all not all normative practices assign interpretation such a central role. In this regard the law contrasts with morality. The reason for the contrast has to do with the status of sources in the law. There are no “moral sources” while legal sources are central to the law. Legal interpretation is primarily—I will suggest—the interpretation not of the law, but of its sources. To understand why interpretation is central to legal practices requires understanding the role of sources in the law: the reasons for having them, and hence also the ways in which they should be treated. I will show how reflections about these topics connect with some traditional jurisprudential puzzles, such as the relations between law and morality. Are there gaps in the law? Is the law or its interpretation objective or subjective?     

税收优先权的顺位分析

税收优先权是优先权的一种形式,但税收又是一种公法上的债权债务关系。因此,当税收优先权与其他优先权竟合时,既可以适用私法债权优先权竞合时的原则,又要考虑国家的特殊政策需要。由于涉及的优先权类型很多,且税收优先权有与其竞合的可能,故有必要对优先权进行分析,并指出税收优先权的法律地位。     

Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development

A number of judges and academics have argued in favour of the convergence of negligence law with human rights law. By contrast, the thesis of this article is that the two legal orders should develop independently, so that for the most part the law of negligence ought not to be affected by human rights considerations. It is argued that the case for convergence is based on two false assumptions, namely that human rights law and negligence law perform similar functions within our legal order and that the norms of human rights law are more fundamental than the norms encapsulated in negligence law. It is also argued that convergence would undermine the coherence of negligence law. Ultimately, the case for separate development rests on the desirability of recognising public law and private law as autonomous normative systems with their own distinctive rationales, concepts and core principles.     

法教义学中法律解释性命题的可接受性证立

法教义学研究是对实在法尤其是实在法规则进行解释和体系化的研究,法律解释性是法教义学考察的核心命题,是对规范陈述在具体案件事实当中意义的研究。法律解释性命题的有效性证立除了需要满足自我证立的融贯性要求之外,也要符合相关理性论辩规则的规制,尤其需要满足可接受性法律证立的修辞论证需要。解释性法律命题的有效性是以法律解释结果的可接受性为基础的,阿尔尼奥的法律解释证立理论正是在此探讨理路上展开的。     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

论犯罪规定的正当化理论之缺失

犯罪规定的正当化理论在刑法学中至今仍无一席之地，犯罪规定的正当化问题或者湮没于刑法的机能之中，或者在刑罚的正当化理论中若隐若现，即使在罪刑法定主义的时代呼唤下，它也仅有微弱的回应。这是刑法裁判规范优先观念的产物，建立市民刑法，应树立行为规范优先的理念，重视犯罪规定的正当化问题，为此必须转变观念，必须反思法益之概念。     

征收补偿中的主观价值

公平市场价值是征收补偿的通常标准,是自愿的买家愿意支付给自愿的卖家的价格,包含了财产对于财产权人的平均主观价值,不包含特殊的主观价值和自治价值。补偿超过平均主观价值的主观价值技术上不可能;财产权是法定的权利,负有社会义务,法律不补偿财产权人的过敏反应;补偿某些特殊的主观价值与宪法价值不兼容,还可能给财产权的策略性抵抗提供正当理由。许多域外征收法规定不补偿特殊主观价值,但特殊主观价值可以通过其他概念在个案中进入补偿。中国征收法采通行的公平市场价值补偿标准,没有规定主观价值的补偿,但主观价值可以通过社会稳定风险评估、补助和搬迁奖励部分进入补偿额。     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.