日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

美国对华经贸规锁:典型事实、行为逻辑与战略约束

特朗普政府执政后,美国从升级对华关税制裁、重塑国际贸易规则、严控高新技术获取、扩容货币互换协议、打压中国概念股票、推进产业链自主化和"去中国化"六个维度,对中国实施选择性"挂钩"和关键领域"脱钩"的经贸规锁。其行为逻辑,一是为满足国内多元化经济集团的利益诉求,二是基于美国对中国崛起的"威胁认知"和大国战略竞争的"权力逻辑"。从战略约束看,美国开放性利益集团的经济理性、其他经济体的行为取向、中国的结构性国家竞争优势,构成了美国对华经贸规锁的重要制约因素。作为应对,中国需确定"全政府"的战略模式,理解"双循环"的科学内涵,贯彻改革开放的既定方针,重视"一带一路"倡议的战略意义。     

U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues

Many previous studies assessed the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid by focusing on voting coincidence rates of all UN votes and found no relationship between U.S. aid distribution and UN voting coincidence rates. Most UN resolutions, however, are simply not important enough for the U.S. to expend its scarce resources in influencing the outcomes. The U.S. government would not be likely to exercise pressure on all UN resolutions but would do so on issues considered vital to America's national interests. If there is any effect from receiving U.S. foreign aid on political outcomes in the UN, it is therefore most likely to emerge in voting coincidence rates on important issues. Using data collected for sixty-five developing countries between 1984 and 1993, a pooled cross-sectional and time-series research design is adopted to examine this hypothesis. Contrary to the argument that foreign aid is an ineffective policy instrument in the pursuit of America's global influence, the currentfindings suggest that the U.S. government has successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign policy compliance in the UN on issues that are vital to America's national interests.     

Constituent Influence on International Trade Policy in the United States, 1987–2006

The debate on whether class-based or industry-based coalitions are politically salient in American trade politics has illuminated domestic sources of international trade policy but remains unresolved. In particular, the literature offers contradictory evidence on the dominance in recent years of class-based or industry-based trade politics. This contradiction is mainly due to selective use of congressional votes. This article contributes to this debate by applying a multilevel item-response-theory model to the entire universe of trade-related votes since 1987. This study finds that class-based coalitions are politically salient in current U.S. trade politics. Furthermore, while this study confirms the significance of party influence on trade voting, it finds little support for the view that political parties have dyadic relationships with particular groups of constituents.     

新安全视角下美国政府的气候政策

"人类安全"逐渐成为一种新的安全理念,环境气候问题等各种影响人类安全和福祉的非传统安全问题日益引起广泛关注。全球性安全威胁的严重程度则取决于治理框架的反应能力。包括气候政策、法律和机构在内的气候环境治理框架能够最大限度地削弱全球化冲突的根源,避免影响的发生或减缓其进程。奥巴马上任以来美国新政府能源、环境和应对气候变化政策出现较大调整,大力推动新能源法案来减缓气候变化。这一政策转向具有深刻的历史动因和政治基础,并将给美国经济复苏和美国企业的国际竞争力带来压力,加剧美国对外贸易摩擦和削弱其在国际气候环境合作中的领导地位。     

Systematic Leadership and Trade Openness

Studies of hegemonic stability tend to specify periods when hegemony is present or absent in the world system. Periods in which hegemony is present are expected to exhibit openness for trade. Periods in which hegemony is absent should be associated with trade closure. Partially as a consequence of this nominal measurement strategy, scholars continue to be unsure whether hegemony and systemic leadership are linked to the openness of the world's trading system. We contend that analysts need to devote more attention to the sources of preponderance and less to its arbitrary presence or absence. Focusing on the U.S. from 1870 to 1990, we first articulate a theory linking certain political-economic systemic leadership variables to trade openness, in terms of the directions, signs, and diffusion speed of the causal links. We then estimate Granger causality and distributed lag models to test our predictions empirically. The empirical results support our theoretical interpretation. The Granger causalities between world trade openness and the systemic leadership variables are found to be reciprocal, with the effects of systemic leadership on world trade openness working faster than those of world trade openness on the hegemon. World trade openness exerts a negative effect on systemic leadership, while systemic leadership promotes world trade openness.     

美国绿色经济理念下的贸易摩擦隐患及中国对策

巨额外债已经成为威胁美国经济发展的重大隐患,美国希望通过倡导绿色经济为其国内经济寻找新的增长点,同时争取在全球气候变化、节能减排等议题中占据主动。该倡议暗含着强烈的战略性贸易保护动机,可能会影响未来中国制造业的国际竞争力,成为中美贸易摩擦的新隐患。为此,我们应该及早应对,从舆论引导、理论研究、政策设计和战略人才储备方面做好充分准备,以便在将来的中美贸易战略布局与战术对决中掌握主动、占据先机。     

美国金融危机对中国对外贸易出口企业的影响分析

一、美国金融危机产生的背景及原因 当前的美国金融危机是经济过度虚拟化和自由化后果的集中反映。20世纪80年代开始，美国进行大规模的产业结构调整，把大量的实体制造业转移到拉美和东南亚，而把美国本土打造成贸易、航运和金融等服务业中心；同时，在里根及其继任者的极力推动下，以私有化、市场化和自由化为目标的“华盛顿共识”在拉美和西方国家迅速推行。随着信息技术的迅速进步、金融自由化程度的提高，以及经济全球化的发展，虚拟资本的流动速度越来越快。     

Failed States After 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?

This paper addresses the relationship between accumulated knowledge and U.S. policy dealing with failed states and terrorism. The central thesis is threefold: (1) that more was known about the possible linkages between failing states and terrorism than appears in pre-9/11 U.S. policies; (2) that since 9/11 some important realignment of knowledge and practice has occurred, but it remains partial and incomplete; and (3) that new knowledge, especially about the policies to sustain and promote legitimate governance, needs to be generated in order to support an effective grand strategy for addressing the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. The paper recommends such a grand strategy and, in addition to the required new knowledge, a significant reorganization of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus. International studies curricula appear well suited for contributing to that new knowledge and the practitioners we require.     

"丝绸之路"复兴计划与中国外交

"丝绸之路"贸易通道的复兴,对于中国经济发展和社会进步具有重大的现实意义。中国已经开展了大量关于"新丝路"的外交活动,但中国更需要将"丝路外交"提升到战略的高度,原因在于"丝路外交"的开展不仅有利于中国突破当前的贸易和能源困境,而且也可以极大地加强中国与周边国家的文化交流,实质性地改善中国的安全处境。中国在"新丝路外交"中应该注意防范非传统安全威胁,利用好包括联合国在内的各种国际协调机制,并避免恶性的大国竞争。     

The Electoral Salience of Trade Policy: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Welfare and Complexity

Why do some trade policies become electorally salient while others do not? While much of the literature argues that citizens act as a domestic constraint in the formation of trade policy, a general consensus has emerged that trade is most often a nonsalient issue among voters. This poses a paradox. On the one hand, trade models hinge upon voters’ rational self-interest and preferences for varying levels of protectionism to keep their governments accountable. On the other hand, the conditions by which trade becomes salient to these very voters in the first place are both undertheorized and untested. Using experimental evidence, I argue that two dimensions of a trade policy affect the likelihood of that issue becoming electorally salient. First, policies with large welfare effects should be more salient. Second, more complex issues should be less salient because such agreements are more likely to obfuscate an individual’s ability to discern its effects. I find support for my hypotheses that a trade policy’s salience tends to increase with the magnitude of its welfare effects and decrease with its complexity.     

人民币汇率变动对中美贸易结构收支的影响——基于SITC分类标准的实证分析

人民币汇率变动能否解决中美双边贸易失衡问题一直是国内外学者研究与争论的焦点。实证分析表明,人民币汇率的水平变动无法起到调节中美两国贸易收支的作用,但适度增加汇率波动弹性有助于缓解贸易失衡。因此,只有消除对人民币升值的预期、进行经济结构调整以及改善外商直接投资的流向,才能从根本上恢复中美之间的贸易平衡。     

The Interdependence of U.S. Troop Deployments and Trade in the Developing World

The relationship between political conflict and trade has contributed to a riveting discussion in international relations about whether trade produces conflict, or whether conflict itself reduces trade. Most studies proxy "the flag" using militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). However, extensions of "the flag" might well obtain in environments short of MIDs. A more general way to proxy the flag is troop deployments. The deployment of military troops is an essential element of foreign policy. Using panel data for 126 developing countries from 1965 to 2002 and a two-stage least square approach, this essay investigates the relationship between trade and United States troop deployments. We find that trade and troops have a nonrecursive relationship: trade follows the flag and troops follow trade. Given the increased insecurity in the world today, the results are timely and reinforce previous research about the reciprocal relationship between the flag and trade.     

中美货物贸易互补性的实证研究

1979～2010年中美贸易规模呈现百倍以上的增长,其原因在于长期以来中美贸易互补性不断增强。通过对贸易结合度指数、显示性比较优势指数、贸易互补性指数的分析研究,均显示出中美双边贸易关系是紧密的,双边贸易的互补性是显著和稳定的,这充分说明中美所处的国际分工的地位及两国产业结构调整的变化使双边贸易往来处于有利的局面,但也应看到双边的贸易摩擦纠纷一直不断,这不利因素短期内难以解决,因而成为阻碍中美贸易发展的障碍。     

Domestic Costs, the U.S. Public, and the Isolationist Calculus

This article examines and tests two models of the circumstances shaping the extent of the American public&;apos;s isolationist sentiment. The first, termed the "elastic band" model, assumes a constant popular disinclination toward foreign involvements, one that may, at most, temporarily be stretched to accommodate responses to major external threats. A second model assumes the operation of a "cognitive shortcut" based on low-information rationality. It proposes that acceptable levels of domestic involvement depend on the gravity of the domestic opportunity costs of foreign involvement, and it is termed the "domestic costs" model. While the former model implies a constant public resistance to international activism, a resistance that is relaxed only in proportion to the gravity of external threats, the latter model suggests that the U.S. public displays a relatively constant internationalist attitude, and that variations around that threat are largely explained by fluctuations in the perceived domestic opportunity costs of international involvement.
Both models are subjected to statistical testing, a testing that vindicates the domestic costs model. Further insights are obtained by examining attitudes toward internationalism as they are affected by levels of education. Although internationalism increases with education, and although levels of education predict differential impacts of the variables encompassed by the model, each segment of the public seems to operate within the general parameters of the "domestic costs" model.     

Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises

In recent years, scholars studying U.S. foreign policy and the diversionary use of force have begun to focus more attention on when foreign regimes time crises with the U.S. Many argue that U.S. domestic conditions play a role in this. I argue that these models should take into consideration the foreign policy relationship between foreign governments and the U.S. I develop a theory of crisis initiation that considers the foreign policy orientation of states that may initiate a crisis with the U.S., and second, when the crisis may occur. I argue that by virtue of their foreign policy orientation, some regime leaders will be more likely than others to initiate a crisis with the U.S. Those regimes that are either closely aligned with the U.S. or closely identified with anti-U.S. interests will be much more likely to initiate crises with the U.S. than those whose foreign policy interests do not lead to such intimate ties of friendship or enmity. I develop and test hypotheses predicting what regime characteristics will be predictive of crisis initiation and when such crises are likely to occur. The results demonstrate that regime type matters more than U.S. domestic conditions in predicting where and when crises involving the U.S. will take place.     

The Demand for Protectionism: Democracy,Import Elasticity,and Trade Barriers

Numerous studies suggest that democracies employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. In this article, we examine the conditioning role that the elasticity of import demand at the commodity level plays on the relationship between democracy and import barriers. Beginning with the assumption that democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to the preferences of mass publics, we demonstrate that the value of free trade as a public good depends on the elasticity of import demand. When import demand for a given commodity is inelastic, trade barriers are more harmful to consumers; as such, democracies will employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. However, as import demand becomes more elastic, publics find it easier to adjust to higher prices; as a result, the difference in imposed trade barriers by regime type decreases. We find support for this argument in statistical analyses of crosssectional data covering 4,656 commodities imported by 73 countries Furthermore, we find that democracies raise higher trade barriers than nondemocracies on commodities for which import demand is very elastic.     

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995–1997). We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors—primarily education, but also gender and income—as the principal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization. Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization, we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than the economic interest predictors.     

Buying National: Democracy,Public Procurement,and International Trade

Many studies show that democracy promotes freer trade. However, because they typically focus on “at-the-border” barriers such as tariffs, we know little about democracy’s effects on “behind-the-border” barriers such as discrimination in government procurement. We address this question by asking how democracy affects governments’ incentives to discriminate against foreigners when buying goods and services. We argue that “buy national” policies have unclear costs and are harder to attack than policies that visibly interfere with consumers’ ability to buy foreign goods. This makes such provisions more attractive than tariffs to democratic leaders seeking reelection. We thus hypothesize that democracy leads to lower tariffs but to greater discrimination in public procurement. We support this hypothesis with an analysis of procurement and imports in 138 countries from 1990 to 2008. Our results imply that a full understanding of the democracy–trade policy relationship requires attention to increasingly prominent behind-the-border barriers to trade.     

Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes on Trade Adjustment Assistance

Globalization intensifies political conflict between citizens whose circumstances improve from foreign trade and those whose lives deteriorate as a result of trade. To pacify these rival interests, governments may assist citizens who become unemployed due to trade. When and under what conditions will legislators fund such assistance programs? The current study addresses this question by examining Congressional roll call votes in the United States during a period of rapid economic integration (1980–2004). The analysis reveals that protrade legislators who represent relatively more exporters are more likely to vote for increased spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs. Exporters and their elected representatives arguably support such expenditures to broaden the protrade coalition.