Contextualising and theorising economic development,local business and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

After Myanmar ended military rule in 2011, significant foreign investment arrived to facilitate a profitable transition to an integrated regional economy, and under the promise that foreign actors can help facilitate peaceful long-term development. However, these firms have also tacitly supported an ethnic cleansing committed by the government that most have partnered with or funded. This article builds theory on economic opening, development and conflict, using research from Myanmar to forward three arguments about business actions in fragile, at-risk countries. First, international-led regulatory reform has had little impact on endemic corruption at the micro- or meso-levels, as local elites and international businesses remain the primary beneficiaries. Second, ‘development’ is a contentious topic, defined locally not as broad societal growth but the unjustified picking of winners and losers in society by foreign entities. Third, business ventures are exacerbating ethnic tensions through a liberal peace-building mentality that is unresponsive to either local conflicts or local communities. The article closes by offering three ways that these findings open future research avenues on business engagement as peace-builders and development agents in developing yet fragile states.     

“So,the Killings Continued”: Wartime Mobilization and Post-War Violence in KwaZulu-Natal,South Africa

ABSTRACT

Many post-war states experience continuous low-intensity violence for years after the formal end of the conflict. Existing theories often focus on country-level explanations of post-war violence, such as the presence of spoilers or the nature of the peace agreement. Yet, post-war violence does not affect all communities equally; whereas some remain entrenched in violence, others escape the perpetuation of violent conflict. We argue that communities where wartime mobilization at the local level is based on the formation of alliances between armed groups and local elites are more likely to experience post-war violence, than communities where armed groups generate civilian support based on grassroots backing of the group’s political objectives. We explore this argument in a comparison of three communities in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, which have experienced different levels of post-war violence. The analysis supports the main argument and contributes to the research on the microdynamics of civil war by outlining the implications of certain strategies of wartime mobilization and how these may generate localized legacies.     

Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict.     

The political process of Boko Haram insurgency onset: a political relevance model

ABSTRACT

As more data emerges on the Boko Haram phenomenon, the controversy over the roots of the insurgency persists. While some emphasise transnational motivational factors based on the Salafist ideology, others focus on diverse local structural factors, including the economy, religion, and politics. Although this article acknowledges the importance of these factors, it argues that these are ubiquitous contextual factors which insufficiently explain the location and timing of the insurgency. By introducing the Political Relevance Model, this article theorises the insurgency onset by focusing on the agency of the local political elites and their relationship with the sect. It finds that the insurgency is rooted in an initial mutually beneficial relationship between the local political elites and a politically relevant group that turned sour, resulting in the attempt by the elites to withdraw the group’s earlier privileges using state coercion which the group frames as state repression requiring violent resistance. These agents have, in their interest, framed this struggle to resonate with the people.     

Revolutionary conflict in federations: the Indian case

Federations promise to provide autonomous, representative governance that is flexible enough to overcome potential internal conflict resulting from the dual stresses of governing diverse populations and power overreach. India is the world's biggest federation but also hosts the most violent revolution in modern history against a federal state. Since 2004, 150,000 people have been killed or displaced in the war between the Communist Party of India-Maoist and India's government. Conflict management efforts led not to resolution but catastrophe across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as state responses contradicted each other and the centre's efforts. The differences illustrated how institutional mechanisms of decentralisation create, sustain and otherwise alter internal revolutionary conflicts that cross subunit boundaries. Three unique characteristics come into play when federal governments tackle revolutionary conflict: picking from subunit actions like policy buffets, exacerbation of state–subunit fissures and empowerment of local elites who put political self-interest above conflict resolution.     

Peace-building and business elites in Guatemala and El Salvador: explaining the discursive ‘institutional turn’

ABSTRACT

The local business elites of El Salvador were generally in favour of the peace agreement and supported its negotiation and implementation in 1992, while in Guatemala the private sector reluctantly supported the peace process and, after the peace agreements were signed in 1996, the private sector sought to obstruct parts of its implementation. In the aftermath of the peace accords, business elites united around an ideology espousing a minimal state and a focus on market solutions to social problems. Although welcoming the security-related measures in the peace accords, business elites have often obstructed transformations towards more inclusive and democratic societies. However, in recent years there has been a change in discourse among influential business associations towards recognition of the need for strong state institutions and the need for institutionalised mechanisms for dialogue to find solutions to social problems. In this article, we seek to shed light on the significance of this discursive turn for continued peace-building.     

Broadening ‘business’, widening ‘peace’: a new research agenda on business and peace-building

ABSTRACT

What role does business play in peace-building and conflict reduction? This special issue tackles this complex question, exploring varied business efforts to bring peace through six rigorous qualitative cases in Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somaliland, Brazil, Guatemala and El Salvador. Three main findings cut across this issue. First, local context is paramount to success; there is no one universal formula that a regulator, business or peace practitioner aiming to advance a business agenda for peace can employ for operational success. Second, rather than compartmentalising ‘peace’ into projects that often carry ‘win-lose’ consequences for local communities, business-peace projects must first understand who they are empowering so that they do not unwittingly make the conflict worse. Third, investment and access are deeply intertwined in fragile and conflict-affected areas, and business-peace projects that simply try to improve business access typically exacerbate inequalities favouring elite actors. We close with a discussion on how to take the business and peace-building agenda forward with scholarship and policy, stressing that business-peace projects must be assessed at the societal and not project level if their impact is to be truly beneficial for a political economy of peaceful development.     

Elections and “sons of the soil” conflict dynamics in Africa and Asia

Recent research reveals that nearly one-third of ethnic civil wars since 1945 have been “sons of the soil” (SoS) conflicts that pit indigenous populations against internal migrants. Despite important differences across SoS conflicts, many share a common trait as they often escalate during elections. While scholars have examined the causal mechanisms behind electoral violence, the relationship between elections and SoS conflicts has been overlooked. By examining a wide range of cases, the article breaks with previous research that privileges in-depth case studies of SoS conflicts with high levels of violence. Using insights from recent fieldwork in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia, the article sheds light on the causal dynamics that link elections and diverging levels of SoS conflict. In so doing, it illustrates how the severing of patronage networks and the shifting balance of power towards migrants create fertile contexts for political elites to instrumentalize local grievances. Elections are thus more likely to produce violent SoS conflicts when elites (at both the national and local levels) are able to mobilize supporters by playing upon these grievances, often through the politicization of citizenship and/or the ethnicization of the local sphere.     

Fighting for a name on the ballot: constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia

ABSTRACT

What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active in the 2016 Zambian general election. Our statistical analyses show constituencies with an incumbent standing for re-election were more likely to experience nomination violence. Also, contrary to previous research on general election violence, we theorize and find that more rural constituencies had a higher propensity for nomination violence than urban constituencies. Our findings highlight the importance of intra-party power relations and the bargaining relationship between the centre and periphery.     

Business engagement in violence prevention and peace-building: the case of Kenya

Kenyan business was important in mitigating episodes of election violence in 2007–2008 and 2013. This article finds that this role was motivated by the ethical and moral commitments of key business leaders to further peace in times of violence; and by interests in preventing future economic loss. However, by adopting a lens that situates business roles in violence prevention and peace-building within Kenya’s conflict systems and political economy, the article finds a paradox: this lens confirms the Kenyan ‘success story’ with respect to specific violent episodes; but it also reveals a much more limited role for business in transforming the underlying sources of conflict; especially when these are congruent with key business fundamentals connected to land ownership, property rights, export-oriented production or services, or a ‘limited’ access order. Overall, the article highlights that business should leverage its comparative advantages within broader multi-stakeholder coalitions, especially in terms of its ability to influence political leaders, entry-points for informal dialogue to diffuse crises and capital to support peace-building initiatives.     

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.     

Domestic political conflict,issue areas,and some dimensions of foreign policy behavior other than conflict∗

This paper examines the seemingly complex linkage between domestic political conflict and external behavior by broadening our consideration of foreign policy behavior. Underlying this analysis is a view that there are elements of both assertiveness and caution in the political use of foreign policy by domestically threatened leaders. They act assertively to divert attention away from domestic issues and enhance the image of their regime, but at the same time they are likely to show some restraint in order to avoid costly military and economic reactions by foreign actors. It is hypothesized that domestic conflict affects the degree of independence, commitment, and intensity in a nation's foreign policy behavior, but no so much its foreign conflict. Supplementing this, the mediating role of another foreign policy property, substantive issue area, is examined as a means of identifying conditions under which the impact of internal unrest would be greatest. The results of the analysis are mixed, but they do lend credibility to the idea that domestic conflict is related to multiple dimensions of foreign policy. More broadly, they suggest that governments employ different foreign policy strategies in coping with different types of domestic political conflict.     

Managing conflict in north-west Kenya: the siege of Loregon and its aftermath

Conflict management in the context of ethnic boundaries and a history of inter-ethnic violence remains a challenge in a range of socio-economic contexts. Conflict management in remote rural areas within developing states where state presence and capacity is relatively weak amidst a background of prolonged and ongoing inter-ethnic violence is particularly challenging. This article examines a case of successful bottom-up efforts to manage conflict at the micro level in northern Kenya. Focusing on the so-called siege of Loregon and its aftermath, this case study describes dynamics on one part of the ‘border’ between Turkana and Pokot ethnic groups, examining the causes and consequences of this violent episode, with a particular focus on recent successes at the local level in managing conflict and as a consequence in reducing the likelihood of future violence in a particular locality, despite ongoing violence in other parts of the interface between Turkana-Pokot ethnic groups.     

Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict

This paper makes two arguments. First, the political and economic institutions of a state affect that state's foreign policy preferences. Second, dyads with similar political and economic institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyads. After developing the logic of these arguments, I create measures of political and economic institutional similarity and test the hypotheses against the empirical record. The empirical analysis supports the argument that dyadic institutional similarity reduces the likelihood of conflict. The most noteworthy finding is that economic institutional similarity, even when the political institutions in a dyad are dissimilar, reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict.     

Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria: the economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency

Nigeria presents an important case for examining the interaction between economic emergence and (in)security on account of the Boko Haram-led insurgency. This paper interrogates long-standing theoretical assumptions about the economic consequences of violent conflict in such a complex space. It analyses the cost of North-East Nigeria’s conflict on development by considering its impact on the economy at the national and subnational levels. Generalised assumptions about the ways through which conflict affects development appear to hold in some regards but not in others. Evidence suggests some disruption in fiscal adjustments at the macro level, trade and investment as well as agricultural production and commerce within the North-East but less so with regard to economic growth and foreign direct investment flows at the national level. The paper finds evidence of a dichotomy in terms of the impact of the conflict on the national and subnational economy. There is a high degree of containment of the repercussions of the conflict at the subnational level. However, there remains a degree of interconnectedness across these strata that are influenced by both domestic and international political economy dynamics.     

Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state

International efforts to resolve the Somali crisis have foundered on one central paradox: the restoration of state institutions is both an apparent solution to the conflict and its most important underlying cause. Somalis tend to approach disarmament and demobilisation—two central pillars of the ‘state-building’ process—with the fundamental question: who is disarming whom? If the answer threatens to entrench unbalanced and unstable power relations, then it may also exacerbate and prolong the conflict. In this paper, the authors examine disarmament and demobilisation initiatives from southern Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. In southern Somalia, externally-driven disarmament and demobilisation initiatives in support of successive interim ‘governments’ have been widely viewed with suspicion and alarm. In Somaliland and Puntland, Somali-led, locally owned efforts have achieved a degree of success that can be instructive elsewhere. The authors conclude that conventional international approaches to ‘state-building’ in Somalia must be reassessed—notably that security sector issues must be treated not as a purely ‘technical’ issue, but as an integral part of the political process.     

Debunking Brazilian Exceptionalism in its Africa Relations: Evidence from Angola and Tanzania

ABSTRACT

From 2003, President Lula heralded a new dawn in Brazil’s expanding African relations. Brazil was claimed to be unlike other exploitative powers because of its cultural, geographic and historic connections; Africa’s true brother. Despite the passing of two decades and a number of scandals, this narrative of exceptionalism remains. Studies on Brazil–Africa relations tend to focus on the Brazilian state as the key, essentially benign agent. Our analysis uses the case studies of Angola and Tanzania to debunk the idea of Brazilian exceptionalism. We demonstrate the significant, overlooked agency of corporations in shaping and implementing Lula’s Africa Policy, and determining its developmentally dubious outcomes. Additionally, the paper shows how political elites in Africa directed Brazilian government and companies into their political and business norms. Thus, Brazil–Africa relations replicated much of the typical economic patterns of the continent’s trade, with oft-controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction and infrastructure.     

When aid builds states: party dominance and the effects of foreign aid on tax collection after civil war

ABSTRACT

Does foreign aid strengthen or weaken post-conflict states? We examine the effects of aid on tax collection after civil war, an important dimension of state effectiveness. While the literature emphasizes aid’s perverse effects, the relationship between aid dependence and the growth of tax collection is unclear. We argue that the impact of aid reflects its political utility for ruling elites in consolidating their authority after civil war. While dominant parties subvert tax strengthening reforms to solidify their political base, elites in more fractionalized settings rely on external political backing to manage internal challenges to their authority, and are more likely to comply with donor conditions. We test this argument through a Latent Curve Analysis of tax collection rate growth in post-civil war countries from 1978 to 2012. We find that aid is associated with slower growth in tax collection in dominant party settings, and more rapid tax growth in politically fractionalized settings. The findings highlight the need for attention to internal political dynamics to explain aid effectiveness after civil war, and point to opportunities to strengthen institutions in some post-conflict countries.     

Narcotics,Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

While the academic debate on security has broadened in recent years, it has failed to cohesively include transnational organized crime and drug trafficking as a security issue. However, especially in weak states in developing and postcommunist regions, these phenomena are having an increasingly negative effect on security in the military, political, economic, and societal sense. Security issues in Central Asia are a prominentexample of the links between drug trafficking and military threats to security. This is illustrated most clearly by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has been both a major actor in the drug trade from Afghanistan to Central Asia as well as the most serious violent nonstate actor in the region. The link between the drug trade and armed conflict is of fundamental importance to understanding the challenges to Central Asian security.     

Ethnic Elites and Rituals of Provocation: Politicians,Pastors, and Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Prominent theories of ethnic conflict argue that instrumental ethnic elites incite violence in order to promote their own power. Yet this approach focuses primarily on political leaders and ignores other ethnic elites, meaning that we know little about how other influential actors think about provocation. In this paper, I present novel data from Northern Ireland on diverse elite attitudes toward polarising Protestant parades with a long history of sparking ethnic violence. Using original surveys of Protestant elected officials and clergy as well as interviews with ex-paramilitaries, this paper demonstrates that these elite groups have different, often competing, interests and opinions regarding contested parades: while politicians tend to support provocative parades, the others do not. By addressing elite actors that are often ignored, I present a more nuanced picture of elite-mass relations and ethnic mobilisation in conflict.