Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France

This article seeks to explain why two states faced with a similar terrorist threat, perceiving it in a similar way, and drawing the same broad implications for their counterterrorist investigations, have nevertheless put in place significantly different types of organizational reforms in response to that threat. The study shows that although France and Britain have embraced a common preventive logic in the face of Islamist terrorism, the changes that they have made to the coordination of intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution in that context have differed because of contrasting organizational routines and interinstitutional conventions in the two states. An analysis of the British and French cases shows that law enforcement can be preventive but that western states are likely to pursue different ways of bringing security agencies and the law together to prevent and prosecute terrorism. The organizational and institutional factors that give rise to such divergent practices have important consequences for the ability of a state to develop a coordinated operational response to terrorism and convict terrorist suspects of crimes in a court of law.     

Preemption in the Bush Doctrine: A Reappraisal

This article argues that the elevation of preemption to a cardinal status in the Bush Doctrine following September 11, 2001 resulted from a larger strategic consideration—to convince rogue states to discontinue their weapons of mass destruction programs and their sponsorship of terrorism. Dismantling the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq as a demonstration of preemptive action was seen as necessary to ensure the forceful and credible conveyance of this message to other rogue states, especially Iran and North Korea. I call this strategic logic behind publicizing preemption, "demonstrative compellence." Because the logic of preemption in the Bush Doctrine relied heavily on the Iraq war and its demonstrative force, it has little relevance to the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy and should not be described as revolutionary.     

俄罗斯与美国反恐战略之比较

在当今世界,俄罗斯和美国是遭受恐怖主义威胁最为严重的两个大国,反恐战略在俄罗斯和美国国家安全战略中都是不可或缺的组成部分。俄美两国在反恐战略的形成、恐怖主义威胁判断、反恐目标、军事反恐战略实践和国际反恐合作等方面有相同之处,也存在显著差别。随着俄美领导人的更换,两国反恐战略都在调整,并且选择了不同的战略取向。反恐是俄美两国合作的重要领域,但俄美反恐战略的分歧可能导致双方之间爆发摩擦乃至冲突。     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

布什主义的影响

一、实现了对克林顿总统的美国国家安全战略的巨大转变 二战以来，美国的国家安全战略大体上分为冷战时期的“遏制战略”、“超越遏制战略”和冷战后美国的对外扩张战略。目前美国仍然处于这一全球扩张的过程中。总的说，美国的国家安全战略有“三大支柱”，即安全、经贸和人权。主要是因应2001年“9·11”事件和国际恐怖主义，乔治·W·布什总统在美国的综合实力基础上，借助反对恐怖主义之机维持冷战后美国在世界上的绝对优势和“领导地位”，推出其国家安全战略即布什主义，强调军事主义，     

New Structures of American Foreign Strategy Since 9/11--Seeking Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Countries

When George W. Bush entered the White House in early 2001,American foreign policy was based on unilateral principles and favored disengagement from global conflict resolution. The United States declared it's decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol, refused to negotiate with North Korea, and, in particular, it's pursuit of a national ballstic missile defense system,in face of global opposition, further reinforced the position of its unilateralism.The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 came as a shock to the world. The United States suffered not only physical casualties, but felt a psychological blow as well. For the first time since the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had been attacked at home. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attacks on September 11 targeted civilians and the cornerstones of the American way of life- their financial and government centers. The terrorist attacks forced the Bush administration to re-examine it approach to foreign policy Seeking cooperation with other powers will be the new choice for American foreign strategy.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

美国生物防御政策与国家安全

生物防御政策是美国政府旨在应对生物威胁、降低生物风险以及为生物事故事先准备、响应及恢复的行动纲要。自21世纪初以来,美国历届总统皆格外注重生物防御政策的制定和完善,从小布什到特朗普,一共颁布了六部相关法案,发布了七份国家战略报告,签发了五项行政命令,通过拨付巨额经费,设置若干专门机构,整合各种资源,加强国际合作等方式,不断提升生物防御和生物安全在国家安全战略中的地位,旨在为美国构筑一道双向度、立体化、全谱系的"生物安全屏障"。究其原因,主要是为了应对恐怖组织不断寻求生物武器给美国带来的威胁,敌对国家不断掌握和研制生物武器产生的持续性压力以及国际社会的相关立法约束乏力。美国生物防御政策对全球生物安全具有双重影响:一方面,通过与其他国家、相关国际组织展开交流与对话,为其提供生物安全援助等方式推动该领域的国际合作;另一方面,自身庞大的生物防御项目、巨额的经费投入、本国安全利益"唯上"的思维又使全球生物安全形势面临恶化的风险。