论司法裁判的合法性

司法裁判的合法性是司法裁判权运作的基础和前提条件 ,司法裁判的合法性为司法裁判活动提供了正当性理由。现代法治理论中有关司法裁判合法性问题的理论存在不足之处。对人们司法裁判合法性信仰的最大威胁来自司法专横和腐败。     

司法裁判引证法律学说的功能研究——基于生效裁判文书的实证分析

法律学说是连接立法与实践的知识储备和理论桥梁,也是推动司法与社会互动的知识引擎和理论动力。学者的学术观点是法律学说的直接体现。在我国,存在司法判决引证法学学者观点的现象。实证研究表明,268份样本裁判文书中,有60位法学学者的观点被引证307次。法律学说在裁判文书中发挥着解释法律、论证说理及补充法律漏洞等作用,从而增强法官对法律事实性质或裁判结果判断的合理性和合法性,提升裁判结果的可接受性。从应然层面来看,法律学说要为司法裁判提供可能的参考答案,为司法裁判提供有效的法律方法以及通过司法裁判总结科学的司法规律。实证研究与理论分析表明,虽然司法判决可以成为法律学说的“试验田”,但是从主题任务和实践立场两分的角度看,法学与司法的适当分离是法治持续进步的阶梯。     

Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning

Judicial obligation to enforce the law is typically regarded as both unproblematic and important: unproblematic because there is little reason to doubt that judges have a general, if prima facie, obligation to enforce law, and important because the obligation gives judges significant reason to limit their concern in adjudication to applying the law. I challenge both of these assumptions and argue that norms of political legitimacy, which may be extra-legal, are irretrievably at the basis of responsible judicial reasoning.     

David Dyzenhaus and the Holy Grail

Abstract
In his book Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems David Dyzenhaus aims to provide a cogent refutation of legal positivism, and thus to settle a very old dispute in jurisprudence. His claim is that the consequences for practice and for morality if judges adopt positivist ideas in a wicked legal system are unacceptable. He discusses the South African legal system as a case in point. I argue that this claim is not secured. Dyzenhaus has three arguments for his view. The first is that positivism cannot account for legal principles, and legal principles are the key source of morally acceptable adjudication. I show that his argument does not go through for sophisticated positivist accounts of "principles" such as those of J. Raz and D. N. MacCormick. Dyzenhaus's second argument claims to find a pragmatic contradiction in positivism, between the belief in judicial discretion and the belief in a commitment to legislative sources as binding fact. I argue that there is no such commitment in a form that supports Dyzenhaus's theory. His final argument is that wicked legal systems are contrary to the very idea of law and legality. I argue that a strong doctrine of deference to legislative authority cannot be bad in itself: It can only be bad relative to a certain content to legislation. Thus Dyzenhaus's claim begs the question against positivism.     

Law and the Evolutionary Turn: The Relevance of Evolutionary Psychology for Legal Positivism

In the present essay, I consider the relevance of evolutionary psychology (EP) for legal positivism, addressing the two main traditions in the legal positivist family: (1) the tradition I identify with the works of Hart and Kelsen and characterize as “normativist,” as it tries to describe law as a purely or, at least, as an essentially normative phenomenon, while remaining true to the ideal of scientific objectivity and value‐neutrality; (2) the tradition I broadly refer to as “legal realism,” which equates law with adjudication and “legal science” with the task of explaining judicial behaviour.     

Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders

I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer an adjudicative theory in the realm of non-ideal theory: I adopt a view of law that has achieved consensus in legal philosophy, make some plausible assumptions about human politics, and then consider directly the question of how judges should reason. Ultimately, I argue that judges should be cognizant of the goods that are at stake on particular occasions of adjudication and that this requires treating legal requirements transparently, i.e., as sensitive to their moral justifications.     

现代社会中司法的力量——兼论转型中国司法的两难困境及应对

在现代社会中,司法成为一种专门且相对独立的活动,这不仅是分权制衡的必要和纠纷解决的产物,也是现代国家统治正当化的策略选择。由此,司法活动既受内在限制,也蕴含了影响国家治理和社会发展的潜在力量。面对人们司法预期增长与法院自身能力不足的矛盾,司法力量的铸成需以克制为基本立场,并依靠相应的制度和司法技艺灵活处理可能危及自身安全和正当性的社会需求。相形之下,转型中国的司法尚未完成现代化就已经无法避免能动的角色担当,其力量的培育不仅需要在审判独立性方面着力,而且还要注重为法院"减压",并理性认识和评估法官实践中的智慧。     

非法证据排除程序再讨论

对于被告方提出的排除非法证据的申请,法院要进行专门的程序性裁判。作为一项基本原则,被告方一旦提出排除非法证据的申请,法院就要优先审查侦查行为的合法性问题,使程序性裁判具有优先于实体性裁判的效力。作为程序性裁判的两个重要部分,初步审查要求被告方承担初步的证明责任,具有过滤不必要的程序性裁判的功能;正式调查作为法院的程序性听证程序,具备基本的诉讼构造,偏重于职权主义的诉讼模式,并由公诉方承担证明侦查行为合法性的责任,且要达到最高的证明标准。对于一审法院就非法证据排除问题所作的决定,二审法院无法提供独立的司法救济,只能将其与实体问题一并作为是否撤销原判的依据。     

司法方法论的若干问题思考——以规范与事实之间的关系为视角

司法方法,即司法适用的方法,主要是指司法裁判方法。司法适用过程,是将法律与事实有机结合,确定案件处理的司法效果过程。在这个过程中,如何判断规范与事实之间的关系;判断两者的相互一致性或符合性的程度;根据事实与法律的有机联系,确定案件的司法效果的推理方式;以及对这一司法效果结论的论证等,无疑是司法方法论的基本问题。正确认识司法方法与法律方法之间的关系,是法律方法研究的重要课题。     

论我国私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金一体规范

《私募投资基金监督管理暂行办法》对于私募股权投资基金设立、基金管理人和基金托管人权利义务等一系列重要问题未作出规范,由此导致法院在处理部分私募股权基金纠纷案件时只能选择参照适用我国《证券投资基金法》作为裁判依据。 我国《证券投资基金法》未将私募股权投资基金纳入其调整范围。 法院此举缺乏正当性。 事实上,私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金在行为性质上同属金融活动,在法律关系的构建上均主要以信托关系为基础,两者产生的法律风险亦具有同质性,将两者一体规范能解决司法裁判适法正当性的问题,既有必要性和可行性,也能提高监管效率、促进行业发展。 我国应当将私募股权投资基金纳入《证券投资基金法》,实现私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金的一体规范。     

法律事实辨析

法律事实是指在法定的程序空间内,由多方诉讼主体依据既定的规则建构起来的一幅案件事实图景,它是某种法律裁决据以作出的事实依据。法律事实是经过程序法规范过滤了的事实,是依据证据规则而剪裁出来的事实,是主体描绘出来的事实,它具有确定性和开放性的特点。司法活动的目的应该从发现事实真相转向确保法律事实形成过程的正当性与合法性。理论研究也应该由对于制度的解构或建构的研究转向针对具体的司法过程的研究,从而实现由关注静态的法律到关注法律的动态运作过程的转变。     

民法冲突解决中的利益衡量——从民法方法论的进化到解释规则的形成

社会主体多元化的利益冲突是民法视角下冲突的根本成因。通过利益衡量可以明确民法预设的秩序价值目标的所在,其方法论意义不容忽视。在长期复杂的司法适用过程中,渐次形成达致统一的规律性的处理方案,才能避免个案中利益衡量的恣意可能性,从而把超越文本上法律的利益衡量机制变成法律秩序的一个环节,而不是超越法律秩序的特例。在解释适用民法规范进行裁判的过程中,裁判者应该按照一定的论证规则和程序进行裁判,即按照法律秩序下的妥当逻辑和方法去论证其所坚持的价值取向的正当性和裁判结果的正确性。     

澳大利亚行政裁判所制度研究

20世纪 70年代以来 ,澳大利亚新行政法的一项重要内容是建立行政裁判所制度。《行政上诉裁判所法》主要包括裁判所的组成和结构、申请、可以接受的审查、管辖、审查、裁决、对裁决的司法审查、裁判所对政策的态度等。这些做法对我国行政法制度的完善具有参考借鉴价值。     

Principle,Discretion, and Symbolic Power in Rousseau's Account of Judicial Virtue

Rousseau's understanding of legislation as the expression of the general will implies a constitutional principle of legislative supremacy. In turn, this should translate to a narrow, mechanical account of adjudication, lest creative judicial interpretation subvert the primacy of legislative power. Yet in his constitutional writings, Rousseau recommends open‐textured and vague legislative codes, which he openly admits will require judicial development. Thus he apparently trusts a great deal in judicial discretion. Ostensibly, then, he overlooks the problem of how legislative indeterminacy—and correspondingly, judicial discretion—may undermine the authority of the general will. However, I argue that Rousseau aims to check judicial subversion of legislative supremacy simply by extending his broader social politics—and specifically, his peculiar concept of republican virtue—to the domain of law. His main concern is that the law should not develop as a mystifying expert practice; therefore, he necessarily rejects any understanding of judicial virtue as lying in principled discourse. Instead, he envisages that judicial power will be checked by a more generic sense of republican virtue. In turn this echoes his apprehension of social differentiation and social complexity as sources of domination and hierarchy.     

论法官的裁判良心

近年来司法界已意识到司法裁决并非全由法律所决定,如果司法裁决并非全部客观,法官的职业行为就变得相关,法官审理具体案件时不仅仅依据的是事实与法律,还要结合自己的良心,要求法官在裁判中要尽量保持良心的客观性。因此,关注法官良心与法的关联性、法官良心的自由与中立及法官良心的社会尊重和养成,直接影响着法官裁判的公正及法院的社会公信力。     

论不能未遂的处罚依据——主观危险理论之再提倡

对于不能未遂的处罚依据的认识,当下中国学界主要存在客观危险说、经验的危险感说以及主观危险说三种理论。客观的危险理论及其修正与经验的危险感说在理论本质以及判断逻辑方面都存在一定的问题。与之相对,主观的危险说具有与规范判断紧密相关的正当性依据,能够和我国本土刑法学理论与法律制度衔接,并且能构建逻辑自洽的着手概念。从正当性依据的角度来讲,法益侵害的危险是行为对规范的违反,通过行为哲学与刑法构成要件理论的双重证明,主观危险理论的正当性通过其与规范违反的紧密关联被体现出来;从与本土法律制度的衔接来看,我国刑法的故意概念包含的“认知”与“意欲”要素,为主观危险理论的“规范违反事实认知”要件与“规范违反行为推动”要件提供了刑法理论与制度的土壤;从着手概念的构建来看,结合主观危险理论的上述两个要件,行为着手的时点也能够合理地被构建出来。从主观危险理论中可以提炼出不能未遂案件司法判断的“三步走”的方法论,从而在分析实际案例中最终达到说理的科学性与结论的妥当性。     

为最高人民法院司法解释权一辩

尽管最高人民法院的司法解释工作尚存在各种不足,然而我们更应该看到其对于我国法制建设与司法实践的积极意义。最高人民法院司法解释权的正当性可以从实在法和学理两个方面得到辩护。要推进我国的司法解释制度,就要在肯定最高人民法院司法解释权之正当性的基础上,对该制度的另一些重要问题展开进一步研究。     

Theoretical Disagreement,Legal Positivism,and Interpretation

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

Adjudicating the Market

The true governance challenge within Europe remains the resolution of conflict within the Internal Market and the identification of efficacious solutions, to its regulatory and redistributive problems. Absent the legitimising sovereign power once furnished by the national constitutional settlement and without recourse to a pre-political principle of pluralist self-limitation, Europe's law must supply a pluralist and contested internal market polity with authoritative adjudication on the meaning and content of institutions of market governance, including 'law' itself. In the endeavour to 'socialise the market', or to re-establish the determinative links between society, politics, and the market place caste asunder by a rationalising process of European economic integration, Europe's law is seemingly returning—via judicial dialogue between national and European courtrooms—to the ancient legal grammar and semantics of 'reasonableness' and 'equity'. Such an adjudicative return serves: (i) the processing of reasonable pluralism within the market in the light of deliberative values: and (ii), the re-establishment and maintenance of the law's factual (non-natural), logical (internally coherent and impartial) and moral (real-world) legitimacy.