可废止性法律推理的理论与实践——基于严格主义法律推理的检讨

既有的严格主义法律推理采行三段论演绎方法,简洁、直观地将法律推理呈现为一个实质蕴涵的过程,确保了法律推理的可判定性、确定性和可操作性。基于构建公理性法律体系是不可能的,法律推理并不能实现无矛盾和无缝对接,法律推理所使用的语言并非是单义性的,法律推理前提集的一致是不可能的判断前提,故严格主义法律推理并不能真实地刻画现实的法律推理活动。可废止性法律推理具有非分析性、实践性、可辩驳性及双向性等特征,其在评价标准、对待推理前提的态度和推理过程方面同严格主义法律推理呈现出不同的特征。可废止性法律推理的理解离不开语境,因而并不是不确定的法律推理。可废止性法律推理整体上为我们描绘了一幅完整的法律适用的逻辑框架,以此为出发点,我们能够很好地理解日常实践中法律运作的逻辑结构。     

再论推导作为诉讼证明的逻辑

推导作为演绎和归纳之外的一种可废止和情境化的第三种类型的非形式逻辑推理是由美国实用主义哲学家皮尔斯提出的所谓"科学发现的逻辑"。其与传统演绎、归纳等形式逻辑的最本质区别在于推导是认识新事物、产生新知识的"逻辑"方法。皮尔斯之后的研究者着力于将"背景知识"的作用引入推导推理,从而促进了推导推理形式的发展完善,这一发展,也使其作为诉讼证明的逻辑更具说服力,更契合诉讼证明与事实认定的实践运行状态。在法学中引入推导推理这一认识逻辑的新范式将引起我们在法律事实、证据、证明及诉讼等领域的一系列重要观念转换。     

法律规则的逻辑结构

中国学界在法律规则的逻辑结构主题上经历了数次范式转换,目前的代表性学说为"新三要素说"。这一学说的形成有其层层相因的发展脉络和合理性,但在理论上存在着重大缺陷,根本原因在于误识了逻辑结构理论所要解决的问题以及逻辑结构的性质。法律规则的逻辑结构学说属于法认识论,它要解决的是法律规则的形式、静态构成及其句法功能问题。新二要素说主张法律规则由构成要件和法律后果构成,满足了逻辑学说的基本标准,解决了过往理论的缺陷,实现了与法律推理的模式相衔接这一根本目标。     

人工智能司法决策的可能与限度

利用人工智能的推理技术和机器学习技术，以及建立海量且有效的法律知识库，算法有可能接管司法决策。目前已经获得广泛应用的法律信息检索系统、法律专家系统皆属辅助型法律智能系统，它们的研发和使用为决策型司法智能系统奠定了技术和经验基础。然而，要使司法决策成为可能，人工智能必须在运用法律推理、掌握法律语言以及深度学习经验性知识方面取得决定性突破。人工智能司法决策必然要求重新审视法律推理逻辑，重构审判责任理论，重塑法官职业身份内涵，甚至改变司法决策过程中人机互动的关系格局。为了避免变革所带来的负面影响，须划定人工智能司法决策模型建构的限度。人工智能的技术应用应符合国际通行的技术安全标准，介入应以司法公正为价值追求。通过构建合理的算法规则机制，对算法不透明性提供必不可少的制度约束。     

制度型对外开放的支点:私法关系涉外性之界定及重构

国际私法是我国规范涉外私法关系、建构私法领域对外开放秩序的基本法律,私法关系的涉外性是其发挥功效的支点。私法关系涉外与否,将在程序与实体上产生体系化的法律效力差异。我国迄今采取法律关系要素涉外的方式界定私法关系的涉外性,这在涉外民商事交往相对简单、法律关系较为传统的历史形势下较好地发挥了建构涉外私法秩序的功效。自贸区(港)、深圳前海、外商投资、共建"一带一路"倡议下"一站式"争端解决机制等对外开放的创新安排和实践,对现行涉外私法关系界定规则造成了新的冲击。我国应积极回应新形势下制度型对外开放的要求,顺势革新涉外私法关系界定规则,对外协调民法等周边规范,对内融贯法律适用法的内在安排,引入实质关联标准,设立矫正规则,创建"非内域私法关系"特别规则,为我国更高水平对外开放的创新安排与实践探索预留空间,为我国从政策型开放向制度型开放转变奠定基石。     

法律论证的推论规则

法律论证的推论规则为论辩思维确立了逻辑导向。在司法实践中,法律断言的证成需要通过实体上和程序上的规范性作为支撑,从而推进特定合理意图作为决策要素的参考性甚至规范性要素。论辩对话在言说当中直接针对表述本身,而表述背后发挥规则性与机制性引导作用的,主要是论辩主体的论辩逻辑思维。法律论证的可废止性建立在论辩前提或者依据针对特定立场的论证力量上。盖然性推论普遍存在于证成结论而诠释因由的言说当中。通过层次性呈现论证推导的隐含前提,有助于论者识别、分析和评价其推论模式及其合理性和有效性。     

法律中的可辩驳推理

法律中的可辩驳推理是法律方法研究中的一个新课题。可辩驳推理作为一种独立的推理模式而在各个领域发生影响主要有以下三种理论的支持:其一,哲学的“语用学转向”;其二,人工智能研究的深入;其三,单一性法律推理向非单一性法律推理的转向。法律中的可辩驳推理可以分为三个维度:推定的可辩驳性;过程的可辩驳性和理论的可辩驳性。可辩驳推理对法律方法、法律论证与民主法治等重大的法律理论问题都产生了深远的影响。     

法律推理理论的哈耶克之维

法律推理是一种实践理性,是法律思维的核心环节.理性本身存在缺陷,哈耶克认为,理性作用是有限的,但在法律推理中的价值不可小觑.理性仍然是司法判决中的决定性要素.哈耶克关于划分内部规则和外部规则在法律推理的理论中的意义是不同的.本文着重论述外部规则在法律推理中的作用.     

法律逻辑：回顾与展望

法律逻辑的历史大致分为三个阶段：第一阶段主要是建立以传统逻辑或一阶逻辑内容为框架的法律逻辑体系,并将这些理论广泛地运用于法律思维领域之中;第二阶段主要是从法律适用问题的研究扩展到了法律发现或获取问题的研究;第三阶段主要是对事实发现、法律获取、诉讼主张与裁决证成的规律、规则与方法进行系统的研究,逐渐地建立以事实推理、法律推理、判决推理与法律论证理论为主要内容的不同于传统逻辑与一阶逻辑框架的法律逻辑体系,并将这些理论应用于事实的发现、法律的获取、诉讼主张与裁决的证立之中。     

论人工智能生成内容的著作权法平等保护

在人工智能时代,人机互动已成为许多作品的常见创作方式,著作权法平等保护就是对人工智能生成内容(AIGC)与人类作品给予相同的制度评价,为此需要解决人工智能生成内容的可版权性问题与著作权归属问题。人工智能生成内容与人类作品在客体外观上具有一致性、在经济利益上具有同质性且符合著作权法激励创新的制度目的,这些是二者得以获得平等保护的前提基础。通过著作权法平等保护,可以降低法律制度摩擦成本、打造统一的著作权交易市场、鼓励标识真实来源并塑造人工智能生成内容市场价值。著作权法平等保护的实现可借鉴法律主体利益实体功能与法律推理功能分离的规范原理,参照著作权二元主体结构机制,将人工智能拟制为形式主体并使著作权利益向人类集中。具体而言,可发挥人工智能形式主体的法律推理功能,将人机互动视为一个创作整体,进而证成人工智能生成内容的独创性,并通过共同创作、委托创作等既有著作权法律关系的权属规则将著作权原始分配给人工智能的人类使用者。     

Validity and Defeasibility in the Legal Domain

In jurisprudential literature, the adjective ‘defeasible’ appears as a predicate of many terms: concepts, laws, rules, reasoning, justification, proof, and so on. In this paper, we analyze the effects of some versions of the thesis of the defeasibility of legal norms on the reconstruction of the notion of legal validity. We analyze some possible justifications of this thesis considered as a claim concerning validity, and enquire into two possible sets of problems related to the defeasibility of the criteria of identification of a legal system. We also provide a formalization of some options regarding defeasible criteria of identification, which can be used as a tool for meta-jurisprudential analysis. Finally, the thesis according to which defeasibility is better conceived of as a feature of legal application is examined and questioned.     

The Three Faces of Defeasibility in the Law

Abstract. In this paper we will analyse the issue of defeasibility in the law, taking into account research carried out in philosophy, artificial intelligence and legal theory. We will adopt a very general idea of legal defeasibility, in which we will include all different ways in which certain legal conclusions may need to be abandoned, though no mistake was made in deriving them. We will argue that defeasibility in the law involves three different aspects, which we will call inference‐based defeasibility, process‐based defeasibility, and theory‐based defeasibility. Only the integration of these three perspectives allows us to provide a satisfactory account of the role of defeasibility in legal reasoning.     

人工智能技术在智慧法院建设中实践运用与前景展望

无论理论研究还是实践经验,我国智慧法院建设已经产生了大量的智慧成果,但在可持续发展的制度化逻辑方面与既有实践成果之间尚未实现科学衔接,智慧法院建设还存在着实践应用不充分、系统融贯性不畅和在线诉讼不足等问题。进一步推动人工智能技术在智慧法院建设中实践运用的基本方案是,在"人工智能+司法"的格局之下,借助数字孪生、拓展现实、隐私计算、情感计算等新兴人工智能技术拓展智慧法院建设的实践运用;在运用前景上,以人工智能技术系统指导智慧法院4.0建设,特别是以人工智能技术推动智慧法院在线诉讼规则,并通过人工智能技术与制度的协同融合推动智慧法院内涵发展,以此推动司法理论与智能技术深度融合、诉讼需求与智能技术深度融合、通用技术与专有开发深度融合,为智能时代中国智慧法院建设提供技术机理和法理结构。     

Law, Morals and Defeasibility

This paper gives a logical characterization of the interrelation between law and morals. To this purpose it first outlines a logic for defeasible reasoning with rules and principles and illustrates the operation of this logic in the field of law. Then it offers a brief argument why law and morals are interrelated. This paper ends by showing how the logic for defeasible reasoning provides tools to logically characterize some aspects of the interrelation between law and morals.     

Ought-Sentences and the Juristic Description of Rules

Abstract .
According to the normative theory of legal science, juristic ought-sentences describe rules, since legal science just deals with rules, and rules cannot be described but by means of ought-sentences. The author challenges this view. Two different constructions of "describing rules" are proposed: Namely, either interpreting or stating the validity of rules. "Interpreting rules," in its turn, can be understood in three different senses: listing all the possible meanings of rule-formulations, reporting the different interpretations a rule-formulation has in fact received by courts, or ascribing meaning to rule-formulations. However, the author argues that ought-sentences are not the proper tools to accomplish such tasks. At the same time, juristic ought-sentences cannot be understood as validity statements, since they neither mention any rule whatsoever, nor include the term "valid." Further, if validity-statements were ought-sentences, their logical behaviour would reflect the logic of rules themselves. However, as the late Kelsen argued, things do not run this way, since two inconsistent ought-sentences, if understood as validity statements, can paradoxically both be true, as well as both false. Hence, validity-statements cannot be reduced to ought-sentences iterating the rules which they (are supposed to) refer to.     

Towards the Semantics of "Constitutive" in Judicial Reasoning

The aim of the paper is to supply a contribution to the semantics of "constitutive," as confined to the scope of judicial reasoning. More precisely, the aim of the paper is to inquire what links the use of "constitutive" in three distinct (seemingly unrelated) issues on adjudication, namely: (a) the procedural classification of different sorts of judicial decisions, (b) the epistemological debate on the very nature of judicial decisions, and (c) a logical query on the import constitutive rules might be taken to have in affecting the sort and/or the nature of judicial decisions in which they might occur as the legal premiss, grounding the solution of the case. The attempt to fix some markers towards the semantics of "constitutive" in judicial reasoning will have Alchourrón and Bulygin's analyses as a main point of reference.