Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey by Berridge,G.R

Nixon was one of the first American politicians to advocate the building of a strong US‐Japan economic alliance and the Nixon administration laid the foundation for the healthy post‐Vietnam dialogue that the Carter and Reagan administrations cultivated with Tokyo. This article examines that foundation, and its contribution to the general post‐World War II US‐Japan relationship. Vietnam changed America, and it even changed the way a once arch‐cold warrior, Nixon, viewed the significance of US‐Japan relations. After years of Washington's scoffing at or ignoring Japanese interests, this American ‘discovery’ of Japan was an important development in itself. Hence, this article also examines a relationship in transition which, for Nixon's America, was an important first step in the construction of a post‐Vietnam view of Asian/Pacific cooperation.     

Britain and Japan: a survey of recent books in English dealing with aspects of Anglo-Japanese relations

Abstract

Since the Japan Festival in the UK in 1991 some significant studies in English have been published about Anglo-Japanese relations. Two sets of volumes stand out. These are the five volumes in the History of Anglo-Japanes Relations 1600–2000 and the ten volumes in the series Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits which have covered up to six hundred British and Japanese personalities and themes. Some aspects of Anglo-Japanese relations and some personalities deserve further attention. Cultural exchanges have developed greatly in the seventy years since the end of the Second World War and merit research and analysis. Considerably more detailed work needs to be done on Anglo-Japanese trade and financial relations and on Japanese investment in the UK and British investment in Japan.     

二战后中日结盟观比较研究——以中苏同盟、日美同盟为例

战后中日结盟观存在差异。从结盟功能来看,中国谋求的是生存与安全;日本谋求的是从生存、安全到对外权力的增加、对国际秩序的影响。从结盟对象来看,中国的结盟对象包括强国和相对弱势的国家;日本的结盟对象集中在强国。从同盟地位与同盟管理来看,中国强调地位及管理的平等,而日本对这方面的不平等往往持容忍的态度。从结盟基础来看,中国从以面临共同威胁而产生的共同安全利益以及意识形态划界,到淡化、放弃意识形态划界。日本则从以面临共同威胁而产生的共同安全利益以及意识形态划界,到淡化意识形态,再到一度逐渐强化意识形态划界。从结盟影响来看,中国经历了结盟利于和平到不利于和平的观念转变,日本则以结盟利于和平的观念为主。     

Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

American foreign policy analysts have generally viewed World War II as the most important of the six wars the country fought in the twentieth century. By entering this war, so the argument goes, the United States prevented the gravest geopolitical threat to its security—German and Japanese hegemonies in Eurasia—from materializing. Careful reexamination of the best case for U.S. entry into World War II, made by Nicholas Spykman in 1942, demonstrates that the traditional view is misplaced: the United States could have remained secure over the long term had it not entered the war and had it allowed Germany and Japan to win. Its standard of living and its way of life, however, would most likely have suffered. Avoidance of those two outcomes was the real reason to have entered the war. The implications of this analysis for balance of power theory and current American grand strategy are spelled out.     

日朝关系与朝核问题

二战结束至今,日朝之间仍未建立外交关系,因此,两国又被称作“近而远的国家”。目前,战争赔偿问题、日本人绑架问题、导弹发射及出售问题已成为日朝恢复邦交关系的一些障碍因素。尤其是朝核问题成为今后相当长一段时期影响日朝关系的一个主要因素。     

The “Anglo-Saxon” Orientation of Wartime Hungarian Foreign Policy: The Case of Antal Ullein-Reviczky

The political élite of Hungary included a group that expected British and American support for Hungarian revisionist claims after the Paris Peace Conference. Their acknowledged leader was Count István Bethlen, the prime minister from 1921 to 1931 and an adviser to Regent Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy until 1944. This analysis investigates a largely forgotten member of this group. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, a diplomat and scholar, shifted from being a Hungarian nationalist with an anti-Nazi attitude towards secret efforts to establish political relations with Britain during the Second World War. Press chief of the Foreign Ministry and the prime minister’s office, Ullein-Reviczky’s last appointment was Hungarian minister at Stockholm in 1943–1944. Both the Germans and the British put little trust in a man whose wife was the daughter of a British diplomat, yet who maintained superb connexions in pro-German Hungary. He changed his mind gradually when he realised that the price for revising the Treaty of Trianon was unacceptable. His long journey through international politics made him a significant player in a global drama, also assisting Raoul Wallenberg’s mission to Budapest. It is a political odyssey worth remembering.     

日本护理保险制度制定的原因分析及启示

战后,面对快速到来的老龄化社会,日本政府在社会保险方面采取了各种对策,老年护理保险制度经历了从无到有、不断发展完善的过程,其间既有成功经验,又有失败教训。目前,我国的老龄人口护理问题也日益突出,如何建立符合我国国情的老年护理保险体系,日本的做法是具有参考价值的。     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

What really happened at Paris?

Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. £27.50.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from The Foreign Office Confidential Print (General Editors K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt). Part II. From the First to the Second World War. Series I. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (ed.) M. Dockrill, Vols. 1–7. University Publications of America, 1989. $1050 (14 vols).

Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. £40.

F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920–1946, Leicester: Leicester University Press, paperback edition, 1988, £12.95.

Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peace‐making, 1918–1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Translated from the German by Rita and Robert Kimber, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. $40.

Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, New York: Norton, 1986 £24.75.     

俄罗斯与日本的经贸合作

俄罗斯和日本是两个经济大国,在战后50多年间,北方四岛领土问题阻碍了两国的经济合作,使两国经济合作发展得非常缓慢。进入普京-小泉时代,两国间的合作拓展了较为广阔的空间,将在能源领域、远东地区开发等方面进行合作。     

美日同盟的出现与冲绳问题的产生

近数年来,围绕着驻冲绳美军基地,特别是普天间基地问题,美国、日本中央政府、冲绳地方政府两国三方之间发生了尖锐的冲突和争执。冲绳的民众为支持地方政府的政策再次掀起要求美军基地撤离的大规模群众运动。战后以来冲绳人一直在抗争试图减少基地甚至是实现无基地化,60多年过去了,冲绳仍然生活在基地当中。那么,冲绳问题在战后之初到底是如何形成的呢?从美日同盟的角度来探讨这个问题,可以看出,美日同盟的出现导致了冲绳问题的产生。《旧金山对日和约》结束了日本被占领状态,同时《美日安全条约》的签订确定了美日安保体制的法律框架,对冲绳来说更为重要的是《旧金山对日和约》第三条也成为美国统治冲绳的法律依据。也就是说,《旧金山和约》和《美日安全条约》结束了美日之间的敌对关系,并开启了两国之间的同盟关系,与此同时,美日安保体制的确立也就意味着冲绳问题的出现。     

What really happened at Paris?

Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. £27.50.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from The Foreign Office Confidential Print (General Editors K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt). Part II. From the First to the Second World War. Series I. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (ed.) M. Dockrill, Vols. 1-7. University Publications of America, 1989. $1050 (14 vols).

Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. £40.

F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, Leicester: Leicester University Press, paperback edition, 1988, £12.95.

Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peace-making, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Translated from the German by Rita and Robert Kimber, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. $40.

Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, New York: Norton, 1986 £24.75.     

A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945–1950

This article focuses on British intelligence in China, Japan, and Korea from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It seeks to ascertain whether the collection of secret intelligence and its subsequent interpretation provided an accurate picture of Soviet and local communist intentions in East Asia. Since the war against Japan began, the region was largely an American responsibility and remained so after 1945 when they occupied Japan, Korea below the 38^th parallel, and sent forces to China. Much of the intelligence effort for East Asia also devolved upon the Americans. Yet, the British retained an intelligence interest there not least because of their extensive commercial assets in China and the region's proximity to Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia. That interest gathered pace after growing Communist threats inside China and Korea. However, the available intelligence resources for the Far East as a whole were scarce, making it difficult to piece together a clear picture of fast moving events in East Asia.     

From mourning to allegory: Post-3.11 Space Battleship Yamato in motion

Abstract

Since 1977, when the first movie version was premiered, Uchūsenkan Yamato (Space Battleship Yamato) has fueled the continuance of an earlier anime boom in Japan, and in the past decades, the anime text has generated multifarious interpretations. One of the most widely embraced readings contextualizes Yamato within Japan's defeat in the Second World War and this approach to the anime not only celebrated its scientific imagination but also legitimized, with a revisionist tone, the country's righteousness in the war. In the wake of the 3/11 earthquake and the subsequent Fukushima disaster, however, this line of canonical reading has declined. In turn, users of internet social media such as Twitter and 2 Channel have revamped the significance of Yamato, largely extolling the anime text as a prognosis of the Fukushima crisis. Surrounding Yamato, those clamorous voices on the internet appear to have grown into what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call ‘multitude’, a social body of collaboration. Online constituents of multitudes are, though still randomly and loosely connected, gravitating to Yamato's newly discovered quality as the allegory of apocalyptic post-3/11 Japan. Whereas concrete action is yet to be taken, the internet multitudes of Yamato fans have engaged in various brainstorming conversations that concern Japan's future and its relation with nuclear technology.     

Japanese political studies: where are we? How did we get here? Where are we going?

Abstract

We offer a historically grounded analysis of major works in the study of Japanese politics with a focus on the period since the Second World War. The article traces an evolution from early assessments of Japanese democracy and modernization through the focus on the political economy of high growth to the current disciplinary-based emphasis on narrower but more empirically defensible research. We close with a call for future research to take greater risks at synthetic analyses of Japanese politics broadly considered.     

Reparations in the Long Run

This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to “learn the lessons” of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers.     

美国对中越西沙海战的反应

西沙海战爆发后，美国采取不介入的立场，军事上不介入中越海战，外交上不支持任何国家对西沙和南沙群岛的领土要求。其主要原因是：其一，美国认为这两个群岛的主权归属难以确定；其二，西沙海战的交战双方是南越和中国，美国难以取舍；其三，美国已经自越南撤军，出于国内政治的考虑，不愿意也难以介入西沙海战；其四，从根本上讲，美国的国家战略决定其必然采取不介入的政策。美国关注海战后军事和外交局势的发展，同时采取措施，尽量避免其盟国与中国之间发生战事，以推行其反苏遏苏的国家大战略。     

Marmagão exchange

After two years of fighting in World War II, the US and Japan agreed on a second exchange of interned nationals. Neutral territory in Goa, Portuguese India, was chosen in October 1943, The US Consulate in Bombay directed the entire complicated operation. Two ships, each carrying approximately 1,500 refugees, all of whom required nationality checks, stateroom assignments, money settlements, sick passengers had to be transferred, and many other services had to be performed. As all were still enemies, they had to be kept separated throughout the operation. Remarkably, the acutal physical excahnge was completed in only three hours, on Tuesday, 19 October.     

冷战前美国的南中国海政策

冷战前美国的南中国海政策是后来的基础。18世纪末到二战结束,南中国海越来越多地涉及美国利益。二战前,美国在南中国海的利益有限,承担责任亦有限;二战期间,美国已深深地介入南中国海事务,南中国海对美国利益的影响也越来越大,从而决定了整个冷战时期乃至如今美国南中国海政策的方向。     

Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo,the league of nations and Sino‐Japanese conflict, 1931–39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.