The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs,Culture, and Status (Part Two)

Part One of this article, which appeared in the last edition of Diplomacy and Statecraft, argued that the origins and early development of British nuclear weapons was largely driven by the particular ideas and beliefs of a relatively small political, scientific, and military elite. It is also argued that these beliefs, which developed into a “deterrence state of mind” amongst the elite, derived in part from a traditional strategic culture that emphasised the importance of producing the most sophisticated weapons of the day to protect Britain's diplomatic and security interests in a largely anarchic international system. Part Two argues that these ideational factors, based on a “realist” perspective of international security held by Britain's political-military leadership, have remained of crucial importance through to the present day.     

Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion

A rising and influential tide of opinion is pressing for the United States to take major steps towards actually realizing “a world without nuclear weapons,” including by taking steps towards dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This article argues that a world without nuclear weapons, and particularly American nuclear weapons, is not desirable nor is real and effective nuclear disarmament possible. Therefore, while non-proliferation is an important objective, the United States should not abandon or move substantially towards the abandonment of its arsenal in pursuit of nuclear abolition. Instead, the United States should seek the worthy goal of preventing and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, a policy that can be followed by de-linking non-proliferation from disarmament.     

中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?

Abstract

The attitude of Turkish officials toward the US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries including Turkey.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy. ¹ 1. If no particular sources are mentioned, the facts of the case are based on reports of the printed editions of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times and The Wall-Street Journal and the on-line editions of the Los Angeles Times The Washington Post The Korea Herald The Korea Times, The People’s Korea and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)      

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

“Sacred nudging” and sanitation decisions in India

Sanitation policies in India have primarily focused on infrastructure development, through building latrines and toilets. Given the persistence of open defecation in India despite such efforts, emphases on behavioral change interventions are crucial. We explore why and how the dual nature of purity and degradation in public and private spaces is relevant to such problems. In the context of sanitation and health policies in India, we propose an intervention that exploits social norms associated with purity via the use of religious imagery in public spaces as a deterrent for unhygienic sanitation behaviors. This intervention falls within the framework of nudging, which has received great emphasis in recent policy discussions. In the absence of empirical data on the intervention, this paper takes into account considerations of ethics, implications, cost, and scalability; suggestions on implementing the intervention at various levels of government are provided keeping in mind India’s socio-cultural context.     

Rand Daily Mail: die dood in perspektief

SUMMARY

The closure of the Rand Daily Mail on April 30, 1985 focused the attention of South Africans on the state of the South African press. This (mainly white) press is examined in the article. It is found that if one uses Merill & Lowenstein's EPS curve of stages of media development in South Africa, the white press is already in the Modern phase, with saturated mass publications, decreasing readership of the mass press and an increasing commitment to specialization and diversification. The black publications are in the Transitional phase, moving from the Elite phase to the Popular phase, with a great potential for mass publications due mainly to increasing literacy and rising levels of income. Readership among Blacks has increased by some 250 per cent between 1962 and 1977. Conclusions drawn from these findings seem to indicate that the Rand Daily Mail had not taken adequate account of the realities of the media market and had positioned itself in a no-man's-land between a sophisticated white market and a developing black one. It had proved itself second best against both its main white and black rivals, namely Citizen and Sowetan. It is recommended that, due to the press's economic difficulties and the need for a diversity of views in a reforming constitutional system on the road to greater democracy, government subsidization of the press be considered seriously as an option for the future.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: US strategies towards China and Taiwan

In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begunto implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneouslydeter unilateral action while balancing out the rival politicaland military forces of each side. A simple standard strategyjust is not sufficient to maintain the status quo. The way tomaintain peace is for Washington to keep its role as a moderatorbetween the two sides while preventing both from taking unilateralsteps toward goals that would naturally provoke the other. USpolicy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena byimplementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. It isalso imperative that policymakers realize the complexity ofthe situation so as not to unwittingly provoke either side.This paper is an analysis of the emerging US strategy of deterringboth sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking unilateral actionwhile maintaining a balance of military and political forces,and gives some suggestions as to the further development ofthis strategy.     

The conceptual essentials of minimum: explaining Pakistan's rationale of minimum deterrence

Very little is known about Pakistan's nuclear policy and, in particular, about its adoption of minimum deterrence, given the existence of nuclear ambiguity and the absence of public, official documentation of Pakistan's understanding of minimum deterrence. Therefore, despite its innocuousness, ‘minimum’ remains a vague and complex phenomenon short of definitional concreteness when it is brought to a real conceptual test. On the one hand, minimum is regarded as a small number of deterrent forces arguing against expansion and arms competition, while, on the other hand, it is viewed as a relative, and therefore continually evolving, concept depending on the region's fast-changing strategic environment. A conceptual basis for the concept of minimum is explored, leading to the question: why does Pakistan pursue minimum deterrence? It traces out the rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence as conceptualized following the 1998 nuclear tests. This rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence is then analysed in light of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to see whether it is consistent with the basics of minimum as conceived here.     

Politics,proximity and paranoia: the evolution of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint

This article traces the evolution of Kashmir as a “nuclear flashpoint,” and the relationship between Kashmir, nuclear weapons, and regional security. The first section discusses the concept of a geopolitical flashpoint, providing a definition and a series of historical examples. The Kashmir issue and its role in the broader Indo-Pakistani conflict fit reasonably neatly into this definition. A second section briefly traces the history of nuclear weapons programs in the region, as the potential for nuclear escalation by competing powers or their allies is a key factor in defining nuclear flashpoints (a post-1945 phenomenon). The third section examines the evolution of the Kashmir issue and successive Indo-Pakistani crises within a nuclearized regional environment from 1984 to 2003. The final section assesses the prospects for Kashmir in the near future, and concludes that due to underlying political factors, Kashmir will remain a nuclear flashpoint for the foreseeable future.     

冷战后俄罗斯恐怖主义泛滥原因探析

冷战结束后,俄罗斯恐怖主义泛滥成灾,究其原因:政治经济转轨带来的社会不公和人民生活日益贫困是滋生恐怖主义活动的社会温床;民族、宗教矛盾激化,黑社会势力发展,邪教组织壮大是诱发恐怖主义活动的重要因素;军火走私,武器扩散,现代科学技术的发展为恐怖主义的活动提供了方便条件;泛民族主义、泛宗教主义的渗透,国际恐怖主义的支持,西方国家的干涉,助长了恐怖主义势力的嚣张气焰;俄反恐斗争的失误使恐怖主义势力得以发展和壮大,也在一定程度上加剧了恐怖主义的泛滥。这些错综复杂的原因严重制约着俄反恐斗争的开展,使俄国家安全面临着严峻的挑战。     

Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1

This article analyzes systemically the understudied topic of why and how the nuclear non-proliferation regime has remained a sustainable, even expanding entity, despite the unequal status of its members, and the fragility of international regimes as a species. The author argues that the convergence of two sets of distinct interests derived from the systemic roles and preferences of nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' has determined the creation and sustenance of the regime. For the nuclear-armed major powers the key factors that facilitate cooperation are the preservation of monopoly rights to possess nuclear weapons and the denial of similar rights to non-major power states. For most non-nuclear states, the regime's norms and principles render an important constraint against nuclear acquisition by their neighbors and a powerful normative restraint against nuclear use by the nuclear weapon states. This unique combination of interests and norms explains why the regime has persisted despite predictions of its demise. The larger theoretical implication is that favorable systemic conditions and system-induced interests have to be present in order for a multilateral security regime to emerge and persist. Conversely, when these favorable systemic conditions change, the regime is likely to weaken or dissipate.     

Beyond Fukushima: Japan's Emerging Energy and Environmental Challenges

This article considers the political-economic process by which “energy angst” created an embedded nuclear orientation in Japanese energy policymaking, and then how, following Fukushima, Japan initially tried to transform that structural tendency, through a political system poorly suited to reform, before edging back toward its traditional path. Due both to the prevailing systemic bias and the underlying political economy of nuclear power, the process of transformation promises to be a turbulent and extended one, with natural gas and energy efficiency being crucial tools for ameliorating the difficult realities of the domestic status quo.     

Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study

This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural factors influenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of extremist views. They also motivated involvement in political violence and a shift in some participants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical grievances were prime drivers of this process.     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.     

Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The European Union has since 2003 developed both a security and a Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy, and it has become the primary interlocutor of Iran in the dispute related to Iran's nuclear development. These are signs of significant policy progress. However, the fact that four years of nuclear diplomacy have brought few results invites a critical appraisal of EU strategy. This essay undertakes this appraisal, arguing that the EU is notably ambivalent regarding its underlying conception of international order. The EU wishes to be pluralist (in the tradition of sovereign equality), but is also anti-pluralist (in the liberal–democratic tradition). The essay lays out how the EU has coped with pressures for reform—arising notably from the United States—within the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this has made the EU problem apparent. The essay finally suggests that to salvage its policy of effective multilateralism the EU must acknowledge its anti-pluralist bias and promote a common transatlantic approach to nuclear non-proliferation.