Overview of: “Crime Place and Pollution: Expanding Crime Reduction Options Through a Regulatory Approach”

Research Summary Crime reduction policy has focused almost exclusively on offenders. Recent studies and evaluations show that expanding our policy portfolio to include places may be highly productive. We show that there is considerable research showing that crime is concentrated at a relatively few locations, that high-crime places are stable, that changing places can reduce crime, that displacement is not only far from inevitable but also less likely than the diffusion of crime prevention benefits, and that owners of high-crime places can be held accountable for the criminogenic conditions of their locations. We link these findings to environmental policy, where environmental scientists, economists, and regulators have developed a broad set of regulatory options. The core of this article describes a portfolio of environmental policy instruments directly applicable to crime places. We also discuss major decisions local governments will need to make to implement various forms of regulation, and we list challenges that governments must anticipate in planning for such implementation. We argue that a regulatory approach to crime places has the potential to lower the cost to taxpayers of reducing crime by shifting costs from governments to the relatively few place owners whose actions create crime-facilitating conditions. Policy Implications Taking a regulatory approach to crime places substantially expands the crime policy options under consideration. Regulatory options may increase local governments’ effectiveness at reducing crime while reducing governments’ costs. This is because regulatory approaches have the potential to shift some portion of the financial burden for crime fighting to owners of criminogenic locations. Policy makers can select between means-based anticrime regulations that focus on how place owners manage their locations and ends-based regulations that focus on the number of crimes allowed at places. Both of these approaches contain several alternative regulatory instruments, each with its own set of advantages and disadvantages. Experimenting with various regulatory instruments could lead to the development of a range of new crime reduction policies. In addition, a regulatory approach has implications for the funding of policy research. Means-based regulatory instruments require governments to develop evidence that the means they regulate have the desired impact on crime. Ends-based regulatory instruments shift this burden to the regulated places.     

土地用途管制模式的立法转变

我国现行土地用途行政管制模式出现“制度失灵”，公法与私法规范结合的激励性管制应成为行政管制的替代模式。国际上土地用途管制改革已出现了总量管制与弹性管制、社区赋权、规划协议等激励性管制的实证样本，规划的不确定性理论、规划权利理论、管制协商理论为新型管制做出了法学解释。激励性土地用途管制的本质是模仿市场机制的私人自我管制。在我国，国家本位的衰落，土地市场多元利益的并存与竞争，迫切需要以激励性管制替代制度成本过高的传统行政管制。土地用途管制改革的基本路径是，划分行政干预与市场配置土地资源的法定边界，合理嵌入管制的私法规范。     

现代行政法学的建构与政府规制研究的兴起

早期行政法学普遍经历了从行政科学到法律科学的转向,而现代行政法学则从以司法审查为中心转向以行政过程为中心。发韧于20世纪六七十年代的政府规制理论为现代行政法学提供了一个强有力的分析工具,有助于革新传统行政法的概念架构和学理体系,建立起对真实世界行政过程有解释力的现代行政法学体系。     

民事诉讼当事人的不诚信行为及其法律规制

民事诉讼当事人不诚信行为之危害性不可小觑，法律规制措施不健全是该类行为屡禁不绝的重要原因，文章根据几种典型不诚信行为之特点，有针对性地提出了相应的规制措施。     

经济法对宏观调控权的规制——以房地产市场、证券市场调控为例

经济法是国家调节社会经济之法。宏观调控是国家调节三方式之一,宏观调控应以市场调节为基础,需要处理好国家与市场之间的关系,调控措施应当科学、合理。需要依法调控,用法律控制权力,防止滥用宏观调控权损害民众利益。宏观调控包括控制与引导、宏观与微观管理相结合,不能片面理解为"控制"、从紧,也不能把各种行政干预措施都当成宏观调控,借宏观调控之名行行政命令计划管理之实。     

试论商业贿赂行为的立法规范

商业贿赂行为是不正当竞争行为的一种。竞争是市场经济的产物,是市场经济最基本的运行机制,没有竞争就无法实现资源的合理配置,故市场经济是竞争经济。然而,市场本身并不能保证竞争的自由和公平,所以会伴随着不正当竞争行为的出现,商业贿赂行为亦如此。商业贿赂行为扰乱了市场经济秩序,破坏了公平竞争环境,桎梏了市场健康发展。但目前我国法律和行政规章在商业贿赂的立法规范上存在缺失和局限,需要重新审视并作出相应的调整。     

日本公用企业政府规制的借鉴

政府规制对公用企业的影响是全方位的,进一步完善公用企业相关法律法规,重新定位强化政府在规制中的职能,对公用企业开展适度公平有效的竞争。同时,公用企业改革应稳中求变、变中求稳,顺应全球公用企业民营化改革的潮流。     

利益分配的国家调节——论经济法的再分配功能

国家调节是对市场缺陷和市场失灵导致的利益分配失衡现象的救济与矫正,是国家介入利益分配领域后,对市场初次分配格局中存在的缺陷的补救,是在市场分配基础上的再分配。经济法作为国家调节社会经济之法,其本质属性在于国家调节,是对利益进行的再分配。以利益分配与国家调节之间关系的探究为基础,对经济法再分配功能的内涵与意义加以分析,有利于我们更好地了解经济法的功能,并运用经济法的再分配功能为建设和谐社会服务。     

Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes

The legitimacy and accountability of polycentric regulatory regimes, particularly at the transnational level, has been severely criticized, and the search is on to find ways in which they can be enhanced. This paper argues that before developing even more proposals, we need to pay far greater attention to the dynamics of accountability and legitimacy relationships, and to how those in regulatory regimes respond to them. The article thus first seeks to develop a closer analysis of three key elements of legitimacy and accountability relationships which it suggests are central to these dynamics: The role of the institutional environment in the construction of legitimacy, the dialectical nature of accountability relationships, and the communicative structures through which accountability occurs and legitimacy is constructed. Second, the article explores how organizations in regulatory regimes respond, or are likely to respond, to multiple legitimacy and accountability claims, and how they themselves seek to build legitimacy in complex and dynamic situations. The arguments developed here are not normative: There is no “grand solution” proposed to the normative questions of when regulators should be considered legitimate or how to make them so. Rather, the article seeks to analyse the dynamics of legitimacy and accountability relationships as they occur in an attempt to build a more realistic foundation on which grander “how to” proposals can be built. For until we understand these dynamics, the grander, normative arguments risk being simply pipe dreams – diverting, but in the end making little difference.     

问题与对策：“刑事和解”制度的实证分析——以和解协议的规制为视角

本文以对刑事和解的实证研究为基础，对实践中存在的刑事和解适用标准不统一、适用率相对较低、适用程序不规范、和解方式单一等问题进行了分析，介绍了针对刑事和解适用范围、刑事和解机构、刑事和解流程等进行的试点改革，并提出了对刑事和解进行规制的建议。