Centripetalism and Electoral Moderation in Established Democracies

Centripetal approaches to ethnic conflict management seek to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation by making politicians dependent on the electoral support of groups other than their own base. There is an ongoing debate about the utility of such approaches, including which kinds of electoral systems can best promote moderate and centrist politics in deeply divided societies. Neglected in this debate, however, has been the experience of ethnically diverse established democracies utilizing centripetal electoral models. This article examines historical evidence from Australia, and recent natural experiments with subnational electoral reform in the United States, which lend support to centripetal claims that preferential, “ranked choice” or “instant runoff” voting can encourage electoral moderation and address political polarization.     

STRUCTURES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT: REVOLUTION VERSUS SECESSION IN RWANDA AND SRI LANKA

A structural framework of ethnic politics is presented, contrasting the patterns of inter-ethnic relations found in ranked versus unranked systems of ethnic stratification. This framework allows us to account for why ethnic conflict erupts in some cases but not others, and why that conflict takes the form of ethnic revolution in some situations and ethnic separatism in others. This framework's explanatory utility is illustrated with a comparison of case studies: why ethnic separatism emerged in Sri Lanka while ethnic revolution occurred in Rwanda.     

Unofficial third-party intervention in international conflict: Between legitimacy and disarray

Conclusions The proliferation of unofficial third-party interventions in ethnic conflict is not, to date, based on the demonstrated and enduring value of their achievements. The growing interest in unofficial intervention is not based on clear goals and well-formulated underlying philosophies of the various methods, but more on general assumptions sometimes guided by goodwill and activism. It is quite likely that unofficial intervention in international conflict contributes in various ways toward the resolution of conflict, but, thus far, there is noempirical evidence that the field has contributed or can contribute to the resolution of ethnic conflict.Scholars of unofficial third-party intervention in international conflict should consider a number of basic questions relating to its goals, the appropriateness of the various methodologies, the connection between methods and goals, characteristics and requirements of third parties, and the interplay between official and unofficial interventions. A major effort should be placed on evaluation, notably the development of frameworks that could be used to evaluate the effects of these efforts, whether positive or negative. Special attention should be directed at ethical considerations for intervention by practitioners of unofficial approaches in ongoing conflicts worldwide.In addition, I suggest that practitioners of unofficial intervention focus and elaborate on the theoretical foundations of their methods and thereby explain how the designed intervention is supposed to contribute to conflict resolution. This is particularly important in light of the increasing use of psychiatric methods that focus on intrapersonal and interpersonallevels of analysis and ignore the underlying structural asymmetries, inequities, and inequalities in ethnic and international conflicts.He is also a founding member of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) based at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. He co-chairs the PICAR Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution.     

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

This study examines partition's success in ending old and preventing new ethnic conflicts. Opponents of partition often claim that partition only invites (further) conflict by its inability to divide existing multiethnic countries in ways satisfying to all concerned ethnic groups. In contrast, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only ethnic conflict solution that provides ethnic separation, an element that is key if conflict prevention is of concern. By separating the belligerent groups, partition provides safety and a decrease in the need for interaction between groups that do not get along. When domestic and international violence is considered, partition's consequences largely depend on the timing of partition. In cases of partitions resulting from ethnic secessionist conflicts, there is a widespread continuation of serious domestic conflict but its frequency does decrease significantly, to a level that can be considered "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of violently partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict in more than one-third of the cases. In cases of peaceful (i.e., preventative) ethnic partitions, domestic conflict starts up in about half of the cases, but despite the significant increase in its frequency, the frequency remains "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of peacefully partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict almost completely. Accordingly, peaceful ethnic partitions produce dyads that are significantly less likely to engage in militarized conflicts and wars than dyads emerging from violent ethnic partitions. Contrary to some expectations, partitions do not create overwhelmingly nondemocratic countries; however, in cases of violent ethnic secessions, democratic institutions do not exhibit significant pacifying effect on subsequent domestic conflict. Important caveats notwithstanding, the overall results indicate that peaceful ethnic partitions have conflict management potential.     

The Effects of Oil Production and Ethnic Representation on Violent Conflict in Nigeria: A Mixed-Methods Approach

A large qualitative literature on violent conflict in Nigeria has identified the importance of oil production and ethnicity as salient factors in understanding violence, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta. This resonates with the broader literature on natural resources, ethnic exclusion, and conflict. This article advances existing research by providing the first highly disaggregated statistical analysis of oil, ethnicity, and violence for Nigerian Local Government Areas (LGAs). We test whether oil production in a weak state environment, and local groups’ access to governmental power, affect the level of violence in Nigeria. We employ unique disaggregated data on violent conflict events, proprietary data on oil production, and newly collected information on local ethnic groups’ access to the federal government for 774 LGAs. We find strong evidence that LGAs with oil infrastructure experience significantly more violence than others, while access to the federal government significantly reduces violence. We complement these findings with a qualitative investigation of violent conflicts in Nigeria.     

Expectations,Rivalries, and Civil War Duration

This paper criticizes the status quo position in African politics on two accounts. First it furthered the consolidation of the state system, and thereby, the failure of integration on the continental level. Second, it resulted in the spread and escalation of ethnic conflicts as a reaction to the suppression of the aspirations for independent expression and equality.

At one level, explaining ethnic conflict requires the reconstruction, in terms of a theory, of the specific context in which it occurs. In this regard, we suggest that ethnic conflicts in Africa are an outgrowth of the consideration that ethnicity constitutes the dominant mode of political practice akin to the state system of dependent, nurture capitalism. Four conditions determine the conflictive potentialities of the ethnic situation: communalization of political practice, catastrophic balance between ethnic groups, economic and political inequalities, and articulation of class conflict and ethnic organization.

Conflict and integration processes are grounded in the dynamics of identity formation. Our hypothesis is that identity formation is contingent on four elements: a) maximum structured relations; b) minimum differentiation; c) maximum ideological interpellation; and d) maximum unity of labor processes. By projecting these conditions on African politics, we advance the thesis that integration in Africa could be worked out as a mode of ethnic conflict resolution and prevention if, in addition to the progressive substantiation of the four elements mentioned above, it takes place on the continental level.     

Does Conflict Lead to Ethnic Particularism? Electoral Violence and Ethnicity in Kenya 2005–2008

What impact does violence have on ethnic identity? Do acts of violence tend to create greater segmentation and “hardening” of identities among ethnic groups? In this article, we empirically assess the claim that violence inevitably leads to the hardening of ethnic identity (which we operationalize as expressions of ethnic particularism over a national identity). Using survey data from Kenya covering the period 2005–2008, integrated with geocoded data on conflict events in Kenya during that period, and employing multilevel logistic regression analysis, we do not find support for the contention that ethnic identity hardens inevitably as the result of violence. Rather, our findings suggest support for a more nuanced view of the effects of violence on ethnic identity.     

Religious Causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities

Most existing large-n cross-sectional analyses of ethnic conflict focus on the behavior of the ethnic minority rather than the behavior of the state. That is, they tend to attempt to predict or explain the level of protest or rebellion in which ethnic minorities engage at the expense of determining the causes for the behavior of the government of the state in which these minorities live. Previous studies have determined that discrimination against minority groups is one of the major causes of ethnic protest and rebellion. In addition, much of the literature on ethnic conflict does not sufficiently deal with the religious causes of that conflict. Accordingly this study focuses on the causes of discrimination with a particular emphasis on the religious causes. This study analyzes two populations from the Minorities at Risk dataset: the 105 religiously differentiated minorities and the 163 minorities that are not religiously differentiated. The results show that religious factors influence the process that leads to discrimination and that the causes of religious discrimination are distinct from the causes of other types of discrimination. In addition, the dynamics of this process are markedly different between the two populations analyzed here. All of this, along with other factors, implies that religion is not merely a reflection of general cultural differences, but rather has a distinct and separate influence on ethnic conflict.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Rethinking the Relationship between Inclusive Institutions and Political Violence

Abstract

In this paper we empirically reexamine the debate over the conflict reducing properties of inclusive political institutions. We examine the purported violence reducing effects of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, parliamentarism, and federalism, conditioning their effects on ethnic fractionalization and whether a country is conflict prone. In other words, are these institutions more effective in countries that have already experienced major conflict or are they more effective in preventing conflict in countries that have not experienced major conflict? Using a data set that includes a sample of 81 countries and 2488 observations from 1973 to 2018, we test the conditional effects of proportional representation electoral systems, parliamentarism and federalism conditioning these by ethnicity and whether the country has experienced a major conflict (i.e., civil war). We find that these institutions have little effect on reducing the number of riots or political deaths, but PR electoral systems reduces ethnic violence when ethnic fractionalization is high. On the other hand PR electoral systems and parliamentarism reduce ethnic violence in conflict prone countries, but federalism increases the likelihood of ethnic violence. We discuss the implications of these findings with regard to arguments regarding inclusive power sharing arrangements and violence in post conflict environments.     

Refugee Flows,Ethnic Power Relations,and the Spread of Conflict

Why do some refugee flows cause conflict in the host state and others do not? Drawing on bargaining models of war, I argue refugees are especially likely to cause conflict when they alter the host state's ethnic balance of power. More specifically, I explain why multiple informational and commitment problems arise when refugee flows produce a rapid shift in relative power between ethnic groups. As an empirical strategy, I examine a unique controlled comparison made possible by the influx of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia in 1999 that eliminates over a dozen competing explanations for civil conflict. I then use process tracing to demonstrate how a change in relative power between ethnic groups fostered violence in Macedonia, whereas the preservation of the ethnic balance facilitated a peaceful refugee flow into Albania. This evidence, though tentative, indicates that a refugee flow's effect on the host state's ethnic balance of power can help explain whether the state experiences peace or conflict.     

Beyond rwanda and kosovo: The interactive dynamics of international peacekeeping and Ethnic Mobilisation

Within the past few decades there has been a significant increase in multilateral interventions in ethnic conflicts in the name of peacekeeping. Most hope that these operations will assist in conflict resolution and reduce violence. However, recent examples indicate that this may not always be the case. This paper explores why international efforts to contain, curtail and resolve ethnic conflicts may not prove successful and even backfire. This enquiry is addressed by employing a cross-national comparative analysis of the involvement of peacekeeping operations in two recent ethnic conflict situations. A sociological model of mobilisation is systematically applied to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda (1994) and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999) to determine whether international actors addressed the primary components that led to mobilisation of the contentious parties. This work argues that the key to successful peacekeeping is to address the primary components of violence. The paper synthesises conflict studies with work on social mobilisation theory and research on peacekeeping, offering both theoretical and policy-relevant contributions to understanding the nexus between effective peacekeeping and factors leading to violent mobilisation.     

族性视野中多民族国家族际政治问题比较研究——基于尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构的经验观察

族性是影响多民族国家安全及其族际政治走向的关键变量。它既能促进族际政治整合、维护国家安全、有助于民族国家建构,也能导致族际政治冲突、危及国家安全、阻碍民族国家建构。以"族性"为分析视角,通过对尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构历程的梳理及其族际政治问题的比较,其共性特征包括:族际政治问题的分析单位是多民族国家;族际政治问题虽然发生在现实中的多民族国家,却往往带有深刻的历史根源;政治与文化边界的重叠是族际政治问题产生的逻辑起点;国内不同民族群体无法得到平等公正对待是导致族际政治问题的核心因素;军事专政和腐败会增加族际政治问题的风险和国家安全的不确定性。解决多民族国家族际政治问题、确保国家安全的关键在于如何让一个在历史上和观念中都不曾存在的国家民族能够超越族性分界而被成功建构。结合两国国情提出应对策略:寻找重叠共识,建构文化多元、政治一体的国族共同体;借鉴差异政治和差别公民权利思想,探寻积极回应不同民族群体正当利益诉求、实现各族人民成果共享、利益均沾的政治制度、体制和机制;消除军人在政治生活中的影响,惩治腐败;探索包容促进多语言、多宗教和谐相处的民族政策。     

Ethnic Elites and Rituals of Provocation: Politicians,Pastors, and Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Prominent theories of ethnic conflict argue that instrumental ethnic elites incite violence in order to promote their own power. Yet this approach focuses primarily on political leaders and ignores other ethnic elites, meaning that we know little about how other influential actors think about provocation. In this paper, I present novel data from Northern Ireland on diverse elite attitudes toward polarising Protestant parades with a long history of sparking ethnic violence. Using original surveys of Protestant elected officials and clergy as well as interviews with ex-paramilitaries, this paper demonstrates that these elite groups have different, often competing, interests and opinions regarding contested parades: while politicians tend to support provocative parades, the others do not. By addressing elite actors that are often ignored, I present a more nuanced picture of elite-mass relations and ethnic mobilisation in conflict.     

Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War

In some ethno-separatist wars, rebel groups direct a large share of violence against members of their own ethnic community. But why do rebels target the co-ethnics they claim to represent in the war against the government? Our aim in this paper is to provide the components for a conceptual framework that we assess using unique disaggregated casualty data on violence committed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against co-ethnic Tamils in territories claimed for the Tamil Eelam state in the early phase of the Sri Lankan conflict, 1985–88. We propose that there are two distinct processes of intraethnic violence: violence against co-ethnic civilians and violence against co-ethnic rivals. While the former aims at controlling the population to win the war against the government, the latter aims at establishing leadership dominance over the ethnic minority. We examine the role of ethnic homogeneity in shaping the use of violence directed against the two types of co-ethnic targets in the buildup phase of ethno-separatist war. We conclude that ethnic demographic structures matter for how the rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war before they have established territorial control.     

Issues and Actors in African Nonstate Conflicts: A New Data Set

Armed nonstate conflict without the direct involvement of the state government is a common phenomenon. Violence between armed gangs, rebel groups, or communal militias is an important source of instability and has gained increasing scholarly attention. In this article, we introduce a data collection on conflict issues and key actor characteristics in armed nonstate conflicts that provides new opportunities for investigating the causes, dynamics, and consequences of this form of organized violence. The data builds on and extends the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Non-State Conflict data set by introducing additional information on what the actors in the conflict are fighting over, alongside actor characteristics. It covers Africa during the time period 1989–2011. The data set distinguishes between two main categories of issues, territory and authority, in addition to a residual category of other issues. Furthermore, we specify sub-issues within these categories, such as agricultural land/water as sub-issue for territory and religious issues for other issues. As actor characteristics, the data set notes whether warring parties received military support by external actors and whether religion and the mode of livelihood were salient in the mobilization of the armed group. The article presents coding processes, key features of the data set, and point to avenues for new research based on these data.     

Measuring the Ambivalence of Religion: Introducing the Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) Dataset

Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict.     

Explaining divergent responses to ethnic exclusion: evidence from two paired comparisons

This article asks why ethnic exclusion from executive-level state power leads to armed conflict in some cases but not in others. To answer this question the author develops a nine-factor model of ethnic conflict, which is used to investigate the diverging conflict trajectories of two pairs of ‘most similar’ ethnic groups. These include the Malinke in Guinea and Northerners in Côte d'Ivoire on the one hand, and Kurds in Syria and Turkey on the other. It is shown that varying responses to ethnic exclusion can mainly be traced back to three factors, which have so far been neglected in the ethnic conflict literature: the selectivity of state violence, the territorial reach of the state and the availability of cross-border sanctuaries. Ethnic rebellion occurs where weak territorial control and indiscriminate repression combine with external sanctuary. Conversely, violent escalation is avoided in a context of strong territorial control, selective repression and no external sanctuary.     

Conflicts between east European states and minorities in an age of democracy

Conflict between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups in eastern Europe has greatly complicated efforts to build stable and just democratic systems in the region. Leaders of new states as well as rulers whose authority extends from the communist era have attempted to create political systems where competition is clearly along ethnic lines. Polarisation and violence have resulted from the manipulation of ethnic feeling, but there are also a range of factors which have encouraged majority and minority representatives to show mutual restraint at crucial moments.

The internationalisation of East European nationality disputes and the gradual acceptance by a number of states of group rights to stand alongside individual ones, have cooled down a number of disputes and possibly forestalled new ones. But the national question will be a troubling one for many still‐fragile democracies unless strong external incentives are offered which encourage states to conciliate internal minorities and estranged neighbours.     

China's Kashmir Policies

The article examines why some ethnic groups seeking ethno-political autonomy engage in violence while others respond with relative quiescence. It compares and contrasts the ethno-political movements of the Bodos and Misings in northeast India and adopts an integrated approach in which the mobilizing structure and state responses assume equal and important roles that determine the correlation between the mobilizing process and levels of contention. A fundamental claim is that popular support and participation are crucial to shape the trajectories and strategies of ethnic movements. What determines the level of popular following is long-term commitment, legitimacy, and effective communicative strategies adopted by activist organizations. This in turn, generates collective mobilization and produces mechanisms for violence. The absence thereof leads to less disruptive contention. Further, the level of ethnic contention is determined by consistency and extent of ethnic accommodation and the nature of state repression. Consistent accommodation can have a countervailing effect on the activists to launch violent rebellion. Accommodation may range from implementing particular ethno-linguistic policies to selective incentives or cooptation of core political activists by the government. Contrarily, inconsistent accommodation and widespread state repression leads to high levels of violence.