普京执政后俄军事建设与改革的新动向

近年来,由于北约东扩、美国筹建国家导弹防御系统以及车臣战争的爆发,俄罗斯日益感到其国家安全遭到威胁.普京自执政以来,非常重视俄罗斯的军事建设与改革.他从本国实际出发,在继承和发展叶利钦时代改革成果的基础上,积极加强国防和军事建设,加紧推进军事改革进程.本文从7方面论述了俄罗斯军事建设与改革的新动向.可以认为,普京时代俄军事建设与改革将进入一个新的深化发展阶段.     

Mortgaging Security for Economic Gain: U.S. Arms Policy in an Insecure World

Similar to other consumer sectors of the global economy, the transfer of advanced conventional weapons and military technologies has entered the globalization process, a process that has qualitatively and quantitatively altered the composition and structure of U.S. national security policymaking. By injecting the decisionmaking process governing arms transfers into the global market place, U.S. policy makers must now reconcile maintaining economic competitiveness within the global system without jeopardizing U.S. national security interests. By subordinating national security interests to global economic imperatives, U.S. decisionmakers are at risk of mortgaging the political, societal, and security welfare of its citizenry for profit.     

Russian military strategies in the Arctic: change or continuity?

This paper examines the nature of Moscow’s military strategies in the Arctic. It is argued that the roles of military power have radically changed since the Cold War era. According to Russian strategic thinking, instead of being a coercive instrument in a global confrontation between two superpowers and capitalist and socialist systems, now military power has new functions, such as to ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its (not their) exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region, protect Moscow’s economic interests in the North, prevent illegal migration and potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and infrastructural objects, fulfil some dual-use functions (such as search and rescue operations, monitoring air and maritime spaces, providing navigation safety, mitigating natural and man-made catastrophes), help academic community in developing Arctic research, and carry some symbolic functions. These new roles, however, do not preclude military power from fulfilling its traditional functions, such as territorial defence, power projection, deterrence, and containment. Russia’s military modernisation programmes are described. The authors arrive at a conclusion that these programmes do not provoke an arms race or undermine the regional cooperation. To prevent negative security trends, a system of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures should be developed in the region.     

2011年拉美地区安全形势回顾

2011年拉美地区继续保持总体和平的安全形势,地区内国家通过双边和多边机制构建互信和加强防务合作,应对与地区外国家的冲突。巴西和阿根廷积极加强双边防务合作,成为深化地区安全合作的重要驱动力。拉美国家,尤其是南美国家在近年普遍提高军费支出,掀起一轮军备更新的热潮,但是这种状况并未恶化为一场地区性军事竞赛,拉美军费支出的绝对值仍然处于较低水平。在非传统安全领域,拉美面对来自有组织犯罪和恐怖主义的挑战。反毒是当前美国与拉美安全合作的关键所在,美国希望加强与拉美国家的合作,以便共同打击贩毒,改善公共安全。     

Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries,1950–1991

There has not been much formal or empirical research on the impact of ColdWar–era arms transfers on regional subsystems, and the work that has been undertaken is inconclusive: arms transfers appear, in some cases, to promote stability, but in other situations they are shown to be destabilizing. This study confronts the issue directly by developing and testing both stability and instability models of Superpower (U.S. and USSR) and third-country arms transfers. The models examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers—India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia—during the 1950–1991 period. Tests of the models with recently released arms trade data reveal that the weapons shipments of the U.S. and USSR were profoundly destabilizing, while those of third parties generally had little impact on subsystem political and military relationships. An intriguing exception to these patterns is the weaponstransfers of the PRC, specifically to Pakistan: these are found to have lessened the military imbalance between Pakistan and India, suggesting that the PRC's reputation as an irresponsible exporter deserves further review.     

Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.     

Beyond the Target State: Foreign Military Intervention and Neighboring State Stability

Despite the abundance of research on the consequences of foreign military intervention for target countries, scant research has been devoted to the possible regional externalities of intervention. This article examines whether large-scale armed operations affect the likelihood of civil conflict onset in countries neighboring the target of intervention. We posit that interventions against the target regime reduce the government's ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory by diminishing its coercive and administrative capacity. This might, in turn, result in safe haven possibilities for neighboring rival groups in the target and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase the risk of civil conflict onset in the contiguous countries. Armed interventions supportive or neutral toward the target state, on the other hand, bolster the government's coercive capacity and mitigate ongoing crises in the target. Such armed intrusions might therefore undermine the likelihood of internal armed conflict in neighboring countries triggered by the factors associated with “bad neighborhoods”: safe haven possibilities, transnational spread of arms, and refugee flows. To substantiate these claims, we use time-series, cross-national data for the 1951–2004 period. Results indicate that hostile interventions increase the probability of civil conflict onset in connected countries while supportive interventions have a regional pacifying effect, reducing the likelihood of domestic unrest in countries neighboring the target state. Neutral interventions, on the other hand, are unlikely to have any discernible effect on regional stability. Further, the primary motive of intervention, whether for humanitarian or other purposes, has no statistically significant impact on the stability of neighboring countries.     

2004年美、日、韩3国的军事发展动向与东北亚政局

2004年在美国军事加快东移的背景下,日韩也采取了大肆扩充军备的政策。这不仅会在今后几年打破东北亚地区已有的相对军事战略平衡,引发军备竞赛的升级。同时,对该地区热点问题的解决也会带来直接影响,地区内国家间的相互猜疑和不信任会进一步增强。     

关于中国在缅军事基地的谣传

近15年来,涉及中国在缅军事基地的报道和论著源源不断。虽未获得证实,但中国对北印度洋的渗透的传闻已深刻影响缅甸邻国,尤其是印度的战略思维。安达曼海大椰子树岛的大型情报站和伊洛瓦底江三角洲海基岛海军基地的报告,已被作为缅甸沦为中国附属国的佐证。在其他观察家看来,这些基地的存在,明确显示就是中国在印度洋进行扩张的计划,甚至是它的全球野心。然而,印度政要于2005年承认,关于中国在大椰子树岛设置情报站的报告有假,并承认缅甸并无中国海军基地。因此彻底改变印度国防计划人员10多年来关注的两大焦点,导致人们怀疑有关缅甸存在其他"中国基地"的说法,进而引起对中缅关系现状及中国在北印度洋的战略利益的思考。     

Prevail or perish: Anglo-German naval competition at the beginning of the twentieth century

Abstract

British politicians often argued that Britain maintained its navy only in order to secure its own survival by keeping sea communications open, while Germany in no real need of a powerful navy, threatened this legitimate British policy-goal by pursuing expansionist politics. German leaders, emboldened and a little dazzled by the tremendous industrial and economic success of the newly unified Reich, held that Britain was maintaining its economic dominance in the Empire by military means and thus blocking the progress Germany hoped to make in its aspiration to parity status and economic prosperity, with all that that entailed. This paper will explore the underlying rationale of the arms race between Britain and Germany shining through in those different positions on legitimate (military) policy aims. It will go beyond the visible symbols, as it were, of the Dreadnought and the Two-Power standard. These very concrete matters will also be dealt with here but, more importantly, this essay is meant to give some answer as to whether an archetypal differentiation between survival on the one hand and domination on the other can be made out as the predominant logic that led the two countries to embark on the road to the Great War.     

Limits to cooperation: Iterated graduated games and the arms race

The arms race is often modeled as mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and arms control as reciprocal cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, while Chicken and other games are used to represent different aspects of superpower rivalry. This paper develops a model of the macro‐structure of superpower rivalry in which each of these games occur at different levels of military expenditures or other measures of military effort. In this iterated graduated game model the two rival states repeatedly select from an ordered sequence of policy options, and each state experiences tradeoffs among the desire to gain an advantage over the rival, the dangers of escalation, and the intrinsic benefits and opportunity costs of military expenditures. Analysis of numerical examples demonstrates that equilibrium in this model corresponds to the intermediate levels of cooperation and conflict characteristic of superpower rivalry. A concluding discussion indicates that this model is also consistent with the existence of policy competition among domestic groups with conflicting interests.     

Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta

Arms acquisition is a crucial venture for armed insurgency groups for carrying out their militant activities. I argue that the specific manner in which these groups obtain weapons may have important consequences for the dynamics of violent intrastate conflict. While most previous studies of the relationship between arms acquisition and armed conflict have focused solely on the impact of arms availability, in this article I analyze the impact of two specific aspects of arms acquisition patterns—the methods and the degree of leadership control—on the dynamics and nature of armed conflict in a qualitative case study of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) between 1995 and 2005. I conclude that the specific arms acquisition method and the degree of leadership control over this process have strongly affected the dynamics of the conflict.     

17世纪西西伯利亚军役人员：形成、编制与管理

西西伯利亚军役人员形成于16世纪末至17世纪初，是俄国统治西伯利亚主要依靠的力量。由于西西伯利亚地域辽阔、人口稀少，其军队的管理机构、数量、等级、兵种、招募等方面与欧俄地区不同。18世纪初，彼得一世进行了军事改革，按照西方建制创立了新型的正规军，西西伯利亚军役人员从此退出了历史舞台。     

全球安全治理视域下的自主武器军备控制

随着人工智能的飞速进展，不断智能化的自主武器日益显现出伦理和安全风险，使得限制或禁止自主武器成为全球安全治理领域的新兴议题。相比其他军控对象，自主武器军控进程在过去几年中获得较快推进，其中《特定常规武器公约》会议已决定设立政府专家组专门探讨自主武器问题。文章系统梳理了自主武器军备控制的概念、伦理和安全争议，旨在通过这种梳理更好地理解自主武器军控进程发展的动因，并对这一进程的未来走向做出预测。当前，自主武器军备控制的主要动因集中在道德层面，特别是让机器自主决策杀伤引发的伦理忧虑。而从安全层面看，自主武器蕴涵的安全风险在其他新兴技术领域同样存在，而发展和使用自主武器带来的战略红利依然显著，这使得主要国家推动自主武器军控的意愿并不强烈。在权力政治与道德政治的博弈下，自主武器军控在可预见的时期内将难以形成实质性成果，稍有可能的是通过“软法”等非约束性方式塑造一定的国际规范。在这个过程中，中国可以发挥更加积极主动的作用，在确保战略利益的同时营造有利的大国形象。     

The Post-Coup Military Spending Question Revisited, 1960–2000

Do military regimes spend more on the military than other regime types? All leaders cater to their winning coalition. For military leaders, core supporters are other members of the military. To solicit support from this group, first, leaders are persuaded to spend more on the military to ensure their political survival, while other autocratic leaders tend to view the military as a competing power center. Second, the cost of repressing challenges from the public in military regimes is cheaper than in other regimes; therefore, leaders in military regimes allocate more resources to the military to satisfy them. We test this argument by examining military spending in different regime types for 1960–2000. The empirical results from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors indicate that military regimes allocate more, on average, to the military than other regimes and that military rulers brought into power through military coups or who have experienced military coup attempts against them increase their military resource allocation.     

Arms Transfers beyond the State-to-State Realm

Arms transfers beyond the state-to-state realm can have harmful effects for international security dramatically affecting the relations and behavior of states. This article examines why an emerging international norm on "prohibiting states to transfer arms to nonstate groups" has failed to diffuse at the international level. It discusses the already available international law framework existing at the regional and international levels upon which the potential norm could be built. The failure of the norm to diffuse at the international level can be primarily explained by the existence of a long-consolidated norm: the customary practice of states to transfer weapons to nonstate actors, that is, groups they deem legitimate to, without any interference or constraint. ¹ The unrestrained transfer of weapons is an established foreign-policy practice. It is the way states form, uphold alliances, extend friendships, and build spheres of influence ( Sorokin 1994 ). Clearly, no state willingly wants to give this up. Therefore, the multilateral agreement on a norm barring most or all transfers of weapons to nonstate actors would curtail the freedom of action to build spheres of influence as states please. There are genuine ethical and moral dilemmas in this discussion, a nonstate actor may be a freedom fighter or a terrorist depending on different perspectives. The distinction between the categories "state" and "nonstate" actors may risk classifying actors in two camps: the good and the bad, respectively. This is problematic as a few states are known to be the most brutal perpetrators of egregious violations against their own citizens, whereas certain nonstate actors are legitimately fighting for the protection of vulnerable populations.     

Unpacking military emulation: absorptive capacity and German counterinsurgency doctrine during ISAF

ABSTRACT

Which organisational activities promote effective military emulation? Which variables facilitate and impede the emergence of these activities? Drawing upon the academic literatures on military change and management studies, as well as semi-structured interviews within the British and German militaries, this article identifies five key organisational activities which promote effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning. In doing so, the article improves understanding of the contribution that management studies can make to multi-disciplinary scholarship on military learning. The article examines the variables which facilitate the emergence of activities which support effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning through a case study of Bundeswehr doctrinal absorptive capacity during ISAF. It also explores the impact of these activities on doctrine development. The article demonstrates the crucial importance of active and well-informed civilian oversight of the activities which support military learning.     

2011年日本军情综述

2011年日本军事发展的主要特点是：推进防卫力量改革,增设新的军事机构;加快武器装备发展,重点发展海空装备;放宽“武器出口三原则”,推行武器出口新标准;强化“西南方向”兵力部署,战略重心逐渐南移;拼抢“新疆域”战略制高点,加快太空军事化进程;自卫队执行多样化任务,防卫力量作用日趋增大;日关恢复“2＋2”战略磋商,深化和发展日美同盟;加强双边和多边安全合作,积极介入南海问题。     

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.