Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury Instructions: A Method and an Example

Methodological problems in jury simulation research involve issues of sampling, choice of stimulus materials, appropriate unit of analysis, appropriate dependent variable, corroborative data, and problems of role playing. Despite these issues, comprehension of jury instructions may be suitable for examination by jury simulation techniques--if certain of these methodological concerns can be satisfied. In a series of 5 experiments using typical Canadian legal instructions on criminal conspiracy and the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, this study attempted to validate a simple and inexpensive technique for testing the incomprehensibility of a given set of jury instructions by requiring participants to apply those legal instructions to a set of facts. The results demonstrate the utility of an application test, and suggest that for assessing the comprehensibility of jury instructions, it may be acceptable to use undergraduate students as participants, to use individual participants without group deliberation, and to employ written stimulus materials.     

The Promise of Legal Semiotics

The aim of the 2008 Roundtable was to focus on the progress to date in the many facets—methodological, epistemological and conceptual—of the field of legal semiotics, specifically the contribution of different schools and forms of semiotics as well as emerging and emergent semiotics approaches which can be used in researching and interpreting law and legal phenomena. The participants sought primarily to engage with the epistemological and methodological challenges which the field currently faces and to discuss the implications of these.     

Research With Cognitively Impaired Participants

Illnesses that cause cognitive impairment are a considerable health problem in the United States. These include Alzheimer's disease, Huntington's chorea, cerebrovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, chronic alcoholism, and AIDS dementia complex. Illness associated with cognitive impairment may cause great suffering to the affected patients and their families. Research involving individuals who may be at risk for or have cognitive impairment is necessary to improve our understanding of these illnesses. For example, this may occur during efforts to develop effective therapies to treat them. However, research with participants who have cognitive impairment presents additional ethical concerns because they may be vulnerable to coercion. Therefore, nurse researchers must not only understand the principles of informed consent (i.e., autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice), but also the additional safeguards provided in the common rule to protect cognitively impaired participants in research. These safeguards include advanced informed consent, legal representative, and assent. Gaps exist in federal regulations related to adhering to these safeguards such as how to assess for decision-making capacity and variations on who can be a legal representative. The nurse researchers have potential roles as educators and advocates in research involving participants with cognitive impairment.     

Context matters: Alibi strength varies according to evaluator perspective

Purpose . The nascent field of alibi evaluation research has produced interesting and inconsistent findings. We focus on a heretofore unexamined variable that may play a critical role in alibi evaluation: context. Specifically, two experiments tested the hypothesis that the same alibi can be evaluated differently when presented in the context of a police investigation vs. criminal trial. Method . In Study 1, 101 college participants evaluated an alibi in one of three contexts: police investigation, criminal trial, or a control condition devoid of specific legal context. Dependent measures included ratings of alibi strength and credibility, as well as the likelihood that the suspect was guilty. In Study 2, both context and the presence of a corroborating witness were varied in a scenario presented to 139 college participants. Results . Across studies, an alibi was rated as stronger in the police investigation vs. trial context, consistent with the prediction that the fact that a case has proceeded to trial implies to perceivers that the alibi is relatively weak. In Study 2, an alibi was deemed stronger when corroborated vs. uncorroborated, but this difference was only significant in the police investigation context. Conclusions . If alibi research is to fulfil its promise for legal and policy implications, a clearer understanding of the variables that influence alibi evaluation must be developed. The present results illustrate the importance of context in this investigation, suggesting that two researchers studying evaluations of the same alibi may arrive at different conclusions based on the simple framing of the experimental task.     

Legal Recognition of Plural Unions: Is A Nonmarital Relationship Status the Answer to the Dilemma?

Intimate relationships involving three or more adults are increasingly visible in American society. Multiparty relationships, which are also known as plural unions, mainly take two different forms: systemic polygyny and polyamory. Family law currently denies recognition to all plural unions. Granting legal recognition to multiparty relationships would advance the goal of family pluralism and expand access to valuable legal protections. However, the possibility of granting official recognition to plural unions must be approached with caution, because systemic polygyny poses a serious risk of harm to women and children arising from the imposition of oppressive gender roles. A possible solution to this dilemma lies in offering a formal nonmarital status (such as civil union, domestic partnership, reciprocal beneficiary, or designated beneficiary) to participants in plural unions. As a result of their differing attitudes toward marriage, polyamorists would be likely to embrace a nonmarital relationship status, while participants in systemic polygyny would most likely reject it. Thus, providing a nonmarital status for plural unions could allow polyamorists to obtain the benefits of relationship recognition, without placing the government's seal of approval on the oppressive aspects of systemic polygyny.     

司法决策如何进行后果考量

主张司法决策应当进行必要的后果考量是当前颇有影响力的一种法律思维方式,从个案裁判法律效果与社会效果相统一的目的论来看,"后果主义"似乎是一种更容易在后果意义上证明为正当的方法论思维。然而,从决策的角度来看,既然决策者需要在各种可能的后果之中去追求最可欲的后果,就必然意味着对某种特定后果进行工具性控制的决策逻辑和权力支配...     

法律经济学中的个人主义和主观主义——方法论视角的解读与反思

来自于经济学的方法论个人主义和方法论主观主义被认为是法律经济学的重要方法论基础。但是 ,对于法律经济学和经济学 ,无论在它们的内部还是外部 ,人们对这两种方法论的认识与评价并不完全一致。作为两种重要的人类行为的解释模式 ,方法论个人主义和主观主义有其固有的缺陷 ,由此 ,法律经济学的分析模式及其研究结论也就不得不蒙受挑战和质疑。     

论法律事实与客观事实

法律事实与客观事实的一般关系是 ,客观事实是法律事实的基础 ,法律事实是客观事实的再现或者反映 ,法律事实必须以客观事实为追求目标。法律事实对客观事实的追求是通过一系列证据法上的制度设计实现的 ,能否最大限度地确保法律事实与客观事实相一致 ,是衡量证据规则是否成功的基本标志。法律事实一般应当与客观事实相符合 ,但由于种种原因 ,也可能产生不一致的情况 ,包括无奈的不一致、错误的不一致和有意的不一致。     

在经验与规范之间:试验立法及其类型化——一种立法进路的提倡

立法理想与法律运行实践间背离的中国境遇,以文本法律不完全是"能用之法",且立法承诺在执法中不能全部兑现之困局为现实表征。以进化论理性主义的哲学立场和无知论的知识假设为理论支撑,采取反复试错、吸纳建议、对话商谈等自发性工具,将实践证明可行的执法经验提炼与抽象,进而升华为普遍性规则的试验立法进路,是修正建构论唯理主义立法进路并撬动当前格局的一个支点。试验立法进路以"采纳—辐射"这个简式架构为运作逻辑。目前的试验立法主要有尝试探索型试验立法、落实测试型试验立法与示范效仿型试验立法三种模式。试验立法的实践性意味着多数立法活动将建立在证据或实证研究的基础上,也将具有方法论的意义,有望成为我国立法方法法定化的发展方向。     

Lessons learned from the implementation of two randomized trials in a criminal court setting

Randomized trials represent the most rigorous type of research design to measure the impact of a social policy intervention. However, such designs are difficult to implement and require the consent of multiple parties, including researchers and non-researchers. Unique challenges arise when seeking to implement such a design in a criminal court setting, due to the need to revise legal procedures, uphold due process for defendants, and obtain the direct, ongoing participation of judges and attorneys, among other stakeholders. The current principals recently conducted two randomized trials concerning the court response to intimate partner violence: one testing the impact of court-ordered batterer programs in the Bronx, New York, and a second testing the impact of intensive judicial monitoring in Rochester, New York. Key lessons involved forging collaborative stakeholder relationships, critically assessing the experimental intervention and its contrast with the control condition, ensuring legal due process for defendants, addressing victim safety, setting realistic timetables, adopting a skeptical view towards estimates of study volume, and anticipating substantial variation from original design to final plan, especially in regards to randomization protocols and defendant eligibility criteria. These lessons may prove invaluable in informing future research in court-based and other social settings where random assignment is pursued.     

司法决策中的“父爱主义”管制逻辑

在包括赵春华案在内的诸多引发舆论关注的争议案件中,法官或许并非不是不懂得如何利用社科法学的判断能力与法教义学的裁判技术去弥合司法标准与公众认知之间的巨大断裂,而更可能是基于其“父爱”式的社会“管制”取向而对司法后果的实质合理性问题做出了“爱之深,责之切”的价值决断。在中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成的历史背景下,为了保证良法的颁行能够导向预期的善治,法律必须以其作为“社会交往机制”的系统潜力而彰显其公理性与司法的合理性。只有首先确立基于交往原则和承认社会自主性的权力逻辑与法律决策结构,那种体现“人性化”“人文化”和“人权化”的方法论逻辑才有可能在法律的运作中获得国家体制官僚无法武断拒斥的实效。     

法律原则在法律推理中的地位和作用——一个比较的研究

我国关于法律原则的讨论一般集中在立法过于笼统与立法所规定的法律基本原则这两个方面。这种意义上的法律原则与德沃金所说的法律原则存在重要区别。德沃金关于法律原则的讨论其目的是强调法律的确定性 ,而我们关于法律原则的讨论却在强化法律的模糊性。法律原则的讨论主要涉及法律推理过程中原则与规则之间的关系。基于法治的原因 ,法律推理必须坚持将法律规则作为法律推理的大前提 ;在法律规则含义不明确、模糊或者相互矛盾时 ,可以使用法律原则 ,但是 ,必须经过一定的法律原则的认定程序。     

The sociology of the sociology of law: A view from economics

The sociology of law appears to be a weak field in the United States, in comparison to other indisciplinary fields of legal study, notably economic analysis of law. Although American legal sociologists have done important empirical work, particularly on the litigation process and on the legal profession, the focus of American sociology of law has been narrow, theoretically limited, and, empirically, limited in both scope and method. These deficiencies may reflect the methodological limitations of Max Weber, the most influential figure in the history of sociology in general and sociology of law in particular. The failure of legal sociologists to borrow theoretical and empirical tools from sociologically minded economists such as Gary Becker is especially regrettable, and may be due to inaccurate perceptions of the political valence of economic analysis of law, sociology's traditional skepticism about the knowledge claims of other disciplines, professional envy, and misunderstanding of the economists' conception of rational choice.     

Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory of Law

Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the “minimal” legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be to discover the values because of which certain things in the world are classified as law and others as non‐law. Focusing on those would give us a more insight to the roles law plays in society, as well as more illuminating answers to traditional jurisprudential questions like the status of law in evil regimes.     

Expert testimony in historical perspective

The ethical problems surrounding expert testimony depend directly on the historically specific relationship between science and scientists, on the one hand, and society on the other. In the seventeenth century, when modern experimental science was beginning to emerge, it drew upon legal experience to bolster its methodological arguments. In the eighteenth century, after the successes of Sir Isaac Newton, science gained in authority, and even in law courts the epistemological authority of science went unchallenged. In the nineteenth century, the more empirical sciences, such as chemistry and physics, entered the courts, and juries found the testimony of experimental chemists and physicists useful for their decisions. In the twentieth century, experimental psychology entered the courts. Pushed by Hugo Munsterburg, who saw in legal recognition a way of advancing psychology as a scientific profession, experimental psychology in the courtroom raised ethical problems at the beginning of the century that are still matters of controversy.     

论破产程序对担保物权优先性的限制

担保物权的优先性在民法中不可质疑,但在破产程序中,尤其在破产重整程序中则受到诸多限制.这种限制系破产程序本身的特点所决定,同时也是破产法立法价值嬗变的结果.基于利益衡平原则,对担保物权优先性的限制必须合理,我国这方面的立法尚存在诸多缺陷,有待进一步完善.     

The Dynamics of Legal Positivism. Some Remarks on Shiner's Norm and Nature

In a recently published book, Roger Shiner shows that understanding the fundamental discrepancies between different legal theories is important for a better understanding of law itself. He argues that one of the most important tasks of legal philosophers is to take into account the dynamics or conceptual movements generated by positivism and antipositivism. Our paper intends to show that Shiner's analysis can be developed and modified when other relevant elements are introduced into the universe of discourse. We emphasize the importance of a positivistic conception of legal science. According to Shiner, an adequate theory of law must reproduce the way in which legal norms work in the lives of the participants who accept the law. After analyzing the distinction between norms and norm propositions and the relationship between legal science and the external point of view, we show that legal positivism is not committed to reproducing the internal point of view to law.     

Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ??intention?? into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ??ought??. The methodological strategy is the ??inversion thesis?? which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ??will?? or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ??objectifies?? the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ??will??, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ??ought?? and therefore the ??will??. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen??s own notions, I will show that Kelsen??s ??inversion thesis?? is parasitic on Aristotle?CAnscombe??s ??ought??.     

Legal obligation as a duty of deference

An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to deny that they owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. I wish to thank John Tasioulas, Joseph Raz, Bill Edmundson, Adam Cureton, the editors and referees of Law and Philosophy, and the participants of the Society for Applied Philosophy 25th anniversary conference, July 2005, St Anne’s College, Oxford.     

Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law

The modern lawyer operates within a conception of law as a bodyof rules. To confront the law of contract, of torts, or of property,is to familiarize oneself with an intricate set of rules. Suchfamiliarity is not yet legal scholarship, much less legal practice.For in order to use the rules as lawyers use them, the rulesmust be contemplated and considered, and the relationship betweenthe different rules must be understood. Because the intellectualprocesses involved in handling the rules exhibit a high degreeof sophistication, those intellectual processes may themselvesbecome the subject matter of philosophical argument. Thus wemay regard jurisprudential theories as embodying differing understandingsof the processes of handling legal rules; and we may conceiveof legal theory as the attempt to grasp the moral significanceof rules as a foundation for social order. This essay shalloffer some thoughts on the relationship between the rule oflaw, considered as a moral ideal, and the notion of rules asthe principal means by which legal order is manifested.