One Formula,Two Experiences: political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession

Since the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to the People's Republic of China, the territory's political development has diverged from that of Macao. The poverty of leadership, state–society confrontations, deinstitutionalization and Beijing's explicit intervention have marked Hong Kong's political development from 1997 to 2004. Since April 2004, the Hong Kong governing style has converged with that of Macao in terms of its pragmatism. Although Macao's political development is characterized by leadership finesse, state–society partnership and institutionalization, its relatively weak civil society and lack of democratic reforms are by no means an attractive ‘one country, two systems’ model to Taiwan; nor does Hong Kong's ‘one country, two systems’ appeal to the Republic of China. Yet, the political corruption and chaos that punctuate Taiwan's democracy have failed to have any positive demonstration effect on Hong Kong and Macao. While the models of Hong Kong and Macao are bound to diverge from that of Taiwan, political development in the two Chinese Special Administrative Regions is gradually converging.     

内地与港澳打击跨境网络犯罪警务合作研究

内地和港澳之间的跨境网络犯罪主要包括通过网络实施的传统非跨境犯罪、传统跨境犯罪以及新型经济犯罪。这些网络犯罪主要以牟利为主,数额巨大;犯罪形式多样,有组织化;犯罪成本小,打击难度大。为了惩治跨境网络犯罪,内地和港澳警方采取了一系列合作措施并取得了一定成效。但是,由于内地和港澳三地在法律、技术和协作程序方面存在缺陷,三地警务合作仍然面临挑战。深化三地警务合作必须缩小各方的立法差距,增强对网络犯罪的调查、取证技术能力,建立跨境网络犯罪的协查机制。     

Economic prosperity or democracy: Dilemma of development in Hong Kong and China

After Hong Kong is integrated with mainland China in July 1997, the economic and political environments of the two places will inevitably link up with each other. Economic modernization significantly not only improves the living conditions of the Chinese, but also alters their social structure and political values. As such, economic prosperity and democracy become the two conflicting values in Hong Kong and China during the transition to 2000. The people of Hong Kong and China are presented a choice over two mutually exclusive targets: economic prosperity vs. democracy. On the one hand, the choice for economic prosperity will imply no democracy because a conservative political system will be maintained to preserve the political status quo. On the other hand, the choice for democracy will imply no economic prosperity, because democratization will be suppressed and hence the economy will suffer as a result of political instability. However, neither of these two choices could offer the people of Hong Kong and China a genuine prosperity and stability. Therefore a congruent relationship between the economy and the political system must be established and maintained. As prosperity is contributed by both economic growth and political stability, neglection of either of these two elements will not result in a long‐lasting prosperity. Thus, economic development and democratization are two complementary rather than contradicting forces on the road to development in China.     

Britain's ‘betrayal’ of Hong Kong: A second look

Claims of British bungling and betrayal were repeatedly raised during the prolonged run‐up to the 1997 Hong Kong handover. This paper seeks to evaluate such claims. It examines five controversial episodes of reputed British mishandling of the Hong Kong transition: (1) Governor Murray MacLehose's reputed double faux pas of March 1979, when the governor first putatively erred by prematurely (and unnecessarily) raising the ‘1997 question’ in a routine meeting with Deng Xiaoping and then compounded his error by misrepresenting Deng's less‐than‐reassuring response; (2) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 1982 miscalculation in requesting a 50‐year extension of the New Territories lease when it was already abundantly clear that Chinese leaders regarded the original lease as ‘unequal'—and therefore non‐binding; (3) Britain's 1987 decision to unilaterally postpone Hong Kong's first direct legislative elections, a decision defended on the disingenuous grounds that government surveys had revealed a majority of the Hong Kong public to be opposed to rapid democratization; (4) Britain's ostensible failure, in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen debacle, to secure the inclusion of adequate democratic safeguards in the final draft of the Hong Kong Basic Law, completed early in 1990; and (5) Governor Chris Patten's ill‐starred democratic reform initiatives of 1992–95, which sharply reversed Britain's previous ‘convergence’ policy and ultimately led to the derailing of Hong Kong's vaunted ‘through train’. Examining available evidence on these five episodes (and one or two other, related cases), this paper argues that despite occasional, palpable policy miscalculations and a notable lack of official candor, Britain did not do serious harm to the vital interests of Hong Kong. On the contrary, the paper argues, given the substantial advantage in resources and leverage enjoyed by the Chinese side throughout the transition period, a more favorable outcome could hardly have been achieved. The one residual allegation of British betrayal that cannot readily be countered, however, is the charge that racism within Britain's ruling Conservative Party—manifested in Parliamentary legislation severely restricting the flow of immigrants from British colonial territories—played a significant role in the British Government's choice of tactics in dealing with the ‘1997 question’.     

Hong Kong redux

There are surprises ahead for both Hong Kong and the China of which it will become a part. This article focuses on how the reversion of Hong Kong will affect the future of politics in both societies. Even though rule by Beijing will change Hong Kong's commercial and political life, China will also be changed by having to deal with the emerging elite of Hong Kong and those persons from the mainland who have been educated in the West. This will not produce democracy in either Hong Kong or China but it will reduce the likelihood that China will become a hegemonic power in East Asia.     

Democratization without decentralization: Local government in Hong Kong

The literature on democratization tends to neglect the question of decentralization. The case of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China shows that there can be partial democratization without decentralization. Democratization in Hong Kong took place in the mid‐1980s and 1990s, when more directly elected seats were introduced to political institutions at the territorial, municipal and district levels. However, democratization has not been accompanied by an attempt to decentralize administrative and political power to the institutions at the local level. These political institutions, including the Urban Council (UrbCo), Regional Council (RegCo) and District Boards remain relatively weak vis‐à‐vis the executive branch of the government. The recent attempt by the HKSAR government to abolish the UrbCo and RegCo represents a move toward centralization of administrative and political power. Moreover, District Boards remain consultative and politically powerless. It is the dynamic relationship between democratization and decentralization at which future research should be directed.     

Hong Kong's policy possibilities and directions toward the mainland‐Taiwan conflict

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was returned from British colonial rule to Chinese rule under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change in political status of Hong Kong has great impacts on the triangular relationship between Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan, in which the mainland and Taiwan are still in a state of intense political conflict and competition. This paper examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in handling its relations with Taiwan. It argues that both Beijing and Taipei want to preserve the existing Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations for political and practical purposes but at the same time will try to avoid being forced into a suspected political trap—for Beijing the recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity and for Taipei the subordination of Taiwan to PRC sovereignty. Between these two baselines, the paper points out that Hong Kong should pursues its own Taiwan policy built upon the interests of Hong Kong and depoliticization of Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations.     

From Fortress Hong Kong to Hong Kong–Shenzhen Metropolis: the emergence of government-led strategy for regional integration in Hong Kong

The Hong Kong government was less active in regional integration before 2003. This study explores what conditions have contributed to the shifting of the Hong Kong government's stance on Hong Kong–Shenzhen integration from protectionism to cooperation since 2003. In addition to secondary data, a questionnaire survey and interviews were conducted in this study. Various external and internal economic, political and social factors that have contributed to the emergence of government-led strategy for regional integration in Hong Kong are analyzed. It is found that regional integration is facilitated by consensus building among the government, political parties, other interest groups and residents within Hong Kong.     

Liberal Patriotism in Hong Kong

Since Hong Kong's reunification with the People's Republic of China in 1997, debates about patriotism have erupted from time to time in Hong Kong. Considering Hong Kong's socio-political background, the feelings and attachment of Hongkongers towards their motherland are unsurprisingly complex. We therefore need a multidimensional concept to capture the complexities of Hong Kong patriotism. Based on survey data, we propose that the term ‘liberal patriotism’ best describes the type of patriotism in Hong Kong society, which is that love of the homeland and the state are qualified by liberal democratic values.     

Introduction: The Basic Law,Governance and Electoral Politics in China's Hong Kong and Macao since 1997

1 July 2007 marks the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong's retrocession to Chinese sovereignty to become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC. The HKSAR has functioned under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework as enshrined in the Basic Law, its mini-constitution. Upon the resumption of Chinese jurisdiction over Macao on 20 December 1999, a similar ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula also came into effect for the new MSAR under its Basic Law. The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula that guarantees a high degree of autonomy in both Hong Kong and Macao is also a cornerstone of the PRC's strategy toward peaceful reunification with Taiwan. To provide a more balanced and informed understanding of these two Chinese SARs in actualizing the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model, this special section of four articles adopts a bi-focal approach. On the one hand, it presents in a joint article the views of two leading mainland Chinese legal scholars (Professors Geping Rao and Zhenmin Wang, both National People's Congress Hong Kong Basic Law Committee members) on some vital dimensions of the Basic Law. On the other hand, it offers three articles with a more locally anchored perspective—a comparative analysis (by Professor Sonny Lo) of the contrasting HKSAR and MSAR experiences, and two case studies (by Professors Bruce Kwong and Eilo Yu) that highlight key features of patron–client linkages and informal politics dynamics in HKSAR and MSAR elections and politics.     

The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1997

China's policy toward Hong Kong in the period 1949-1997 was primarily driven by utilitarian calculations of national interests and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong policy of China, as an integral part of its foreign policy, was distinctive in that ideological fervor and nationalist passions had limited influence. The goals to be achieved by the Hong Kong policy remained unchanged throughout the period; the strategies adopted, however, changed in accordance with the changing international situation and the national interests as defined by the Chinese leaders. The primary goals of the Hong Kong policy were to secure a less threatening external political environment for China and to make calculated use of Hong Kong for China's economic development. By tolerating Hong Kong as a British colony, China also depended on Britain to control the potentially threatening anti-Communist Chinese population there. The 'over-dependence' on the British to control the Chinese people in Hong Kong on the eve of Hong Kong's reversion to China, however, alienated the Hong Kong people as well as impeded the formation of local political leaders in the territory. As a result, the acquisition of Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering friction between them.     

The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong

On 1 July 2003, over half a million Hong Kong people staged a mass protest against the poor governance of the post-handover Hong Kong government. The grievances of the marchers quickly snowballed into a widely backed movement for democracy. The subsequent record-breaking support for pro-democratic candidates during the local elections held on 23 November 2003 unnerved Beijing over its possible loss of control over Hong Kong. Beijing swiftly shifted to a hard-line approach, attempting to dampen the local democracy movement. This paper will expound the five fundamental causes of Hong Kong's broad-based demand for full democracy, analyse its type of democratic transition to illuminate its political dynamics, and highlight the parameters impacting its democratic development.     

Hong Kong joins the National People's Congress: A first test for one country with two political systems

Before its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997, Hong Kong was preoccupied with safeguarding its autonomy while China insisted on keeping separate the two political systems of Hong Kong and the mainland. Toward these ends, everyone focused on Hong Kong's own governing councils and ignored its future status within China's congress system. Not until the December 1997 deadline approached for naming Hong Kong's delegation to the March 1998 meeting of China's new Ninth National People's Congress, did the full implications of this oversight become apparent. Hence, the institutional channels whereby the two systems must interact are actually rooted in the reforming structure of China's congress system. Delegate selection in Hong Kong revealed a new ‘bridging’ function whereby the two legislative systems are linked through the old organization tactic of concurrent membership. The bridging function also illuminates previously unheralded features of Hong Kong's new post‐1997 government, as a replica and appendage of China's people's congress network.     

Business as usual: The dynamics of government‐business relations in the Hong Kong special administrative region

This is an attempt to evaluate the implications of Hong Kong's political transition to post‐colonial rule for economic governance in the SAR beyond the ‘Beijing versus Hong Kong’ perspective. The article examines the changing government‐business dynamics in Hong Kong after the reversion by focusing on three inter‐related dimensions: economic ideology; institutional and policy framework; and the new political environment in post‐colonial Hong Kong. By challenging the assertion that Hong Kong is returning to the pre‐Patten colonial order under Chinese management, it argues that economic governance in Hong Kong has always been more complex than has been characterized in the literature. A conceptual framework incorporating the dynamic interplay of domestic and international factors is needed to comprehend the changing nature of government‐business relationships in the SAR.     

A “greater China“?

This paper sees “Greater China” as a would‐be reunited China that includes the present PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. The coming into being of a “Greater China” hinges on future domestic politics in the PRC and Taiwan and among the triangle of Beijing‐Taipei‐Hong Kong. It also hinges on American, British, and Japanese policies addressing the current trends of economic integration and political accommodation among the three Chinese entities. Of the external variables, future U.S. politics toward the PRC, and toward the evolution of political exchanges on the Beijing‐Taipei trajectory will be the most decisive. Economic and political developments in the past fifteen years have brightened the prospect of Chinese reunification, but national reunification remains a complicated and protracted process.     

Civil Society in Self-Defense: the struggle against national security legislation in Hong Kong

The political struggle against national security legislation in Hong Kong led to an unprecedented awakening of civil society against the state and the largest indigenous movement in Hong Kong history. The proposed laws by the Hong Kong government were seen as overbroad and ill-defined, and the government's disregard of public opinion led to an outcry from various social sectors. The Catholic Church, legal professionals and the press played special roles in opinion leadership and mobilization in the struggle. The mass protest created an internal split of the governing elite and forced the postponement of the legislation. It also encouraged local participation, re-fueled an ailing democracy movement, and put democratic reforms onto the political agenda of Hong Kong.     

Hong Kong in United States‐China relations: The international politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty

This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on US‐China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement‐containment debate on China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference’ in Hong Kong would turn the territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implications for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in Hong Kong, US‐China relations will be aversely affected.     

Identity,Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing's responses to offshore Chinese democracies

Investigating how the PRC responds to democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this paper argues that the Chinese Communist leadership has mainly developed three strategies in managing the complicated crises, including Beijing's own legitimacy crisis and the integration crisis of the Chinese nation, caused by the rise of offshore Chinese democracies. These strategies are: identity politics, sovereignty politics, and economic penetration. With ‘identity politics’, Beijing identifies ‘identification with the Communist leadership’ as the sole Chinese national identification, and utilizes the nationalistic passions of mainland and even overseas Chinese people against democrats in Taiwan and Hong Kong, by labeling the latter as ‘separatists’ or ‘national traitors’. Further, Beijing defines ‘sovereignty’ in a way in which the ‘central’ government monopolizes all possessions of the nation, and excludes ‘people's sovereignty’ from the politics of national reunification or the ‘one country, two systems’ model actualization. While appealing to both ‘soft power’ based in ‘patriotic nationalism’ and ‘hard power’ embedded in national sovereignty, however, the Chinese regime also mobilizes business resources and opportunities provided by China's growing economic power and China's dominance in Greater Chian economic integration for its political purposes of curbing offshore Chinese democracies.     

Stock market integration in Hong Kong and China

The Hong Kong Stock Exchange currently ranks sixth in terms of trading volumes in the world while China's fledgling securities industry at Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges combined is barely more than 7 years old. With 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, the securities industries of the two sides ought to integrate into one market. However, the Basic Law governing Hong Kong maintains unchanged British Common Law system as well as the life style of Hong Kong capitalist society, at least for the next 50 years. To understand how the stock exchanges operate under such a situation and how they cooperate in the future is the theme throughout this paper. This paper first describes the market backgrounds separately in Hong Kong and China. It intends to answer how, what and why China needs Hong Kong market and how, what and why Hong Kong, at a different level, needs China's. Then it deals with the interactions or cooperation in the primary market operations. The paper also deals with broader issues such as the RMB convertibility with respect to the integration of the stock exchanges and tries to forecast the future trend in the regional as well as international perspectives. It concludes that as part of the ‘one country, two systems’, the SEHK will be stronger as it has an added value to China's financial window to the world.     

香港、澳门、新加坡行政主导比较

适应社会发展和高效决策的需要,行政主导已成为国际社会普遍的政治现象。由于社会条件的差异,各国各地区行政主导的类型和表现不同,绩效不一。本文对香港与澳门、香港与新加坡的行政主导作比较研究,从政治制度、政府运作、社会条件等不同角度探求了不同形式行政主导的共性与差异。