Trust, Cooperation and Friendship

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Peace,Development and Progress

Theinternationalsituationinthepastyearwascomplicatedandchangeable.TheUnitedStateswagedwaronIraq熏whichshockedtheworld鸦therelationshipamongtheworldpowershadundergonepro鄄foundchanges鸦therehadbeennewdivisionandrealignmentintherelationsacrosstheAtlantic鸦thebuildingof″LargeEurope″hadmaderapidprogress鸦theMiddle-EastsituationhadremainedunstablewithPalestineandIsraelstillgettingstuckinantroubledtimes鸦KoreaPeninsulanuclearissuehaddrawntheworldwideattention鸦UNwasregainingitsvigorafterhavin…     

Change, Gain and Loss

Five years have passed since the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred. America s counter-terrorism campaign is still on the way. Besides the momentary monumental significance of the fifth anniversa- ry, five years is still too short in regard to the lo…     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.     

APEC, ASEM, SCO and New Security Concept

I. The timely birth of the three major organizations 1. The establishment of APEC in 1989 and its development afterwards well go withthe requirement of the time and people's aspirations. APEC includes almost all the major countries and economies in the region, which have diversified social systems, cultures, values and history backgrounds. Also there are sharp discrepancies either between the geographical sizes of the countries or between economic strength, with their economic performance a…     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

The Use of Force—Stability and Instability: India,Pakistan, and China

This article evaluates the source of instability and stability in the India-Pakistan dyad and the Sino-Indian dyad. Challenging the dominant thesis that “means determine ends,” the article posits that the use of force by Pakistan renders the India-Pakistan relationship unstable, whereas the Sino-Indian relationship is significantly more stable because of the absence of force. The difference in the state of stability in both dyads is because the weaker state, Pakistan in its conflict with India has failed to accept the verdict of its military defeats. This failure to internalize irreversible military outcomes makes Pakistan particularly susceptible to employing forcible solutions to settle its dispute with India over Kashmir. The reality reverses in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, in that India has implicitly accepted its military loss against China in 1962 and charted a diplomatic pathway in resolving the boundary dispute.     

Sterling,Bretton Woods,and Social Democracy, 1968–1970

Following the November 1967 sterling devaluation, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson struggled to defend the new exchange rate of £1?=?$2.40. Sterling's travails continued throughout 1968 and well into 1969 despite growing evidence that the external balance was moving into the black. Its problems arose from external difficulties, notably from the growth of footloose balances of foreign currencies—especially Eurodollars—within the international economy and from instability caused by the decline of the Bretton Woods system. Labour was determined to protect the new exchange rate, since a new devaluation or even a float would have led to a run on the pound, the collapse of its economic strategy, and the failure of its attempt to build a social-democratic order in Britain. It was successful in the end thanks to growing confidence in its policies and to belated international co-operation designed to salvage the Bretton Wood regime.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

Geopolitical Implications of the US Unconventional Energy Revolution

The unconventional oil and gas revolution is certainly a game changer in the current international political setting, since it will bring the United States close to energy self-sufficiency. However, it seems unlikely that this new energy status will dramatically redefine US foreign policy and security priorities. In strategic regions such as the Middle East, US interests are expected to remain unchanged, while the new energy status will contribute only in part to modifying the US approach towards the EU’s energy posture vis-à-vis Russia. What the new American energy condition is likely to change are the tools and policy options available to Washington to cope with the strategic challenges – China’s power in primis – emerging in the multipolar international relations system.     

US–Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Forward and Retro after 2008?

Abstract

The arrival of a new US administration in 2009 is a swinging door with respect to opportunities for Russian–American cooperation in strategic nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation. Both US presidential candidates in 2008 supported nuclear abolition as a theoretically desirable goal, and the Obama administration will certainly pursue nuclear arms reductions consistent with already agreed, or lower, levels. Missile defenses complicate US–Russian relations on this issue, but they pose negotiable, not insurmountable, barriers to further arms reductions and strategic stability.     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER 9–11

Can military reform in Russia become a reality, or is it doomed forever to the status of oxymoron? The answer to this question will have as much to do with US-Russian relations as with internal Russian politics and finance. Despite a warm personal friendship between Presidents Putin and Bush, polls show the Russian people remain highly ambivalent about US policies and intentions toward Russia and the CIS. Many inside and outside the military believe the United States will use the war in Afghanistan and its foothold in Central Asia to encircle and weaken Russia. This thinking has spilled over into attacks on Putin for his attempts at military reform, particularly his decision to de-emphasize the strategic nuclear forces. While Putin has made some courageous moves to stem corruption and bring the military to heel, in other cases he has been forced to back off in order to avoid a political backlash. As a result, military reform continues to proceed in fits and starts, still more oxymoron than reality.     

朝鲜半岛安全问题及中国与有关各方的合作策略

自朝鲜核试验到最近的"天安"号事件,朝鲜半岛及东北亚安全形势发生重大变化。问题的解决涉及多方甚至整个国际社会。中国应妥善处理中美关系,加强中、日、韩三国间的互信、共识与合作,加强与俄罗斯及国际社会的沟通与合作。在坚决促朝弃核,推进半岛无核化的同时以经济外交为杠杆促朝融入国际社会,在寻求外交谈判解决半岛危机的同时,做好应对半岛可能出现的突发事件的准备。     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

朝鲜的核、导战略态势及其影响

朝鲜实施导弹发射和地下核试验,意在实现核拥有,籍以提高对美战略的筹码。朝鲜开展核战略角逐由来已久,先后展开过以守为攻;“边缘”对应;将计就计;以硬对强四个回合。角逐结果虽不乏战术上的小胜,却丧失了战略上的大胜。此番的导弹试射与地下核试验可视为第五个回合,是朝鲜核、导角逐战略“以攻为守”的转换。朝鲜执意实现核拥有纵有多种原因,却因核、导本身所拥有的“双刃剑”作用,带来于己、于他都不利的负面影响。包括:自食其言,愈加难以取信于国际社会;产生连锁反映,引发新一轮的军备竞赛;挑战核不扩散条约,难免遭到更大封杀;破坏合作气氛,延缓统一进程;置中国于尴尬境地,动摇中朝关系基础。朝鲜的“自行其事”难免遭到国际社会更加严厉的抵制。