Convenient and Inconvenient Truths in Family Law: Preventing Scholar‐Advocacy Bias in the Use of Social Science Research for Public Policy

This is the second of two articles on the risks of advocacy bias in the reporting of research findings when boundaries are blurred between social science research and advocacy in the pursuit of public policy. In the first article we identify common ways in which social science researchers and reviewers of research—wittingly or unwittingly—can become advocates for ideological positions and social policies at the expense of being balanced reporters of research evidence. The first article discusses the difference between truth in social science and truth in law and identifies a range of scholar‐advocacy strategies that bias research evidence, illustrated by recent debates about overnight parenting of infants and toddlers. In this second article we show how biased research evidence by scholar advocates results in increased confusion and controversy that diminishes the credibility of all parties and stalemates progress in the field, using a case illustration of intimate partner violence in family court. We also show how adherence to scientific methods prevents the misuse of research and suggest a number of collaborative, integrative measures that can help transcend the adversarial stalemate. In a look to the future we consider some unbiased, standardized ways of assessing the strength and generalizability of research evidence.     

The Myth of Universality: The UNESCO “Philosophers’ Committee” and the Making of Human Rights

This article reexamines one of the most enduring questions in the history of human rights: the question of human rights universality. By the end of the first decade after the end of the Cold War, debates around the legitimacy and origins of human rights took on new urgency, as human rights emerged as an increasingly influential rubric in international law, transnational development policy, social activism, and ethical discourse. At stake in these debates was the fundamental status of human rights. Based in part on new archival research, this article offers an alternative interpretation of the rediscovery by scholars in the late 1990s of a 1947 UNESCO survey that purported to demonstrate the universality of human rights through empirical evidence. The article argues that this contested intellectual history reflects the enduring importance of the “myth of universality”—a key cultural narrative that we continue to use to find meaning across the long, dark night of history.     

Public criminologies

Research Summary Public scholarship aspires to bring social science home to the individuals, communities, and institutions that are its focus of study. In particular, it seeks to narrow the yawning gap between public perceptions and the best available scientific evidence on issues of public concern. Yet nowhere is the gap between perceptions and evidence greater than in the study of crime. Here, we outline the prospects for a public criminology, conducting and disseminating research on crime, law, and deviance in dialogue with affected communities. We present historical data on the media discussion of criminology and sociology, and we outline the distinctive features of criminology—interdisciplinary, a subject matter that incites moral panics, and a practitioner base actively engaged in knowledge production—that push the boundaries of public scholarship. Policy Implications Discussions of public sociology have drawn a bright line separating policy work from professional, critical, and public scholarship. As the research and policy essays published in Criminology & Public Policy make clear, however, the best criminology often is conducted at the intersection of these domains. A vibrant public criminology will help to bring new voices to policy discussions while addressing common myths and misconceptions about crime.     

面对中国的证据法学——兼评易延友《证据学是一门法学吗》

通过对证据学和证据法学历史分野的考察,可以发现诸多学者曾经对证据法学独立作出的努力,证据法学独立于证据学以及程序法学是一个基本的趋势。回顾我国从1930年到2005年证据法学的起步、发展、挫折到恢复的历程,虽然有不同时代的学者对证据法学研究作出的贡献,但也存在相当多的问题,甚至重新纠缠于证据学的研究之中。如果要立足于证据法学的继续发展,应该借鉴英美证据法学的学术资源,明确研究的对象,改进研究方法,并在研究的程度上进一步深入。     

The Social Movement Turn in Law

The rise of social movements in US legal scholarship is a current response to an age‐old problem in progressive legal thought: harnessing law for social change while maintaining a distinction between law and politics. This problem erupted in controversy around the civil rights–era concept of legal liberalism defined by activist courts and lawyers pursuing political reform through law. Contemporary legal scholars have responded by building on social science to develop a new concept—movement liberalism—that assigns leadership of transformative change to social movements to preserve conventional roles for courts and lawyers. Movement liberalism aims to achieve the lost promise of progressive reform, while avoiding critiques of legal activism that have divided scholars for a half‐century. Yet rather than resolving the law‐politics problem, movement liberalism reproduces long‐standing debates, carrying forward critical visions of law that it seeks to transcend.     

Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co‐Production of Law and Science

This article combines Monahan and Walker's classification of social facts, social authority, and social frameworks with political‐institutionalism's view of law and science as competing institutional logics to explain how, and with what consequences, employment discrimination law and industrial‐organizational (I‐O) psychology became co‐produced. When social science is incorporated into enforcement of legislative law as social authority—rationale for judicial rule making—law's institutional logic of relying on precedent and reasoning by analogy ensures that social science will have ongoing influence on law's development. By helping set research agendas and providing new professional opportunities, institutionalized legal doctrine shapes social science knowledge. But because of differences in institutional logic, wherein legal cumulation is backward looking whereas scientific cumulation is forward looking, co‐production of law and science may produce institutional mismatch between legal doctrine and scientific knowledge.     

“We Are the Visible Proof”: Legitimizing Abortion Regret Misinformation through Activists’ Experiential Knowledge

Since 2010, many abortion policies emerging at the state level have been designed around the idea of “abortion regret,” a scientifically discredited assertion that abortion causes long‐term health problems for women. Studies have examined the legal significance of regret claims in case law as well as the role scientific misinformation and uncertainty play in the policy process. However, scholars have given less attention to the intersection between abortion regret experiences and misinformation. We address this gap in the literature by examining how antiabortion activists' experiential knowledge continues to reinforce and legitimize misinformation contained in state policies. We explore the process of substantiating abortion regret misinformation by attaching it to activists' experiential expertise. Based on twenty‐three interviews with antiabortion activists, we argue that misinformation receives validation through the certainty of experiential knowledge, which activists mobilize around and use as a source of evidence in the policy process.     

Does Empirical Legal Studies Shed more Heat than Light? The Case of Civil Damage Awards

Empirical investigation of legal systems is emerging as a leading trend in both the social sciences and the legal academy in the early twenty‐first century. Law reviews are now filled with studies reporting empirical data. Because empirical investigation of law commonly seeks to inform contentious social and political debates, however, its research often fuels more debate than it resolves. Partisans on both sides of contentious issues now cite the same body of research to support their reform efforts. However, social science research on law is not a useless undertaking, as it can sharpen debate. But the hope that the new empirical legal studies movement will become a neutral source of information for policy makers is unlikely to be realized.     

Twenty-Five Years of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Social Science in Law</Emphasis>

In this essay, we take the publication of the seventh edition of the casebook Social Science in Law (2010) as an opportunity to reflect on continuities and changes that have occurred in the application of social science research to American law over the past quarter-century. We structure these reflections by comparing and contrasting the original edition of the book with the current one. When the first edition appeared, courts’ reliance on social science was often confused and always contested. Now, courts’ reliance on social science is so common as to be unremarkable. What has changed—sometimes radically—are the substantive legal questions on which social science has been brought to bear.     

‘In this Day and Age’: Social Facts,Common Sense and Cognition in Tort Law Judging in the United Kingdom

Tort law judging in the United Kingdom includes judicial ‘truth claims’ or ‘social facts’ about the world, society, and institutional and human behaviour. Although corrective justice and rights scholars assert tort law is autonomous and internally referential, social facts can be influential in tort decisions. While there is some evidence of judicial use of empirical research, many social facts are based on judicial notice, judicial common sense, and intuition. Social facts, often based on judicial common sense, play a role in tort judging. However, they can also be fertile ground for the introduction of cognitive bias and judicial error. The role of social facts in tort judging is not confined to ‘policy’ reasoning but includes social framework, context, and background. Emerging research on judicial cognition can help explain the nature and impact of common‐sense social facts. There is a need to consider potential responses to judicial use of social facts and judicial cognition.     

Law School Climates: Job Satisfaction Among Tenured US Law Professors

In this article, we combine quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate why post‐tenure law professors of color and women professors within the US legal academy are differentially dissatisfied with their work lives. Previous social science research has indicated lingering difficulties for professionals from traditionally marginalized groups as they advance to higher levels. Post‐tenure law professors have been understudied relative to similar senior‐level professionals. Mixed methods allow us to isolate institutional structure and implicit cultural bias as key mediators of this dissatisfaction, converging on issues of respect, voice, and collegiality as crucial. We use the example of the legal academy to show how empirical research can shed important light on the realities of legal professionals—here, the faculty who are training the next generation of US attorneys. Following in the new legal realist tradition, we demonstrate the power of mixed empirical methodologies for grasping social realities pertinent to law.     

Autopoietic Law and the 'Epistemic Trap': A Case Study of Adoption and Contact

This paper examines autopoietic theory with reference to functionally differentiated social sub-systems, particularly law, science, and politics. It sets out to 'test' the practical relevance of autopoietic theory in relation to ongoing debates about post-adoption contact and personal identity issues. Law has resisted social scientific pressure to regulate post-adoption contact in the context of a social policy approach, which emphasizes the relationship between identity development and genealogical continuity. I argue that law's response to this pressure relates to the particular nature of adoption as this is expressed through legislation and case law. Law's refusal to intervene in post-adoption contact reflects its self-referential operations and its attempts to avoid epistemic entrapment by a social scientific discourse. Applying autopoietic theory to law's practical operations in adoption clarifies its explanatory value, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between law, politics, and social science and indicates areas that require theoretical refinement.     

Primetime Dispute Resolution: Reality TV Mediation Shows in China's “Harmonious Society”

Through a case study of reality TV mediation shows, this article joins the debate about the recent promotion of formal and informal mediation by the Chinese government, what some scholars have called a “turn against law” (Minzner 2011). We identify three converging reasons for the sudden popularity of mediation shows on Chinese primetime television: (1) the desire of TV producers to commercially exploit interpersonal conflicts without fanning the flames of social instability; (2) the demands of official censors for TV programming promoting a “harmonious society”; and (3) the requirement for courts and other government institutions to publicly demonstrate their support for mediation as the most “appropriate” method for resolving interpersonal and neighborhood disputes. Cases drawn from two top‐rated mediation shows demonstrate how they privilege morality and “human feeling” (ganqing) over narrow application of the law. Such shows could be viewed merely as a form of propaganda, what Nader has called a “harmony ideology”—an attempt by the government to suppress the legitimate expression of social conflict. Yet while recognizing that further political, social, and legal reforms are necessary to address the root causes of social conflict in China, we conclude that TV mediation shows can help to educate viewers about the benefits and drawbacks of mediation for resolving certain narrow kinds of domestic and neighborhood disputes.     

“Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response

The author responds to comments reappraising “Critical Legal Histories” (CLH) (1984). CLH critiqued “evolutionary functionalism,” the idea that law is a functional response to a typical modernizing process. CLH argued that “society” was partly constituted of legal elements and that law was too indeterminate to have reliably regular functional effects. CLH has been misinterpreted as calling for a return to internal histories of “mandarin” doctrine: all it said was that some doctrinal histories were valuable, without privileging them. This response clarifies that the relations of law to society and social change, and of high‐level official law to everyday local law are distinct issues. CLH is mostly moot today, since social‐legal historians have incorporated its insight that legal concepts are embedded in everyday social practice. But other fields have revived deterministic Whiggish accounts of progressive development and of law functional to it—to which CLH's critique still seems relevant.     

Rules,Institutions, Transformations. Considerations on the “Evolution of Law” Paradigm

The article's main objective is to test the merits of the evolutionary paradigm as it has been applied first to social phenomena and then more specifically to the legal domain. In a preliminary move, a set of the available concepts of law is worked out. A discussion of the idea of evolution and of its use in the social sciences follows. Functionalism and systems theory are scrutinized, with a close eye to the new doctrine of “autopoiesis.” Once an institutional and normative concept of law is agreed upon, attempts to introduce an “evolutionary” paradigm are deemed—the article contends—to be unfruitful. The article concludes that, if law needs a metaphysics, it should be one which allows for change, transformation and the emergence of the radically new. A social universe without gaps, all possible forms of which are determined from the beginning, will end up as the opposite of what we are used to considering as the practice of law.     

The “Totality of Circumstances Test” in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective*

We discuss uses of social science definitions and research methods in judging compliance with the recently modified language of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. That Act now specifies a “totality of circumstances” effects lest for the existence of racial vote dilution. There are seven “typical” factors listed by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in its report on the 1982 Voting Rights extension as among those which may be used to establish a Section 2 violation. Because of the nature of these factors, extensive (and often conflicting) testimony by social scientists has now become an inescapable feature of Section 2 litigation. We focus particular attention on one of the seven factors, racially polarized voting, because measurement of it is, as judged by recent litigation, the most controversial, the most complex, and the most important. We also discuss at some length another factor, racial campaign appeals, which also raises issues of appropriate definition and measurement. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a standardization of terminology and operationalization in an important public policy area, and to show how social science methodology can assist legal fact-finding.     

证据学是一门法学吗——以研究对象为中心的省察

通过对十年来我国证据法学研究在知识的增长方面进行量化的考察,结果显示:一方面,我国证据法学研究大部分仍然游离于法学与自然科学之间,这种研究既不能增长自然科学方面的知识,也无法增长法学方面的知识;另一方面,在有可能增长法学知识的领域,证据法学却又依附于法学的其他门类,从而丧失了自身独立存在的价值。方法论训练的缺乏及学术研究能力的有限,是造成这些现象的根本原因。因此,为使证据法学成为一门独立的法学学科,必须加强研究者的方法论训练,从而提高该学科在增进法学知识方面做出贡献的能力,并朝着建立统一的证据法学理论的方向努力。     

社会科学证据在美国的发展及其启示

我国的民事、行政法庭中已经出现了社会研究报告这种全新的证据形式,它实际上是社会科学证据的典型代表。社会科学证据已经在美国经历了超过百年的发展历史,最早可以追溯到上世纪初出现的"布兰代斯辩论摘要"。在经历了司法实践多年的考验之后,社会科学证据终于从上世纪70年代之后在美国获得了长足发展。如今,社会科学证据在美国的法庭中已得到了广泛的应用。我国可以学习美国的经验,将社会科学证据放在科学证据的框架之下进行研究和应用,这将成为我国证据法学理论的一个重要突破。基于当前的司法证明实践,应当对社会科学证据的证据属性、证据形式、公证问题、审查认定规则等重点问题加强研究。     

Pluralism and local law in extraterritorial spaces

Based on ethnographic research, this article shows how legal orders are being established in spaces where the state law is absent. The case of refugee camps—often discussed as sites of legal limbo and state of exception—seems to be a space of legal pluralism. However, when observing local legal practices, this pluralism is dissolved into a powerful local camp law. This characteristic type of legal order is produced by social camp-specific mechanisms, camp materiality as well as the remaking of pre-camp structures. Therefore, refugee camps should be viewed as extraterritorial spaces with a high degree of legal autonomy that enables and forces residents to create a local camp law. The findings of this study add to the literature of law and order in camps and to the debates on plural configurations in extraterritorial spaces.