Ambivalent Legal Mobilization: Perceptions of Justice and the Use of the Tutela in Colombia

This article explores the relationship between legal consciousness and legal mobilization in the context of constitutional rights in Colombia. Citizens report extremely low confidence in the state and the judiciary, yet hundreds of thousands of Colombians make constitutional rights claims through the acción de tutela procedure each year. Why does profound skepticism of the ability of the judiciary to provide justice and fair treatment seem to coexist with high levels of use of the legal system? How do perspectives on rights and the legal system relate to observed mobilization of the law? Drawing on 74 interviews and an original 310‐person survey, this article develops legal consciousness theory, identifying the specific beliefs that encourage or discourage individuals to turn to the courts to make claims to their rights. In the Colombian case, understandings of law and the state encourage the use of the tutela procedure, not due to the realizable promise of the state to protect rights or the majestic power of the law, but because the tutela is understood to be the only mechanism through which citizens can access their rights. In other words, citizens turn to the courts because there is no other alternative.     

纳税人权利话语之法理形构

有关纳税人权利话语的实践性议论和法律议论唤起了法学方法论的觉醒,但关于纳税人的权益如何构成一项公法上主观权利或宪法权利的争辩并没有被认真对待。如果直接从公民基本权利的性质切入,再加以层级化的结果,可以将之分为:自然权、宪法基本权利和一般法律权利三个层次,税法上的纳税人权利的主观公权利性质似乎没有疑问,但是宪法层次的纳税人权利面临着法律实践和理论的困难,在宪法解释学意义上所谓“纳税人基本权利”也许可以解释为宪法基本权利和纳税义务之间的平衡。     

宪法权利与民事权利关系辨

宪法是一国法律体系中的根本法,民法是对宪法在民事领域的具体化;但宪法又是公法,与作为私法的民法有本质上的区别。与此相对应,宪法权利与民事权利在性质、内容和行使方式等方面存在差别,但宪法权利功能的变迁又使其有影响民事权利发展的可能性。人权是整体法律体系的价值基础,人权入宪为宪法权利通过其体现的人权价值影响民事权利提供了法律基础,尽管如此,两者仍是不同性质的权利,宪法权利规范不能直接用于调整私人间的民事权利义务关系。     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law

In this article, I take up two arguments in favor of the discursive model of legal argumentation: the claim to correctness argument and the dual nature thesis. The argument of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, and the dual nature thesis implies a nonpositivistic concept of law. The nonpositivistic concept of law comprises five ideas. One of them is the special case thesis. The special case thesis says that positivistic elements, that is, statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, are necessary for law in order to achieve legal certainty. Without this, law would not be as perfect as it could possibly be. But it says, at the same time, that this alone would not be enough to fulfill the claim to correctness. The claim to correctness refers not only to the real dimension of law, defined by statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, but also to its ideal dimension, defined, first and foremost, by justice. The special case thesis is my oldest thesis. It has remained an essential element of my system over the years. Its connection with four other theses—the Radbruch formula, the human rights thesis, the idea of deliberative democracy, and principles theory—does not change this at all. On the contrary, this connection has lent greater strength to the special case thesis.     

Machiavelli,Guicciardini and the “Governo Largo”

Niccolò Machiavelli's support for what he calls governo largo, or popular government, is usually contrasted with the diffidence towards it of Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine aristocrat. The article argues that both these authors grounded their vision on Polybius' theory of “mixed government,” though adapting it in different directions. In examining this difference, the article reaches the conclusion that it concerns far less the degree of popular participation in political decision‐making and government than the value that Machiavelli and Guicciardini respectively ascribe to it in comparison with that of safety‐liberty (or legal certainty). In this respect, their theories may be viewed as anticipating the tensions between democracy and the rule of law, the co‐presence of which provides the essential foundation of the structure of present‐day constitutional democracies.     

The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

The Common Core between Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law: A Structural Account

Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter IHRL) and international criminal law (hereafter ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, the predominant approach to constructing the link is substantive. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a subset of moral human rights. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the substantive approach. After identifying two flaws in the substantive approach (the problem of threshold and the problem of ethical neutrality), I defend what I call a structural account by focusing on duty‐holders. I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics common to IHRL and ICL qua international legal regimes: who has the authority to address violations of IHRL and ICL, and who can be liable for those violations. I then infer that public authority (functionally construed) constitutes the common structural core of IHRL and ICL. I rely on the extraterritorial application of IHRL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IHRL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects.     

我国宪制发展中短期态势评估

我国宪法确立了国家的基础性制度架构,内容包括若干基本宪法原则、公民宪法权利的范围及其保护、国家权力的横向和纵向配置,以及宪法的保障实施。我国宪制发展面对的课题可概括为以下几种:使政治、法律体制改革跟上经济体制改革的步伐;有效保障宪法确认的公民基本权利;实现执政党与国家关系的法治化;形成独立的有权威的司法体系;建立行之有效的违宪审查制度。我国完全可以在今后5-10年内实现一些具体的宪制改革目标,其中包括:初步实现政党以及执政党与国家机关关系的法制化;省、自治区、直辖市人大代表乃至全国人大代表由选民直选产生;修改选举法,容许人大代表选举实行竞选;实现不同职业选民的平等选举权;使司法机关相对于本级地方党委和本级地方其他国家机关有较大独立性;采取立法措施弥补公民基本权利法律保障方面的缺失;消除地方因权力过度集中于执政党的领导机构而形成的党的书记破坏法制、搞个人专制的问题;在全国人大内部设立宪法监督委员会作为设立宪法法院前的过渡措施;逐步终止地方国家机关正职领导人员选举和补选环节普遍违反法律原则的做法。     

欧洲近现代历史上宪政民主政制的生成、建构与演进

宪政民主政制与社会经济发展之间的关系,是一个值得深入进行理论探讨和实证研究的新课题。本文对西方宪政民主的起源、生成与演变史做了一个鸟瞰式的回顾,为探究宪政民主与经济发展之间的关系提供一些背景知识。在从词源和辞义上辨析了西方文字中的"constitution"以及以及与之对应的中文"宪法"和"宪政"的基本含义之后,本文对英国、法国和德国近现代宪政民主政制的生成、建构和演变史做了一些简略的历史考察,并在最后一部份对近现代欧洲历史上宪政民主政制下的法律制度的生成原因做了理论的和历史的分析。     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

Becoming a Threat: The Burqa and the Contestation Over Public Morality Law in France

Through an examination of legislative debate and court opinions, this article illustrates that the French understanding of public order policing as a bulwark of freedom and national sovereignty deeply informed the development of (and contestation surrounding) the 2010 ban on all facial coverings in public. This ban notably includes the burqa or niqab, garments worn by a small minority of Muslim women in France. This article has two aims. The first is to expand on the sociolegal argument about the contested nature of rights protections and constitutional constraints on legislative authority by highlighting how a nation's legal culture can profoundly shape that contestation. The second aim of this article is to show, through a technique called legal archaeology, how longstanding French views on rights confront current European‐inspired alternative views that would give more weight to individualistic protections against state action than has traditionally been the case in France.     

The Subjects of Collectively Binding Decisions: Democratic Inclusion and Extraterritorial Law

Citizenship and residency are basic conditions for political inclusion in a democracy. However, if democracy is premised on the inclusion of everyone subject to collectively binding decisions, the relevance of either citizenship or residency for recognition as a member of the polity is uncertain. The aim of this paper is to specify the conditions for being subject to collective decisions in the sense relevant to democratic theory. Three conceptions of what it means to be subject to collectively binding decisions are identified and examined, referring to those subject to legal duties and legal powers or to those subject to legal duties and state institutions. The contrast between them is most clearly illustrated in relation to non‐residents, those not present in the territory of the state. The extraterritorial dimension of the law thus highlights a fundamental ambiguity in the theory of democracy concerning the extension of political rights.     

MARRIAGE IN CANADA—EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?*

On July 20, 2005, the Canadian Civil Marriage Act became law, extending equal access to civil marriage to same‐sex couples while respecting religious freedom. This article briefly traces the distinctive juridical factors that have contributed to the legislation: the constitutional comity or dialogue among Parliament, the courts and the people resulting from the constitutional entrenchment of a Charter of rights and freedoms; the growth of the substantive concept of equality in Canadian law; and the impact of the constitutional division of powers and the nature of Canadian federalism. Together, these factors contributed to a constructive debate centered on respect for diversity.     

Law against the Rule of Law: Assaulting Democracy

This article examines how authoritarian contenders use law to advance an agenda geared to exclusive state power in light of a paradigmatic case: the National Socialists’ takeover of the German state apparatus in spring 1933. This case highlights two ways in which an office holder is able to expand his power in an authoritarian fashion through legal dispositions. A conjunctural use of law for authoritarian purposes draws on legal statutes to undercut the political capacity of opponents and competitors, hollow out institutional checks, and crucially hamper civil freedoms. Taking advantage of constitutional provisions that make institutional subversion from within possible (‘constitutional Trojan horses’), a structural use of legal statutes reorders the power structure by reallocating decisional rights. In both cases, law serves as a weapon against the rule of law. These considerations raise the question of the standards by which we are to judge the legality of such acts. Contemporary instances of democratic backsliding are cases in point.     

社会治理与法治

法治是社会治理的一种,社会治理是人在认识自然的规律和人的本性的基础上调整人与自然、人与人的关系,并建立和维持秩序的过程。从民主的观点来看,社会治理的最高治权应当归于人民全体。执政者所掌握的只是使用权,因此他们对社会的治理不是一种统治,而是一种管理。好的社会治理称之为善治,而法治就是一种理想的善治。     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

The impact of international human rights norms—a “law undergoing evolution”

Abstract

In this paper, the author outlines the history of, and reasons for, the growing impact of international human rights jurisprudence upon the work of judges in New Zealand, Australia, England and elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Nations. Formerly, international and domestic law were virtually entirely separate. But now, there is increasing legal authority to support the use of international human rights jurisprudence in domestic judicial decision‐making. It can be done in the application of constitutional or statutory provisions reflecting universal principles stated in international treaties. But, according to the Bangalore Principles, it can also be done where there is a gap in the common law or where a local statute is ambiguous. The judge may then fill the gap or resolve the ambiguity by reference to international human rights jurisprudence which will ensure that domestic law conforms, as far as possible, to such principles.

In its decision in Tavita, the New Zealand Court of Appeal declared this to be “a law … undergoing evolution”. The author outlines some of the impediments and problems for the evolution. But he also collects the reasons why it is a natural and inevitable phase of the common law in the current age. He suggests that judges should be aware of the developments. In appropriate cases, they should inform their decisions with relevant international human rights jurisprudence. That will at least ensure that they develop domestic human rights law in a principled way, consistently with international law, and not in an idiosyncratic fashion “discovering” new fundamental rights which may otherwise be criticised as mere judicial invention.     

人权启蒙与科学主义重建--晚近十年宪法学研究的几点哲学思考

晚近十年的宪法学研究 ,是对十年前宪法学研究中的唯科学主义进行解构与重建的过程。一方面 ,以人权、人本和自由为终极关怀的宪法本质观取代了旧有的国家主义宪法终极关怀观 ,这种超验之思不能为科学方法最终证实。另一方面 ,宪法制度构建和宪法学研究方法转换的过程中科学主义仍起着基石性作用。宪法学研究的科学主义重建就是从科学万能返回到有限科学理性方法的重建。宪法作为人们生活标准和生活方式的准则 ,无疑是超验的 ;同时宪法又作为对人类生活发生影响的一种法律制度 ,又必须是科学的。宪法的这种两面性才是其本来面目。