Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation

Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.     

Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration's Policy towards Sudan

In contrast to the Clinton administration, which tried to isolate Sudan, George W. Bush initiated a dialogue with Khartoum and followed a “constructive engagement” policy. Three factors explain this radical change in U.S foreign policy: the influence of American evangelicals, the significance of the war on terror, and economic interests, particularly the oil lobby. However, each of these factors led Washington to opposite directions.     

Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World

The future of globalization is the crucial issue facing naval planners in deciding future mission priorities and programs. Around the world, we are witnessing a slow shift from traditional “modern” preoccupations to less familiar “postmodern” ones. This is producing navies with different assumptions, sets of missions and acquisition programs. But how long this can continue and how deep it can go remains unclear. Tackling the naval implications of this issue depends on how planners read the future of globalization. Will it survive and prosper, or will it decay, forcing us to revert to older, more familiar patterns of naval behavior?     

Financial Warfare

This paper brings together the key dimensions of financial warfare and places them in a larger policy framework. Its major conclusions are that financial warfare will be a much more important issue because of the astounding growth in international finance itself. In addition, financial warfare allows for more precise targeting than conventional economic warfare. Much like “precision strike” technology in arms, it gives more control over sanctions, but by no means perfect control. Finally, financial warfare's larger policy framework should draw on escalation and de-escalation theory because it is likely to be most effective when combined with other forms of pressure. This article does not “advocate” financial warfare. But it does argue that, since this type of conflict is emerging as an increasingly likely possibility, it needs to be thought through carefully. The worst outcome is to use it, without thinking about it, which, the author argues is where we are today.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

The Strategist's Curse: A Theory of False Optimism as a Cause of War

This article proposes a new theory of false optimism as a cause of war. Named for its similarity to the winner's curse in auctions, this theory explains how and why established sources of misperception (cognitive, psychological, bureaucratic, and organizational) interact with the selection of one military strategy from a set of alternatives to produce a surprising amount of additional false optimism. Even if a state's general perceptions of how well it will fare in a potential war are not biased toward optimism, this theory explains why its perceptions of the particular strategy on which it will base its plans for fighting that war will be systematically biased toward optimism. Simulations and formal modeling confirm the logic of the theory and suggest that the strategist's curse can sharply increase the probability of war due to false optimism.     

Does the IMF cause civil war? A comment

The global economic downturn has heightened concerns about intervention by global financial institutions and political stability. One prominently-published article purports to show that signing on to an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) increases the risk of civil war, Hartzell et al. (International Organization 64:339–56, 2010). The authors claim that IMF SAPs push liberalization, which hurts people badly enough that they foment civil war. We advance the debate by critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of who actually wins and loses from liberalization and who might be in a position to rebel. Using their data, we find that signing on to an IMF program predicts the onset of a civil war negatively if one uses a lower threshold of 25 deaths when defining civil war. These results suggest that the operationalization of the IMF variable as well as the use of large-scale civil war (1,000 deaths and above) simply capture the effect of ongoing conflict rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the time period under study and making only minor changes to operationalization, we find that at no time does IMF involvement successfully predict the onset of a civil war.     

Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response

The displacement of thousands of U.S. Gulf Coast residents in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is emblematic of a human migration challenge that will likely become more severe in the years and decades ahead. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that climate change will manifest in dramatic ways-extreme weather events, droughts, heat waves, increased cyclone (hurricane, typhoon) activity, sea level rise, etc.-and some of these effects may induce large scale human migration, both within and among countries. The increasing trend of environmental migrants is clashing with widespread anti-immigrant sentiment in both developed and developing countries around the world. Some countries are describing migration-and particularly unauthorized international migration-as a “security threat” and are turning to military forces to deter or manage the human flows, a trend that is likely to grow.     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

The Historical Mind and Military Strategy

As important as the study of history for military strategists is the acquisition of the historical mind—that is, a way of thinking that uses history as a mode of inquiry. From practical cases to inspiration, history can help with U.S. military decision-making. The historical mind will detect differences as much as similarities between cases, avoiding false analogies, and look for the key questions to be asking. It will look for continuity but also for more important discontinuities; it will look for linkages between data points, but not be too quick to attribute causation. It is a well-traveled mind that appreciates the variability of people and places, conditions and problems; it avoids over-reliance on “lessons learned.” For that reason, the historical education of civilian and military strategists is more, not less, important in an age of rapid change.     

走出南海诸岛主权争端的法理迷途

南海主权争端之所以越来越复杂,甚至是迷雾重重,是因为有些国家制造了解决主权争端的法理迷途。文章认为,走出南海主权争夺的法理迷途需要明确:联合国《海洋法公约》不解决主权争端;"实际占有,有效控制"原则充满战争危机;旧金山《对日和约》涉西沙群岛和南沙群岛条款是违法条款。     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

Middleman in the Middle East: America's Flawed Approach to the ‘Peace Process’

President Bush professes optimism that an Arab-Israeli peace accord can be reached before he leaves office. Hamas, which presumably senses his urgency, has recently proposed a temporary truce with Israel in Gaza, with an option to extend it to the West Bank. This initiative is eerily reminiscent of Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Hamas essentially advocates a short-term period of peaceful coexistence to bide time while it strengthens its forces and lulls Israel into a false sense of security. If the United States accedes to this proposal or pressures Israel to do so, it will demonstrate once again the Cold War-style attitudes and perceptions that still characterize its approach to the “peace process.”     

Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence

Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.     

Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World

The quality of the U.S. military has improved steadily since the end of the Cold War, but technological and managerial advancements cannot compensate for the inadequate size of the American armed forces. The post–Cold War years saw a shift from the Westphalian, state-ordered world to one where Western states are at war with transnational, substate terrorist groups. This requires adjustments in the American military establishment. Improvements in quality must be matched by an increase in quantity in order to meet U.S. security needs. As interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, a minimalist force may be sufficient to win a war, but where nation-building is required, it will find it difficult to win the peace.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

从社会运动到内战的演变机制 ——基于中东变局的考察

受到中东变局波及的中东国家,尽管结构背景大同小异,但各国爆发的社会运动带来的国内影响却截然不同,如突尼斯和埃及发生了较为平和的变革,而利比亚、叙利亚却爆发了内战。社会运动在不同的国家之所以产生不同的结果,原因在于抗议者能否形成跨阶层动员以及军队的立场选择。抗议者形成跨阶层动员,是社会运动得以持续并实现规模扩大的前提;在大规模社会运动面前,军队内部是否发生分裂,则决定该国是否爆发内战。就此而言,社会运动演变为内战需要两个条件,一个是形成跨阶层动员,一个是部分军队支持抗议活动或在抗议活动中保持中立。这一分析模式有助于研究者对社会运动是否会演变为内战进行预测。     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

The Probability of War, 1816–1992

What factors increase the probability that a pair of states might go to war is the focus of this study. Six hypotheses, derived from the steps to war explanation, are tested by comparing pairs of states that go to war with each other at least once in their history (from 1816 to 1992) with those that do not. It is found that as two states take the various steps to war that have been posited, the higher their probability of going to war. States whose relations are dominated by territorial disputes have a higher probability of having had a war if both sides have had outside allies, have had recurring territorial disputes, have been engaged in an enduring rivalry, and have had an arms race. As each of these factors becomes present, the probability of war progressively increases. Pairs of states whose relations are dominated by nonterritorial disputes also have their probability of war increased if these factors are present, but at a lower level. Of the various factors that increase the probability of war, outside politically relevant alliances seem to have the weakest impact.