What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?

Abstract The purpose of this article is to review the main challenges to the principle of free movement of persons in theory and practice in an enlarged European Union. The right to move freely represents one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market as well as an essential political element of the package of rights linked to the very status of EU citizenship. The scope ratione personae and the current state of the principle of free movement of persons is assessed by looking at the most recent case law of the Court of Justice and the recently adopted Directive on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. But what are the hidden and visible obstacles to free movement of persons in Europe? How can these barriers be overcome to make free movement and residence rights more inclusive? This article addresses these issues along with the following questions: Who are the beneficiaries of the free movement of persons in an enlarged Europe? What is the impact of the recent legal developments in the freedom of movement dimension, such as the European Court of Justice case law and the new Directive? And to what extent are pro‐security policies such as the Schengen Information System II and an enhanced interoperability between European databases fully compatible with the freedom of movement paradigm?     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

The Heathrow Case in the Supreme Court: Climate Change Legislation and Administrative Adjudication

In R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd the UK Supreme Court allowed an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision that there had been a series of legal errors in the designation of the Airport National Policy Statement. This case note analyses the case from an ‘internal’ doctrinal perspective and argues that the Supreme Court could have engaged more explicitly with the legal issues that arise from climate change legislation for administrative law adjudication. For courts to adjudicate well in such circumstances they need to be prepared to develop administrative law doctrine, particularly in light of the issues of integrating climate change into public decision-making and of scientific/policy uncertainty which lie in the background of climate change legislation.     

Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration

European economic integration with a minimalist social policy at EU level was in part made possible by strong domestic labour market and social welfare institutions. The main contention of this paper is that EU market liberalisation was embedded within institutions of social citizenship at domestic level, which served to counter the liberalisation of the internal market. But this settlement has been put under strain. In addition to the challenges posed to the sustainability of European welfare states by the global economic crisis, the internal market jurisprudence of the Court of Justice casts doubt on the sustainability of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’. This paper focuses on the role of the Court, in particular in its jurisprudence on the interaction between (EU) market freedoms and (national) labour law, which undermines the ability of states to retain their regulatory autonomy over labour or social welfare law and, arguably, speeds up the unravelling of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’.     

Adjudicating the Market

The true governance challenge within Europe remains the resolution of conflict within the Internal Market and the identification of efficacious solutions, to its regulatory and redistributive problems. Absent the legitimising sovereign power once furnished by the national constitutional settlement and without recourse to a pre-political principle of pluralist self-limitation, Europe's law must supply a pluralist and contested internal market polity with authoritative adjudication on the meaning and content of institutions of market governance, including 'law' itself. In the endeavour to 'socialise the market', or to re-establish the determinative links between society, politics, and the market place caste asunder by a rationalising process of European economic integration, Europe's law is seemingly returning—via judicial dialogue between national and European courtrooms—to the ancient legal grammar and semantics of 'reasonableness' and 'equity'. Such an adjudicative return serves: (i) the processing of reasonable pluralism within the market in the light of deliberative values: and (ii), the re-establishment and maintenance of the law's factual (non-natural), logical (internally coherent and impartial) and moral (real-world) legitimacy.     

The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day

Abstract: The trade union movement faces a challenge to the legality of transnational collective action as violating economic freedoms in the EC Treaty. How are disparities in wages and working conditions among the Member States to be accommodated? Are national social models protected? Does the internal market allow for trade union collective action? How does EU law affect the balance of economic power in a transnational economy? What is the role of courts in resolving economic conflicts? This article analyses the responses to these questions as referred to the European Court of Justice by the English Court of Appeal and offers some conclusions. The purpose is to highlight the different positions adopted by the old Member States and the new accession Member States as regards the underlying substantive issues, and the options available to the Court of Justice in answering the questions posed.     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

Constitutionalising the Market,Marketising the Constitution,and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law

Ever since the Court's judgment in Walrave, there has been a concerted effort in caselaw and doctrine to limit the horizontal direct effect of free movement provisions to exceptional circumstances. This article suggests that this effort has always been incoherent, and is simply untenable after Viking and Laval. The implications are far reaching, especially in the sphere of the free movement of capital and corporate governance where the Court is well on its way of imposing a model of shareholder primacy on European company law. Full direct horizontal effect will also have important repercussions for private law and its ability to resolve conflicts between economic freedoms and fundamental rights. Given the nature of the free movement provisions, their horizontal effect will sometimes lead to a constitutionalised market and sometimes to a marketised constitution, without there being any principled way of distinguishing between the two. In that light, horizontal direct effect is very unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of internal market law—whichever model of the social market economy it is thought to embody—and is best abandoned.     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union

Abstract The concept of citizenship is analysed on three seemingly contradictory levels: its integration by the recent case law of the European Court of Justice into the existing free movement acquis, its restriction in the accession treaties with new Member States concerning free movement of workers, and its redefinition by new Member States themselves. The result is a somewhat blurred picture: While the European Court of Justices uses citizenship to fill gaps left by primary and secondary law mostly with regard to non‐discrimination, the accession treaties have allowed a ‘re‐nationalisation’ of free movement, against the promises of equality inherent in the citizenship concept, which also includes nationals from new Member countries. The concept of citizenship itself in new Member countries, as the examples of Latvia and Estonia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other demonstrate, is very much related to the (somewhat sad) lessons of the past and therefore highly politicised; it has not been shaped with regard to free movement in the EU. The author suggests a gradual ‘communitarisation’ of citizenship itself even though the EU seems to miss competence in this area, for example, by paying greater attention to residence as basis for Community rights.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach

Over the years, in the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determining the availability of family reunification rights for migrant Member State nationals, the pendulum has swung back and forth, from a ‘moderate approach’ in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan (1982) and Akrich (2003), towards a more ‘liberal approach’ in cases such as Carpenter (2002) and Jia (2007). Under the Court's ‘moderate approach’, family reunification rights in the context of the Community's internal market policy are only granted in situations where this is necessary for enabling a Member State national to move between Member States in the process of exercising one of the economic fundamental freedoms; in other words, where there is a sufficient link between the exercise of one of those freedoms and the need to grant family reunification rights under EC law. Conversely, under the Court's ‘liberal approach’, in order for family reunification rights to be bestowed by EC law, it suffices that the situation involves the exercise of one of the market freedoms and that the claimants have a familial link which is covered by Community law; in other words, there is no need to illustrate that there is a link between the grant of such rights and the furtherance of the Community's aim of establishing an internal market. The recent judgments of the ECJ in Eind and Metock (and its order in Sahin) appear to have decidedly moved the pendulum towards the ‘liberal approach’ side. In this article, it will be explained that the fact that the EU is aspiring to be not only a supranational organisation with a successful and smoothly functioning market but also a polity, the citizens of which enjoy a number of basic rights which form the core of a meaningful status of Union citizenship, is the major driving force behind this move. In particular, the move towards a wholehearted adoption of the ‘liberal approach’ seems to have been fuelled by a desire, on the part of the Court, to respond to a number of problems arising from its ‘moderate approach’ and which appear to be an anomaly in a citizens' Europe. These are: a) the incongruity caused between the (new) aim of the Community of creating a meaningful status of Union citizenship and the treatment of Union citizens (under the Court's ‘moderate approach’) as mere factors of production; and b) the emergence of reverse discrimination. The article will conclude with an explanation of why the adoption of the Court's liberal approach does not appear to be a proper solution to these problems.     

The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas,Pluralism & Power in EC Anti‐dumping Law about China

‘Market’ and ‘market economy’ exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ‘market economy’? Does it make sense to speak of a ‘nonmarket economy’, and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ‘market economy’ and ‘nonmarket economy’ related? Focusing on EC anti‐dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti‐dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China.     

《最高人民法院公报》选编民事案例的变化

1985-2008这24年间,《最高人民法院公报》选编民事案例存在以下变化:年度选编民事案例的数量逐渐增多、案件类型趋向复杂化。在裁判方法上,从突出国家规则强制到注重判决说理;从突出案件裁判类型的代表性、示范性到注重展示法官的裁判方法;从示范最高人民法院对法律的权威理解、严格解释法律规则的基本文义到注重对裁判规则的建构;司法裁判中的知识观由一元发展为多元。形成这些变化的原因有:市场经济的发展、有中国特色的社会主义法律体系的逐步建立、法律职业化、对案例作用的重视、司法裁判由单纯追求政治正确向注重知识正确的转向。合理预期、职业知识而非简单的伦理说教或单纯的意识形态灌输,应当成为中国司法未来发展的主导逻辑。     

Commons as possessions: The path to protection of the commons in the ECHR system

The ‘commons’ is not mentioned in the texts of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P‐1). This essay argues that ‘possessions’ — which does appear in the latter — should be interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to protect commons against national governments' undue interferences. The argument comprises two parts. First, we analyse the polysemic term ‘possessions’ to show how the current understanding of this category is marred by flawed assumptions and by false dichotomies. Then, we propose an ‘ecological’ construction of legal relationships between subjects and objects. We find support in the ECtHR case law on Article 8. We argue this approach should be extended to Article 1 P‐1: once disentangled from possessive individualism and market paradigms, ‘possessions’ encompass the commons and the category offers a solid legal basis toward the justiciability in Strasbourg of privatisations.     

Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders

I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer an adjudicative theory in the realm of non-ideal theory: I adopt a view of law that has achieved consensus in legal philosophy, make some plausible assumptions about human politics, and then consider directly the question of how judges should reason. Ultimately, I argue that judges should be cognizant of the goods that are at stake on particular occasions of adjudication and that this requires treating legal requirements transparently, i.e., as sensitive to their moral justifications.     

On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative Pluralism"

Abstract This paper focuses on the question: Do persisting disagreements in constitutional interpretation affect the legitimacy of “the democratic system as a whole”? According to both Michelman and Waldron, the epistemic indeterminacy of interpretation—that is, the fact that principles do not possess stable meanings beyond, and independent of, their application to concrete cases—puts its finger on a point of the contractualist and prevailing political theory. But, if neither the legitimacy of any democratic order nor the standard of internal criticism can be founded on a broad background consensus on constitutional essentials, “what else makes a deliberative process of legislation and adjudication a generator of legitimacy so that citizens are induced to accept controversial results as ‘worthy of respect’?” The route pursued goes beyond all views that require legitimacy to be based on sharing a set of “thick” ethical beliefs. In this perspective, the author argues that the performative meaning of constitution‐making “provides a thin yet sufficiently strong base,” which corresponds to the minimal requirements inherent in the very practice of framing a constitution.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

劳动者个人信息处理中同意的适用与限制

劳动者个人信息处理中同意的内在困境比其他社会关系都更为鲜明。应打破劳动法、民法与个人信息保护法的理论藩篱,重视对劳动者同意的适用及体系性限制。劳动者信息处理的合法性来源存在两种替代个人同意的适用,分别为"订立或履行合同所必需"的默示同意及以集体合同或劳动规章制度为载体的集体合意。为促进信息利用,应允许雇主在超越"订立或履行劳动合同所必需"时,以劳动者明示同意作为信息处理的合法性来源。无论同意的性质为默示同意、集体合意或明示同意,均应强调对同意自治性的审查,利用"目的限制"与比例原则,丰富"合法、正当、必要"体系性限制的内涵,平衡劳动者个人信息权益保护与信息利用,从而纾解劳动关系下同意的困境。     

Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’

Governing bodies have significant autonomy in the organisation of professional sport in the EU, a situation now supported by Article 165 TFEU. However the post‐Lisbon competence for sport does not grant any exemption for practices that infringe fundamental freedoms or competition law; such infringements can only be justified where they are a proportionate response to an inherent need in that sport. The football ‘transfer system’ has been the subject of a series of EU law challenges, but continues to place obstacles in the way of the free movement of players between Member States and may restrict the ability of most clubs to compete for the elite players. Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions in transfer dispute cases have entrenched this situation, and recent evidence casts doubt on both the ability of the authorities to justify the current system and the 2001 decision by the European Commission to sign it off as being an acceptable balance between the rights of the stakeholders.