Unravelling semi-presidentialism: democracy and government performance in four distinct regime types

Do semi-presidential regimes perform worse than other regime types? Semi-presidentialism has become a preferred choice among constitution makers worldwide. The semi-presidential category contains anything but a coherent set of regimes, however. We need to separate between its two subtypes, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Following Linz’s argument that presidentialism and semi-presidentialism are less conducive to democracy than parliamentarism a number of studies have empirically analysed the functioning and performance of semi-presidentialism. However, these studies have investigated the performance of semi-presidential subtypes in isolation from other constitutional regimes. By using indicators on regime performance and democracy, the aim of this study is to examine the performance of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes in relation to parliamentarism and presidentialism. Premier-presidential regimes show performance records on a par with parliamentarism and on some measures even better. President-parliamentary regimes, on the contrary, perform worse than all other regime types on most of our included measures. The results of this novel study provide a strong call to constitution makers to stay away from president-parliamentarism as well as against the idea of thinking about semi-presidentialism as a single and coherent type of regime.     

Three waves of semi-presidential studies

This article reviews the scholarship on semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s. We identify three waves of semi-presidential studies. The first wave focused on the concept of semi-presidentialism, how it should be defined, and what countries should be classified as semi-presidential. The second wave examined the effect of semi-presidential institutions on newly democratized countries. Does semi-presidentialism help or hinder the process of democratic consolidation? The third wave examines the effect of semi-presidential institutions on both recent and consolidated democracies. Third-wave studies have been characterized by three questions: to what extent does the direct election of the president make a difference to outcomes; to what extent does variation in presidential power make a difference; and what other factors interact with presidential power to help to bring about differential outcomes? The article argues that the concept of semi-presidentialism remains taxonomically valid, but that the empirical scholarship on countries with semi-presidential institutions needs to respond to broader developments within the discipline if it is to remain relevant.     

Consistency in constitutional design and its effect on democracy

ABSTRACT

Does the art of crafting and amending a constitution lead to an internal consistency among constitutional provisions, and if so, what effect does that have on countries’ democratic performance? Drawing from theoretical claims on the separation of power and electoral legitimacy, this article develops a concept that identifies the institutional characteristics of consistency and inconsistency in the constitutional design with the example of the presidency. Empirically, this concept is focused on aligning or counterbalancing the mode of presidential election and the de jure power of the president. Based on a comparative perspective of republican parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the article focuses on the empirical trends of consistent and inconsistent design and addresses their effect on democratic development. The findings show a balance between consistent and inconsistent design in terms of quantity. The influence on democratization varies considerably across different measures but I find significant support for a positive effect of inconsistency on liberal democracy, freedom, horizontal accountability and the rule of law.     

Leader Language and Political Survival Strategies

Authoritarian leaders’ language provides clues to their survival strategies for remaining in office. This line of inquiry fits within an emerging literature that refocuses attention from state-level features to the dynamic role that individual heads of state and government play in international relations, especially in authoritarian regimes. The burgeoning text-as-data field can be used to deepen our understanding of the nuances of leader survival and political choices; for example, language can serve as a leading indicator of leader approval, which itself is a good predictor of leader survival. In this paper, we apply computational linguistics tools to an authoritarian leader corpus consisting of 102 speeches from nine leaders of countries across the Middle East and North Africa between 2009 and 2012. We find systematic differences in the language of these leaders, which help advance a more broadly applicable theory of authoritarian leader language and tenure.     

印度尼西亚宪政制度初探

印尼的宪政始于1945年通过的宪法,宪法历经1999年、2000年、2001年和2002年四次修正。印尼现行宪法规定了国家性质、政权组织形式、国家结构形式、公民基本权利与义务、国家机构等宪政制度。印尼宪政制度呈现出受传统观念影响较大、总统权力集中和军警影响政治发展的三大特点。     

In the name of king,country, and people on the Westminster model and Bhutan's constitutional transition

In 2008 Bhutan inaugurated a written constitution thereby instituting the state as a constitutional monarchy. The constitution is almost unanimously described as democratic by international media and academics. The ease with which this apparent consensus on its democratic character has been achieved, however, raises the important question of how best to approach the theory of constitutional democratization. In approaching the issue of democratization as a move towards popular control, this article discusses the ambivalence of the Bhutanese constitution towards this principle in a cultural context where social order is seen as constituted within the unity of king, country, and people. Curiously, this language is not as unique to Bhutan as one might expect, but influenced by the Westminster legacy in its emphasis on the principle of “Crown in Parliament”, its ritualization, and ideas of political inequality. It raises the question whether this model is suitable as a blueprint model for countries with different historic and cultural trajectories from the European ones? The article advocates a novel approach to the analysis of constitutional transition that transgresses the dichotomy between an institutional and linguistic approach, thus opening up interesting new insights on the waxing and waning of processes of expanding popular control.     

Populism and democratic crisis in semi-presidential countries

This article demonstrates how different political opportunity structures in semi-presidential countries either enable or inhibit the overreach of populist presidents. In Turkey, for example, political leverage has been used to hamstring the opposition and transform a democratic regime into an authoritarian one. In Bulgaria, democracy also faded under a populist prime minister. Ukraine’s democracy had a checkered history, with frequent changes of power culminating in presidential breakdown. The Czech Republic introduced popular elections for the president to strengthen legitimacy, but that exposed the regime to conflict between the president and the prime minister.     

Organizing to rule: structure,agent, and explaining presidential management styles in Africa

Recent studies of comparative presidentialism have emphasized the importance of informal relationships between presidents and other political actors in explaining how presidents build governing coalitions. What has generally been under-investigated in the literature is how the characteristics of “presidents as agents” impact how they interact with other political actors – in particular, how presidents relate to their cabinets in terms of turnover and inclusiveness. We hypothesize that presidents who were former rebel leaders will behave very differently from presidents that do not have such backgrounds. To test our hypotheses, we collected data from 36 countries that are classified either as presidential or semi-presidential systems in Africa with 93 individual presidential administrations from 1990 to 2009. We found that presidents who were former rebel leaders were less likely to have major cabinet turnovers than other presidents. However, former rebel leaders did not have less politically inclusive cabinets (at least in partisan terms) but did have less ethnically inclusive cabinets than presidents with other backgrounds. The results suggest that agent characteristics, that is, the previous experiences of the president as a decision maker, are as important as the structural constraints he or she faces.     

Going beyond the Roman dictator: a comprehensive approach to emergency rule,with evidence from Latin America

The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on emergency rule, a practice that democratic theory has struggled to conceptualize. Accordingly, this article differs from existing approaches, which mainly focus on the constitutional design of regimes of exception and tend to identify the institution of the Roman dictator as their source. In contrast, we offer a comprehensive approach, considering other historical sources of emergency rule, going beyond the dichotomy of constitutional and de facto emergency, and focusing specifically on the types of emergency powers involved: executive, legislative and judicial. We propose a different way of conceptualizing emergency rule, following a political rather than a constitutional logic, and we illustrate this different conceptualization by offering evidence from Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala to demonstrate how this comprehensive approach works in practice.     

‘Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power,Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries

This article provides a systematic overview of the institutional basis of presidential power in 30 sub-Saharan African countries, using a broad comparative scheme to assess presidential power developed by Siaroff (2003). The dual purpose is, first, to compare the power of African presidents to patterns found by Siaroff for countries worldwide, looking particularly at the relation between regime type and presidential power; and second, to make a preliminary analysis of the political consequences of high levels of presidential power in the light of earlier theoretical claims associating it with regime problems such as democratic breakdown.

The article's comparative framework illustrates the high levels of institutional power of presidents in 30 African countries. As argued by Siaroff, regime type tells us little about presidential power; in these African cases, semi-presidential systems score even higher than presidential systems. One ‘parliamentary’ system also shows a high degree of presidential power. Moreover, there is very little difference in presidential power between democracies and non-democracies, and ‘minimal’ electoral democracies score higher on average than non-democracies and liberal democracies.

Examination of the consequences of high levels of presidential power also shows that more than a quarter (28.6 per cent) of such regimes experienced a democratic breakdown, although this is not a statistically significant level. A weak correlation is found between presidential power and freedom and democracy ratings, again not at a statistically significant level, while correlations with governance ratings are strong and statistically significant. A repeated measures test, however, does show a statistically significant relation with freedom and democracy. Although more research is needed, including a larger N and more variation in the independent variable, the evidence supports intuitive knowledge: a high degree of presidential power bodes ill for democracy and good governance in Africa.     

Compensatory Constitutionalisation: A Comparative Perspective

Legal scholars argue that there is an emerging global compensatory constitution. This denotes a set of compatible supranational and national institutions that fulfil functions hitherto fulfilled by national constitutions. Thus, de-constitutionalisation at the national level, which, as this strand of literature argues, has been brought about by forces such as globalisation, is compensated for. There are strong hints that such constitutionalisation takes place in a formal sense: there is an increasing number of norms which could be seen as elements of a new global constitutional order. But it is far from clear whether these norms make a difference. In this paper we ask whether states comply with this presumably new constitutional order. We distinguish between three types of rights which are granted by a constitution—political, economic and social rights. In this paper we focus on the economic and social components of the emerging global constitution, which have been neglected in previous research. We study compliance with International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms. The ILO is the major source of a global social constitution; the WTO is the major source of a global economic constitution. We show that compliance is very uneven. Whilst formally a global constitution may be in the making, it makes little difference for citizens.     

Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya

A comparison of recent contested elections in Kenya and Ethiopia points to divergences in the forms of political violence. While both countries saw the use of excessive force by members of the security services, Kenya experienced more widespread and deadly inter-ethnic violence than Ethiopia. This article considers these two countries in light of competing explanations for inter-ethnic violence, and concludes that variation in the extent of constitutional reforms is critical in influencing citizens’ responses to close electoral contests. In Kenya, there has been a lack of meaningful constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. By contrast, Ethiopia has seen extensive and substantive constitutional reform in a similar period, but without a negotiated pact among political elites. In both cases, electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of politics and therefore led to significant and escalating political violence, but in unforeseen ways. The important electoral issue of regionalism or devolution in both countries is also briefly considered here. The violence surrounding the elections raises concerns about how to sustain citizen engagement with elections and other democratization activities when these fail to meet voter expectations over several electoral cycles.     

ISA Presidential Selection: A Discussion of Alternatives

During fall 2000, all ISA members will be asked to vote on a set of changes to the association's constitution. Most of the proposed changes are required to bring ISA's constitution up to date with current practices and association circumstances (for example, instead of having only the Editor of ISQ as a member of the Governing Council, one of the proposed changes adds the Editors of ISR and ISP to the council). In the course of examining and reflecting on possible changes to the constitution, the ISA Governing Council discovered that there was controversy among its membership regarding how officers are elected. As a result of this discussion, the Governing Council voted to put a referendum before the membership concerning the election issue and the other requested constitutional changes (though only the officer election issue is discussed in the following pages). To ensure that all members of the association are aware of what the election issues are, we have asked members representing the various positions to discuss their views in the pages of ISP . In addition, Craig Murphy, 2000–2001 ISA President, has written an introduction to the election debate that is printed below. ISA members will be asked to choose between these options in a mail ballot this fall.     

Constitutional Debates and Nationalist Visions

This article looks at the role of competing nationalist visions in shaping the course and content of constitution-making processes. Using Turkey as its case study and focusing on a recent attempt at constitution writing (2011–2013), the examination demonstrates that engagements with and the framing of competing narratives of nationhood during constitutional negotiations go to the heart of societal reconstruction. Hence, such engagements should not be treated as an afterthought to institution building. The Turkish case also demonstrates how in deeply divided societies constitutional debates can acquire an ontological significance for the parties that in turn can work to deepen the existing ideological cleavages.     

Time for a haircut: political regimes and sovereign debt restructurings

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to full debt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countries take a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions from investors. This article argues that these differences are largely explained by the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previous research examines whether democracies make more credible commitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining with foreign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with their institutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, and public deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentives to pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set of viable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset of debt restructurings with private creditors in the period 1975–2017. The event history analysis indicates that democracies experience longer restructurings and the double-hurdle regression analysis shows that democracies obtain larger creditor losses. Further, there is interesting variation among democracies and autocracies. Our findings suggest that political regimes are crucial to explaining why cooperation fails in international debt markets.     

International development and the European Union's external policies: changing contexts,problematic nexuses,contested partnerships

This special section explores and explains how the European Union's (EU's) overall approach to international development has evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the international level, the rise of a group of emerging economies has not only provided developing countries with greater choices, but has also further enhanced their agency, thus questioning the EU's leadership and even relevance in international development. At the European level, the various (paradigmatic) shifts in each of the three key external policies—trade, security and foreign policy—and the EU's aspiration to project a coherent external action have collided with the EU's commitment to international development. Numerous tensions characterize the various nexuses in EU external relations, which ultimately challenge the EU's international legitimacy and (self-proclaimed) identity as a champion of the interests of the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has made more progress than is generally acknowledged in making its external policies more coherent with its development policy. Moreover, the EU's relationship with developing countries has gradually become less asymmetrical, though not because of the EU's emphasis on partnership and ownership but more because of the increased agency of developing countries.     

When do NGOs Matter? Activist Organisations as a Source of Change in the International Debt Regime

Who drives change in international economic regimes? While mainstream International Political Economy scholarship has traditionally focused on the major players within states and markets as the key sources of political and economic change, recent studies have sought to highlight the important role that is also played by a wider range of social actors. A common point of reference here is the activities undertaken by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with the campaign to put debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries on the global agenda being often cited as the exemplar of a civil society success story. This article explores the mechanisms through which the international sovereign debt regime for the world's poorest and most indebted economies has changed over the last 15 years, with increasing acceptance that large-scale debt relief was appropriate for a select group of countries leading to the establishment of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996 and the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999. Through tracing how international NGOs were able to shape the reform agenda with respect to the international sovereign debt regime for low-income countries, the article seeks to enhance our understanding of when, why, and how NGOs can potentially act as an important source of change in international economic regimes.     

Why Play by the Rules? Constitutionalism and Democratic Institutionalization in Ecuador and Uruguay

This article argues that constitutionalism and democratic institutionalization are linked, and that variations in progress towards institutionalized democracy are explained by incentives for political actors to comply with constitutional constraints on their power and to cooperate in governing. The analysis examines the impact of incentives generated by political institutions on Ecuador and Uruguay's contrasting experiences in institutionalizing democracy. Institutions generate incentives for political actors to ‘play by the rules’ when they extend protections, align interest with duty, and encourage negotiation and compromise. Survival provisions, electoral rules, and the nature of parties and the party system are found to generate incentives to cooperate in governing and to comply with constitutional constraints in Uruguay, and disincentives to engage in these behaviours in Ecuador. A new classification of survival provisions is proposed – shared, mixed, and separate – which isolates the impact of these rules on the degree of cooperation in governing. The article's findings clarify the mechanisms by which institutional choices facilitate or obstruct the emergence of constitutionalism and institutionalized democracy.     

Testing the Hollowing-Out Thesis

In recent years, many economists have argued that governments are discarding pegged exchange rates in favor of alternative exchange rate regimes such as monetary unions and currency boards on the one hand, or floating exchange rates on the other. Capital mobility, such economists argue, has made pegged exchange rates costly to maintain for long periods, and thus the pegging option is being “hollowed-out.” Few, however, have tried to present evidence that capital mobility has a direct effect on exchange rate regime choices. I present two sets of tests using different measures of capital mobility that provide qualified confirmation that developing countries peg less as capital mobility rises. These tests indicate that direct measures of capital mobility have some correlation with de facto exchange rate regimes but not with de jure exchange rate regimes. Capital flows, a consequence of capital mobility, may have a direct effect on the choices of both de jure and de facto regimes. Governments do not make changes in their declared exchange rate policies in rational anticipation of the growing costs of pegging associated with increasing capital mobility. Rather, governments normally adapt their declared exchange rate policies after capital flows have increased and actual exchange rates have become more difficult to manage. The tests also indicate that hollowing-out has not only been the result of systemic factors such as increasing capital mobility and capital flows, but also due to domestic factors such as growing public sector indebtedness and the spread of democracy.     

A Rising Power & the Coming of a Great War

This article examines the strategic decisions that led to the struggle between Britain and Germany, exploring how a great war involving Europe's leading powers could come to pass. In 1914, there were no forces beyond the control of decision makers pushing them into the grisly war of attrition that destroyed the social and political fabric of nineteenth-century Europe and ushered in the horrors of the twentieth century. Rather, those horrors resulted from poor policy and strategic choices made by the leaders of the great powers. The war's outbreak underscores history's contingent nature, dramatically showing how errors in judgment on the part of political and military leaders can ruin great countries. One stark lesson of the Great War is that no leader sought as an outcome the conflagration produced by their decisions. Today, China's weapons programs and foreign policy assertiveness conjures up fears that Beijing seeks to establish a new international order, much as Germany's rulers tried to do a hundred years ago with such catastrophic consequences. Shaping the internal debate among China's rulers, so that they judge self-restraint in armaments and strategy as being in their best interest, will test the strategic acumen of American leaders in the years ahead.