Critical Review of Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: a formal–legal perspective

This paper examines definitions of Chinese corruption. While many Chinese corruption studies have argued that Chinese corruption has its own unique features, our review of definitions of Chinese corruption featured in current academic literature reveals that most definitions in use are similar to the general definition of corruption: abuse of public office for private gains. Valuable as it is, such a general definition does not adequately specify the actors, behavior and motives in Chinese corruption. This paper argues that actors in Chinese corruption are not limited to employees in the public sector but also include any Chinese state functionary engaging in public activities. In addition, corrupt behavior refers to both economic (embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, and bribery) and disciplinary corruption (violation of social norms and the dereliction of duty) that are damaging to public interests. In doing so, this paper finds that even behavior such as the dereliction of duty and violations of social norms, that is not motivated by private gain, is regarded as corruption in China. We also discuss the political nature of this broadly defined Chinese corruption.     

Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in China

The initial paragraphs of this article outline the broad themes of this special section, drawing attention to changing perceptions and definitions of corruption and to corruption prevention practices in Greater China. The remainder of the article focuses on a particular theme: the relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption in both theoretical terms and in its application in mainland China. Conflicts of interest are conceptualized as the incompatibility between the public interest associated with official duties and interests derived from the private domain. Such conflicts do not always necessarily lead to corruption and may be distinguished from it. By examining the way in which they are regulated in China, we argue that although an intricate web of rules has been established, regulations alone cannot guarantee ethically sound behaviour if there is no supportive value framework of like-minded civil servants. Rules require interpretation and if this discretion means that civil servants choose to follow an administrative culture and personal values that conflict with the regulations, they will have little effect. Hard rules may mean soft constraints.     

数字腐败的博弈分析及其对策

"数字出官与官出数字"本质上是政绩评估者与被评估者之间基于利益得失的考虑而进行的一种博弈过程.数字腐败出现的原因是"数字出官与官出数字"博弈过程中存在制度缺失.因此,要从根本上杜绝数字腐败就必须从政绩评估体制与统计制度改革等方面入手,完善作为"数字出官与官出数字"博弈规则的相关制度.     

Strange bedfellows: Dynamics of government‐business relations between Chinese local authorities and Taiwanese investors

China poses a theoretical challenge in that corruption and rent‐seeking activities have not hindered foreign direct investment and economic development. Studies in development have documented the problems of rent‐seeking. International capital presumably hesitates to step into a Third‐World country such as China, which cannot protect private property rights with a comprehensive legal framework. However, for the last decade in China export promotion, foreign capital, and industrial development have proceeded simultaneously. This research argues that local officials helped investors overcome the problem of high transaction costs during a period of institutional uncertainty and local informal rules supplied foreigners with effective protection of property rights under corrupt circumstances. By controlling rent‐seeking activities, local officials created a wide variety of ad hoc patronage for private and foreign investments within their administrative domain. In return, local governments received extrabudgetary payments for the official patronage. This article provides an in‐depth case study of the so‐called joint venture between Taiwanese enterprises and Chinese local authorities in the Pearl River Delta, the institutional bases for their collaboration and the dynamics of the relationship under institutional change.     

渎职侵权犯罪轻刑化研究

当今国际社会存在对官员从严整治的趋势,但是我国却长期存在渎职侵权犯罪轻刑化的现象,这不单是与国际潮流不相符合,也与我国的刑法基本原则和宽严相济的刑事政策相冲突.作为公权力的行使代表,国家机关工作人员理应严格按照法律规定来行使权力,维护人民和国家利益,践行作为公仆的职责.所以,国家应当秉持从严治官的思想,遏制职务犯罪轻刑化的趋势,维护法律威严.     

国家权威碎裂化:成因、影响及对策分析

近年来 ,国际上有些学者提出了对中国国家权威结构的新的分析范式 ,其核心论点是 ,随着改革的深入 ,中国的国家权威正经历着一场碎裂化的过程。国家权威碎裂化在现实的政治行政过程中有种种表现 ,较集中地表现为公共政策的“非公共化” ,行政过程中执法者个人对自我利益的追逐 ,行政自由裁量权的滥用 ,以及非正式规则的盛行等方面。克服国家权威碎裂化是一个必须面对的严峻课题 ,制度整合、政策整合、权力整合 ,职能整合 ,以及利益整合对于有效防止国家权威的碎裂化极为关键。     

From rule of man to rule of law: An unintended consequence of corruption in China in the 1990s

The ethics of government in the People's Republic of China have been corroded by rampant corruption over the last two decades. The corruption has not only weakened the state's legitimacy and capacity to govern, but also provided an opportunity (to a certain degree, a catalyst) for a possible change from a traditional society ruled by man into a rational‐legal society ruled by law. Economic reforms over the past 20 years have unleashed market forces in a nation so dominated by the Party‐state that basic boundaries and distinctions defining the limits of markets and official power have been weak or nonexistent. At one level, this has made for an increase in corruption and confusion about the meanings of the term. At another, it has produced a situation that requires the improvement of the legal system to handle the issue effectively. Beijing leadership seems to have realized the importance of strengthening the legal system in addressing this issue. This shift in strategy may have profound implications for the prospect of institutionalizing the changes in post‐Deng China. This paper hopes to reveal how corruption, or the effort to check corruption, is helping to draw a distinction between private and public domain and between politics and administration, to redefine codes of conduct for public administrators, and to demand institution‐building in political processes.     

论警察权的私权基础

传统警察法多从公法角度研究警察权问题,鲜有人从私法角度进行深入思考.事实上,警察权有着深厚的私法和私权基础.循着公私法划分的起源和发展,我们能够找到原始的公权力与私法的关系.从警察权的本原上,我们可以进一步厘清警察权的公权力属性,并进而寻找到警察权的私权基础.警察消极行政作用的强化和警察比例原则的普适化是警察权私权基础的集中反映.     

关于腐败成因的管理学探析

本文从管理学角度对腐败成因进行了研究。文章认为,从成本—收益角度看,腐败的客观基础是公共决策与决策者私人利益间的矛盾,腐败行为发生的根本原因是腐败收益大于腐败成本。从寻租角度看,转型期中国的寻租环境是腐败行为发生的重要根源。从委托—代理角度看,腐败是民众与国家以及官员之间的公共权力委托—代理运行的失灵。     

转型时期权力腐败的伦理思考

从伦理学角度分析 ,权力腐败产生的主观因素就是个体道德、人性变异所引起的对利益的饥渴追求 ,客观因素就是社会道德价值多元化给腐败分子提供了滋长腐败行为的土壤。从伦理学上反腐 ,一方面要从个体道德“内”部防腐 ;另一方面则要从社会道德“外”部反腐     

以绩效预算制度为核心的财政预算交易成本控制研究

财政预算的本质，是社会公众与政府之间围绕预算资金使用和公共产品供给进行的委托代理交易。作为交易，财政预算存在交易成本，即财政预算的运行程序成本。制度经济学认为，交易成本过高会降低交易绩效。那么财政预算的交易成本过高也会降低预算绩效。为了控制财政预算交易成本，应当在预算法中构建一种有效的内部激励机制，保证预算执行主体的本位利益与社会公共利益挂钩，促进预算执行主体自觉地以社会公共利益最大化为目标运用财政资金，即绩效预算法律制度。     

私利·公利·正义·仁义--义利关系的传统反思与现代诠释

本文首先在剖析中西义利观区别的基础上,把义和利的内涵分别分解为私利、公利和正义、仁义等不同层次.然后通过对社会主义市场经济内在本质的考察,提出理解义利关系的三大理论原则第一,以私利为动力,以公利为目标;第二,以正义为约束,以仁义为引导;第三,以利释义,以义制利,义利统一.最后根据以上原则提出社会主义市场经济条件下坚持义利统一的三个层次合理谋利即是义;增进公利即是义;自觉让利即是义.     

村官腐败及其治理

村官腐败在高官大吏腐朽堕落的阴影下被遮蔽和保护起来，在大词腐败学的研究中受到冷落，但在和谐社会构建和建设新农村的背景下，其严重性日益凸显。村官腐败是由各种因素促成的，是一种“综合症”，但最重要的还是整体社会转型的结构性空间转换造成的。当然其治理也应是一种所谓的综合治理，通过权力与权利．制度与人心的多向互动达致乡村的善治。     

我国问责官员复出机制的构建问题研究

构建科学有效的问责官员复出机制,对于建设责任政府和维护公众利益具有重大意义。问责官员复出机制具有静态结构、动态过程、生态环境、心态系统四个维度。目前,我国问责官员复出的规则体系不完善,官员问责与官员复出的程序断裂,问责官员复出的体制性弊端凸显,复出的内在调控力薄弱。建立统一的复出规则体系,构建责任分类管理机制,加强官员问责与官员复出的动态管理,完善复出中的异体参与机制,以及形成法律制度之外的柔性伦理建构和内在驱动机制,是防止问责官员非正常复出的策略选择。     

论公安执法中的公正原则

公安行政执法是公安机关及人民警察为了实现公安行政管理的目的，依照法律、法规、规章规定的职责、权限、程序实施的影响行政相对人权利与义务的活动。因此，只有坚持执法公正原则，才能真正维护最广大人民的根本利益，从而实现社会的和谐、稳定。     

Fiscal Decentralization: guilty of aggravating corruption in China?

The relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is highly controversial but insufficiently tested with respect to China. This article empirically tests whether fiscal decentralization aggravates corruption in China's local governments. To acquire more robust results, we employ multiple corruption and fiscal decentralization measures and collect data for 31 provinces from 1998 to 2008. Fixed effects panel models estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption after controlling for gross regional product per capita, the relative wage in the public sector compared to the private sector, political leadership changes, education levels, law enforcement and the number of NGOs. Our findings suggest that China has experienced a trend towards fiscal recentralization rather than decentralization in the 2000s. We also find the moderating effect of the level of law enforcement on corruption: fiscal decentralization in local governments with strong law enforcement deters corruption but the opposite relationship is found when their law enforcement is weak. The implication of our research is that a sound legal system and political will are prerequisites for successful fiscal decentralization.     

Distortion and Credibility within China's Internal Information System

Behind the problems of credibility of public official information in China lie two patterns of internal information distortion, one restricting the downward flow of sensitive general information and the other filtering the upward flow of local information. Information gathered at the center is increasingly restricted as it is transmitted down the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the ‘facts on the ground’ are sifted by local official interests at each level of upward transmittal. Awareness of these distortions has been increased by the Internet revolution, but the structures that encourage them remain in place. An empirical survey of different levels of local cadres in Guangdong Province indicates the different perspectives produced by different positions in the internal information system. Municipal level officials, who have more general information but less diverse local information, tend to be more positive about the quality and objectivity of statistics, while their staff members, further from central sources but closer to messy local realities, are more skeptical.     

党内反腐倡廉法规研究

自1938年党内法规一词提出后,不同时期研判党内法规范围的标准不同.2013年《中国共产党党内法规制定条例》公布后,党内法规的范围应当按照其规定的法定标准判断.腐败是国家公职人员利用公共权力实施的违反法律规范的滥用权力、谋取私利、有社会危害性、严重损害公共利益的行为.党内反腐败法规应在狭义上使用,仅指党中央、中央纪律检查委员会、中央各部门层面制定的对腐败行为本身加以规制的党内法规.     

政府失灵的又一种救治途径——一种不同于公共选择理论的分析

公共选择理论认为政治市场与经济市场一样,官员也是追求自身利益最大化的"经济人",这与官员作为公共利益的代表存在持久的冲突,并导致政府失灵,进而得出结论是:市场失灵并不是政府干预的充分条件,政府应尽量减少干预,最大限度地约束政府的权力范围。但是笔者以为,对于市场经济已经非常成熟而且官僚制业已达到极致的西方发达国家是适用的而且实践证明是成功的。但对于我国而言,减少干预只是解决问题的一个很小的方面,因为"后发外生型"国家要实现跨越式发展,没有政府的大量干预和推动是不可能实现的。解决问题的关键在于在政府利益与公共利益之间建立起一整套激励共容机制,这样政府利益不仅不会损害公共利益,反而更能促进公共利益。     

The Rise of Collective Corruption in China: the Xiamen smuggling case

The Xiamen case, as well as several other high-profile corruption cases uncovered at the end of the 1990s, signals a new trend in collective corruption whereby private companies, entrepreneurs and organized crime groups now play an important role in initiating and coordinating networks of criminal activity. This article uses the concept of collective corruption to examine the smuggling empire built up by the entrepreneur, Lai Changxing, the network of state-owned enterprises and officials that supported and protected his smuggling operations, and the central government's crackdown. It concludes with a discussion of two other major corruption scandals, and what they say about the nature and extent of collective corruption in China. I argue that these recent cases show that corruption in China has evolved into more sophisticated, complex and destructive forms that resemble the more extreme forms of corruption found in post-communist countries where corrupt networks have been able to infiltrate and take over state institutions.