Bodies of Law: the Divine Architect,Common Law and the Ancient Constitution

This article addresses the architecture of the four Inns of Court inLondon as repositories for the body of law (corpus iuris). Thebuildings are perceived as visual representations of the unwrittenconstitution; evidence that the sign, not the text, remains thepredominant form through which the constitution manifests its content.It is in this context that the self-governing Inns are interpreted asmicrocosms of the City of God, envisaged by Saint Augustine andprefigured in ancient Greece by the Republic of Plato. The Innssynthesise these classical and Christian precepts; thereby creatinga unique commonwealth whose Utopian ideals are based on the applicationof Justitia, or righteousness: an ethical rather than alegal concept which underpins the English constitution. The argumentproposes a correlation between architectural development at the Inns andthe challenge posed to the institutional authority of the law by the newlearning of the Renaissance. It is the semiotics of legal architecturerather than its historical provenance which is central to my analysis. Iattempt to comprehend the effect of the influences outlined above on theform and content of the common law, the legal institution and theancient constitution.     

The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation

Abstract The European model of the constitutional review of legislation, characterized by the concentration of the constitutional review power in a single constitutional court, had its origin in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that this Constitution established at the same time a parliamentary system of government in a fairly radical form. As the author explains, this “invention” of a constitutional court is attributable to two factors. One factor is the federal aspect. The Court was conceived by the framers of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 as an umpire between federal legislation and the legislation of the states or Länder. In this respect it was meant as a substitute for the principle of the priority of federal law over state or Land law. This is manifest in the initial draft of the Constitution, where actions on questions of the constitutionality of legislation could only be brought by the Federal government (against the legislation of one or another of the states or Länder) and by the State or Land governments (against federal legislation). Right from the beginning, however, the Court could examine a parliamentary act ex officio when it had to apply such an act in another proceeding. It was this power of the Court that triggered the development of constitutional review. Its exercise gradually transformed the Court into a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, in particular, the fundamental rights of citizens. The author traces this development in the context of the concept of state and law that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This concept included specific restrictions on constitutional review. On the basis of a different understanding of the functions of a constitution, the Court gave up these restrictions and followed the examples of the European Court of Human Rights, the German Constitutional Court and—indirectly—the American Supreme Court.     

对宪法适用问题的再思考——与童之伟教授商榷

宪法适用就是国家机关依照法定职权和程序,应用宪法规范处理具体案件或纠纷的专门活动。中国全国人大及其常委会制定或者修改法律的活动,国务院规定行政措施、制定行政法规,发布决定和命令的活动,都不属于宪法适用。不论从权力来源方面看,还是从人民法院审理案件的实体法依据来看,中国宪法第126条中的“法律”都是包括宪法在内的广义的法律,中国多元多级的立法体制,为人民法院对从属性造法机关所制定的规范性文件进行违宪审查,留下一定的空间。     

俄罗斯公司立法综论——兼与中国公司立法比较

俄罗斯的公司立法起步很早,但发展缓慢,直到20世纪90年代才形成相对独立的公司法体系。传统上,俄罗斯采民商合一的立法体例,但在民法典之外,仍制定有公司单行法,并与调整公司关系的总统命令和政府规章等规范性法律文件以及联邦最高法院和最高仲裁法院所作的司法解释一并行使调整公司关系的职能。俄罗斯公司立法注重对私权利的维护,以任意性规范为主。但在向市场经济过渡时期,实践中的公司利益冲突不仅危害社会公共利益,最终也损及股东权益。有鉴于此,立法者不得不修订法律条文,增加强制性规范,强化公权力对公司活动的干预。这虽然与我国公司立法的趋向刚好相反,但两国立法的最终目标都是在寻找一个自由与干预的最佳平衡点。     

The Underrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples on Canadian Jury Panels

Under common law, Canadian jury panels, or arrays, are supposed to be broadly representative. In the early 1980s, the Law Reform Commission and, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court claimed that provincial legislation virtually guaranteed that this was the case. However, evidence presented to various provincial and federal commissions and a series of court cases has pointed to the continuing underrepresentation of Indigenous Canadians resulting from both the content and the administration of provincial laws. In this article, I examine evidence of underrepresentation and review various political and legal attempts to challenge bias in out-of-court selection. I suggest that contemporary practices in some jurisdictions have not consistently provided a representative jury pool or panel. As a result, the jury selection process has not always appeared to offer justice to Indigenous people and, in doing so, may not have served the Canadian legal system well.     

Does strict judicial scrutiny involve thetu quoque fallacy?

To protect what it deems fundamental rights, the Supreme Court strictly scrutinizes legislation that impinges on these rights. The Court views such legislation as a means to some end the legislation seeks to accomplish. The Court requires that the statute be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive; the legislation may not affect more people than necessary to achieve its end, nor is the statute permitted to leave some people out in achieving its end.I argue that when legislation imposes burdens, its underinclusiveness is irrelevant, and that when it dispenses rewards its overinclusiveness is irrelevant, because those affected by the statute areex hypothesi deserving. One commits thetu quoque fallacy when one tries to infer that those affected by the law are undeserving from the fact that some deserving individuals were not affected by the statute.I show concretely how the Court has erred in specific cases. I also point out how the doctrine of judicial review prevents the Court from availing itself of the remedy that logic would demand.Lastly, I consider the possibility that the Court uses the doctrine of strict scrutiny to strike down legislation that the Court suspects has an impermissible motive. I conclude that if the Court has evidence of an impermissible motive, it could present an inductive argument for such a motive and strike the legislation down for that reason. Using thetu quoque fallacy does not advance the search for the impermissible motive.This paper was read at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting in New Orleans on April 27, 1990.     

The War of the Booksellers: Natural Law,Equity, and Literary Property in Eighteenth-Century Scotland

This article analyses the case of Hinton v Donaldson (1773) in which the judges of the Scottish Court of Session refused to follow their English brethren in recognizing an author's right of property outside the Statute of Anne (1710). The decision must be understood against the background of distinct notions of common law and equity in Scots law, drawn from the Natural law tradition of the European jus commune. At the same time the decision reveals developing strands of Enlightenment thought and concepts of the judicial role in relation to legislation.     

The Heathrow Case in the Supreme Court: Climate Change Legislation and Administrative Adjudication

In R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd the UK Supreme Court allowed an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision that there had been a series of legal errors in the designation of the Airport National Policy Statement. This case note analyses the case from an ‘internal’ doctrinal perspective and argues that the Supreme Court could have engaged more explicitly with the legal issues that arise from climate change legislation for administrative law adjudication. For courts to adjudicate well in such circumstances they need to be prepared to develop administrative law doctrine, particularly in light of the issues of integrating climate change into public decision-making and of scientific/policy uncertainty which lie in the background of climate change legislation.     

The Negotiability of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange in the Time of Chief Justice Holt

This paper explores the development of bills of exchange and promissory notes in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It will be argued that the early law of negotiability was founded on a principled interpretation of the common law and that parliament's eventual rejection of this law resulted in a half-century of confusion. This time period, however, was fundamental in the development of the modern principle of negotiability as the courts struggled to create a workable framework for the transfer of written instruments. This paper examines the early conceptual difficulty of transferring written instruments and studies why bills of exchange were capable of transfer, despite the common law's bar on the assignment of choses in action, whereas promissory notes were not considered transferable at common law prior to the eighteenth century. The most important figure for the development of this area was Chief Justice Holt, whose legal interpretation of the transferability of bills of exchange was based on clearly defined and long-standing principles of common law. This interpretation of the common law was viewed as a hindrance to trade, and in response to Holt CJ's decisions, parliament passed the Statute of Anne 1704, allowing promissory notes to be transferable in the same manner as bills of exchange. This began to collapse the distinction between bills of exchange and promissory notes, which created numerous conceptual difficulties in the law of negotiable instruments. It was not until the case of Grant v Vaughan, heard in 1764, that the courts fully developed a new framework for the negotiability of written instruments. This early law displays the difficulty that courts had in developing the underlying principles of the assignment of written instruments, and deciphering its development is fundamental in understanding the modern principle of negotiability.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

安全抑或自由: 危机中的美国宪法简

危机时刻是验证法治国家体制适应性的真正时机，由于美国宪法没有紧急状态条款，在南北内战、一战二战、反恐战争等紧急时期美国总统往往行使“超宪法权限”侵犯公民基本权利。为保证危机中的宪法依然有效，处理好国会立法与总统紧急权力之间的重大分歧，作为制衡者的法院需要对宪法进行更加审慎的解释，但其所表现出来的实用主义政治立场变换和共和紧急法制观的转型，揭示了非常态下美国宪法解释的核心问题：要自由的宪法还是安全的宪法？这也正是当下危机频发背景下每个奉行法治和保障人权的国家面临的共同难题。     

Making sense of the case law on Ombudsman schemes

This article analyses the case law on ombudsman schemes in the UK, with the purpose of identifying some of the key trends that underpin this branch of law pre-the first Supreme Court decision in this area, JR55 v Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. While the law on ombudsman schemes remains based on legislation and the various grounds of administrative law available in judicial review, distinct bespoke principles have also been relied upon. These principles are beginning to provide consistent guidance on how the law should be used and interpreted in cases involving an ombudsman scheme. One task of the Supreme Court in JR55 will be to confirm these principles, or rationalize any departure from them.     

宪法的稳定性与稳定性的宪法——以中美宪法文本的比较为视角

宪法的稳定性既是维持宪政秩序有效运行的基础,也是宪法作为根本法的原则性和作为法律的规范性的具体要求。美国宪法具有较强的特定性,它是通过民众对宪法精神的敬畏与信仰,以及宪法文本的独特品质与最高法院的宪法解释等途径实现的。探索《美国宪法》稳定性的深层背景,检讨我国《宪法》文本的缺失与不足,对于我们如何处理宪法的稳定性与适应性的关系,完善我国的宪法解释与宪法修改制度,都具有十分重要的借鉴意义。     

法律适用规则探析——从律师诉公安机关户籍迁移案谈起

在程海律师诉公安机关户籍迁移纠纷中即涉及到法律适用的问题，该问题涉及到下位法在执行上位法时所添加的条件的合法性判断规则，以及规范性文件的合法性判断规则。依据这些规则，可以得出这样的结论：公安机关现行户籍立法违反了《中华人民共和国户口登记务例》之规定，但是该《条例》与现行宪法不相符，该问题的解决涉及到宪法的修改。无论是法院还是公安部对此都无能为力，也不应该做出违反宪法规定的判决或者改革。     

Authentic Interpretation

I approach the identification of the principles of legal interpretation through a discussion of an important but largely forgotten strand in our legal heritage: the idea (and at some points in English law, the rule) that the interpretation of legislation is to be done by the lawmaker. The idea that authentic interpretation is interpretation by the lawmaker united the Roman emperors Constantine and Justinian with Bracton, Aquinas, King James I of England, Hobbes, and Bentham. Already in the early 17th century, a new modern approach was emerging in England. The modern approach separates the interpretive power from the legislative power, and allocates the interpretive power to an independent court. I argue that there are some cogent, general considerations in favour of the modern approach. But it is worth identifying the elements of good sense that made it seem that the interpretive power ought to be reserved for the lawmaker. And it is worth identifying the drawbacks in the modern approach; I argue that they are highly relevant to the complex question of how judges ought to interpret legislation.     

RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: Empowering Tribunals to Enforce the Human Rights Act 1998

In RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – follow-on litigation from the high-profile bedroom tax cases – the Supreme Court handed down a judgment which has significant implications for social security law, the interpretation of the Human Rights Act, the tribunals system, the judicial control of delegated legislation, and access to justice. Central, however, was the issue of the enforceability of human rights. We argue that the Supreme Court was not only justified in its interpretation of the Human Rights Act but that it has made the protections of the Act more easily enforceable.     

反垄断普遍主义法理论、法原则探究

反垄断法作为市场经济社会的“经济宪法,”维护近现代商品生产社会的市场经济秩序、“有效竞争”市场结构。在历经百年的反垄断立法和实践中,确立了“本身违法”原则、合理原则、域外适用的“效果原则”。我国反垄断法的制定,应科学借鉴反垄断普遍主义法理论、法原则,规范我国社会主义市场经济秩序、竞争关系。     

On the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal Dialogues between the EU and US

Law plays a significant role in contemporary transatlantic relations outside of the bilateral context which, from the perspective of EU external relations law, might seem neither conventional nor apparent. Non‐bilateral transatlantic relations increasingly deploy law as a communication tool between the two legal orders. For example, in 2011, the US intervened informally and anonymously in the formulation of EU legislation, while the US House of Representatives passed legislation to prohibit the impact of EU law upon the US legal order. Another example is constituted by EU amicus curiae submissions before the US Supreme Court in death penalty cases. The so‐called Brussels effect is also the subject of recent scholarship, assessing the perceived spillover effect of EU regulatory standards onto US rules. The paper provides many vivid examples of the variable institutional and legal components of transatlantic relations not usually accounted for in scholarship on transatlantic relations.