Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the “Home-Grown” Threat

Australian interests have been considered viable targets for Islamist terrorists since at least 2001, and Australians have suffered from attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005, and Jakarta in 2004 and 2009. Moreover, Australian citizens have been involved in militant Islamist networks since the late 1980s, and similar to other Western countries in recent years there have been examples of “home-grown” plots to carry out domestic terrorist attacks. This article seeks to clarify the nature of the contemporary security threat within Australia by analysing the involvement of Australian citizens and residents in Islamist terrorism, both at home and abroad. The results build upon previous research findings revealing that while the profile of Australian jihadis is unique in terms of its exact manifestation, there is overall conformity with generally observed trends in Islamist terrorism in other Western countries.     

Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France

This article seeks to explain why two states faced with a similar terrorist threat, perceiving it in a similar way, and drawing the same broad implications for their counterterrorist investigations, have nevertheless put in place significantly different types of organizational reforms in response to that threat. The study shows that although France and Britain have embraced a common preventive logic in the face of Islamist terrorism, the changes that they have made to the coordination of intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution in that context have differed because of contrasting organizational routines and interinstitutional conventions in the two states. An analysis of the British and French cases shows that law enforcement can be preventive but that western states are likely to pursue different ways of bringing security agencies and the law together to prevent and prosecute terrorism. The organizational and institutional factors that give rise to such divergent practices have important consequences for the ability of a state to develop a coordinated operational response to terrorism and convict terrorist suspects of crimes in a court of law.     

Radicalization in Prisons? Field Research in 25 Spanish Prisons

This article has two principal objectives: (1) to study the behavioral dimensions of Muslim prisoners which predict their Islamist radicalism and (2) to study whether the behavior manifested by them is higher in prisons with a greater concentration of Muslims and a higher presence of prisoners convicted for Islamist terrorism than in prisons with fewer Muslims and no convicted Islamist terrorists. We conclude that some Spanish prisons may provide favorable social environments for jihadist radicalism and that the questionnaire utilized is a useful diagnostic tool for evaluating the magnitude of this phenomenon.     

Economic Sanctions,Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis

This study examines the impact of economic sanctions on international terrorism. It is argued that sanctions intensify economic hardships on the poor within countries and this increases their level of grievance and makes them more likely to support or engage in international terrorism. Further, economic sanctions are conceptualized as creating an opportunity for rogue leaders to manipulate aggrieved poor people to terrorize foreign entities who are demonized as engaging in a foreign encroachment on the sanctioned nation's sovereignty. A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 152 countries for the past three decades provides evidence that ceteris paribus, economic sanctions are positively associated with international terrorism. This finding suggests that, although the main purpose of economic sanctions is to coerce rogue countries to conform to international norms and laws, they can unintentionally produce a negative ramification and become a cause of international terrorism.     

Defeating the Sixth Column: Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist Terrorism

For the first time since the late 1940s, Washington is attempting a comprehensive analysis of the role and performance of the American intelligence system. In rethinking intelligence, it needs to address that the sixth column—Islamist terrorists residing in states that knowingly or unknowingly give them sanctuary—is the weak underbelly in the war on terror. To defeat this sixth column, important personnel, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be addressed. The experience of other countries that have had success in fighting terrorism suggests that the United States must focus on offensive counterintelligence, penetrating terrorist groups, and creating mistrust among them.     

Homegrown Terrorism in the West

The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as “homegrown terrorism.” This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term “homegrown,” which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal—but not autonomous. Finally we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon.     

The discourse and study of terrorism in decolonised states: the case of Pakistan

The existing literature in the terrorism field does not address the absence of terrorism scholarship in developing countries. This article focuses on this intellectual gap using the case of Pakistan. It argues that most decolonised states, including Pakistan, are yet to grasp the complexities of traditional approaches to the study of terrorism, let alone its critical dimensions. The article explores some of the prevailing conditions in developing countries, specifically decolonised states such as Pakistan, which prevent the development of a robust academic discourse on terrorism and the development of a strong field of study. It suggests that the main barriers that account for this shortfall include the state’s legitimacy deficit, a flawed education system that nurtures fictions as truth and inhibits knowledge production, the institutionalised role of conspiracy theories in national politics and the multiplicity of terrorism discourses among government and sociopolitical entities. The conclusion highlights a number of reasons that might help to explain this persistent condition and offers a few policy recommendations.     

The Challenge of Talking about Terrorism: The EU and the Arab Debate on the Causes of Islamist Terrorism 1

The Arab “hegemonic debate” on the causes of Islamist terrorism nurtures (pan-) Arab, anti-Western sentiments and delegitimizes criticism of the political status quo. The European Union's emphasis on multilateral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion leads to official pronouncements that barely address the Arab world's domestic problems, instead referring to international tensions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict as a particular cause of Islamist terrorism and the need for cooperation with Arab governments. By failing to challenge the official narratives of authoritarian Arab regimes the EU obstructs interests in the democratization of the region and the delegitimization of Islamist violence.     

Press coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the UK and Denmark: shaping the reactions of the public,affected communities and copycat attackers

Following 9/11, Al-Qaeda-orchestrated plots were considered the greatest threat to Western security and sparked the coalition’s war on terror. Close to a decade later, the post-9/11 threat landscape had shifted significantly, leading then CIA-director Leon Panetta to describe “the lone-wolf strategy” as the main threat to the United States. Subsequent lone-actor attacks across the West, including the cities of London, Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Ottawa and Charleston, further entrenched perspectives of a transformed security landscape in the “after, after-9/11” world. The unique features of lone-actor terrorism, including the challenges of interdiction and potential of copycat attacks, mean that the media is likely to play a particularly important role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat attackers. This article presents findings from a content analysis of British and Danish newspaper reporting of lone-actor terrorism between January 2010 and February 2015. The study highlights that lone-actor terrorism is framed, with national variations, as a significant and increasing problem in both countries; that Islamist lone-actors are often represented as distinct from far-right lone-actors; and that some reporting, despite relatively limited amplification of specific terrorist messages, potentially aids lone-actors by detailing state vulnerabilities to attacks.     

Iranian covert aggression: Support for radical political Islamists conducting internal subversion against states in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region

The extent to which the Islamic Republic of Iran provides covert assistance to radical Islamist groups employing terrorism and violence against states in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region is a controversial issue. This study takes an analytic approach to the topic to determine the degree to which linkages exist. The evidence examined was drawn exclusively from open sources. The author provides an analytic framework for both current and future analysis of the issue. Five specific conclusions about past, present, and impending Iranian sponsorship of radical Islamists conducting internal subversion activities in the region are deduced from the assessment of the evidence. Given the consistency in Tehran's use of covert aggression as an instrument of foreign policy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, there is little to indicate a change in this policy in the near term.     

Indian counterterrorism policy and the influence of the Global War on Terror

India has been a major victim of Islamist terrorism and has long fought against an array of Islamist terrorist groups. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India's previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). After outlining India's Islamist terrorist challenge, this article examines India's evolving approach to counterterrorism and how the GWOT has influenced it. It concludes that India has adopted a localized, defensive, law-and-order approach to counterterrorism which has evolved in response to various attacks over the years but still remains seriously underdeveloped. The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although its influence has been subtle and indirect rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American counterterror cooperation, shaped India's terror environment by launching the war in Afghanistan and enriched Indian counterterrorism with American experience. Just as important, it has also had an impact on India's debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and human rights.     

Positions on sexual and reproductive rights in Muslim-majority countries and institutions: a telling indication of things to come?

ABSTRACT

This article provides a policy analysis of Muslim-majority countries’ positions on sexual and reproductive rights (SRR). First-hand observations, interviews, and reports are used to review how statements around various intergovernmental moments continue to be formulated since the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994. The analysis outlines both the similarity and diversity between and among Muslim-majority countries on a range of SRR areas, while pointing out that positions are by no means unique to them. Rather, it is argued that opposition to SRR defines a terrain of “unholy alliances” between and among different religiously inspired nations, and ends by enquiring whether SRR may be an important political indicator of real politik.     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach

Conventional wisdom suggests that dissident groups use terrorism when they face an overwhelmingly more powerful state, yet attacks in developing countries have predominated in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that terrorism is an increasingly weak state phenomenon. Cross-national studies of terrorism find mixed results for how common measures of state capacity influence terrorism. We argue that these indeterminate findings are due in part to a partial understanding of both what constitutes state capacity and how different aspects of state strength or weakness relate to the propensity of groups to use terrorism. We decompose state capacity into two dimensions that we theorize are particularly relevant to dissident groups: military capacity, or the ability to project conventional military force, and bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Our analysis supports the claim that terrorist attacks are more frequently targeted at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries but less frequently targeted at states with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. We also compare two militarily capable states, France and Russia, that have had different recent experiences with terrorism to help illustrate the causal mechanisms involved. Evidence from our models and cases suggest that states can be capable in different ways, and these various capabilities create differing incentives for using terror as a strategic and tactical tool.     

Performing PREVENT: anti-extremist theatre-in-education in the service of UK counter-terrorism,a Freirean analysis

ABSTRACT

This article reveals a new trend in UK counter-terrorism: the emergence of anti-extremist Theatre-in-Education (TIE) to deliver counter-terrorism projects in schools and colleges. Using Paulo Freire’s vision of critical and dialogic pedagogy, I offer an analysis of anti-extremist TIE against a backdrop of PREVENT, the UK counter-terrorism strategy. The September 11 attack, the London Transport bombings and the more recent attacks in Europe and the UK have contributed to a strengthening of counter-terrorism measures in all spheres of public life. In 2015, the UK government introduced a statutory duty for education providers to prevent young people from being drawn into terrorism. This is known as the PREVENT Duty. The implementation of the duty has not been without controversy, with commentators noting a disproportionate focus on Islamist forms of terrorism. My study has shown that the guiding principle of TIE to enact social change is threatened in this climate, whilst maintaining the possibility of engaging young people in meaningful dialogue about terrorism and violent extremism.     

Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice

This article argues there is a need for a more nuanced analysis of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir than has been available so far. First, the popular legitimacy of violent groups has little bearing on their operation. Rather, the keys to the intensity of terrorist activity are held by Pakistan's military establishment. Second, the supposedly secular-nationalist movement of the early 1990s was in fact deeply Islamist in character; there has been a greater unity of thought underpinning terrorism than the literature admits. Finally, the article argues, the operation of terrorism needs to be read not simply in the limited context of Jammu and Kashmir, but as part of a larger South Asian crisis of identity.     

The Homegrown Threat: State Strength,Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism

Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted.     

Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India

The incidence of domestic terrorism varies dramatically across the states of India. This study demonstrates that important state-level differences in political party systems help to explain different levels of terrorist activity within the Indian states. Analysis of statistical data on terrorist attacks as well as other political, social, and macroeconomic indicators of the twenty-seven Indian states and the Delhi municipality from 1998 to 2006, determines that Indian states characterized by multiparty electoral competition, a diffusion of legislative seat distribution among parties, and minority party government are more likely to experience terrorist attacks than states with stable, two-party systems and majority party rule. These party system features increase the likelihood that terrorism will occur because they nurture the political conditions under which terrorism is likely to flourish and because they impair government ability to craft coherent and effective responses to terrorism.     

Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study

This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural factors influenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of extremist views. They also motivated involvement in political violence and a shift in some participants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical grievances were prime drivers of this process.     

Wake-up call for the Lowlands: Dutch counterterrorism from a comparative perspective

The Netherlands is one of the few countries in Western Europe that did not experience massive terrorist attacks and where counterterrorism actions did not feature prominently on the political agenda. Until quite recently, the Netherlands had neither emergency legislation for terrorist incidents nor a specific Act that criminalized terrorist offences. In response to the European Union framework legislation, a bill was produced that penalizes participation in a terrorist organization, flanked by a vast array of other measures. This article analyses the policy, institutional and legislative responses to terrorism in the Netherlands and compares these with responses from other European states. The events of 9/11, as well as the political and public anxiety over the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands insofar as the threat of terrorism is concerned. Whilst most countries adopted an incremental approach to countering terrorism, the Netherlands witnessed a radical shift in criminal justice and law enforcement policy following these events.