Joint Criminal Enterprise

The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is in disarray. Despite repeated judicial scrutiny at the highest level, the doctrine's scope, proper doctrinal basis and function in relation to other modes of complicity remain uncertain. This article examines the doctrine's elements and underlying principles. It argues that while joint criminal enterprise is largely used to make individuals liable for offences committed by their associates in excess of the common criminal purpose, its proper function is to police the limits of associate liability and thus to exculpate rather than inculpate. The doctrine governs not only instances of accessorial liability; it also applies where the parties involved are joint principal offenders. As this puts into question the prevalent view that joint criminal enterprise is a form of secondary participation that results in accessorial liability, the article concludes that it is best seen as a doctrine sui generis.     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty

Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny, I probe the depths of this duty-supplying doctrine, including to whom the duty is owed, whether the duty is grounded in statute, cause of peril, or contract, and what the content of the duty is. Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine unveils questions we may have about duty generally, it is no more problematic than other duty-supplying doctrines in the criminal law.     

Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine.     

美国环境犯罪严格刑事责任的演化与评析

为了确保食品、药物及环境等涉及公共福利领域的安全,美国法院发展并确立严格刑事责任制度,该制度包括公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则。确立环境严格刑事责任的目的是确保刑法在保护环境和促进环境法遵守方面的效率。公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则减轻了美国起诉部门的证明责任,降低了司法成本,同时提高了犯罪的成本,增强了刑法的威慑力。这体现了美国环境刑事政策的价值取向是社会利益保护优先和效率优先。     

论继承性共犯

继承性共犯,是指在先行为人已经实施了犯罪的手段行为或者结合犯的前一犯罪之后,以共同的犯罪故意单独或者帮助先行为人实施犯罪的目的行为或者结合犯的后一犯罪的犯罪人。继承性共犯只存在于两种犯罪形态中:一是由手段行为和目的行为结合而成的犯罪,二是结合犯。对继承性共犯应确定与被继承性共犯同样的罪名。     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

试论环境法上的社会连带责任

环境法领域中的连带责任——社会责任之归责原则、自己责任的社会化、证明责任的“客观化”都隐含了连带责任;复合污染共同侵权行为、企业污染损害赔偿基金与责任保险制度、社会安全体制,国家的连带责任、非政府组织(NGOs)的兴起,都凸显了连带责任的发达;调和社会连带责任——个别责任与连带责任、法定的连带责任与自愿的连带责任、扩大生产者责任与连带责任,使生产者、消费者、公众、国家(政府)间形成合理的既独立又连带的责任分配机制。     

我国刑事赔偿制度归责原则反思

对刑事赔偿的归责原则,我国有学者主张适用过错责任原则,有学者主张适用违法责任原则,还有学者主张适用结果责任原则,等等。这些原则在解决应否赔偿的问题上都存在难以克服的缺陷。之所以如此,主要是因为刑事赔偿制度与一般侵权赔偿制度有重大区别,刑事赔偿程序由国家向受害者支付赔偿费用的程序以及追偿程序两大程序构成,这两大程序应适用不同的归责原则:前一程序应适用结果责任原则,后一程序应适用过错责任原则。我国国家赔偿法对刑事赔偿归责原则的规定存在严重缺陷,应当进行彻底重构。     

一个根本不存在的共犯种类--胁从犯--胁从犯的刑法依据和政策依据质疑

以刑法第28条作为胁从犯的存在依据,实属牵强附会,刑法第28条是关于主犯和从犯的补充规定;按作用分类法的理论,胁从犯是不存在的,刑法中只有主要作用和次要作用、辅助作用的规定,一些论者关于胁从犯的"较小作用"、"作用小于从犯"、"作用最小"的观点没有刑法依据.以毛泽东同志关于"首恶必办、胁从不问、立功受奖"的论述作为胁从犯的政策依据,也值得推敲,毛泽东选集中的"胁从"之说在当时主要是指听从"首恶"指挥跟从"首恶"国民党官兵,是今天刑法中"从犯"的立法依据,而不是胁从犯的政策渊源.     

实行过限之构成及其判定标准

在实行过限状态下，存在两个犯罪行为：基本行为和过限行为。基本行为的构成要件为：共犯关系、实行行为、实行故意；过限行为的构成要件为：行为主体的同一性、时空场域的密接性、主观犯意的超出性。实行过限的判定标准应当有不同的等级层次。在立法领域，应当坚持超出共同故意说，此为一般判定标准；在司法领域，应当坚持实质改变说，此为具体判定标准。     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

Conversations with Russian mafiosi

Open interviews and unplanned conversations with criminals are an important part of ethnographic research in criminology. This paper presents an analysis of conversations with members of Russian criminal groups. An attempt is made to explore the value of these informal interviews, the danger of informal contacts with criminals, and the reliability of the information received.

Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case

According to the authors, the Report of the UN Commission ofInquiry on Darfur and the Security Council referral of the situationin Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) bring tolight two serious deficiencies of the ICC Statute and, moregenerally, international criminal law: (i) the systematic ambiguitybetween collective responsibility (i.e. the responsibility ofthe whole state) and criminal liability of individuals, on whichcurrent international criminal law is grounded, and (ii) thefailure of the ICC Statute fully to comply with the principleof legality. The first deficiency is illustrated by highlightingthe notions of genocide and genocidal intent, as well as thatof joint criminal enterprise. The second is exposed by drawingattention to the uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding suchnotions as recklessness and dolus eventualis, and in additionto the frequent reliance in both international case law andthe legal literature on customary international law and looseconcepts such as proportionality. The authors finally pointout that if the ICC tries to operate as a real criminal courtunder the rule of law and shows sensitivity to the rights andinterests of the accused, US fears of politicized prosecutionwill diminish.     

The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA

In its 2006 National Security Strategy, the USA reaffirms thecontroversial doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as crucialin the "war on terror" proclaimed after the attacks of 9/11.But it does not provide a detailed examination of pre-emption.The questions left open in the 2002 US National Security Strategyas to what will trigger pre-emptive action, when action againstnon-State actors will be permissible and what degree of forcewill be proportionate in pre-emptive action are still unresolved.The promise that "The reasons for our actions will be clear,the force measured and the cause just" does not offer much inthe way of specific guidance. It is very striking that in thiscontext, the US strategy makes no reference to internationallaw or to the role of the UN Security Council. The other mainfocus of the strategy is on the "promotion of democracy", butit does not go so far as to assert any legal right to use forcefor this purpose, and it makes only passing reference to humanitarianintervention. The EU 2003 Security Strategy provides a markedcontrast in that it does not adopt the doctrine of pre-emptiveself-defence, does not expressly identify "rogue States" anddoes profess respect for international law and for the roleof the UN. Other States have not generally shown themselveswilling to accept a Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence.They agree that there are new threats facing the world frominternational terrorists and the danger of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, but the 2005 World Summit showedclearly that there is no general acceptance of pre-emptive action.Moreover, the International Court of Justice still follows acautious approach to self-defence. The 2006 National SecurityStrategy largely reaffirms the doctrines of the earlier 2002Strategy, but whereas the focus in the 2002 Strategy was onthe threat posed by Iraq and North Korea; attention has nowshifted to Iran and Syria, accused of being State sponsors ofterror by Hizbollah and Al-Qaida. The article ends with a discussionof the recent conflict in Lebanon: this raised the crucial questionwhether the war on terror gave Israel a wide right to use force,even a pre-emptive right. The conflict highlights dramaticallythe practical significance of the divisions on the scope ofthe law of self-defence with regard to action against non-Stateactors, pre-emption and proportionality.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

组织进化视野下对企业刑事归责模式的反思

我国传统企业刑事归责模式的典型特征在于:一方面,其包含了企业和企业成员两个主体的归责,另一方面,企业归责适用的是以特定企业内个人犯罪行为为处罚根据的同一视原则。虽然该模式与我国早期单一科层制企业形态相适应,但随着组织形态的进化,企业规模扩大,内部权力去中心化以及组织结构复杂化,企业犯罪出现了不同于我国早期企业形态下新的特征。为此,传统企业归责模式不仅难以公正地对企业及其成员进行归责,还会造成组织无责、惩罚效果不理想等一系列不利后果。在法人社会下忽略对企业组织犯罪的控制需求并不现实,法人刑事责任拟制论应当被否定。相反,有必要构建与企业成员归责路径相分离的、以企业自身过错为处罚依据的组织责任模式。应当依据功能对等原则对组织责任模式进行构建,维持刑法体系的逻辑严谨性,并遵守刑法的罪责原则。     

故意伤害罪探疑

1 .根据着手的规范意义 ,论证了胎儿伤害行为待胎儿出生为人时成立故意伤害罪 ;2 .根据故意伤害罪的法益 (他人生理机能的健全 ) ,界定了伤害行为是非法侵害他人生理机能的行为 ;根据违法阻却原理 ,说明了对于得承诺的伤害应以结果无价值论为基础认定故意伤害罪的成否 ;3.根据殴打与伤害的区别 ,阐明了以殴打故意致人死亡的只能认定为过失致人死亡罪 ;根据共同犯罪的原理 ,论述了“同时伤害”的处理原则 ;4 .根据未遂理论 ,指出了故意轻伤未遂的不成立犯罪和故意重伤未遂应适用故意轻伤的法定刑 ;根据结果加重犯的原理 ,分析了故意伤害行为致第三者死亡的三种情形以及共同故意伤害致人死亡的刑事责任 ;5.根据罪刑相适应原则 ,得出了连续伤害他人应成立同种数罪且应并罚的结论 ;6 .根据刑法的特别规定 ,讨论了相关条文的性质与协调法定刑的原则