族性安全的概念、理论与范式

族性是族类群体所具有的共同特质,是形成族类群体认同的纽带。族性认同是族类群体形成认知和行动一致性的基础,凭借动员的环节,族性及族性认同被带入政治场域,参与资源和权力的分配,并因循不同的政治行动呈现出族际关系、族类群体与国家关系、族类群体与国际关系的复杂交织和震荡联动,在不同的时空表现出不同的态势和影响。当族类群体的政治行动超出有序范围,以暴力、骚乱、恐怖行动、屠杀、清洗、武装冲突和分裂运动等形式出现时,便给相关群体带来恐惧与伤害,给社会和国家带来失序与动荡,甚至会危及国家主权和地区、国际的政治关系与秩序。族性安全,是指因族性动员而对人的生命、社会秩序、国家主权、国际关系等是否产生威胁或损害的状态。族性转化为安全议题需要以认同为基础、以动员为条件、以信念为支持,并在一定的族际结构中发生,因而需要族性认同、政治动员、民族主义、离散政治等理论的诠释。族性安全的研究范式可分为规范研究和经验研究。     

族性视野中多民族国家族际政治问题比较研究——基于尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构的经验观察

族性是影响多民族国家安全及其族际政治走向的关键变量。它既能促进族际政治整合、维护国家安全、有助于民族国家建构,也能导致族际政治冲突、危及国家安全、阻碍民族国家建构。以"族性"为分析视角,通过对尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构历程的梳理及其族际政治问题的比较,其共性特征包括:族际政治问题的分析单位是多民族国家;族际政治问题虽然发生在现实中的多民族国家,却往往带有深刻的历史根源;政治与文化边界的重叠是族际政治问题产生的逻辑起点;国内不同民族群体无法得到平等公正对待是导致族际政治问题的核心因素;军事专政和腐败会增加族际政治问题的风险和国家安全的不确定性。解决多民族国家族际政治问题、确保国家安全的关键在于如何让一个在历史上和观念中都不曾存在的国家民族能够超越族性分界而被成功建构。结合两国国情提出应对策略:寻找重叠共识,建构文化多元、政治一体的国族共同体;借鉴差异政治和差别公民权利思想,探寻积极回应不同民族群体正当利益诉求、实现各族人民成果共享、利益均沾的政治制度、体制和机制;消除军人在政治生活中的影响,惩治腐败;探索包容促进多语言、多宗教和谐相处的民族政策。     

民族分裂主义及其治理模式研究

具有高度政治分离目标和主权诉求的民族分裂主义是导致国内、国际政治失序和政局动荡的重要因素。由于民族分裂主义不时出现在国际政治的发展进程中,不时搅动或重组原有的政治格局,因而抑制和应对民族分裂主义是必要的多民族国家治理功能。实现有效的民族分裂主义治理应当从分析民族分裂主义的特点和诱发机制起步。发生普遍、目标明确、诱因复杂、认同坚韧是民族分裂主义的特点。利用和强化族性认同、渲染政治主张、通过动员形成集体行动、获取外部支持等环节构成了民族分裂主义行动的诱发机制。因循民族分裂主义生成与发展的机理,从无条件捍卫主权的理路采取的严厉打击模式,从不同程度赋权的理路采取政治容留模式,从消减族性动员的理路采取认同调控模式,从抑制精英力量的理路采取柔性控制模式,从转化政治生态的理路采取外部干预模式,可成为多民族国家治理中的参考。     

论美国“多族化”与族群政治的互动

美国的"多族化"是指美利坚民族内部形成了多个族类群体,并时常伴有族群中心主义或族群民族主义等族群性构建和复苏的现象。进入20世纪下半叶以后,随着族源多样性移民的空前增加和"聚众成族"现象的日益普遍,美国"多族化"现象空前扩展、"多族化"诉求日益高涨,造就了美国族群政治的新特征与新趋势。在美国等西方国家萌芽、兴起的多元主义族群政治,初衷是为了回应日益增长的"多族化"权利诉求、调控"多族化"问题,但是在现实中却与美国的"多族化"交互结合,加剧了美国"多族化"现象的广泛化和固化,对美国的国族认同和国家整合产生了始料未及的影响和后果。基于美国"多族化"带来的种种困扰和隐忧,从理论和政策两个维度关注美国族群政治的得失和走向,有益于民族国家,尤其是多族群发展中国家理性创建和正确选择符合"本土化"的族际政治整合模式,有效调控和治理"多族化"问题,实现民族国家的国族整合。     

解释印尼的族群动员方式:理论与评析

印尼民主化和地方分权的制度变革催生了大量的族群动员现象,也提供了多种动员方式的选项。族群使用何种方式进行政治动员是一个重要但较少被关注的理论问题。本文提出印尼改革时期的族群动员方式出现4种形态,接着从文化主义视角、反应性族群视角、族群竞争视角、政治过程4个理论路径梳理了对印尼族群动员方式的研究成果,指出以上理论路径都不足以单独解释印尼族群动员的方式选择问题。目前的研究成果有以下4方面缺陷:聚焦族群动员方式的研究成果少;4种理论路径存在内生缺陷,"目的-行动"逻辑与印尼现实情况脱节;案例比较意识淡薄,缺乏机制提炼和变量转化的努力;实证研究有普遍的案例选择偏差问题。本文提出未来对印尼族群动员方式的研究方向将是基于制度条件变量和地方情境变量的逻辑框架。     

中国东北地区俄裔：族称和族群认同

东北地区俄裔(俄罗斯裔)的汉语族称有数种,这些汉语族称与俄裔的族群认同之间有密切的关系,俄裔的血缘构成对他们的族群认同产生一定的影响。     

国家认同与族群认同:以马来西亚为例

国家与族群具有不同的结构与功能,因而国家认同与族群认同的要素,特别是二者的认同基础存在较大的差异。正是这种差异决定着二者关系的基本形态。国家的公共性要求它不应该将政治政策偏向任何一个族群。族群平等是国家认同与族群认同的平衡点,否则,可能会导致政策所损害的族群对国家存在意义的质疑。马来西亚独立后,特别是20世纪70年代后,实施的正是偏向马来人的政策,从而造成非马来人对国家的不满。     

小国民主中的多元族群:一项以尼泊尔为例的政治人类学解析

尼泊尔的族际关系经历了整体民族概念形成、以种姓等级为基础的整合、以印度教高种姓为中心典范的同化、多元平等的民族共同体四个阶段。在第四个时期,由于山地高种姓、本土民族、马德西人三类主要民族的差异,其内部的族群认同和政治结盟得以可能,进而对国内的政局也产生了重要影响。尼泊尔的案例表明,为深入理解全球化背景下的小国政治,应从族群性的三方面,即政治文化、生计方式和地缘政治进行考察。     

族群视角下的东南亚国家间关系与区域合作

东南亚地区的人口在族群构成方面体现出了极强的多样性。与此同时,族群冲突也是东南亚国家面临的一个普遍问题,并深刻地影响了该地区国家间关系的发展和区域一体化的走向。文章梳理东南亚国家民族人口构成的整体情况,并对东南亚族群冲突进行分类。在此基础上,文章提出族群冲突的外溢效应和族群政治竞争的外化直接导致了国家间互信的缺失和区域规范的选择性应用,这也进一步阻碍了区域身份认同的形成。     

印度东北部民族问题的政府治理及其启示

印度是一个宗教、种族和语言构成差异性极强的国家,印度东北部地区族群问题是印度民族问题复杂性和国家民族政策发展变化的缩影。在从族群认同向公民认同的过程之中,政府治理是关键的中间媒介,是一种身份转化的无形力量。印度联邦政府在民主框架下对东北部地区族群问题采取的政府治理,在一定程度上为发展中多民族国家处理民族问题方面提供了借鉴意义。同时,治理过程中的某些不足和偏颇也值得总结经验教训。     

Al-Qaida as a Muslim (Religio-Political) Movement Remarks on James L. Gelvin's “Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology”

Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is a transnational Islamic movement operating in over forty-five countries. Literature on HT has focused mainly on its activities in Central Asia and Europe. As such, when the HT chapter in Indonesia organized the largest-ever political gathering staged by HT, many observers were caught by surprise. Yet despite the importance of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), little is known about the organization in the English-speaking world. This paper is an attempt to present empirical data on this group. The paper argues that HTI's usage of different mobilization strategies has resulted in its ability to effect policy changes in Indonesia.     

The Potential of Internet Mobilization: An Experimental Study on the Effect of Internet and Face-to-Face Mobilization Efforts

In recent years, voluntary associations and political organizations have increasingly relied on Internet-based mobilization campaigns, replacing traditional forms of face-to-face recruitment and mobilization. Within the literature, one can observe an intensive debate about the possible consequences of this transition. Most importantly, the question is whether political mobilization through the Internet is just as effective as mobilization in a face-to-face setting. In this article, we report on a mobilization experiment using both traditional (face-to-face) and modern (Web site) incentives for mobilization. The experiment was conducted among undergraduate students in Belgium and Canada and included a test of medium-term mobilization effects. Results suggest that the Internet is successful in transferring knowledge and raising issue salience among respondents, but neither experimental manipulation led to significant behavioral changes. We do not find any indication that among this experimental sample Internet-based mobilization would be less effective than traditional face-to-face forms of mobilization.     

Orphan Counties and the Effect of Irrelevant Information on Turnout in Statewide Races

Over 10% of the American electorate lives in counties served by out-of-state media because of the mismatch between media markets and state boundaries. Frequently, these “orphan” counties face a different information environment than others in their home state: they receive no news coverage and political advertising for their own statewide races, irrelevant information pertaining to candidates in the neighboring state who will not appear on their ballots, or both. With a combination of county-level, individual-level, and political advertising data, our analysis evaluates the effect of orphan county residency and irrelevant political information on political participation. Results indicate that orphan counties have lower turnout rates than non-orphan counties and that this difference is explained by lower levels of interest in the campaign stemming from exposure to irrelevant information.     

Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that particular religious structures are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes more likely. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if so, in which way? To answer these questions, this article draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g., demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g., inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Logit regressions suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. These findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis, and stress the impact of conflict-prone religious structures, and particularly, the fact that overlaps of religious and ethnic identities are conflict-prone. Future research should investigate the religion-ethnicity-nexus in more detail.     

What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

This article provides insights into the driving forces that underpin new forms of political participation. Digital technologies offer opportunities for engaging in a wide range of civically oriented activities, each of which can contribute to deeper democratic engagement. Conventional acts of political participation are argued to be driven primarily by intrinsic motivations relating to self-efficacy and empowerment, with participants feeling they can have influence over decision makers. Little research explores whether similar motivations drive participation in less conventional acts, as well as whether mobilization attempts via social media by peers or political organizations mediate those motivations. Drawing on data from a survey among a representative sample of the U.K. electorate, we find the offline and online spheres of agency remain fairly distinct. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations both matter but extrinsic motivations have the strongest explanatory power independent of the sphere of activity. The mediating effect of mobilization tactics has a minimal effect on extrinsic motivations, online or offline, but online intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory power. As intrinsic factors offer little explanatory power, some forms of online political participation may lack meaning to the individual. Rather, these non-conventional acts result from reward seeking and are more likely to be encouraged by nongovernmental campaigning organizations, suggesting social media users are most likely to perform simple acts in support of non-contentious causes.     

The PKK and its evolution in Britain (1984–present)

ABSTRACT

As of today, a highly mobilized Kurdish diaspora and its most prominent representative, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), has become so influential in the European political arena that it might tip the balance of the European Union’s policies on Turkey in its favor. Since too much attention has been given to the PKK’s activities in Germany, the organization’s actions in Britain remain understudied, despite the fact that Britain has been a vital place in Kurdish politics and political lobbying activities. Drawing on fieldwork findings, this article attempts to explore both the evolution and the political activities of the PKK in Britain across three different timeframes, from 1984 until the present time. Our findings suggest that in Britain, the PKK has departed in recent years from its conventional terrorist activities and transformed into a lobbying power that is likely to gain full legitimacy (i.e., being de-listed from terrorist organization lists) in the near future.     

A New Typology of Electoral Violence: Insights from Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Existing literature on election violence has focused on how violence suppresses voter participation or shapes their preferences. Yet, there are other targets of election violence beyond voters who have so far received little attention: candidates and government agencies. By intimidating rival candidates into dropping out of the race, political hopefuls can literally reduce the number of competitors and increase their likelihood of winning. Likewise, aspiring candidates can target government agencies perceived to be responsible for holding elections to push for electorally beneficial decisions. In this paper, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence and utilize new data of election violence that occur around executive elections in Indonesia from 2005 through 2012. The types of violence we identified differ in these ways: a) Of all cases of electoral violence observed in this article, most incidents were targeted towards candidates and government bodies; b) candidates are generally targeted before elections, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tends to occur afterwards; c) pre-election violence is concentrated in formerly separatist areas, but post-election violence is more common in districts with prior ethnocommunal violence. These distinctions stress the importance of examining when and why different strategies are adopted.     

Social media and protest mobilization: evidence from the Tunisian revolution

This article explores how social media acted as a catalyst for protest mobilization during the Tunisian revolution in late 2010 and early 2011. Using evidence from protests we argue that social media acted as an important resource for popular mobilization against the Ben Ali regime. Drawing on insights from “resource mobilization theory”, we show that social media (1) allowed a “digital elite” to break the national media blackout through brokering information for mainstream media; (2) provided a basis for intergroup collaboration for a large “cycle of protest”; (3) reported event magnitudes that raised the perception of success for potential free riders, and (4) provided additional “emotional mobilization” through depicting the worst atrocities associated with the regime's response to the protests. These findings are based on background talks with Tunisian bloggers and digital activists and a revealed preference survey conducted among a sample of Tunisian internet users (February–May 2012).     

Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – starting points and divergent trajectories

This introduction sets the context for the following articles by first conceptualizing the divergent post-uprising trajectories taken by varying states: these are distinguished first by whether state capacity collapses or persists, and if it persists, whether the outcome is a hybrid regime or polyarchy. It then assesses how far starting points – the features of the regime and of the uprising – explain these pathways. Specifically, the varying levels of anti-regime mobilization, explained by factors such as levels of grievances, patterns of cleavages, and opportunity structure, determine whether rulers are quickly removed or stalemate sets in. Additionally, the ability of regime and opposition softliners to reach a transition pact greatly shapes democratic prospects. But, also important is the capacity – coercive and co-optative – of the authoritarian rulers to resist, itself a function of factors such as the balance between the patrimonial and bureaucratic features of neo-patrimonial regimes.     

How Can Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Insights From Nepal

How can insurgent groups that are militarily far weaker than the state survive and grow? Influential accounts drawing on Kalyvas' “control-collaboration” model argue that limited state reach can make this possible by allowing rebel groups to carve out pockets of control where they can elicit collaboration. I suggest that this account is inadequate. Even states with limited reach are likely to transfer sufficient forces to rebel-affected areas to establish at least partial control. Weak rebels therefore often face the challenge of building capacity without local control to begin with. I identify two broad factors that can make this feasible: first, strong pre-existing rebel networks, which facilitate collaboration through solidarity, norms of reciprocity, and social incentives; and second, counterinsurgency policies and practices that fail to exploit the opportunities that control offers for incentivizing collaboration and shaping political preferences. These arguments are grounded in a fieldwork-based case study of insurgency processes in a hamlet of Rolpa, Nepal.