The flip side of power

Public Choice - In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the...     

General and maladaptive traits and anger in a combined forensic psychiatric and general population sample

The present study examines the associations between anger and general and maladaptive traits in a combined forensic psychiatric and community sample of men. Thirty-four male forensic psychiatric patients and 219 men from the general population completed the Novaco Anger Scale (NAS; Novaco, 1994), the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the ADP-IV (Schotte & De Doncker, 1994) and the VKP (Duijsens, Haringsma, & EurelingsBontekoe, 1999) at two measurement occasions with a one-year interval. The results of a series of multiple regression analyses showed that general and maladaptive traits accounted for a substantial amount of variance in anger scores. Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Externalizing traits were most prominent in the prediction of anger, while Conscientiousness was acting as a suppressor variable in the regression models. Strengths and limitations of the present study and implications for further research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Power comes with responsibility��or does it?

In a Public Good (PG) experiment, after playing it the standard way, one of the players (the allocator) is given power over the endowments of her co-players. Will the allocator show responsibility i.e., contribute most or all of her own as well as her co-players?? endowments? Can we thus improve the suboptimal level of voluntary provisions of public goods? The result is that, on average, all players are better off than in the standard PG game. In repetitions of the procedure, however, selfish behavior (contributing mainly the others?? endowments) becomes more and more frequent.     

A difficulty with oaths: On trust, trustworthiness, and signalling

In the wake of the Enron and Worldcom financial scandals that rocked Wall Street in 2002, the US government’s financial regulatory body, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the unprecedented step in June 2002 of requiring that the chief executives and chief financial officers of America’s 947 biggest companies to swear on oath that their company results and financial reports were to the best of their knowledge accurate. The one-off order was quickly followed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxely act, which will require many more CEOs and CFOs to certify their company reports and financial statements at regular intervals. In this paper we apply a simple signalling model to examine whether or not this type of institutional signal of trustworthiness is always efficient. We find that in the presence of signalling costs, the separating equilibrium can be socially inefficient as well as causing a general loss of trust. JEL classificationC72. D81. D82. K22