Chinese Views of US Hegemony

In the past several years, Chinese analysts have acknowledged that the United States possesses a vast amount of power and influence, which has allowed it to act in arrogant and often aggressive ways, and has fueled its ambitions of achieving global hegemony. While many PRC authors attribute to the US a coherent grand strategy of world domination, others have followed and assessed the debates that pervade US foreign policy-making, analyzed the nature of American hegemony, and critiqued the theoretical discussions on the subject carried out in US political science journals. Chinese analysts see both strengths and weaknesses in American hegemony, for while the country currently has superior comprehensive national power, there are also vulnerabilities in its economic and military strength, as well as in its relations with its allies. The views of Chinese authors are not uniform on the subject of US hegemony, however, for some believe that the US already is a hegemon, while others view America as a superpower seeking hegemony, or argue that the nation simply displays hegemonic behavior. Consequently there are several different schools of thought on the characteristics of US hegemony, as well as its tactics, goals and manifestations.     

China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea

China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea has arisen from the growth of its military power, its ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the Western financial crisis and its heightened nationalism. The other littoral states of the South China Sea have been troubled by the opacity of Chinese politics and of the process of military decision-making amid a proliferation of apparently separately controlled maritime forces. The more active role being played by the United States in the region, in part as a response to Chinese activism, has troubled Beijing. While most of the ASEAN states have welcomed America as a hedge against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly dependent upon China and they don't want to be a party to any potential conflict between these two giants. The problem is that there is no apparent resolution to what the Chinese call, in effect, these ‘indisputable disputes’.     

Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of proliferation and instability

This article examines the sources of Chinese foreign policy in a particularly important case—recent policy toward North Korea. It surveys that policy in several areas: the economic backdrop, leading the six party talks, permissive support for United Nations Security Council measures, signals—some rhetorical, others more tangible—warning against future transgressions, and some coercive measures that impose costs on North Korea today. In sum, it finds Beijing has wielded a number of coercive tools aimed a North Korea, while avoiding excesses that might lead to spirals on the peninsula or regionally. Defensive realism best explains this policy, both in the aggregate and in detail in many cases. Offensive realism, strategic culture, and bureaucratic politics approaches do a particularly poor job of explaining outcomes in what should be for each of them a relatively easy case. This has important implications for understanding the sources of Chinese foreign policy in other areas. Further, on North Korea policy, while it is important for American policy makers to recognize that Beijing is not working fundamentally at cross-purposes to Washington's own goals, it is also important to recognize that Beijing has mixed motives.     

Ambiguity,Economic Interdependence,and the US Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait

As tensions across the Taiwan Strait have risen in recent years, some have argued that the US policy of strategic ambiguity—under which Washington leaves unclear if and how it would intervene in a cross-Strait conflict—has outlived its usefulness because ambiguity may foster dangerous misperceptions about US intentions and hence contribute to future crises. In this essay I critically examine strategic ambiguity, and conclude that ambiguity remains the best policy available to Washington given current US goals in the Taiwan Strait. I argue that ambiguity remains essential both to deterring a Chinese attack and to restraining Taiwanese moves toward independence, but that it nonetheless carries with it inherent risks of conflict. I further argue, however, that these additional risks triggered by ambiguity per se are likely small, and hence are overshadowed by the strategic obstacles faced by the alternatives to an ambiguous policy. Moreover, I show that growing economic interdependence between Mainland China and Taiwan further reduces the risk that ambiguity itself would be a contributing factor to war in the Taiwan Strait. As such, the relative attractiveness of ambiguity has likely increased, rather than decreased as argued by its critics, over the past decade.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese perceptions of the engagement policy debate in the United States

This paper argues that now, more than at any other time, the way that China‐US relations evolve will shape each country's interests and affect the development of global politics. Thus, at this critical point, it is important that the two countries develop a mutually beneficial relationship. In this respect Chinese views of US intentions matter because these views translate into policies; policies that influence US domestic politics and shape relations between the two countries. It is ironic, then, that while Chinese understanding of US domestic politics has never been better and its response to it has never been more sophisticated, the criticisms of China in the US have never been stronger than at any time since rapprochement in the early 1970s. And, pointing specifically to the debate in the US since 1994 over the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, Jia analyzes this as a key source of current Chinese frustrations.     

The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China‐United States Relations: A Chinese perspective

At the early stage of the post-Cold War era, Chinese scholars put more attention into the study of US international standing than to the study of US global strategy. Around the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious for Chinese scholars that the power structure in the post-Cold War era was 'yi-chao-duo-qiang' (one super-power and several big powers). People realized that the leading position of the US would be unshakable and its comprehensive national power would be unparalleled by any single country in the foreseeable future. Since then, Chinese scholars have paid more attention to the study of US global strategy. Chinese scholars tend to agree that the Bush Administration's strategy was a transitional one, and that the US global strategy in the post-Cold War era came into being in the middle of President Clinton's first term. It is symbolized by the appearance of so-called 'engagement and enlargement strategy'. At the very beginning of his Administration (January 1993), President Clinton set forth that 'economy, security and democracy' would be the three pillars of US foreign policy. This greatly changed the traditional 'security first' strategy. The new strategy reflects some new features in the international and domestic contexts of the post-Cold War era. It has very important influences on Sino‐US relations.     

马英九上台后美国对台政策调整的背景分析

马英九上台执政后，美国对台政策的着力点由反对单方面改变台海现状转向正面评价台湾当局调整大陆政策和两岸关系的改善。美国的上述调整虽然有其现实的国家利益需求，但决策环境的变化也在对美国传统的对台思维和战略产生深刻的影响。未来四年，美国会继续发展美台关系，保持对台海局势的影响力，但随着两岸对话的不断深入，美国对台海局势的关注度可能会有所降低，台湾问题对中美关系的负面影响也可能趋于弱化。     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

关于当前美国华人餐馆业处境的思考

"凡是有海水的地方就有华人的足迹,凡是有华人的地方就会有中国餐馆",此种说法或许有点言过其实,但自从中国人踏上美国的土地起,就与餐馆业结下了不解之缘,并一度将其发扬光大.尽管如此,华人餐馆业在美国的发展并非一帆风顺,在起伏颠簸中,可谓喜忧参半.本文重点分析了近20年来美国华人餐馆业的发展现状及其发展过程中的优劣势,并针对其劣势及发展前景提出一系列建议.     

美国民众对军售台湾支持率的影响因素研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

美国对外政策的制定通常需要有民意基础,然而现有研究鲜有从美国民众的视角探究美国对台军售。本文基于美国人对华态度实证调研的数据,利用单因子试验法测试美国民众在“中美关系”和“对台军售”间的权衡,并采用logistic模型来检查影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。结果表明即使对台军售会严重恶化或危害中美关系,58％的美国民众依然支持美国对台军售。政治倾向（温和派）、媒体和信息渠道（收听广播和浏览网络频率）、个人因素（性别、年龄）等是影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。终止美国对台军售,我国一方面需要有更加强有力的反制措施,另一方面可以尝试通过长期规划的网络传播手段来扭转美国民众对对台军售的支持。     

International Political Economy from a Chinese Angle

In the 1990s, international political economy (IPE) as a set of concepts to interpret the current and future world system caught on quickly among Chinese scholars and policy analysts. Recent events (the Asian financial crisis and the US role, WTO negotiations, US‐Japan trade disputes) combined with China's historical experience (imperialism, war, revolution) and aspirations (to be a regional power) have given IPE specialists a different perspective on and language for the issues and events of today's global political economy. Zhu Wenli highlights the divergence between US and PRC views and interpretations on concepts of hegemony (the role of the US in a unipolar system), globalization, development models, and economic security, arguing that understanding this theoretical gap helps us to understand the current policy gap. She concludes with a reference to the limited role that international relations concepts and ideas play in the formation of foreign policy.     

The impact and clash of ideologies: Sino‐US relations from a historical perspective

Sino‐US relations over the last 100 years have been heavily affected by the ideological and cultural traditions of both sides; but the impact of ideas on each other has by no means been an even interaction. At the turn of the century when China and the US encountered each other, their destinies took opposite trajectories. While the US saw its dream of national greatness fulfilled with the continuous rise of its national power, China witnessed the sharp downfall from the peak of its self‐perception as the great central kingdom. Ever since then, all progressive intellectuals and reformers took inspiration from western ideas of democracy and freedom, while struggling at the same time against oppression and exploitation by western powers. These two aspects constitute the basic aspirations of the Chinese nation as a whole, which was summed up as ‘anti‐feudalism and anti‐imperialism’. One of the basic urges of Americans of all sorts in dealing with China throughout the years was to influence, educate and change China to its like. However, in front of Chinese revolutionary movments with democratic rights as part of their aims, the US government policies more than often favored the conservative or reactionary rulers. Meanwhile, the development of China takes its own course beyond the control of the US. Yet, under different circumstances, neither side could help placing hopes on the other. As for rulers of different Chinese adminstrations, they wavered between seeking American support in China's economic development and diplomacy on the one hand, and fear and resentment of American cultural influence on the other. Anti‐communism entered the US foreign policy thinking ever since the Russian Revolution. But US relations with the Chinese Communist Party have not been hostile all the way through but have undergone twists and turns. The period of best relationship between the US and the PRC took place in the 1980s and underwent a sharp turn after the events of 1989. Leaving aside other factors, the age‐long cultural paradigm of unrealistic hopes on each other, hence drastic disappointment, played a certain role. At present, The mentality of the bulk of Chinese including young students have also undergone a great change from the pre‐1989 period. The admiration for the US has receded and a certain degree of resentment of American pressure on China is on the rise. The pursuit of a strong and prosperous China remains the common and deep‐rooted national aspiration prevailing among Chinese of all ages and social strata and in this they identify themselves more with the government vs. foreign pressure, whatever their views on other subjects. The ideological aspect of difficulties in Sino‐US relations is not likely to go away in the foreseeable future and much wisdom is needed to handle it properly.     

The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress,problems, and prospects

This article offers an overview of China's evolving nonproliferation policy over the past decade. It documents the key developments during this period and identifies both the internal and external factors that have brought about significant change in Chinese policy. It argues that China's growing recognition of the threats posed by WMD proliferation, image concerns, its interest in maintaining stable Sino-US relations, and the US policy initiatives aimed at influencing Chinese behavior are largely accountable for Beijing's gradual acceptance of nonproliferation norms, pledges to adhere to selected multilateral export control guidelines, and the introduction of domestic export control regulations. It suggests that the future direction of China's nonproliferation policy to a large extent will depend on how Beijing and Washington manage their increasing differences over missile defenses and the Taiwan issue.     

Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: the case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy.     

Research note on the Taiwan relations act: Executive and legislative differences

Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the executive branch and the legislative branch have diverged on US‐Taiwan relations. As the executive branch created its version of the TRA, the Congress exerted its influence by adding security provisions. Yielding to the influence of Congress, President Carter accepted and signed into law the TRA. The 1982 Joint Communiqué contradicts the TRA. President Reagan signed this Communiqué which pledges that the US will decrease its arms sales to Taiwan. However, the TRA binds the US, by law, to sell a sufficient amount of defensive weapons to Taiwan for its security. How can the US provide sufficient amounts of defensive weapons to Taiwan if the US is decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan? The security provisions that Congress placed in the TRA comes into conflict with a presidential foreign policy statement. This paper finds that there is and has been a divergence of actions that occur even though the rhetoric and statements made by both sides seem similar. Traditionally, the Congress, has been the supporter, friend, and ally of Taiwan, whereas the administrations have been more concerned with US‐PRC relations. The TRA, being the law of the land, is contradicted by the 1982 Joint Communiqué. This paper illustrates the most recent differences between the Congress and Clinton administration.     

改革开放以来中国共产党处理民族问题的理论演进

中国是个统一的多民族国家，民族问题始终是中国社会主义革命、建设、改革总问题的重要组成部分。改革开放以来，我党逐步实现民族问题指导思想的拔乱反正，在建设中国特色社会主义历史进程中，紧紧围绕“什么是社会主义民族问题、怎样正确处理社会主义民族问题”的主线，自觉进行理论创新，正确落实民族政策，最终形成中国特色社会主义民族理论体系。     

The politics of greater China's integration into the global Info Tech (IT) supply chain

The most notable feature of the public ‘dialogue of the deaf’ taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero‐sum logic. This logic of one‐upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross‐Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross‐Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end‐point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross‐Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault‐line of the Taiwan Strait. Non‐partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross‐Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long‐term to stabilizing cross‐Strait political interaction.     

Building New Vital Mutual Interests for a Better Future: a commentary on Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal's Addressing US–China Strategic Distrust

This analysis of the dangerous forces increasingly dynamizing Beijing–Washington relations explains why the usual proposals for increasing the cooperative aspects of USA–PRC relations will not succeed. It builds on the policy analysis and policy proposals of others who understand what a disaster it would be if China–America relations were to continue to grow worse. It makes a suggestion for restructuring the institutions of the international political economy so as to construct fundamental over-lapping interests between America and China. The author finds that without some difficult and basic changes in the relations, worst case outcomes become ever more probable.     

Working Toward an Inclusive World

正The world has never been homogenous.Over the ages,the plurality of man has been blamed as the root of various conflicts.But it must also be acknowledged that it is through such diversity that mankind managed to compete and progress,ultimately contributing to what it is today.