世界主义对世界秩序的建构及其挑战

在全球化时代,世界主义价值的回归促进了世界秩序的转型,由特殊主义和权力政治为导向的国际秩序逐渐转向以普遍价值和全球正义为依归的复合多层次的全球社会秩序。而面对2008年来世界秩序转型中的新情势、新挑战,世界主义需要重新全面审视"国家"回归的可能性,重新认识与社群主义的争论;在非西方国家普遍崛起过程中摆脱西方中心观念,将非西方价值与文化纳入世界秩序构建中去;同时,在全球发展实践的过程中,需要不断丰富世界主义价值"落地"的方式。世界主义可以从人类整体主义、政治去中心化以及具体问题解决的在地化等角度加以完善,这为世界秩序的转型提供了有益启示。     

现行国际秩序演变的方向与中国的选择

中国与西方国家使用不同术语来描述现行国际秩序,双方对国际秩序的认识也确实存在明显差异。但是仔细分辨之后,又能发现中国与西方的国际秩序观实际上重叠之处远大于差异之处。2008年金融危机后,国际秩序开始发生重大变化。2020年的新冠肺炎疫情进一步加剧了这一变化。一方面国际格局的变化导致西方国家认为现行国际秩序遭到新兴大国挑战,另一方面西方国家内部对全球化的不满则导致一些西方国家主动挑战现行国际秩序。当前国际秩序演变出现了自由主义色彩消退、民族国家作用逐渐强化的趋势,这将导致中国与西方国家在某些方面的竞争加剧,但也有可能导致双方对国际秩序演变方向的认知差异缩小。只有准确理解国际秩序演变的这些脉络,中国才能更好地进行战略和政策抉择以趋利避害。     

美国霸权与国际秩序

20世纪是美国霸权的时代,其间三次国际秩序建设的诉求都是与美国霸权目标直接相关的.伍德罗·威尔逊的世界秩序设计和霸权目标是奠基性的,制定了20世纪美国的外交政策议程及其霸权方式.富兰克林·罗斯福接过其世界秩序的火炬,促成了联合国的创立,以此为基础的国际制度体系,将美国推上了西方世界霸权的宝座.冷战结束以来,尤其是乔治·W·布什遵循具有帝国特征的单极秩序逻辑,体现了美国大战略的转轨.鉴于多边国际制度作为建构未来秩序的基本原则越来越成为国际社会的共识,美国当前的单边主义战略难以奏效.     

中美“他”大三国结构与中国安全环境

正现在谈国际局势往往会和所谓"国际秩序"问题联系在一起。在西方的舆论环境中,所谓"国际秩序"就是美国主导的国际格局。而从美国主导的角度看,中国的崛起本身就是对美国霸权的挑战。所以,中国和平发展面临的国际环境问题,主要是美国以确保其霸权地位为核心的战略所构成的挑战。一、美国霸权与中美"他"大三国结构     

国际秩序变动中的“全球南方”与中国角色

作为一个术语，“全球南方”是国际舆论和学术研究中热议和争论的理论问题；作为一种现实，“全球南方”是影响国际格局、世界秩序、全球治理变革的重要力量。“全球南方”的崛起，既有国际格局新变化的深层背景，也有非常浓厚的大国博弈色彩，同时为深化全球发展治理合作提供了新机遇。金砖国家作为“全球南方”的代表，利用金砖国家合作机制，参与全球治理，促推全球治理体系的民主化改革与务实合作。当前，“全球南方”国家普遍不满西方国家试图强加给发展中世界的所谓基于规则的国际秩序，主张推动国际秩序朝着更加公正合理的方向发展。中国既是金砖国家的重要成员之一，更是“全球南方”的当然成员，还是南南合作的重要引领者，当下则面临着严峻且复杂的国际形势：一方面，以美国为首西方国家借助分类、拉拢和施压等手段，试图分化瓦解“全球南方”乃至排斥和制衡中国；另一方面，“全球南方”国际影响力渐增，自主发展意识和制度建设加强。鉴此，中国继续坚定不移地维护发展中国家共同利益，并可基于自身发展经验，不断深化“全球南方”国家之间新型南南合作，从而不断助力全球发展治理新架构的构建。     

威慑与新世纪美国核战略

美国国防部的《核态势评估报告》于2002 年1 月正式出台, 这标志着在经过近10 年 的调整后, 新世纪的美国核战略已现雏形。新的核战略在坚持核威慑的同时, 将威慑的对象扩大并 且重点发生转移, 提出建立“新的三位一体”威慑力量体系, 加强常规和防御力量, 构建一种全方位 的威慑。新世纪美国核战略的调整必将对大国关系、战略态势和未来的国际安全格局产生重大影 响。     

后危机时代的美国霸权与中美的亚太博弈

美国霸权是冷战后世界秩序中最重要的特征。金融危机的爆发以及中国崛起引起了人们对美国全球领导地位的广泛争论。奥巴马政府高调宣布“重返亚太”战略，中美之间围绕亚太地区的博弈愈加剧烈。全球格局／战略与地区格局／战略息息相关，本文立足对后危机时代美国全球霸权地位的判断，对美国亚太战略的基本目标和政策手段以及中美关系的新博弈进行了分析。     

“大变局”下的大国战略竞争

当下的世界,正在经历复杂而深刻的历史性变化.究竟如何看待和定义这种"大变局",它是否意味着新的国际战略格局和世界秩序已经形成,国际社会还莫衷一是.笔者认为,判断国际战略格局变迁主要有两个指标,那就是国际主要行为体之问的力量对比和维系国际秩序运转的规制是否发生了根本性变化.从这两个层面考察,我们可以看到,冷战结束后形成的"一超多强"格局并未发生根本性变化:一方面,仍没有任何一个大国或国家联盟的综合国力能与美国相匹敌;另一方面,仍没有一套新的国际机制和规则能取代美国所主导的国际规制.     

后金融危机时代的全球地缘政治变局与中国的机遇

源于美国次贷危机的全球金融危机对世界格局产生了深远影响,国际体系正经历着冷战结束以来最大的地缘政治变动。后危机时代,国际体系将发生一系列深刻变化:新兴大国群体崛起,传统大国趋向衰落,国际战略力量分化重组,多极化发展到一个新的阶段;中美力量对比发生此消彼长的重大变化,中美关系将成为今后一个时期全球最重要的双边关系;大国关系趋向缓和,全球和地区地缘对抗色彩淡化;国际秩序酝酿结构性调整,中国面临历史性机遇。     

国际组织与世界秩序——为联合国成立50周年而作

国际组织是一定的世界秩序的产物,又是为维护这种秩序而存在的。 联合国是以雅尔塔协议体系为基础并以维护这一体系为目标,在安理会中赋予5大国以否决权,实行“大国一致”方针,是历史的一大进步。但是在半个世纪的时间里,联合国因两极格局的制约,作为是很有限的。 现在世界已发生巨大变化,联合国也必须随着形势的发展而进行改革和加强。需要从建立和维护一定的世界秩序的角度,来规划和考虑这一重大问题。     

General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory

Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Nonetheless, despite a few exceptions, the quantitative literature has ignored the subject of general deterrence, focusing almost exclusively on situations of immediate deterrence. My purpose in this essay is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting a recently developed theory of general deterrence—Perfect Deterrence Theory—to a systematic test by examining general deterrence from 1816–2000. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are strongly supported by the empirical record.     

Capability,Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence

Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of extended deterrent threats with different characteristics. We find that defense pacts with more capability and more credibility reduce the probability that a member state will be a target of a militarized dispute. We also find that states can affect the capability and credibility of their extended deterrent threats through alliance design. Members of defense pacts that include higher levels of peacetime military coordination are less likely to be attacked. This analysis provides support for deterrence theory in the context of extended general deterrence. It also provides evidence that should aid policymakers in designing security structures to meet their goals.     

U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

East Asia in a unipolar international order and Europe’s role in the region

This article attempts to explore the post-Cold War international system in which regional orders intermingle their influence. It pays special attention to regional conflicts in East Asia in the new era and what roles global powers could play to maintain regional stability. I will first examine the characteristics of the new global order after the end of the bipolarity. I will then focus on American foreign policy in the new international system in the context of its dealing with major global events that have strategic implications for its relations with other major global powers. As to discussions of regional orders, this article focuses on East Asia, where conflicts between states have not evaporated despite the relaxation of the global Cold War confrontation. What makes this area special is the involvements of many great powers and less-powerful nations that could somehow easily manipulate the seniors into the conflicts to their favour. While the regional order in East Asia is being shaped by the post- Cold War international order, the regions peace and conflicts will in turn significantly influence global order. Finally, I will argue that dealing with problems in East Asia should acquire involvements of powers that would give necessary momentum to the existing participants to solve conflicts by the means of multilateralism. The European Union (EU) is often forgotten for its role in contributing to world order, and the EU should be taken seriously by the powers in East Asia as a possible player in maintaining the regional peace. I conclude that both global and regional security depend on continuing US unipolarity, strengthened by the co-operation of the EU in the form of multilateralism. By the same token, US unilateralism without a EU counter-balancing it, only invites potential challengers, such as China, to threaten the USs preponderant position, thereby destabilising world peace.This article was supported by a research project (NSC-P3-2414-H-004-018) of the National Science Council, Taiwan, which is gratefully acknowledged.     

太空武器化及中国太空安全构建

太空技术的出现来自冷战时代的美苏军备竞赛。在世界第一颗卫星上天后,太空随之被赋予了军事化意味,太空武器化接踵而至。冷战后,为了确保太空霸权,同时维护一超独霸的地位,美国不惜重拾冷战时代的太空武器化政策,由此,引起其他国家的相应回应。太空武器化程度逐渐抬升,给国际战略稳定与平衡造成严重威胁与挑战,引起反导系统和太空军备竞赛,增加核战风险,阻碍世界核裁军进程,也给太空商业开发、"太空2030议程"等带来诸多挑战。太空武器化给中国太空安全造成巨大的挑战与威胁,使中国太空资产的安全陷于危险境地,中国利用太空资产的自由有可能被限制或被剥夺,战略目标(包括战略核力量)受到太空系统的侦察与打击的威胁。为应对太空武器化的威胁与挑战,从安全上加强太空威慑力量建设,构建中国的太空安全体系显得紧迫与必要。     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

This article examines whether geographical proximity between defensive allies and a protégé increases the likelihood of successful extended general deterrence. I argue that proximate allies are better at making a credible deterrent threat because proximate allies are more willing and able to help alliance partners in times of crisis than distant ones. This claim is theorized by examining how geographical distance influences the international and domestic costs of alliance commitments. The empirical tests reveal that a potential aggressor is less likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a target with proximate defensive allies. Furthermore, I find that the power of proximate defensive allies is a more significant determinant of successful extended general deterrence than that of distance allies. Interestingly, I also find that the constraining effects of geographical distance on the effectiveness of extended general deterrence have been alleviated by advancements in military technologies throughout history.     

Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

The basic logic of graduated deterrence worked fairly well against the Soviet Union, as each level of aggression was to be deterred by a matching response. But this logic has now been undermined vis-à-vis future rogue state chemical and biological attacks by the spread of dual-use technologies that can be diverted to weapons, and by decisions of the United States and other democracies to forego possession of chemical or biological weapons. This article identifies some of the serious difficulties of alternative approaches to deterring chemical or biological attacks, ranging from nuclear escalation to a reliance on supposed American advantages in conventional weapons. Lumping chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons into a new category of "weapons of mass destruction" is a very imperfect solution.