The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel

Many concerned about UK corporate governance have urged those who own equity in listed companies to forsake a traditional bias in favour of passivity and act as responsible, engaged ‘owners’. The recent financial crisis has given added impetus to such calls, with the notion of ‘stewardship’ taking centre stage and resulting in July 2010 with the launch of a Stewardship Code targeting UK‐based institutional investors. This paper summarises the Stewardship Code initiative and argues that, primarily due to sustained fragmentation of share ownership occurring over the past 20 years, the Code is unlikely to foster substantially greater shareholder involvement in UK corporate governance.     

Assisting altruism: evaluating legally binding consent in organ donation policy

The growing need for organ and tissue transplants has led a number of states to enforce a policy that views a donor's declared intent to be an organ donor as legally binding. This allows health officials to harvest organs without the permission of the next of kin. Legally binding consent is controversial because of concerns that it may anger family members, lead to negative publicity, and discourage potential donors. We use interviews and a pooled time-series data set of cadaveric donation rates in U.S. states to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy. Our research indicates that enforcement of legally binding consent has marginally increased cadaveric donations while not significantly affecting donor registration. We also find evidence that the effect of the policy might be greater if it were more fully implemented and coordinated with efforts to improve public acceptance and awareness.     

论有限责任公司股东的同意权与优先购买权

《公司法》第35条对有限责任公司股权的向外转让规定其他股东的同意权和优先购买权,以期作为限制。但实践中关于如何理解该条的限制颇有歧义。要正确地理解该条,必须在澄清法条含义的基础上,理顺有限责任公司对外转让股权的规范。由于同意权纯粹只起到摆设的作用,故应该废除同意权,同时完善优先购买权,更好地协调有限责任公司的人合性与资合性。     

Arresting Developments? Restricting the Enforcement of the UK's Universal Jurisdiction Provisions

Recently introduced legislative amendments limit the issue of arrest warrants on the application of a private prosecutor where jurisdiction is based on universal jurisdiction. The amendments addressed a ‘loophole’ in English law whereby a private prosecutor could seek and be granted an arrest warrant, generally in respect of an individual on a short term visit to the UK, even though the consent of the Attorney General would be required for the prosecution to continue. This article argues that these amendments addressed legitimate evidentiary and diplomatic relations concerns, are consistent with the UK's international obligations, and are in line with the UK's policy on the exercise of universal jurisdiction and with international trends. However, given the limited category of persons who were subject to such arrest warrants under the previous law and the practice of the UK concerning special missions, the amendments may be of limited practical significance.     

股权转让与一人公司问题探讨

股东之间转让股权导致股份集中于一个股东时 ,是股权转让合同无效还是公司无以存续 ?这是司法实践中的一道难题。本文分别探讨了股权转让及其限制、股权转让合同的效力以及一人公司的存续问题 ,主张不应以股权转让合同导致股份集中于一人而认定其无效 ,并提出我国法律对一人公司的法律地位应当持谨慎、分步承认的态度。     

Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

     

关于我国"一人公司"立法问题的研究

随着我国公司制企业的发展,出现了一种特殊的公司形式——一人公司,一人公司已经被越来越多的国家立法所承 认。但目前我国没有健全的财产登记制度,也未建立严格意义上的公司人格否认制度,因此,在我国暂不应允许自然人一人公司的设 立。     

Promoting a more efficient corporate governance in Nigeria through the law

Corporate governance reforms have been viewed as one of the formal means of improving the economic and social welfare of emerging economies. There have been efforts by the Nigerian government, through its agencies, to promulgate codes of best practices for companies in the country. These reforms appear to be ineffective and the codes do not compliment and are not complimented by corporate law. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems that hinder effective corporate governance reforms in Nigeria within corporate law. Using the doctrinal approach, the paper analyses features of the Nigerian corporate governance framework and identifies the problems bedeviling this regime. It argues that the problems stem from (amongst others), state ownership and control, board independence, poor minority shareholder protection, ineffective judicial system and Incomplete disclosure. The paper, by linking the apparent weakness of the extant framework to the attempt to reform outside corporate law, suggests a hybrid of legislation including hard laws, soft laws and other policy proposals to promote an effective corporate governance regime in Nigeria.     

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPANY

The important role that corporate governance has played in a wide range of public companies is self-evident. Recent major corporate failures are more or less related to bad corporate governance and the increasing corporate scandals call for good corporate governance not only in China but all around the world. Corporate governance is principally about how companies are structured and directed, which is indeed a quite broad field. It is a good direction to discuss how to improve the overall corporate governance level in China through the perspective of perfecting shareholder protection. However, while running companies for shareholder interests is getting increasingly more criticisms, the so-called stakeholder model and entity model are raised as alternative approaches. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this paper to find the most appropriate corporate objective which could be applied as the starting point for future corporate governance discussion by providing a right direction for assessing and evaluating corporate performance and accountability of management. Through the comparative studies of the three models, this paper concludes that shareholder primacy is a more effective and efficient approach with regard to advancing social welfare and controlling director’s accountability among others; the other two models cannot justify substituting the shareholder model as the corporate objective.     

从信用角度对我国公司资本制度的思考

商法意义上的信用指的是商主体所具有的履行承诺的经济能力及其对外表现的可信赖性而获得的社会评 价。信用既具有人格利益,也具有财产利益,通过信用对货币的置换可以达到为公司聚集一定量的资本的目的。在 必要时,并经其他股东同意时信用应被视为股东的有效出资。从建立信用的社会考虑,在我国应实行折衷资本制。     

论有限公司股东的股权继承与股东资格继承

我国《公司法》第76条的规定应该解释为对死亡股东继承人股东资格的取得而设。可以认为,自然人股东死亡后,若公司章程没有相反的规定,其继承人或继承人的代理人可以马上向公司申请办理股东变更手续。为此,我国公司立法应该进一步明确公司有义务在合理的时间内办理股东变更手续,否则推定继承人取得股东资格。     

上市公司控股股东自利性并购的隧道阻遏研究

日渐活跃的企业并购在给我国上市公司带来发展繁荣的同时,亦为控股股东的自利性行为提供了新的媒介和手段,其往往通过与上市公司之间股权、资产的移转来实现利益输送,不断侵蚀中小股东的利益,掏空上市公司,而立法上的缺漏和监管上的匮乏却对此捉襟见肘。面对屡见不鲜的控股股东自利性并购,法律的不完备性日渐显现,使得私法诉讼难以成为有效的利益输送阻遏手段,而建立有效的证券监管体制和自律机制将能有效补充司法处理的短板。因此,针对控股股东愈渐隐蔽化的自利性并购行为,应该以"分而治之"的思路建构全景式的三维法律治理方案,从司法救济、证券监管和上市公司治理结构优化等制度维度进行全面治理,特别是通过优化证券监管职权配置和明确控股股东信义义务来增强阻吓频度与力度,最终有效阻遏控股股东的利益输送行为,促进我国上市公司与国民经济的健康发展。     

公司股东抽逃出资的法律制裁及完善

随着我国社会主义市场经济的不断发展．作为市场经济重要参与主体之一的公司也在其中发挥着重要作用。公司资本是公司财产的重要组成部分,是公司具有法人人格最基础的物质基础,是维护公司对外交易安全、股东、债权人以及公司等合法权益的重要保证。对公司而言．股东出资是公司成立和存续的物质基础,是公司资本形成的最基本途径。然而,股东抽逃出资是公司治理中较为普遍的现象。本文在对股东抽逃出资内涵界定的基础上,对其法律制裁措施的不足、成因以及出路做以探讨,以期为完善股东抽逃出资的法律制裁措施提供参考。     

论控制股东对公司债权人的诚信义务及法律责任

我国在经济转轨时期,大部分公司股权相对集中,存在着控制股东现象,由于控制股东持有大比例的公司表决权股份,具有控制公司股东大会和操控公司经营管理层的能力.随着股东控制权的滥用,公司控制股东侵害公司和债权人利益以及其他股东利益的现象不断出现,这时我国加强公司治理,建立控制股东制约机制提出了迫切的要求.由于公司形式多样,受控制股东影响的公司利益相关者众多,本文将研究视角局限在我国股份公司中的债权人保护上,提出在股份公司中,控制股东应对公司的债权人承担诚信义务,以免发生侵害公司债权人利益的事情.     

Xenotransplantation: consent, public health and charter issues

There is a growing body of literature and commentary analyzing the ethical and public policy concerns associated with xenotransplantation. While this technology holds great promise to provide an almost limitless supply of organs for transplantation, there remains grave concern about possible public health ramifications. As a result, it has been recommended that patients who undergo xenotransplantations will need to agree, inter alia, to a lifetime of close health monitoring, participation in an international database and autopsy upon death. It has been suggested that this agreement would transform the nature of informed consent into a "binding contract." Though such draconian measures are understandable given the magnitude of the risks involved, would existing common law and legislation allow their implementation? This paper analyzes relevant Canadian consent and public health law in the context of the xenotransplantation. Canada is a country with a particularly rich body of informed consent jurisprudence--jurisprudence firmly rooted (rightly or not) in the ethical principle of autonomy. In this climate, many of the suggested monitoring strategies would find little support from Canadian law. Before xenotransplantations proceed, policy makers must be sensitive to the legal barriers which exist to the implementation [of] effective public health measures. Effective surveillance programs will require novel approaches to consent and the enactment of specific public health laws.     

股东违反出资义务应向谁承担违约责任

关于公司成立之后,股东未履行出资义务的责任承担,我国《公司法》相关规定存在不明确之处,值得进一步探讨。《公司法》第28条、第31条和第84条、第94条的规定,均涉及股东违反出资义务的责任,但存在体系上不一致及逻辑上的不严密之处,其中股东违反出资义务应当向其他股东承担违约责任的规定殊值质疑。显然,股东出资义务之性质是股东因违反出资义务而承担违约责任的理论基础。从公司设立协议、公司章程、公司法人性等方面对股东出资义务的性质进行分析,可以得出股东违反出资义务应当向公司而非股东承担违约责任的结论。     

Ascertaining The Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model

Public companies play crucial roles in today's world, and it has been acknowledged that ascertaining the objective of such companies is a critical issue. However, there remains great uncertainty as to what that objective should be. This article examines the two predominant theories of the corporate objective, namely the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories. This is followed by an explanation of and the case for a new model, the entity maximisation and sustainability model. This model focuses on the company as a separate legal entity and maintains that the objective of the company is to maximise the wealth of the entity as an entity and, at the same time, to ensure that the company is sustained financially.     

一人公司对传统公司法的冲击

自２０世纪８０年代开始，许多国家顺应现代市场经济发展的客观需要，先后在公司法中确立了一人公司的合法地位。但是，一人公司的出现与发展，对传统的公司社团性理念以及公司法律制度产生了极大的冲击，使人们不得不重新思考公司制度的本质特征。本文认为，传统的公司理念对公司立法承认一人公司不利，应强调公司的本质特征为“公司是独立于其出资人的法人”，而不在于其社团性。但我们必须正视一人公司的弊端，因为一人股东确实打破了复数股东的相互制衡性。因此，应在公司法确立一人公司的合法地位同时，强化对一人公司运行机制的平衡控制。如强化公司资本制度，严格资本充实规则；在公司登记中强化公示主义与要式主义的适用；在法定的有限范围内对一人股东适用无限责任；特定场合下适用揭开公司面纱的制度等。     

Public (Interest) or Private (Gain)? The Curious Case of Network Rail's Status

This paper develops Whitehouse's 2003 examination of the creation of Network Rail, a case study of New Labour's attempt to operationalize the 'third way'. Significant changes have occurred since 2003 which make Network Rail's position as a private company with private sector debt appear increasingly anomalous. These changes include: the reclassification of the debt of another rail company from private to public, and the introduction of'imputed debt'into public sector debt measurement; new funding arrangements for Network Rail which make it heavily dependent on public support; and important rail regulatory policy changes. The paper analyses these changes, and revisits White-house's conclusions. In particular, this paper challenges Whitehouse's contention that Network Rail's creation led to the de facto renationalization of the railway infrastructure at a reduced public cost. The paper demonstrates that Network Rail is a very expensive mechanism for channelling public money to private companies, and argues that the Labour government's attempt to maintain the company's private sector status as part of its third way approach is ultimately untenable.     

Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote: A Marxist‐progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment

This paper argues that liquidity, short‐termism and low involvement in corporate governance are fundamental ingredients of shareholders’ value maximisation strategies. Neither shareholders nor their representatives will voluntarily adopt restrictions which inhibit their ability to pursue these strategies, such as those presented by the Stewardship Codes. Utilising Marxist and progressive theory this paper evidences the tendency for all capital (including shares) to seek liquidity. It presents historical evidence which shows that political policy can either restrict this tendency, as it did in the progressive and post war period, or facilitate it, as it did in nineteenth century England and in the current neoliberal period. The shareholder empowerment initiatives examined in this paper are therefore best understood as strategies to justify shareholder claims in the current crisis and to thereby protect the neoliberal status quo.