Looking beyond the economy: Pussy Riot and the Kremlin's voting coalition

The arrest of the protest punk band Pussy Riot (PR) in March 2012 and the subsequent prosecution of three band members pose a significant puzzle for political science. Although PR's performances presented a coherent alternative to the Putin regime's image of Russian reality, it was unlikely that the discordant music and crude lyrics of their art protest would inspire Russian society to take to the streets. Yet, the regime mounted a very visible prosecution against the three young women. We argue that the trial marked a shift in the Kremlin's strategy to shape state–society relations. In the face of declining economic conditions and social unrest, the PR trial encapsulated the Kremlin's renewed focus on three related mechanisms to insure social support: coercion, alliance building, and symbolic politics. The PR trial afforded the Kremlin an important opportunity to simultaneously redefine its loyal constituency, secure the Church–state relationship, and stigmatize the opposition.     

日俄国家主义的形态特征及相互关系辨析

日本与俄罗斯,无论在地区还是在全球政治中,都是扮演重要角色的国家。在历史与现实中,两国的国家主义传统既有相似性,又有差异性。两国的国家主义对近代以来各自的历史都产生了重要影响,并且对地区和全球政治格局的构造与变迁发挥过不可忽视的作用。两国的国家主义在历史上既有冲突又有合作,在现实中既有竞争又有协调。作为邻国,日俄两国国家主义的取向和属性,无疑会对中国对日、对俄战略产生基础性影响,它会制约中日关系和中俄关系战略定位的层级。     

Significance of the BRICS Mechanism

正The two-day Sixth BRICS(Brazil,Russia,India,China,South Africa)Summit,which convenes on July 15 in Fortaleza,Brazil,marks the fi rst session of the second cycle of BRICS Summits.Formulated as a global investment concept a decade or more ago,the BRICS group has held summits respectively in Yekaterinburg,Brasilia,Sanya,New Delhi,and Durban.Inter-BRICS cooperation began with the foreign ministers’meeting during the 2006 UN General Assembly,and progressed to the First BRICS Summit of 2009.The mechanism has since evolved into a framework for building partnerships in international politics,international economy and pragmatic cooperation.Centering on BRICS Summits,the partnership is buttressed     

Factors in successful program implementation in Russia during the transition: pilot programs as a guide

While much of the implementation literature over the past several decades has recognised the importance of context (e.g. in issues of institutional culture, degree of hierarchy), little of the literature comparing the results of numerous program implementation experiences examines the experience of non‐Western contexts. This study seeks to partially fill this gap by applying the ‘conventional wisdom’ of implementation theory to program implementation experience in Russia. We analyse the implementation of 18 demonstration projects in Russia against 9 success factors identified in the implementation literature. Most of the pilots involved multiple cities; so there are a total of 48 city‐case observations to study. Overall, the findings are that the factors associated with successful program implementation among OECD countries are also those at work in Russia's transitional economy. The weights associated with the various factors may differ, however. One could imagine, for example, that political support counts for more in Russia than in the western local governments. One might also believe that opportunities for learning from other implementers could be more important in the West, where professional associations are more highly developed. The core finding of consistency should be valuable to administrators across transitional economies who can now refer to the rich findings of implementation research with greater confidence of its applicability to their programs. Perhaps equally important is the finding that some of the same factors predominantly associated with successful or troubled implementation in Russia have similar effects in implementation examples drawn from transition and developing nations; there are, however, some important differences. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Virtual regionalism,regional structures and regime security in Central Asia

The failures of regionalism and regional structures for cooperation between the five CIS Central Asian states are well studied. However, explanations so far do not convincingly account for the apparent enthusiasm of these states for the macro-regional frameworks of the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This article argues that, as with previous efforts at Central Asian regional self-organization, these broader organizations still largely represent a form of ‘virtual regionalism’. But for the Central Asian states they offer a new and increasingly important function, that of ‘protective integration’. This takes the form of collective political solidarity or ‘bandwagoning’ with Russia (and China in the SCO) against processes and pressures that are perceived as challenging incumbent leaders and their political entourage. A primary motivation for Central Asian leaders' engagement in the EAEC, CSTO and SCO, therefore, is the reinforcement of domestic regime security and the resistance of ‘external’ agendas of good governance or democracy promotion. These goals are concealed behind a discourse that denigrates the imposition of external ‘values’ and continues to give pride of place to national sovereignty. This offers little to overcome the underlying fractures between states in Central Asia.     

“9·11”事件后俄罗斯对外战略的重大调整

去年"9·11"事件以来,俄罗斯外交战略的调整引起了全世界的高度关注,其外交动向呈现出鲜明的"大西洋主义"色彩。俄罗斯外交战略的调整既是俄罗斯传统战略文化的现实折射和外交经验的深刻总结,也是俄着眼于国际环境和自身实力而做出的务实选择。"立足欧洲、融入西方"已成为俄罗斯既定的外交战略,俄美关系、俄北关系、俄欧关系也将随之经历重大变化,它们彼此之间的利益互动和冲突决定了俄罗斯的"西进"之路将是曲折而漫长的。     

俄中关系和俄罗斯社会经济现状

近年来,俄中的战略合作伙伴关系有了进一步发展。2001年俄罗斯经济发展指标反映了其社会、经济发展状况,俄罗斯实施了一系列行政改革的措施。国家公务员学院的研究领域更加宽泛。     

Russia’s civil service: professional or patrimonial? Executive-level officials in five federal ministries

ABSTRACT

The issue of poor performance of the Russian federal bureaucracy is addressed by linking performance to type of official, through analysis of biographical data on deputy ministers and division (departament) heads in five federal ministries since 2012, supplemented by internet searches on behavior, particularly of a corrupt nature. Education, previous career experience, and recruitment, including its timing relative to superiors and subordinates, are analyzed, in order to determine whether officials behave primarily as members of patrimonial teams, as members of problem-solving organizations, as self-serving individuals, as the instruments of capture by commercial organizations, or as servants of bureaucratic agency interests. The data do not strongly support any one conclusion, but problem-solving officials have the strongest presence.     

The body global and the body traditional: a digital ethnography of Instagram and nationalism in Kazakhstan and Russia

ABSTRACT

What is the power of social media in defining and policing sexual identities and bodily expressions, and what are their connections to understanding nation, power and self in authoritarian contexts? Through the study of popular Instagram accounts in Kazakhstan and Russia, I argue that these sites serve as spaces of visualization and re-creation of new forms of ‘acceptable’ behaviour and lifestyles, that on the one hand may lead to new globalized visions of sexual identity and the body while on the other promoting localized conflict and resentment online, triggered by online users’ fear of losing their ‘national culture’ in these global trends. While many resort to policing gender norms and heteronormative body images online, influencers and Instagrammers from Russia and Kazakhstan take an active part in resisting these frameworks and categories.     

Kazakhstani public opinion of the United States and Russia: testing variables of (un)favourability

ABSTRACT

Though Central Asia is often studied through the prism of its relationships with external powers, research on local public perceptions of these different actors has largely been overlooked. The literature on Kazakhstanis’ perceptions of their neighbours, for instance, is scarce, and mostly focused on analysis of official discourse on Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy, with little exploration of how this is received, appropriated or refuted by the population. On the basis of Gallup data spanning the last decade, and several other surveys, we test most of the main hypotheses usually advanced to explain attitudes to the US and Russia – age, ethnicity and access to information – and draw five main conclusions: (1) Kazakhstanis are not defined by an exclusive pro-US/pro-Russian dichotomy; (2) they nevertheless largely choose Russia over the US if forced to pick; (3) age does not have a significant effect on foreign policy attitudes; (4) ethnicity does affect some of the attitudes under consideration, but its effects are not large enough to produce markedly different opinions among ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians in aggregate; and (5) consumption of media from Russia and access to non-governmental and Western sources of information do not seem to have significant effects on the attitudes under consideration.