The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

Inter-Korean relations and the roles of the US and of the EU

The North Korean nuclear standoff has escalated since North Korea let slip that it was developing nuclear weapons while James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was visiting Pyongyang in October 2002. The Bush administration has acknowledged that the United States will not discount a preemptive military strike on the suspected nuclear development facilities, and North Korea has stood firm against any pressure to halt its nuclear development from the international community. Dialogue and meetings for international cooperation among the major countries concerned, including Korea, the U.S., Japan and China, have been activated to resolve the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, especially after the U.S. pronounced an end to its war against Iraq in early May of this year. In the middle of the rapidly changing situation on the Korean peninsula, the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation initiated by the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae Jung administration and followed by the Roh Moo-hyun administrations Policy of Peace and Prosperity are not separable from the nuclear situation. This paper follows recent developments of inter-Korean relations, illustrates South Koreas stance on the issue and suggests the EUs role on the nuclear issue. This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Asia-EU Journalists Seminar organized by the Asia Europe Foundation and the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), held in Brussels, Belgium, May 22 2003. Financial support from the KPF is gratefully acknowledged.     

朝鲜核试爆与重开六方会谈

朝鲜核试爆是美朝新一轮较量的产物。朝鲜核危机的发展仍取决于美朝关系能否发生变化。重开六方会谈是相关各方的共同愿望,但取得实质性进展的可能很小。朝鲜将实际成为“拥核”国家,朝核危机长期化的可能性越来越大。六方会谈并不因为朝鲜核试爆而减弱其历史作用,它依然是解决朝核问题的最佳形式,也是各方为应对和消除朝鲜“拥核”而进行对话、沟通、协商的理想平台,并有可能进而成为实现朝鲜半岛和平机制和东北亚安全合作的合理载体。     

Military Mobilization and Commitment Problems

Because of its costliness, military mobilization is generally seen as a mechanism by which high-resolve leaders can credibly signal their high resolve in international crises, thereby possibly overcoming informational asymmetries that can lead to costly and inefficient war. I examine how power-shifts caused by mobilization within a crisis can lead to commitment-problem wars. In a simple ultimatum-offer crisis bargaining model of complete information, war occurs if and only if the power-shift caused by mobilization exceeds the bargaining surplus, which is Powell's (2004 Powell, Robert. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power. American Political Science Review, 98 May: 231–241. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2006 Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(1): 169–203. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) general inefficiency condition for commitment-problem wars. When private information is added, and hence mobilization potentially has a stabilizing signaling role, under certain conditions the commitment problem overwhelms the signaling role and mobilization leads to certain war. Finally, I analyze an infinite-horizon model that captures the reality that mobilizing takes time, and find that commitment-problem wars occur under broader conditions than the general inefficiency condition implies.     

Narrating the cultural trauma of 3/11: the debris of post-Fukushima literature and film

Abstract

Images of debris dominate our understanding of the 3/11 triple disaster – earthquake, tsunami, nuclear meltdown – that took place in Japan on 11 March 2011. They have been effectively used to rewrite the story of individual suffering into one of collective tragedy. In this article, debris is a locus for examining the construction of the narrative of 3/11 as cultural trauma. The article analyzes three texts that deal directly with images of 3.11 debris: Fujiwara Toshi's documentary film No Man's Zone and two short stories: Murakami Ryū's ‘Little eucalyptus leaves’ (Yūkari no chisana ha, 2012 Murakami, Ryū, 2012b. Yūkari no chisana ha. In: Sore de mo sangatsu wa, mata. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 245–60. [Google Scholar]) and Saeki Kazumi's ‘Hiyoriyama’ (2012) Saeki, Kazumi, 2012a. Hiyoriyama. Trans. Jeffrey Hunter. In: Elmer Luke and David Karashima eds. March Was Made of Yarn. New York: Vintage Books, 163–81. [Google Scholar]. Fujiwara interrogates the position of the viewer via images of destruction, Murakami connects 3/11 to the multidirectional memory of other global traumas like Auschwitz, and Saeki constructs a local narrative that contrasts the personal experience of the disaster with a televisual or filmic representation. These texts are engaged in the cultural work of constructing 3/11 as collective trauma. They create a collective identity, a ‘we’, for this trauma that speaks both for and against the national narratives of recovery. This article examines images of debris around the one-year anniversary of 3/11 and speculates on the concurrent lack of images of bodies.     

Putin's foreign policy toward North Korea

Since coming to office in 2000, President of the Russian Federation,Vladimir Putin, has taken a pragmatic and calculating approachto the conduct of foreign policy in order to promote Russia'sgeopolitical and economic interests. For him, a higher profileon Korean issues has been an opportunity to show that Moscowcan influence Pyongyang and play a meaningful role in greatpower diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. As a result of activediplomacy toward North Korea, the two former communist alliesput a period to the deteriorating relations in the 1990s; afterthe September 11 terrorists attack and the launch of the waron terrorism Moscow's influence over Pyongyang reached its peak.The beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October2002, however, relegated Moscow to a marginalized position inthe Korean issue. This paper examines how Putin's pragmaticdiplomacy was put into effect in Russia's foreign policy towardNorth Korea and how circumstances on the Korean peninsula haveaffected Russia–DPRK bilateral relations. An analysisof these factors shows why Russia's role in the ongoing Six-Partyprocess has become insignificant. At the present time, it iscertainly plausible that Russia will not activate diplomaticefforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and will besatisfied with merely securing a seat at the multilateral talksin Northeast Asia.     

The post-Aum films of Kurosawa Kiyoshi

The films of Japanese director Kurosawa Kiyoshi in the late 1990s and early 2000s capture the malaise of the ‘lost decade’ (ushinawareta jû-nen) of the 1990s, a period characterized by the end of an economic boom that propelled Japan through two decades of unprecedented prosperity. Facing the decline of high-growth, the country for the first time in two decades could no longer ignore the things that it had suppressed to realize progress: the failure of Japan's radical movements of the 1960s and early 1970s and their de-evolution into extremism. As the haze of prosperity dissipated in the early 1990s, Japan was again stunned by a violent uprising more than two decades after the collapse of the student movements – the Tokyo subway gassings in 1995, an event that many associated with the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The attacks served as a reminder of the deep-seated social dissatisfactions that existed among the activist generation and the violence that results from extremism. Utilizing trauma theory, this paper will examine the way Japan's radical past is re-experienced in Kurosawa's films in the years following the gassings. Through an analysis of the cinematic style of Charisma (Karisuma 1999 Karisuma, 1999. DVD. Directed by Kurosawa Kiyoshi. Nikkatsu Studio. [Google Scholar]), Pulse (Kairô 2001 Kairo, 2001. DVD. Directed by Kurosawa Kiyoshi. Tokyo: Daiei Studio. [Google Scholar]), and other cinematic works in light of their narrative references to radicalism, this article will flesh out the layered process through which Kurosawa's films engage the past while coping with the trauma of post-Aum Japan.     

New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse

Scholars of political communication have long examined newsworthiness by focusing on the news choices of media organizations (Lewin, 1947 Lewin, K. 1947. Frontiers and group dynamics. Human Relations, 1: 143–153. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; White, 1950 White, D. M. 1950. The “gate keeper”: A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27: 383–390. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Sigal, 1973 Sigal, L. V. 1973. Reporters and officials, Lexington, MA: Heath.  [Google Scholar]; Gans, 1979 Gans, H. J. 1979. Deciding what's news, New York: Vintage Books.  [Google Scholar]). However, in recent years these traditional arbiters of the news have increasingly been joined or even supplanted in affecting the public agenda by “new media” competitors, including cable news, talk radio, and even amateur bloggers. The standards by which this new class of decision makers evaluates news are at best only partially explained by prior studies focused on professional journalists and organizations. In this study, we seek to correct this oversight by content analyzing five online news sources—including wire services, cable news, and political blog sites—in order to compare their news judgments in the months prior to, and immediately following, the 2006 midterm election. We collected all stories from Reuters' and AP's “top political news” sections. We then investigated whether a given story was also chosen to appear on each wire's top news page (indicating greater perceived newsworthiness than those that were not chosen) and compared the wires' editorial choices to those of more partisan blogs (from the left: DailyKos.com; from the right: FreeRepublic.com) and cable outlets (FoxNews.com). We find evidence of greater partisan filtering for the latter three Web sources, and relatively greater reliance on traditional newsworthiness criteria for the news wires.     

The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’

To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace. Pope John Paul II, 1 ?1. Pope John Paul II, 25 February 1981. View all notes 1981

Pax Invictis2 ?2. ‘Peace to the undefeated’ or the victor's peace. Inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Solider in St Mary's Cathedral, Sydney, Australia. View all notes

Virtue runs amok. Attributed to G.K. Chesterton     

Informal institutions,forms of state and democracy: the Turkish deep state

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms.1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’; O'Donnell, ‘Another Institutionalization’; O'Donnell, ‘Polyarchies’; Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions’; Merkel and Croissant, ‘Formale und informale Institutionen’; Weyland, ‘Limitations’; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In ‘defective democracies’,2 Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective’. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually ‘the actual rules that are being followed’.3 O'Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: ‘without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where ‘perverse institutionalization’5 Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation’, 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal ‘domination’,6 Weber, Economy and Society. View all notes Herrschaft in a Weberian sense. This modality of dual domination is what I call ‘deep state’.     

Militancy and violence in West Africa: reflecting on radicalisation,comparing contexts and evaluating effectiveness of preventive policies

By 2000, ‘radicalisation’ had become a major global issue. Although ‘9/11’ was still a year away, the American Embassies in East Africa had been bombed in 1998 and violent conflicts simmered in many parts of the world. At just about the same time, bitter civil wars, resource-centred conflicts and intra-ethnic strife raged in West Africa. Against the background of research being undertaken at King's College London,1 1. For example, Dr Olonisakin was researching into the civil wars in the region and was completing her book on the politics of United Nations involvement in the Sierra Leone war, while Dr Alao Alao, Abiodun. 2007. Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment, Rochester: University of Rochester Press.  [Google Scholar] was looking at the politics of natural resource conflicts in the region and was also completing a book on the subject. The Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG), King's College London, was awarded a grant from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to undertake a research project on youth vulnerability and exclusion in West Africa, with Dr Olonisakin Olonisakin, 'Funmi. 2008. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, Boulder: Lynne Reinner.  [Google Scholar] as principal investigator. the mutually reinforcing links between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ (potentially sensitive terms, discussed below) in West Africa became clearly obvious and a successful application to investigate this was submitted to the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).2 2. ‘Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Reflecting on Radicalisation, Comparing Contexts, and Evaluating Effectiveness of Preventive Policies’. Dr F. Olonisakin and Prof A.J.W. Gow. ESRC Award No. RES-181-25-0024. This Special Issue contains articles emerging from that work, with a set of country studies complemented by overarching synthetic analysis.     

Power-sharing and political party engineering in conflict-prone societies: the Indonesian experiment in Aceh

Establishing legitimate political leadership through non-violent means is an essential step in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies. For this reason the successful holding of democratic elections is often seen as the crowning achievement of the peace process. In recent years, however, it has become clear that elections do not always guarantee the peace, and may in fact, make societies more dangerous.1 ?1. Collier Collier, Paul. 2009. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York: Harper Collins.  [Google Scholar], Wars, Guns and Votes; Brancati, Peace by Design. View all notes This has prompted political scientists to look more closely at other dimensions of the transition from violent conflict to democratic politics, including the role of political parties. Political parties play an essential role in all democracies, but their importance is magnified in conflict-prone societies. While some scholars have argued that political parties may help to consolidate peace by forming coalitions between groups formerly in conflict, more recent research suggests that such parties may also entrench social cleavages, especially if party formation is based along former conflict fault lines. This article considers these arguments in the case of Aceh, Indonesia, where an historic peace agreement allowed former Acehnese rebels to form their own political party—one based along both ethnic and former conflict lines.     

Capital Mobility and Current Account Imbalance: Nonlinear Threshold Vector Autoregression Approach

In this study, we utilize the growth rate of gross domestic product as the threshold variable to construct two nonlinear threshold vector autoregression models to re-examine the findings in Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]:23) that “current account imbalance causes capital mobility in developed countries; capital mobility causes current account imbalance in emerging countries.” The nonlinear causality test shows that the findings of Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) can exist only in certain regimes and the primary factor that affects the causality between current account and financial account (and its components of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment) is the asymmetry caused by the business cycle.     

Ableing work,Disableing workers?

Grounded within the substantive conception of ableism (Wolbring 2008 Wolbring, G. 2008. “The Politics of Ableism.” Development 51 (2): 252–258. doi: 10.1057/dev.2008.17[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), this article explores the prejudices and discriminations that arise out of many different forms of ableism: of bodily abilities/disabilities, gender, social structure, and economic organisation. It illustrates the processes and outcomes of ableisms deployed on the shop-floor of a multiple-award winning small-scale manufacturing unit in India. By employing a number of persons with disabilities, single women, and widows, and with plans for engaging juvenile delinquents in the near future, the manufacturing unit has seemingly created opportunities for “empowerment” of those subjected to discrimination. However, the outcomes are not necessarily so.     

Youths in the interface of development and security

This article interrogates the link between youth, security and development in Africa and argues that the central determinant in the link is ‘governance’, especially as this implies the ability of the state to harness the productive potential of youths and to meet their demands on a number of issues. The article also asserts that the reality of a youth bulge in many African countries presents challenges (as opposed to crises), as much as opportunities for national socio-economic transformation. Besides, youths in many developing countries have been the victims of developmental experiments often tele-guided by international financial and development agencies. In its conclusion, the articles argues that efforts to address the challenges posed by youths must move from platitudinous wish-list into formulation of coherent policy agenda that is consistent with the socio-economic and political realities of individual countries; in which youths themselves active agents; and one which must be incorporated into the wider governance framework of nation-states.

The issue of youth and violent conflict concerns more than youth, it is a reflection of society in crisis and hence of development itself. If a society's values, norms, customs, practices, structures and institutions are under threat and such changes in turn threaten the development of its children into youth and then adults, then that society cannot sustain itself.1 ?1. UNDP, Youth and Violent Conflict, p.12. View all notes

The state … the economy… are predicated on notions of adulthood; they all require the participation of adults in order to function. If youth are unable to fully make this transition to the minimal conditions of adulthood, then such structures are unsustainable and will either fracture or mutate in unforeseen ways. An understanding of the intersections between youth, violent conflict and society is a way of re-examining development and developing societies. Youth, those who engage in violence and especially those who do not, are located at the junctures between development, security, peace and conflict.2 ?2. UNDP, Youth and Violent Conflict, p.13. View all notes     

Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state

For the first time in 51 years of independence, Malaysia's ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) under the weak leadership of Abdullah Badawi was denied its customary parliamentary two-third majority in the 2008 elections. The three major opposition parties, which formed the Pakatan Rakyat (The People's Alliance, PR) after the elections, increased the number of opposition-held state governments from one to five. The opposition had never held more than two state governments at any one time.1 Chin and Wong, ‘Malaysia's Electoral Upheaval’. Parts of this paper were used in a research project organized by the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. View all notes For many practitioners and students of Malaysian politics, the 2008 poll means the birth of a long overdue ‘two-party system’, where two multi-ethnic coalitions contest for power and alternate in running the country. After all, two similar attempts to build a Malay-dominated second coalition to rival the ruling coalition dominated by the ethno-nationalist United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were made in the 1990 and 1999 elections by former UMNO leaders who lost in their party in-fighting. Sadly, the coalitions built did not survive even the next elections. We argue that such optimism may be misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the ‘electoral one-party state’ nature of Malaysia.2 Wong and Norani, ‘Malaysia at 50’. View all notes Despite having held 13 national elections without failure, and having almost no incidence of in- or post-election violence, neither a military coup nor ‘people's power’, Malaysia has never been anywhere close to being a ‘consolidated democracy’, 52 years after joining what Huntington called the second wave of democratization.3 Huntington, The Third Wave. View all notes For Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy requires not only a government with de facto authority to generate policy and exclusive de jure power, but also that ‘this government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote’. In other words, democracy has to become ‘the only game in town’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 5. View all notes     

Post-9/11 counterterrorism in popular culture: the spectacle and reception of The Bourne Ultimatum and 24

This article examines the representation of counterterrorism in contemporary film and television and surveys its reception among active online audiences. Contemporary counterterrorism fiction like The Bourne Ultimatum (2007 The Bourne ultimatum. 2007. Film. Directed by Paul Greengrass. Produced by Doug Liman, Henry Morrison and Jeffrey M. Weiner. USA.  [Google Scholar]; Film. Directed by Paul Greengrass) and the TV series 24 (2001–2010; Television series. Created by Robert Cochran and Joel Surnow), present viewers with conventional hero-driven narratives wrapped in a spectacle of high-tech surveillance technologies. As counterterrorism is an inherently covert exercise, the widespread popularity of these Hollywood franchises raises questions about how the public understands the capabilities and ethics of counterterrorism. These questions are addressed through an analysis of the generic and aesthetic features of the texts along with a survey of audience responses on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb).     

Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR Congo

Border towns bring out the worst in a country… 1 ?1. Charlton Heston ‘Vargas’ in Touch of Evil, 1958. View all notes