The flip side of power

Public Choice - In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the...     

Enduring neoliberalism in Alberta's oil sands: the troubling effects of private–public partnerships for First Nation and Métis communities

Changes in federal government relations with First Nations and Métis in Canada have been described as shifting over time, from fur trade colonialism, to welfare colonialism, to neoliberal partnerships. Acknowledging changes and continuities in Aboriginal peoples–state relations over time, this article examines the effects of recent policies that emphasize private–public partnerships for economic development on Indigenous communities in northern Alberta. We argue that while the term ‘partnership’ connotes equality, cooperation, and consensus, the actual workings of partnerships are anything but equal, and the effects include fragmentation, competition, and lack of overall accountability. These outcomes work against the needs and aspirations of Indigenous communities.     

Power comes with responsibility��or does it?

In a Public Good (PG) experiment, after playing it the standard way, one of the players (the allocator) is given power over the endowments of her co-players. Will the allocator show responsibility i.e., contribute most or all of her own as well as her co-players?? endowments? Can we thus improve the suboptimal level of voluntary provisions of public goods? The result is that, on average, all players are better off than in the standard PG game. In repetitions of the procedure, however, selfish behavior (contributing mainly the others?? endowments) becomes more and more frequent.     

A difficulty with oaths: On trust, trustworthiness, and signalling

In the wake of the Enron and Worldcom financial scandals that rocked Wall Street in 2002, the US government’s financial regulatory body, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the unprecedented step in June 2002 of requiring that the chief executives and chief financial officers of America’s 947 biggest companies to swear on oath that their company results and financial reports were to the best of their knowledge accurate. The one-off order was quickly followed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxely act, which will require many more CEOs and CFOs to certify their company reports and financial statements at regular intervals. In this paper we apply a simple signalling model to examine whether or not this type of institutional signal of trustworthiness is always efficient. We find that in the presence of signalling costs, the separating equilibrium can be socially inefficient as well as causing a general loss of trust. JEL classificationC72. D81. D82. K22