The comparative analysis of international organizations

This study challenges the notion that the United States is a declining hegemon, or that the Western regime is in peril. Comparisons of economic output, trade, and power statistics indicate that the United States continues to hold a more favorable position than previous hegemons did at comparable periods in the trajectory of their rule in relation to both its allies and opponents. Most important, indicators of power (unlike economic indicators) suggest the power distribution in the world order has varied little since World War II and continues to insure American dominance. The preception of a withering American hegemony is a trendy but inaccurate assessment of our time.     

The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism,the Balance of Power in Europe,and America's Decision for War in 1917

According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.     

The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

Limiting America's Engagement: Roger Hilsman's Vietnam War, 1961–1963

This article examines the role of Roger Hilsman, an important State Department official in the Kennedy administration, in the formulation of American policy towards the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1963. Hilsman was one of the leading opponents of a conventional military escalation of the war in Vietnam, frequently clashing with the Pentagon and the American military establishment in order to limit United States' engagement. Hilsman was convinced that “victory” in Vietnam was possible if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. This perception was forged by his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in World War II. Perceived to be one of the main architects of the coup against President Diem in 1963, and vilified by elements in the United States military, he was removed from office by President Johnson early in 1964.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

‘Unfortunate Arabia’: The United States,Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63

As it emerged from a long, self‐imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo‐American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

Trump and the End of an Era? The Liberal International Order in Perspective

ABSTRACT

The liberal international economic and political order which the United States created from the ashes of World War II and has since led is in trouble. To United States President Donald Trump, the order which provided the framework under which sovereign states agreed to follow a rules-based system of economic and political cooperation and shared multilateral governance, has not only allowed other nations (in particular, China) to take advantage of US ‘magnanimity’, but also weakened the United States economically, while asymmetric alliances compromised its military advantages. Given the sustained assault this cosmopolitan order is facing, many fear that it may not survive if Trump is re-elected in November 2020. Indeed, if the United States response to the COVID-19 pandemic is any guide, an ‘America First’ agenda, especially a hard-line approach to China, will shape US policy if Trump wins a second term.     

The Struggle for Sea Power: Lessons from the Great War

The history of the contest for naval mastery during the Great War has particular resonance for today because the United States now faces a serious threat from China's increasing capabilities to wage war at sea. China's naval challenge calls into question America's continued command of the maritime commons. The stakes at risk for the United States in today's contest are just as high as they were a hundred years ago for Britain. Defeat at sea would wreck American global leadership in the twenty-first century just as surely as it would have meant the collapse of British power in the twentieth. What, then, can we learn from past struggles for sea power and America's entry into the First World War that offers guidance for understanding our current strategic predicament?     

Sitting on the Balcony: American Responses,Strategic Dilemmas,and Swedish Criticism of the Vietnam War

Small states often seek power by exercising authority beyond their borders. Sweden, a prominent protagonist of the global projection of moral values, established itself as a champion of humanitarian internationalism in the post-Second World War period, especially during the Vietnam War. By voicing criticism of the American war effort and putting moral purposes beyond itself, Sweden tried to change American policy. Years of vehement criticism provoked strong reactions in the United States, leading to bilateral diplomatic crises and long-lasting political conflicts. Even though part of a wave of international criticism and based on the power of the better argument and conveyed through open advocacy, Sweden's public diplomacy had little bearing. Its confrontational style was counter-productive; its content badly synchronised with the domestic American debate and lacking originality and centrality; and the criticism generally considered irrelevant. Attention fell on Swedish verbal activism when more conspicuous elements of Swedish Vietnam policy were in focus.     

War Makes the State,but Not as It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism

The shock of war is thought to be closely associated with the growth of the state, in the United States and elsewhere. Yet each proposal to significantly expand state power in the United States since September 11 has been resisted, restrained, or even rejected outright. This outcome—theoretically unexpected and contrary to conventional wisdom—is the result of enduring aspects of America's domestic political structure: the separation of powers at the federal level between three co-equal and overlapping branches, the relative ease with which interest groups access the policy-making process, and the intensity with which executive-branch bureaucracies guard their organizational turf. These persistent aspects of u.s. political life, designed by the nation's founders to impede the concentration of state power, have substantially shaped the means by which contemporary guardians of the American state pursue “homeland security.” War does make the state, but not as it pleases. Theoretical approaches to state building should recognize that domestic political institutions mediate between the international shock of war and domestic state building.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

战后日本国家战略演进及岸田内阁战略走向

二战后日本不得不放弃武力扩张的国家战略,但伴随形势变化,日本不同当政者的治国方略则不相同。围绕是维护宪法、优先发展经济、重视国际协调,还是修改宪法、增强军事力量、成为政治军事大国等,存在两种不同国家战略倾向。其背后则是两种不同的历史观。战后,日本在《日本国宪法》下走和平发展道路,经济、科技取得令世界瞩目的成就,但外交则受制于美国而缺乏自主性。日本成为经济大国后,开始借助美国,努力成为亚洲领导国家和联合国常任理事国,而非所谓摆脱美国的"正常国家"。21世纪以来,安倍晋三的国家战略目标是对内推动修宪,使日本成为"能战国家";对外构筑"自由开放的印太",制衡中国。菅义伟内阁继承了安倍的国家战略。岸田文雄执政后在延续同一国家战略的同时,会展现何种特色,值得关注。     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

“Between Two Communities So Diverse”: Confrontation and Collaboration in Cuba, 1898–1902

In 1898, the United States government took possession of Cuba. Rather than annexation, the William McKinley Administration chose to create a new nation-state. Cuba’s fate therefore was unlike that of the Philippines, waiting until after the Second World War for independence. It leads to a question: when it came to Cuba, why the choice of creating a nation rather than annexation? The short answer is that the Cubans would have resisted annexation by force. The longer—and more interesting—answer is that annexation became unnecessary: Over time, Cuba’s nationalist elite proved willing to co-operate with American interests, and McKinley’s Administration left Cuba in nationalist hands, provided those hands were bound by the Platt Amendment. Historians have argued that Cuban nationalists co-operated because of coercion. Whilst true, Cuba’s nationalists also saw value in a relationship with the United States. Therefore, Cuba’s new leaders resisted American demands in ways not only to preserve the good opinion of Washington, but to prove themselves capable of civilised self-government.     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Contested geopolitical messages for tourists at the Okinawa Peace Park and memorials

Abstract

Now marketed as a tropical beach destination, Okinawa's identity is also forever linked with the horrors of war. Okinawa's tumultuous past encompasses the Ryukyu Islands, which had close economic ties to China until being annexed by mainland Japan, were invaded by the US in the Second World War, were occupied until 1972 and, more recently, have become the centre of heated debates over the continued presence of US military bases. The Battle of Okinawa was one of the bloodiest of the Second World War and the inhabitants faced not only the American invasion but also the tactics of the Japanese army, who viewed the islands as expendable in order to slow invading forces from reaching mainland Japan. In the context of the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa in 2015, and beyond, it is argued here that these conflicting geopolitical disputes present significant challenges in terms of the messages presented to educational dark tourists visiting the Okinawa Peace Park and Memorials. The Peace Park Story Tellers or kataribe who are the Second World War survivors, have the critical task of mediating the message to both domestic and international tourists, some of whom are not prepared to hear anti-Japan sentiment. Through an examination of the historical and geographic background, and an analysis of the tourist experience at the Peace Park and Memorials, this paper explores the complexity of educational dark tourism where competing messages collide.     

Transforming international communications strategies

The strategy used by governments to communicate with foreign populations has changed dramatically in the twentieth century. The need perceived by governments to use such a strategy in the first place derived from numerous social changes in the 150 years before World War I, most particularly the increased role played in politics by the masses organized in nation‐states. The shifting strategy of persuasive communication since then forms part of a broader transformation of international political communication which includes technological change, organizational developments, and absolute but not necessarily relative growth in international communications transactions.

The predominant strategy developed in World War I was propaganda. It used fairly straightforward appeals to rationality, sense of morality, and such important but readily accessible emotions as hatred. Its excesses, especially the wide dissemination of atrocity stories which did not bear up well under later dispassionate examination, at once made all propaganda suspect and alerted governments to the necessity of refining their communicative techniques for the eventuality of future international conflicts.

The years before and during World War II saw international communicators—especially Goebbels in Nazi Germany and the Anglo‐American psychological warriors—develop a new strategy which utilized new knowledge about the psychological roots of human behavior. In addition to straightforward appeals to the consciousness of individuals, they sought to manipulate their audiences by playing on their deep‐seated desires and fears. Of particular importance for Nazi Germany were the allegedly racial ties of the individual to a people and the need for figures of authority.

First major experiments were made in World War II to develop an even more basic strategy of international communication: structuring the situation in which people learn their predispositions, perspectives, and behaviors. Its basic idea is to create situations in which the communicator does not have to tell the targeted audience anything at all, but in which the audience, left to its own devices, can only come to the conclusions desired by the communicator. Thus strategic bombing sought to destroy the morale of the enemy's home front and, through that action, to weaken its war‐making capacity. The postwar occupation of Germany originally sought to create a new environment in which Germans could be reeducated to democracy. Subsequent emphasis has also been on communications aimed at generating certain predispositions, such as a desire for consumer goods or a particular political style, which then spawn appropriate perspectives and behaviors.

This new strategy of structural communication has its limits. The most important of these is the difficulty of controlling all aspects of a foreign population's communications environment (which includes traditions, face‐to‐face networks, and conflicting sources of information). The potential importance of the strategy nonetheless makes it likely that governments will continue to work toward its development and implementation for their own international political purposes.