INSTITUTIONAL LAYERING IN GOVERNING HEALTHCARE QUALITY

Since the 1980s, regulated markets and New Public Management have been introduced in the public sector across the world. How they have affected existing governance mechanisms such as self‐regulation and state regulation has remained largely unexplored, however. This article examines the origins and consequences of institutional layering in governing healthcare quality. Dutch health care, where a market‐based system has been introduced, is used as a case study. The results show that this market‐based system did not replace but modified existing institutional arrangements. As a result, hospitals have to deal with the fragmentation of quality demands. Using the concept of institutional layering, this study shows how different arrangements interact. As a consequence, the introduction of a certain policy reform will work out differently in different countries and policy sectors. Our ‘archaeological’ study in this layering can be seen as an example of how such incremental change can be studied in detail.     

ANALYZING URBAN CRIME DATA: Deterrence and the Limitations of Arrests per Offense Ratios

Police reports of Index crimes, arrests, and population estimates for 1960 through 1977 for 49 U.S. cities are used to compare trends in arrest rates, crime rates, and the arrests per crime (A/C) ratio-a measure sometimes correlated with crime rates to assess the deterrent effect of arrest. Since the correlation of the A/C ratio with the crime rate can produce tautological results in a trend analysis. comparisons of trends for crime rates and arrest rates for specific cities are examined. The results do not support a deterrence hypothesis. but indicate that the A/C ratios for some of the nation's largest cities are unstable over time and sensitive to changes in reporting practices. The analysis illustrates the pitfalls encountered when data limitations are overlooked and underscores the need for more dependable measures of crime, apprehension, and punishment.     

Does Fiscal Stress Induce Privatization? Correlates of Private and Intermunicipal Contracting, 1992–2002

Using Census of Governments data, preferences for private and intermunicipal contracting by U.S. counties during the 1992–2002 period are modeled as a function of established economic and political factors. After distinguishing between private and intermunicipal contracting, there is no evidence that fiscal stress induces privatization. High debt levels are associated with fewer publicly delivered services, but counties with high debt are as likely to partner with neighboring municipalities as they are with private firms. Political factors are weak predictors of either form of contracting. The strongest and most reliable predictor of both private and intermunicipal contracting is the creation of new public services. These findings imply the strategic use of contracting for trial, temporary, or contingent services.     

European elections and the pre-electoral period: Media use and campaign evaluations

Abstract: This article addresses the problems of the campaign period of the 1989 Euro-elections: frequency of following the campaign, media use, preferences for various channels of communication (conversations, encounters with party workers, political meetings, mailed material, posters, advertisements, press, TV, radio). It demonstrates that, even if important national variations can be found, common socio-economic and political stratifications are at work, across borders, on the continent.
The variables of sex, occupation and political affiliations clearly play a role which frequently is transnational, and sometimes more active than the variable of nation. It is also true that, compared to the 1979 campaign, the 1989 one is marked by a problem of significant alignments: the last campaign tends to be less sexist, less 'socially privileged' and less biased to right wing voters than the first one. But these alignments take place among weak figures of interest and participation.     

WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS*

This paper reports on a new methodology to estimate the “cost of crime.” It is adapted from the contingent valuation method used in the environmental economics literature and is itself used to estimate the public's willingness to pay for crime control programs. In a nationally representative sample of 1,300 U.S. residents, we found that the typical household would be willing to pay between $100 and $150 per year for programs that reduced specific crimes by 10 percent in their communities. This willingness amounts, collectively, to approximately $25,000 per burglary, $70,000 per serious assault, $232,000 per armed     

Agents of past principals: The lasting effects of incumbents on the political ideology of bureaucrats

Understanding representation is central to politics. Numerous studies assess under which conditions politicians share citizens’ ideological preferences. However, under which conditions bureaucrats share citizens’ ideological preferences has not been systematically studied. Yet, bureaucratic preferences shape policy outcomes. Our paper thus studies why bureaucrats are more right or left-wing than citizens in some countries and points of time, yet not others. We theorize that political ideologies of past incumbents shape this variation. Incumbents can select ideologically aligned bureaucrats and socialize bureaucrats into ideological preferences; moreover, prospective bureaucrats may self-select into ideologically aligned governments. As bureaucratic tenure exceeds political tenure, this politicization has lasting effects. Survey data from 87 countries supports this argument: bureaucrats are more left-leaning than citizens in countries with longer prior rule by economically left-wing governments, and more right-wing in countries with more authoritarian pasts. This suggests that incumbents continue to shape the ideological preferences of bureaucrats after leaving office.