我国法院调解制度的博弈分析--再论调审分离

法院调解中双方当事人之间的讨价还价过程可以被模型化为一个不完全信息动态博弈,运用博弈理论分别考察在调审分离与调审合一两种情况下双方当事人的和解情况,可以得出调审分离更有利于提高调解的成功率的结论.此外,要提高和解的成功率,不但相关事实的查明是必要的,而且法院也不应该按同一个标准收费.     

农村社会协同治理:实践模式与理论构想——以衢州“三民工程”为例

在我国社会管理走向多元主体治理模式的背景下,实现社会管理各系统的协同已成为社会管理体制改革的必然选择。衢州市"三民"工程的时间也证明协同治理是实现社会管理体制改革的有效手段。现阶段构建农村社会协同治理模式应注意以下几点:必须动态分析民情,把握农村公共需求;必须沟通协商,维护农村公共利益;必须全程服务,提供农村公共产品。     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

信访制度的历史演进:一个功能论的视角

实践永无止境,创新永无止境,研究永无止境。从历史的角度探讨信访制度的道路,寻求信访制度变迁的过程及其所遇困难的根源,对当前信访制度的改革具有极其重要的现实意义。     

近十年日本防范和打击海盗对策研究

近十年日本商船受到海盗威胁比较严重,因此日本高度重视防范和打击海盗问题,建立了以日本为主导的亚洲反海盗合作机制,并派军舰参加了在索马里和亚丁湾海域的护航行动。日本所采取的这些措施对维护海运安全起到一定作用,但由于日本是受《和平宪法》约束的"非正常国家",其热衷打海盗的背后还有着更加深远的战略目的,需要加以警惕。     

博弈的伦理意蕴

博弈中的人们追求利益的最大化,但是博弈中也有伦理道德的存在。博彝中的行为者只有遵循道德法则行事,尊重自由、平等、民主以及正义的原则,使博弈双方互为目的和手段,这样才能达到共赢,实现自我价值和共同幸福的目标。对博弈与伦理的这种关系进行探讨,有助于我们更深刻地认识博弈中的伦理意蕴,更好地实现个人价值、个人利益与社会公共道德、公共利益的统一。     

辩诉交易的博弈分析--以囚徒困境为例

辩诉交易制度以抗辩式审判方式、法官居中裁判为制度基础,辩诉交易是控诉方与辩护方出于理性作出的行为,通过博弈论对辩诉交易进行分析,可以更好的理解辩诉交易在审理取证困难的疑难案件时,虽然不理想但却十分必要,是退而求其次的在公正与效率间寻求博弈均衡,是提高诉讼效益之必要方式.     

证券市场零和博弈与监管有效性的法经济学分析

为避免股市赌场论,我国主流学界一直否认证券市场的零和博弈特点,只是强调证券市场对优化资源配置的良好属性。然而在现实生活中,在证券市场优化配置的理论框架下我们却无法回避为什么证券市场会存在内幕交易、虚假陈述、操纵市场等私利性行为,我们在现有理论框架下也无法解释为什么现有的监管制度不足以有效监管市场。基于学界与监管层在观点上并不接受证券市场为彼之所得为我之所失的零和博弈观点,因此我们的监管实践并不是根据零和博弈的特点对症下药,这是导致目前我国证券市场处于监管不足与监管过度两难境地的根本原因。为此,我们试图从证券市场博弈的零和性分析出发,对我国证券市场监管的制度诉求、有效监管的制约因素及制度选择的有效性在法经济学层面作番讨论,以期对我国证券监管的制度重塑提供相应的理论依据。     

博弈视野下的职务犯罪侦查监督关系

最高人民检察院出台相关规定,确立了职务犯罪案件由上一级检察院决定逮捕的模式。从博弈论的角度看,职务犯罪案件决定逮捕权上提一级的模式实质上是确立了上级检察院侦监部门、下级检察院侦监部门和下级检察院自侦部门的侦查监督三角博弈关系。自职务犯罪案件决定逮捕权上提一级实施以来,司法实践中出现了一些问题,三角博弈关系在现实中处于失衡状态,究其原因在于博弈的前提规则的不完善。有必要重塑博弈规则,完善职务犯罪案件侦查监督的相关措施。     

International Technology Cooperation: The Problem of Commercial Rivalry

International technology cooperation promises to help countries exploit the potential of new innovations, but commercial rivalry between companies and governments raises obstacles to it. In this article, I present and solve a model of international technology cooperation. The formal analysis shows that a technology agreement must address two issues. First, governments must be able to induce companies to innovate. Second, governments must credibly commit to penalizing companies for failing to share new information produced through research. Based on these observations, I show that the potential for technology cooperation is maximized in symmetric settings between equally capable governments and companies. In practice, this observation warrants a policy focus on countries and industries that are already on a level playing ground. I also consider extensions to multinational companies and adverse selection problems. The formal analysis provides a solid foundation for practical policy implementation.