Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France

This article seeks to explain why two states faced with a similar terrorist threat, perceiving it in a similar way, and drawing the same broad implications for their counterterrorist investigations, have nevertheless put in place significantly different types of organizational reforms in response to that threat. The study shows that although France and Britain have embraced a common preventive logic in the face of Islamist terrorism, the changes that they have made to the coordination of intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution in that context have differed because of contrasting organizational routines and interinstitutional conventions in the two states. An analysis of the British and French cases shows that law enforcement can be preventive but that western states are likely to pursue different ways of bringing security agencies and the law together to prevent and prosecute terrorism. The organizational and institutional factors that give rise to such divergent practices have important consequences for the ability of a state to develop a coordinated operational response to terrorism and convict terrorist suspects of crimes in a court of law.     

Preemption in the Bush Doctrine: A Reappraisal

This article argues that the elevation of preemption to a cardinal status in the Bush Doctrine following September 11, 2001 resulted from a larger strategic consideration—to convince rogue states to discontinue their weapons of mass destruction programs and their sponsorship of terrorism. Dismantling the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq as a demonstration of preemptive action was seen as necessary to ensure the forceful and credible conveyance of this message to other rogue states, especially Iran and North Korea. I call this strategic logic behind publicizing preemption, "demonstrative compellence." Because the logic of preemption in the Bush Doctrine relied heavily on the Iraq war and its demonstrative force, it has little relevance to the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy and should not be described as revolutionary.     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

俄罗斯与美国反恐战略之比较

在当今世界,俄罗斯和美国是遭受恐怖主义威胁最为严重的两个大国,反恐战略在俄罗斯和美国国家安全战略中都是不可或缺的组成部分。俄美两国在反恐战略的形成、恐怖主义威胁判断、反恐目标、军事反恐战略实践和国际反恐合作等方面有相同之处,也存在显著差别。随着俄美领导人的更换,两国反恐战略都在调整,并且选择了不同的战略取向。反恐是俄美两国合作的重要领域,但俄美反恐战略的分歧可能导致双方之间爆发摩擦乃至冲突。     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

布什主义的影响

一、实现了对克林顿总统的美国国家安全战略的巨大转变 二战以来，美国的国家安全战略大体上分为冷战时期的“遏制战略”、“超越遏制战略”和冷战后美国的对外扩张战略。目前美国仍然处于这一全球扩张的过程中。总的说，美国的国家安全战略有“三大支柱”，即安全、经贸和人权。主要是因应2001年“9·11”事件和国际恐怖主义，乔治·W·布什总统在美国的综合实力基础上，借助反对恐怖主义之机维持冷战后美国在世界上的绝对优势和“领导地位”，推出其国家安全战略即布什主义，强调军事主义，     

New Structures of American Foreign Strategy Since 9/11--Seeking Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Countries

When George W. Bush entered the White House in early 2001,American foreign policy was based on unilateral principles and favored disengagement from global conflict resolution. The United States declared it's decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol, refused to negotiate with North Korea, and, in particular, it's pursuit of a national ballstic missile defense system,in face of global opposition, further reinforced the position of its unilateralism.The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 came as a shock to the world. The United States suffered not only physical casualties, but felt a psychological blow as well. For the first time since the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had been attacked at home. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attacks on September 11 targeted civilians and the cornerstones of the American way of life- their financial and government centers. The terrorist attacks forced the Bush administration to re-examine it approach to foreign policy Seeking cooperation with other powers will be the new choice for American foreign strategy.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

EU internal security governance: the case of counter-terrorism

There are clear indicators that in spite of the sensitivity of internal security in terms of essential state functions and national sovereignty an EU governance framework with specific characteristics has emerged in the counter-terrorism field. Common threat assessments guide governance responses, and specific institutional structures, cooperation mechanisms, legal instruments, and forms of external action have been put into place to respond to the cross-border nature of the terrorist challenges. However, in line with the general subsidiary role only of the EU as provider of internal security in addition to the Member States, this governance framework remains based on the interaction and cooperation between national counter-terrorist systems and capabilities that remain largely under national control and still enjoy relatively wide margins of discretion in terms of priorities, legal framework, and organization. This analysis concludes that the EU's internal security governance – as evident from the counter-terrorism field – may be best characterized as an advanced institutionalized system of cooperation and coordination between national governance frameworks constructed around a core of common instruments and procedures with a cross-border reach.     

The European Union in the new millennium

The Bush administration has been too quick to dismiss containment as an obsolete hangover of the Cold War. Appropriately modified to operate through international institutions and regional alliances, containment provides the most viable available basis for responding to terrorist threats emanating from rogue regimes and weak states.     

美国生物防御政策与国家安全

生物防御政策是美国政府旨在应对生物威胁、降低生物风险以及为生物事故事先准备、响应及恢复的行动纲要。自21世纪初以来,美国历届总统皆格外注重生物防御政策的制定和完善,从小布什到特朗普,一共颁布了六部相关法案,发布了七份国家战略报告,签发了五项行政命令,通过拨付巨额经费,设置若干专门机构,整合各种资源,加强国际合作等方式,不断提升生物防御和生物安全在国家安全战略中的地位,旨在为美国构筑一道双向度、立体化、全谱系的"生物安全屏障"。究其原因,主要是为了应对恐怖组织不断寻求生物武器给美国带来的威胁,敌对国家不断掌握和研制生物武器产生的持续性压力以及国际社会的相关立法约束乏力。美国生物防御政策对全球生物安全具有双重影响:一方面,通过与其他国家、相关国际组织展开交流与对话,为其提供生物安全援助等方式推动该领域的国际合作;另一方面,自身庞大的生物防御项目、巨额的经费投入、本国安全利益"唯上"的思维又使全球生物安全形势面临恶化的风险。     

What Kind of Security Concept Does Our World Need?

While the threat of war has decreased,there have appeared intricate security issues that affect all aspects of human life,breaking through various defenses and threatening the well being of all actors in the contemporary world,including nations,groups and individuals.This risky situation calls for a new security concept,one that transcends traditional state centrism,national supremacy and coercion.The new security concept,which should assimilate the general theory of grand strategy,focuses on a vision that spans time and space,valuing humankind as it exists as one of the dynamic factors of nature and society.The essentials of the new security concept are to recognize balanced development as the substance of security and to govern national strength and the application of means and tactics.It aims at realizing comprehensive security across various social fields within states,to achieve mutual security among national,international and individual actors,as well as harmony between man and nature,continuous security leading to lasting and universal peace in the future.     

Information terrorism: Political violence in the information age

Information warfare represents a threat to American national security and defense. There are two general methods in which a terrorist might employ an information terrorist attack: (1) when information technology (IT) is a target, and/or (2) when IT is the tool of a larger operation. The first method would target an information system for sabotage, either electronic or physical, thus destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any information infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependent upon it. The second would manipulate and exploit an information system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function for which it was not meant (such as spoofing air traffic control). A perennial dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security. The special problems associated with IT are examined. The US national security establishment needs to use a flexible, integrated response to counter information terrorists ‐ one which employs information warfare tactics tailored to counter gray‐area phenomena, but which also pools resources from ‘conventional’ counter‐terrorism and law enforcement authorities.     

Press coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the UK and Denmark: shaping the reactions of the public,affected communities and copycat attackers

Following 9/11, Al-Qaeda-orchestrated plots were considered the greatest threat to Western security and sparked the coalition’s war on terror. Close to a decade later, the post-9/11 threat landscape had shifted significantly, leading then CIA-director Leon Panetta to describe “the lone-wolf strategy” as the main threat to the United States. Subsequent lone-actor attacks across the West, including the cities of London, Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Ottawa and Charleston, further entrenched perspectives of a transformed security landscape in the “after, after-9/11” world. The unique features of lone-actor terrorism, including the challenges of interdiction and potential of copycat attacks, mean that the media is likely to play a particularly important role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat attackers. This article presents findings from a content analysis of British and Danish newspaper reporting of lone-actor terrorism between January 2010 and February 2015. The study highlights that lone-actor terrorism is framed, with national variations, as a significant and increasing problem in both countries; that Islamist lone-actors are often represented as distinct from far-right lone-actors; and that some reporting, despite relatively limited amplification of specific terrorist messages, potentially aids lone-actors by detailing state vulnerabilities to attacks.     

Going Public as Political Strategy: The Bush Administration,an Echoing Press,and Passage of the Patriot Act

Research suggests that political elites excel at controlling political and media information environments, particularly in times of national crisis, such as the events and aftermath of September 11. This study examines the creation and passage of the Patriot Act, which was proposed by the Bush administration following the terrorist attacks and quickly passed with strong support by the U.S. Congress. We argue that (a) the public communications of the Bush administration, particularly those by George W. Bush and John Ashcroft, and (b) news coverage about the legislation were instrumental in this outcome. Public communications by Bush and Ashcroft and news coverage about the Act were content analyzed to identify the timing of the messages and the themes and perspectives emphasized, and congressional debates and activities were examined for insight into their relation with administration and press discourse. Findings suggest that Bush and Ashcroft's communications, in combination with a press that largely echoed the administration's messages, created an environment in which Congress faced significant pressure to pass the legislation with remarkable speed.     

Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS1

Abstract

The article discusses the emergence of a Russian version of the Bush doctrine in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian officials’ conceptual stretching of the strategic culture embodied in the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine (MD) from 2000 onwards. While these documents seem to cherish multilateralism and United Nations (UN) primacy in questions of global and regional security, terrorist attacks on Russia proper have engendered a more assertive approach to regional security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia and brought Russian officials to consider unilateral pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases. In the case of the Caucasus, Russia has been striking against terrorist bases on Georgian territory and contributed to constructing a failed state, whereas in the Central Asian case, Russia has sought to revitalise the defunct CIS security framework and pledge assistance to ‘allies’ in the fight against terrorism. The article argues that the war against terrorism has given Russia a new footing in the CIS. The issue of security is more salient, as is the reliance on military force to facilitate it.     

Terrorism,violence against the public,and the media: The Australian approach

This paper examines the balance between the apparently competing objectives of government and the media in the general area of violence against the public and details the Australian model for handling issues associated with terrorism and the media. Australia's counterterrorism strategy may be considered holistic, going beyond the idea of a comprehensive capability for response to an actual public incident to include preventive measures and enhancement of the national security environment, suggesting that all elements of the society, including the media, regard security as a cooperative endeavor. These elements have been developed in the “National Anti‐Terrorist Plan” (NATP), developed by Australia's Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Prevention against Violence (SAC‐PAV). For the past several years, the SAC‐PAV has been developing a basic strategic guide to provide structure for its many activities, and the committee has agreed that the NATP requires a fourfold strategy for dealing with the media: (1) public communication policies and guidelines, (2) incorporating media response and incident management strategies, (3) media training, and (4) physical controls. In addition, the SAC‐PAV has formulated a set of guidelines for the media to apply when covering terrorist incidents, indicating clearly what crisis managers and counterterrorism response organizations expect of media handling of public crises.     

The US Approach toward Islamic Militancy: Current Policies in Historical Perspective

Following the events of 9/11, the US declared a global war on terror and a new strategy based on preemption for defeating Muslim extremism and terrorism. However, the new US strategy so far has not been more successful than earlier strategies in combating either Muslim extremism or international terrorism. Arguably, it may even have contributed to the strengthening of the appeal of Islamic extremism and certain terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The principal reason for this lack of success has been the historically inconsistent and contradictory approach of the US to dealing with the problem of Muslim militancy and its manipulation of it for short-term objectives.     

Preemption, Unilateralism, and Hegemony: The American Tradition?

Historian John Lewis Gaddis has found precedent for the current war on terror in early American history, arguing that the British burning of the capitol in 1814 had an impact on defense policy similar to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, leading to an emphasis on preemption. In basic respects, Gaddis restates the consensus among diplomatic historians that the early republic's foreign policy focused on preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. But these depictions of early American diplomacy conflate separate eras and ignore an opposing tradition that was more moderate and principled. They are not without some truth, but their imperious sway in histories of our country needs to be checked and balanced.