Political Elite Coalition and Local Administrative Reform in China—a case study of Shunde under Wang Yang

This article examines the importance of political elite coalitions at local levels to create institutional reform in contemporary China. By exploring Shunde’s administrative reforms under Wang Yang, Guangdong’s provincial Party secretary from 2008 to 2012, this article identifies a provincial–grassroots coalition as the essential impetus to local reforms. It argues that formation of political elite coalitions, built upon mutual trust through reciprocal interactions, is crucial for the success of reform. Within the coalition, the strong reformist provincial leader provides his leadership by becoming intensively involved in the reform process, while active grassroots cadres serve as designers and executors of reform plans. By means of a comparison between the scenarios of active grassroots cadres without Wang and Wang with less enthusiastic grassroots cadres, the article concludes that this political elite coalition is by nature fragile; if either side is not present, the coalition will collapse, resulting in either the failure of reform or a deviation of existing reforms to a less fruitful pattern.     

Getting Ahead in Rural China: the elite–cadre divide and its implications for rural governance

This article will outline the politics and pathways of promotion among government officials working in a rural county in Anhui province and their attitudes towards elite status. It will analyze the implications these processes and pathways have for the operation of local government in rural China. Drawing on interviews and relationships spanning a ten-year period (2004–2013), this article primarily relies upon the personal experiences of colleagues and friends who have attempted to rise through the ranks of government and business in Benghai County, with varying degrees of success. While the article will focus on political elites, in Benghai it is impossible to separate business from politics. This article will delineate strategies adopted for career advancement and attaining elite political status, and the effects these strategies have on the relationship between political elites and ordinary cadres.     

地方党政领导班子和领导干部实绩考核研究

建立并完善促进科学发展的地方党政领导班子和干部实绩考核评价体系,对于推进地方党政领导干部工作的科学化、民主化、制度化,具有十分重要的意义。本文从地方党政部门的工作实际出发,在中央相关文件的指导下,运用“平衡计分卡”这一绩效管理工具构建了适用于地方党政领导班子和领导干部实绩考核的框架模型。用北京市延庆县的实例阐述了地方党政领导班子和领导干部实绩考核从绩效目标到绩效指标的转承过程,以期为地方党政领导班子和领导干部的实绩考核提供借鉴。     

领导干部要积极预防和应对群体性事件

改革开放30余年的历史经验告诉我们,在中国不改革就不会有任何出路.当前要继续深化经济体制和政治体制改革.在大的改革时期,正是不同类型的群体性事件高发的时期,随着改革的深入发展如处理不好社会风险因素,往往易诱发群体性事件.目前各级地方政府及一些领导干部对于群体性事件的治理更多的是被动应对.因此,提升领导干部预防和应对群体性事件能力就显得十分迫切     

The Localism of Local Leadership Cadres in Reform Shanxi

The changing face of China's politics is to be found as much in the cadre force as in the categories of ‘new rich’ engendered by economic reform and rapid development. A series of interviews undertaken in 1996 and 1997 with local cadres—at sub-provincial, county and section levels—in Shanxi Province provides evidence as to the extent of change and continuity in their social backgrounds, careers and political attitudes. Analysis focuses in particular on five common hypotheses about the cadre force in reform China: that they are conservative upholders of the status quo; a priviligentsya; imposed ‘from without’; the source of a ‘new class'; and one which has come in the reform era to be dominated by ‘technocrats' (rather than former revolutionaries). Though local political and administrative leadership in the 1990s appears to have become more localist, and even in some senses parochial, such analysis must be kept in perspective. The local cadre force is considerably less local, parochial and ‘privileged’ than their counterpart local business elites; and the agency of the provincial organisation of the Chinese Communist Party is still very much in evidence.     

From Rural Revolution to Urban Revolutionization: A case study of Luzhongnan

Based on materials from local archives and the author's interviews in Shandong Province, this paper uses case studies in the Luzhongnan prefecture to trace how the rural revolutionaries rose to prominence and to discuss their cultural impact on Mao's urban revolution after 1949. The paper begins by examining the intellectual origin of the Chinese revolution in this region, and then moves to a discussion of the end of political urbanism in the anti-Japanese War and the Civil War. As a result of wartime mass mobilization, peasants became the most dynamic forces in the political arena. Peasant cadres were systematically recruited and trained to run local governments. Eventually, they surpassed the revolutionary intellectuals both in number and in importance. When the CCP came to power, the peasant cadres were assigned to take over urban China. These rural revolutionaries were committed to the mission of creating a 'new socialist man', and rural revolutionary culture became the cultural orthodoxy of the People's Republic of China. This paper explores the nature and characteristics of the political and cultural programs, referred to as 'cultural de-urbanization', launched by Mao Zedong and his rural revolutionary followers in order to remold the urban people's mentality by the rural revolutionary tradition and practice.     

省级“政府绩效评价”模式及比较

省级政府在中国层级政府结构中具有特殊地位。作为体制内评价,省级政府绩效评价体现中央政府的宏观意图,对市、县、镇级政府有着决定性影响。目前省级政府绩效评价或政绩考核可划分为"效能考核"、"科学发展水平考核评价"与"政府绩效评价"三种模式,福建、广东、深圳具有代表性。由于中国各地的情况迥然有别,不同评价模式表现出自身的地方特色和领导者的个人风格,但总体上看,三种模式均可视为自上而下的标杆管理,甚至成为强化上级政府管治的"理性工具"。     

The Social and Political Implications of China's WTO Membership

China will join the WTO soon. This article does not question the rationale of China's decision to join the WTO; nor does it challenge the premise that, all in all, the potential benefits from WTO membership outweigh the potential costs, at least in the long term. Rather, it focuses on the social and political implications of China's WTO membership. It is assumed that even if WTO membership is potentially a productivity-enhancing move for China, the benefits and costs of such a change will not be evenly distributed. Unless there is a mechanism that can induce or force the winners to compensate the losers, distributive conflicts between the two groups will be inevitable. Such conflicts may weaken or even erode political support for globalization. Thus, to remain committed to globalization, the government of an open economy must play a role in redistributing gains and costs. The first section elaborates this analytical framework. The second section argues that Chinese reforms have changed from a win‐win game to a zero-sum game. As a result, China has turned itself from a relatively egalitarian society into one with huge and growing inequalities. The third section analyzes who will stand to win and lose when China joins the WTO. It predicts that precisely those social groups who have borne the costs of recent reforms will be hit hardest. More significantly, those losers happen to be the social groups that have long served as the political bases of the communist regime. WTO membership thus poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. The final section discusses the political implications of China's WTO membership.     

乡村政治研究中的“保护-逆保护”

保护关系与逆保护是人类生活中一种常见的交换关系,保护者与被保护者在资源占有、社会地位、社会影响等方面是不对等的,但保护者在一定情况下可能成为被保护者,而被保护者也有可能成为保护者.在乡村政治研究中.特别是乡村干部之间的关系、村民与村干部之间的关系、村干部的腐败等领域,"保护-逆保护"成为一种具有一定解释力的分析范式.     

Sociopolitical Attitudes of the Masses and Leaders in the Chinese Village: attitude congruence and constraint

Do ordinary villagers and cadres in the Chinese village share similar attitudes toward major sociopolitical issues? Do these two groups construct their respective attitudes in a similar way? This article addresses these two crucial questions based on the data collected from both villager and cadre surveys in a rural setting. The findings indicate that (1) villagers and cadres had quite different views of the village socioeconomic conditions, the legitimacy of CCP rule, democratic principles, and the effects of post-Mao reforms as a whole, although they did have similar opinions on the role of the individual; (2) these two groups constructed their views on some issues similarly but on others differently; and (3) the relevance and salience of issues were positively associated with the levels of attitude consistency among both cadres and villagers. These findings have strong implications not only for the ongoing interaction between these two sets of political players, but also for sociopolitical stability in rural China.     

How Do Rural Elites Reproduce Privileges in Post-1978 China? Local corporatism,informal bargaining and opportunistic parasitism

Many scholars have shown that cadre status is associated with cadre earnings advantages in rural China. What is less clear from the published research is how political power is used by rural elites to generate personal gains. We narrow this knowledge gap by studying three main mechanisms whereby cadre privileges are reproduced in rural China. Using ethnographic data from three rural townships in Guangdong province, we show that local economies have been differentiated in the post-1978 era, leading to three different mechanisms with which village leaders in each of the three townships have maintained their earnings advantages respectively, i.e. local corporatism, informal bargaining and opportunistic parasitism. We predict that local corporatism will be the dominant model of the reproduction of cadre privileges in rural China.     

民族地区农村党员干部现代远程教育浅析——以贵州黔东南苗族侗族自治州为例

黔东南苗族侗族自治州开展的农村党员干部现代远程教育试点工作,为其他民族地区乃至全国开展这项工作积累了宝贵的经验。为了使农村党员干部现代远程教育对民族地区的经济社会发展发挥更加积极的作用。文章提出:把开展农村党员干部现代远程教育作为建设社会主义新农村的抓手;采取措施解决民族地区开展农村党员干部现代远程教育所急需的资金;各级政府在转变职能中,要为农村党员干部现代远程教育搞好管理和服务;要抓好农村党员干部现代远程教育中的基础性工作等建议。     

加强领导干部作风建设推动公安教育健康发展——关于公安院校领导干部作风建设的几点思考

公安院校作为培养公安事业接班人的摇篮,领导干部的作风如何,直接关系到人才培养质量和公安事业的兴衰成败。认真学习领会中纪委第七次会议精神,充分认识新的历史条件下加强领导干部作风建设的重大现实意义和深远历史意义,以思想作风和学风建设为前提,以工作作风和领导作风建设为核心,以生活作风建设为重要内容,从教育、监督、制度三个关键环节入手,建立健全领导干部作风建设的长效机制,全面加强和改进领导干部作风建设,引领公安教育事业持续协调健康发展,既是一个重大的理论课题,更是一项严肃的政治任务。     

论马克思主义家庭观视阈下的领导干部家风建设

马克思恩格斯十分重视家庭在人类社会发展中的突出地位和作用,并将家庭作为唯物史观的重要范畴来加以考察和研究。新时代,领导干部的社会地位决定了人民群众对其有着较高的道德期待与角色期待,因此,领导干部的家风成为中国亿万家庭门风的风向标,对社会风气的形成具有示范和引领作用。马克思主义家庭观不仅影响着人们的家庭观念、道德观念等,而且对于解决经济社会快速发展所带来的家庭伦理危机等难题,也具有积极的现实意义。以马克思主义家庭观为指导加强领导干部优良家风建设,一方面有利于马克思主义家庭观在当代中国社会得以传播并发挥重要作用,另一方面能够推动我国家庭伦理研究向纵深发展。     

创办“党群致富联合体”搭建农村党员发挥先进性作用的平台

“党群致富联合体”是在实行家庭联产承包责任制、我国大多数农户生产经营活动处于高度分散状态的情况下，党员发挥先锋带头作用的有效载体，对促进农村经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设和党的建设都有着积极的作用和影响。     

南方民族地区山村的村民自治与宗族意识——以湖北西部少数民族地区农村为例

1996～2000年作者四次率课题组在鄂西少数民族地区农村对当地宗族文化和村民自治的情况进行了较深入的调查，认为该地区农村1999年进行的第四届村民委员会选举工作是卓有成效的，但仅是实施村民自治工作的第一步。当地宗族意识一定程度上的复苏既是对80年代实行家庭联产承包责任制以来小家庭式的较落后的生产和耕作方式的一种回应，也是对当前农村社区管理和社区服务中存在缺陷的一种自发弥补，在当地农村的社会生活中产生了一定的影响。由于少数民族地区农村的经济和文化相对较落后，村委会干部的群体素质不高，村民委员会在当地农村社会生活中多数只发挥了部分职能。要使其应有的政治组织、经济组织、文化教育组织和社会控制的职能得到全面有效地发挥，还有很长的路要走。     

党外领导干部能力建设研究

党外干部是党的干部,是我国人才资源的重要组成部份。党外干部不仅是改革开放和中国特色社会主义事业的重要力量,也是中国共产党加强同社会各方面成员联系的重要桥梁和纽带。党外干部能力建设要立足新形势新任务的要求,不断提高党外干部的政治把握能力、参政议政能力、组织协调能力、合作共事能力。     

浅析大学生村官退出机制

大学生村官已成为新农村建设的重要力量,但在服务农村建设的同时,他们也面临聘期满后出路选择的诸多困境.因此,完善大学生村官退出机制就尤为重要.针对大学生村官退出机制存在的问题以及退出机制不畅的原因,有必要从以下几方面加以解决：一是建立完善保障机制,激发队伍活力;二是逐步完善大学生村官选拔任用政策;三是优化创业环境,促使村官扎根基层;四是加大另行择业的引导力度;五是建立齐抓共管机制,畅通就业渠道.     

转变经济发展方式与提升领导干部的执行力

加快经济发展方式的转变,是我国目前经济和社会领域的一场深刻变革。能否成功进行转变,关键在于领导干部。作为社会主义现代化建设的重要领导力量,领导干部的观念、能力和工作直接影响到转变工作的进行。要使他们的执行力与经济发展方式的转变这一工作相协调,就必须在主观认识水平、科学发展能力、引导市场能力等方面要有相应的提升。     

Only the Party Manages Cadres: limits of Local People's Congress supervision and reform in China

This article joins the debate on the increasingly consultative nature of Chinese politics by adding the role of the Local People's Congress (LPC). In contrast to previous research on LPCs that emphasizes their increasing importance and improved capacity, this article shows that the central Party leadership, in order to uphold its monopoly of the cadre management system, has reduced LPC standing committees' (LPCSC) influence over cadres. The article analyses the consequences of the People's Congress Standing Committee Supervision Law passed in 2006 and the policy of appointing the first Party secretary as LPCSC chairperson. A case study of the changes over a ten-year period (1998–2009) in a county People's Congress (PC) in Zhejiang illustrates how the change in leadership and the implementation of the Supervision Law effectively stopped previously initiated reforms to strengthen the LPC and crippled the LPCSCs' capacity to supervise government cadres. The article concludes that the policies adopted in order to strengthen Party control over LPCSCs have resulted in a decrease of horizontal accountability and confirm the image of an emerging consultative authoritarian political system.