行政立法公众参与问题研究

行政立法是法定的行政机关依照法定权限和程序制定行政法规和规章的活动。在司法实践中往往存在着立法机关对行政机关授权过宽,使之行政机关在行政立法过程中享有太多自由裁量权。于是,世界各国普遍采取立法机关授权立法控制、司法违宪审查控制的方法来有效地控制行政机关的行政立法权。随着民主思想的不断高涨,公民主动要求参加国家政治生活的愿望也更加强烈,能够充分体现民主精神的公众参与理论也慢慢兴起,行政立法中的公众参与使得人民主权理论能够在行政立法过程中得到延伸,能够让公众参与行政立法全过程,从而有效地防止行政立法过程中行政自由裁量权的滥用,使行政立法权能够良好运行。本文分析了我国行政立法过程中公众参与存在的一系列问题,在此基础上有针对性地提出了我国完善行政立法过程中公众参与制度的建议。     

反腐的关键:规制行政裁量权

行政裁量权由于其可能导致肆意和专断,因而成为腐败的重灾区。因此,反腐的关键在于规制行政裁量权,保证行政裁量权在法治的轨道上运行。行政裁量权的规制属于复合规制模式,包括立法规制、行政规制、司法规制以及权利规制四种规制路径。然而规制模式有其内在的局限性,公众参与作为民主理论在行政过程的投射,其所具有的民意表达、利益协商、程序正义等功能和优势,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制。建立起公众参与的配套制度,并完善公众参与的程序设计,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制,促进反腐倡廉建设的健康发展。     

香港特别行政区行政会议成员利益申报制度及其评价

行政会议成员的利益申报包括定期定时申报和个别事项申报。通过公开的利益申报资料,公众可以对行政会议成员是否存在利益冲突进行监督。利益申报制度为防止行政会议成员在决策时以权谋私预设了一道屏障。行政会议成员利益申报与其他相关制度存在重复与冲突,影响申报执行的效果。行政会议成员利益申报制度属于内部控制,在预防腐败的过程中,作用有限。     

政府环境信息公开和保密的利益限制与平衡

由于政府环境信息公开涉及不同利益的冲突,要维持公共利益和个人利益的平衡,必须确立法的明确性原则、利益衡量原则、有限行政自由裁量原则、可分割性原则和程序正当原则.建立政府环境信息公开的利益平衡机制,需要完善立法保障、行政规制、司法救济以及社会监督,才能使公众的环境知情权和各方利益保持相对平衡的和谐状态.     

公众参与是行政立法正当性的基础

行政立法虽然是当今世界社会发展的普遍现象,但是由于行政立法机关不是由民选代表组成,缺乏民意基础,因此需要公众参与行政立法促进行政立法的民主化,只有公众参与,行政立法才能获得民主正当性,行政立法程序才可能构成正当程序。公众参与必须符合自愿、平等、有效的实质要求。我国行政立法程序应当提高立法层次,强化公众参与制度,提高行政立法程序的民主化程度。     

行政决策公众参与的宪政价值及其实现

公众参与的宪法基础,是公众参与得以存在的正当性基础,从民主理论出发,强化公众在行政决策中的参与机制,对推进国家民主政治,全面贯彻实施宪法具有有利于落实宪法规定的民主政治、有利于平衡与整合社会公众的不同利益、有利于公民教育和法治意识的提升和实现具体决策的科学化的重要价值。公众参与行政决策实施需要制度上的配合,专门的公众参与行政决策法律在内容框架上,应当主要解决参与主体、参与方式、参与效力等问题。     

行政规划中的公众参与程序:理想与误区——从汶川地震恢复重建规划说起

通过对汶川地震恢复重建规划的分析可以发现,行政规划的确定将对众多社会群体的法律利益和事实利益产生重大影响。为此,有必要构建行政规划中的公众参与程序,作为公有制前提下公共利益与个体利益的平衡器,并以主体性公众参与作为目标模式。在行政规划的公众参与过程中,容易因公众参与的无限扩张导致政府决策效率低下甚至无法决策,或因公众利益的分化和参与不平衡导致社会公正受损,或者发生公众意见对法律和政策目标的偏离,对此均应竭力避免和纠正。     

行政议价的法律性质研究

行政议价是行政机关在作出具体行政行为之前,就具体行政行为的内容与行政相对人进行协商,然后根据协商结果作出具体行政行为的行为.当前广泛存在的行政议价大多属于滥用职权或者超越职权的行为.造成行政议价广泛存在的原因主要包括立法过程博弈不充分、行政机关部门利益化驱动、法院司法审查权的过度狭小.要禁止行政议价,关键是要消除行政议价的成因.     

重大行政决策公众参与研究

法治政府的建设离不开科学、民主和合法的重大行政决策制度,其中公众参与就是保证重大行政决策科学、民主和合法的一个重要环节,同时达到控制行政权力的滥用和防止社会矛盾激化的效果。本文在分析了重大行政决策公众参与的背景和前提的基础上,从重大行政决策公众参与的立法、公众参与主体、公众参与启动模式、公众参与形式以及公众参与反馈机制五个方面进行了研究。     

行政立法后评估中的公众参与

公众参与行政立法后评估是扩大公民对立法工作有序参与的重要内容,其法理基础应当是程序正义、人民主权、法的合意性.但当前在行政立法后评估中无论在评估主体、还是评估的具体实施方面都缺失了公众的参与.要真正实现公众对行政立法后评估的有序参与,要在制度上对其予以完善,并对评估的模式进行重构.     

Executive veto power and credit claiming

The line-item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending. A model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive??s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods. The item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature.     

The Italian budgetary process: Political and institutional constraints

The Italian budgetary process requires constant interaction between executive and legislature. As a result budgetary policy is a reflection of Italian legislative activity in general. Time‐consuming negotiations and compromises are required between a wide range of political interests. Coherent and consistent economic policy‐making is, in these circumstances, difficult to achieve.     

Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries

Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988–97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect .     

中国政府执行行为动力机制构成的实证分析——以湖北省为例

政府执行行为动力机制是政府执行行为维持、运作与演变的内在力量源泉。当今西方公共管理主流理论有关政府行为动力机制的核心理论前提是所谓"自利经济人"假设,政府工作人员一切公务行为的唯一动机就是追求个人利益的最大化;公共利益不构成政府执行行为的动机前提。本文实证分析表明,当前中国各级政府执行行为已经形成了以"公共性价值取向"价值因子为导向与核心,以"公共性利益因素"、"机关外部动力因素"、"制度因素"等三类政府执行行为影响因素为主要内外影响因子,密切相关、内在稳定的一个主流动力机制功能体系。不过,这一体系并没有完全排斥个体性利益与价值追求。中国政府执行行为动力机制的制度化、规范化水平有待进一步提升。     

以反腐倡廉建设推进中国特色社会主义理论体系大众认同

反腐倡廉是中国特色社会主义理论体系的内在要求,推进中国特色社会主义理论体系大众认同,不仅需要宣传普及中国特色社会主义理论体系,还要坚持反腐倡廉,纯洁党风政风,营造良好的政治生态环境。当前的腐败现象严重损害了人民利益,给反马克思主义思潮提供了生存空间,阻碍了中国特色社会主义的建设进程,直接危及中国特色社会主义理论体系的大众认同。必须以反腐倡廉切实维护人民群众的根本利益,为推进中国特色社会主义理论体系大众认同创设重要条件;必须以反腐倡廉切实维护中国共产党的自身形象,为推进中国特色社会主义理论体系大众认同提供根本保障;必须以反腐倡廉增强中国特色社会主义理论自信,为推进中国特色社会主义理论体系大众认同激发内生动力。     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

Top Management Turnover: The Role of Governing Board Structures

The convergence of performance accountability policies, a graying bureaucracy, and shorter executive tenures highlights the timeliness of investigating executive turnover. Prior public administration research has examined pull and push factors linked to these departures, but it has yet to fully explore the influence of governing board structures and political pressures that stem from such structures. Using data on 123 public four‐year research universities in the United States from 1993 to 2012, this article finds that governing board structures play a pivotal role in predicting the departure decisions of university presidents. While the size of the board increases the risk of departure, boards overseeing multiple institutions and boards with a faculty or student representative lower the risk of departure. Additional evidence suggests that both the share of gubernatorial and legislative appointees on the board and the party division of the legislature have a direct influence on departure.     

The first word and the last word in the budgetary process: A comparative institutional analysis of proposal and veto authorities

This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. We examine: (i) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (ii) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (iii) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process.     

Executive veto and spending limitation: Positive political economy with implications for institutional choice

The consequences of institutional change in the budgetary process are not generally determinate independent of the preferences of political actors. Nonetheless, this study shows for a general class of preference configurations that the legislative branch cannot be made better off by a spending limitation unless the executive is empowered with a line-item veto. In the absence of executive item-veto authority there is no incentive for the legislature to constrain spending.     

Constraining Executive Action: The Role of Legislator Professionalization in Latin America

What explains the failure of legislatures with strong constitutionally endowed powers to exert themselves over the executive in practice? We examine the role of legislator professionalization in strengthening the legislature's ability to constrain executive action, conceptualizing legislator professionalization as prior legislative experience and prior professional work experience. We argue that more professionalized legislators, through the skill and knowledge they bring to the policymaking process from prior experience, will be better equipped to challenge executive authority. In a sample of four Latin American countries from 1990 through 2010, we find that legislatures are more likely to curb executive decree issuance when individual legislators are strongly professionalized, controlling for constitutional powers and several other partisan and political factors. Our findings suggest that legislatures composed of more professionalized legislators can constrain executive action, especially in the context of a unified political opposition in the legislature.