The Battle for Baghdad: Testing Hypotheses About Insurgency From Risk Heterogeneity,Repeat Victimization,and Denial Policing Approaches

The Iraqi Insurgency (2003–2011) has commonly been characterized as demonstrating the tendency for violence to cluster and diffuse at the local level. Recent research has demonstrated that insurgent attacks in Iraq cluster in time and space in a manner similar to that observed for the spread of a disease. The current study employs a variety of approaches common to the scientific study of criminal activities to advance our understanding of the correlates of observed patterns of the incidence and contagion of insurgent attacks. We hypothesize that the precise patterns will vary from one place to another, but that more attacks will occur in areas that are heavily populated, where coalition forces are active, and along road networks. To test these hypotheses, we use a fishnet to build a geographical model of Baghdad that disaggregates the city into more than 3000 grid cell locations. A number of logistic regression models with spatial and temporal lags are employed to explore patterns of local escalation and diffusion. These models demonstrate the validity of arguments under each of three models but suggest, overall, that risk heterogeneity arguments provide the most compelling and consistent account of the location of insurgency. In particular, the results demonstrate that violence is most likely at locations with greater population levels, higher density of roads, and military garrisons.     

How Can Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Insights From Nepal

How can insurgent groups that are militarily far weaker than the state survive and grow? Influential accounts drawing on Kalyvas' “control-collaboration” model argue that limited state reach can make this possible by allowing rebel groups to carve out pockets of control where they can elicit collaboration. I suggest that this account is inadequate. Even states with limited reach are likely to transfer sufficient forces to rebel-affected areas to establish at least partial control. Weak rebels therefore often face the challenge of building capacity without local control to begin with. I identify two broad factors that can make this feasible: first, strong pre-existing rebel networks, which facilitate collaboration through solidarity, norms of reciprocity, and social incentives; and second, counterinsurgency policies and practices that fail to exploit the opportunities that control offers for incentivizing collaboration and shaping political preferences. These arguments are grounded in a fieldwork-based case study of insurgency processes in a hamlet of Rolpa, Nepal.     

The political process of Boko Haram insurgency onset: a political relevance model

ABSTRACT

As more data emerges on the Boko Haram phenomenon, the controversy over the roots of the insurgency persists. While some emphasise transnational motivational factors based on the Salafist ideology, others focus on diverse local structural factors, including the economy, religion, and politics. Although this article acknowledges the importance of these factors, it argues that these are ubiquitous contextual factors which insufficiently explain the location and timing of the insurgency. By introducing the Political Relevance Model, this article theorises the insurgency onset by focusing on the agency of the local political elites and their relationship with the sect. It finds that the insurgency is rooted in an initial mutually beneficial relationship between the local political elites and a politically relevant group that turned sour, resulting in the attempt by the elites to withdraw the group’s earlier privileges using state coercion which the group frames as state repression requiring violent resistance. These agents have, in their interest, framed this struggle to resonate with the people.     

Socio-religious communities and fertility patterns in West Bengal,India

This article explores the fertility differential of different religious groups across various socio-economic characteristics. The article is based on primary data collected from a field survey of 2,590 households in the Malda district of West Bengal in India. The mean number of children ever born (MCEB) is used to measure fertility. The analysis shows that there is a major variation in the impact of various socio-economic variables on the number of children ever born among different religious groups. The study findings will be helpful for policymakers regarding the planning for management of different demographic processes.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors

From the Patriotic Front struggle against the minority rule in Rhodesia to the seven-party mujaheddin alliance in Afghanistan, inter-rebel alliances make the armed opposition more resilient and successful in the face of government repression. Why then do some rebel groups cooperate with each other while others do not? Drawing on the principal-agent theory, I argue that the presence of foreign sponsors is likely to encourage alliance formation in civil wars especially when two rebel outfits share a state sponsor. Shared sponsors may demand cooperation between their agents and credibly threaten to punish them for non-compliance. They may also insist on the establishment of umbrella institutions to improve their monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and to increase the legitimacy of their agents. I test this argument using the UCDP Actor dataset with new data on alliances between rebel groups. I find strong evidence that shared sponsors increase the probability of inter-rebel alliance.     

Sustaining livelihoods in complex emergencies: experiences of Sri Lanka

This article examines the role of context-specific factors that help to perpetuate the vulnerability of conflict-affected people. The discussion revolves around key concepts of household livelihood security, resilience building, income diversification, market access, and armed non-state actors. It is argued that, while conflict-affected households develop adaptive strategies to sustain their livelihoods amid the commonly observed vulnerabilities, the governance arrangements of the parties to the conflict can place stress on local initiatives, confining them to subsistence level and so reinforcing their vulnerability. Deeper analysis of the sources of vulnerability and implications of policy processes could help to inform intervention strategies.     

Understanding households’ livelihood choices,wealth, and poverty in Accra,Ghana

This article reports on a study that aimed to deepen understanding of the factors which influence livelihood choices, and perceptions of wealth and poverty, in Accra, Ghana. Focus group discussions and household surveys were held in ten selected communities. Although parents are able to influence their households’ livelihood choices, the prevailing socio-economic circumstances are more likely to determine what household members are likely to do. Perceptions of wealth and poverty are influenced by factors both internal and external to households, indicating the complexity and variety of interrelated assets which the poor depend on for their livelihoods.     

Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence

Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.     

A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States

ABSTRACT

Drawing on Rapoport’s four waves thesis, this study asks whether the emergence of terrorist semi-states (TSS) in the 21st-century MENA region and Pakistan mean that we are seeing the beginning of a new (fifth) wave. We define a TSS as a rebel group that a) has control over portions of a weak state’s territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launches terrorist attacks against third-party states. To be considered a fifth wave, the new terrorism phenomenon at hand must both fit Rapoport’s criteria of a wave (be global, have the same driving force) and also be significantly different from the prior wave. Clearly, the TSSs are different from the religious terror groups of the fourth wave in key respects: they prioritize territorial control, they engage in a much wider array of governance activities (not just social services), most of their victims have been members of the same religion—namely, Muslims (which suggests that they are driven more by the pursuit of power than by Jihad); and finally, their behavior (though not their statements) shows they have a local rather than a universal agenda. The main counter-argument is that TSSs are all Islamic and have so far not been exported globally.     

Image formation,the low involvement viewer,and televised political advertising

Political observers have extensively documented the national media's focus on committee and party leaders. Legislators' local coverage, in contrast, remains largely unexplored and unexplained. This article examines 40 local newspapers to explore how these factors may influence legislators' local newspaper coverage. We find that local newspapers do not provide more coverage to congressional leaders and that independent papers write more frequently than chain-owned competitors about the local House delegation. Additionally, the extent to which a legislator's district geographically overlaps with the newspaper's market has a strong effect on legislators' mentions.     

Interdependent Preferences, Militarism, and Child Gender

Selection effects make it difficult to determine whether concern for other people genuinely affects individuals' policy preferences. Child gender provides a conveniently exogenous means of exploring the issue, especially in contexts such as military policy where girls and boys face different risks; in many countries male children are disproportionately likely to become soldiers and thus bear the costs of militarism. This creates divergent effects: those in households with girls generally prefer more hawkish foreign policies than do members of households with boys. Data from the 2004 American National Election Study confirm these intuitions, both in general statements of policy preference and in evaluating the net costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts.     

Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan

Pakistan has a long history of patronizing militant proxies, and in recent years it has become a victim as well as a supporter of terrorism. The evolution of the jihadist insurgency in Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pashtun militants leading it, efforts to counter the insurgency, and the overall strategic threats to the state have merited significant study. With some notable exceptions, less attention has been paid to the role Punjabi militant organizations and their splinters have played in bringing the insurgency to Pakistan's heartland. The involvement of these actors in the revolutionary jihad against the state gives the FATA-based actors leading this insurgency power projection capabilities throughout the country. This article helps to fill that knowledge gap by bringing a more detailed level of analysis to the understanding of how anti-state Punjabi militant networks function at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. In doing so, it illustrates that the introduction of new loci of jihad at the macro-level, simultaneous integration and atomization among militant groups at the meso-level, and greater portability of fighters at the micro-level impedes covert control by Pakistani intelligence services and decreases the utility of even sincere counterterrorism efforts by the Pakistani state.     

A multidimensional approach to measuring household food security in Taraba State,Nigeria: comparing key indicators

This study used household data from Taraba State, Nigeria, to explore the advantages of using a multidimensional approach to measure food and nutrition insecurity. Adaptations of three popular food security indicators were combined in a single household questionnaire to test how well the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), the Dietary Diversity Score (DDS), and the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) complement each other. Sixty-nine per cent of households in the sample were classified as extremely food insecure, which means they are likely to resort to intensive but erosive coping strategies and lower dietary diversity. The three indicators powerfully complemented each other. This multidimensional food security measurement framework provided a more nuanced picture of the depth and breadth of food insecurity for local government areas in Taraba State. This approach can help Nigerian policy authorities overcome the information deficits that impede effective food and nutrition assistance interventions.     

同族群平叛优势理论再思考：以印度平息锡克叛乱为例

同族群优势主要包括当地环境、人力情报和民众动员等三个方面,各方都有机会去利用同族群优势,争取在少数族群叛乱与反叛乱斗争态势中的优势。政府平叛策略应强调发挥温和派的作用,从而在同族群因素方面削弱、抵消乃至胜过叛乱组织的相对优势。同族群平叛优势的作用机制在于控制人口和争夺民心两个方面,当政府控制足够多的当地人口时,叛乱组织就无法在族群内部招募到足够的人员,以补充在政府平叛行动中损失的成员;而拥有民众支持的意义则在于,虽然有了民众支持并不必然平息叛乱,但是没有民众支持是无法平息叛乱的,叛乱组织将一直具备持续甚至升级叛乱的民众基础。为了考察同族群平叛优势的效用,根据温和派是否具备相对于叛乱组织的实力优势和是否拥有平叛行动主导权,有四种不同策略下的平叛效果考察框架。结合印度政府治理和平息锡克叛乱各个阶段有代表性的平叛行动,详细解读印度政府、锡克叛乱组织和温和派在各阶段的策略选择,以及如何影响同族群优势的平叛效果。     

Analysis of off-farm work decisions among smallholder farm households in Burkina Faso

This article investigates off-farm work decisions by smallholder farm households. Using data on 1,101 households from Burkina Faso, it demonstrates that in addition to the usual household socio-demographic characteristics, remittances, access to information and beneficiary of specific training affect off-farm work decisions, as well as rainfall factors and idiosyncratic health shocks. Community characteristics such as accessibility and number of inhabitants are also key factors. While suggesting that off-farm work is less likely to be undertaken for accumulation purposes, these results have important policy implications. In particular, policy measures should consider each segment as a separate entity.     

The differential experience of Mozambican refugee women and men

This study examines differences in Mozambicans mens' and womens' experiences of living in refugee camps in Malawi late in 1990. The aim is to identify the differences in impact by gender in assistance policies and programs. In early 1991 there were an estimated 1 million Mozambican refugees in Malawi. This study is based on quantitative and qualitative data collection. The study sample included Chiumbangame and Mwawa in Mangochi District (refugee camps) and Ntcheu (settlements integrated with Malawi's population). Findings indicate that 17% of the 2006-person sample were female-headed households. Men in general had more years of schooling than women. 34% of the women and 47% of men completed at least 1 year of school and 10% of women and 24% of men completed 2 years. At all ages boys were more likely to be enrolled than girls. 4.1% of the 847 persons over 18 years old were receiving some training, but only 1 person had increased household income due to training. Refugee income was nil for women and about 20 cents/day for men. The mean daily income for individuals from female headed households was about half that of income from male headed households. Women were more likely to be working and spent more time in productive work than men. Women worked in household maintenance. Women in income programs gave housework chores to younger females in the household. The income programs were of low quality and products had low marketability. Girls helped with housework from an early age, while boys helped as teenagers. 44.2% of female headed households and 34.9% of members of male headed households reported health problems. This study identifies the ways in which refugee policy worsens gender inequalities in economic production and work burden.     

Bringing the Insurgents Back In: Early Wars in British India

What role do weaker actors play in determining the outcomes of irregular wars? The literature on counterinsurgency outcomes has tended to explain weak-side victory either as a result of informational asymmetries caused by constraints on counterinsurgent forces, or as a result of suboptimal strategic choices by the state. We suggest that this underplays the role of insurgents themselves; we attempt to “bring the insurgents back in,” giving variation in insurgent polity a role in explaining their own victories and defeats. In order to do so, we focus inductively on a relatively novel pool of cases: Great Britain's wars in India from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Doing so allows us to hold the counterinsurgent side constant while evaluating variance among the insurgents themselves. We find that variance on the insurgent side is indeed significant in determining outcomes, and suggest possible reasons why this occurs.     

Determinants of people's participation: a study of rural West Bengal,India

This article considers the determinants of people's participation in local level decision-making spaces in rural West Bengal, India. It defines participation from the perspectives of attending meetings, raising issues, making complaints, and making contributions. The results from a sampled household survey in East Midnapore district of West Bengal indicate that better awareness, increase in land holdings, organisational membership, and political affiliation tend to improve participation. Households showing livelihood dependency and entitlement, and belonging to socially and economically weaker sections are more likely to participate. However, the results point towards the possibility of ‘elite capture’ and ‘clientelism’ in participatory spaces.     

Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?

This article presents results of a survey of 141 Pakistani families of slain militants. This survey collected data about the militants and their households. While derived from a convenience sample, these data are unprecedented and offer a glimpse into the backgrounds of militants and the families who (mostly) supported their decision to join the jihad. Most militants served and died in Kashmir and seem to be “high quality” militants in that they, like their heads of household, are well educated and not predominantly coming from seminaries, as is often claimed. This analysis suggests that while the militants merit attention, so do the families that produce militants.