哈特的规则理论

一、法律——规则构成说 （一）法律是一种社会规则 法律和法律制度是从极其复杂的社会事实中抽象而出的，这是英国法哲学中分析实证主义的一个共同信条。坚持认为法律是一种社会事实的结果使他们作出这样的区别：法律是什么是一回事，它通过社会事实的考察而发现；法律应该是什么是另一回事，它通过运用道德规则而发现。对这两个普遍原则，哈特和古典分析实证主义持同一看法。     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。     

分析实证主义法学的法律制度观

奥斯丁认为法律制度由主权者颁布的命令构成;凯尔森第一次提出用联系的观点看待规则之间的关系并将法律制度看做是等级森严的规则体系;哈特则主张构成法律制度的是主要规则和次要规则的有机结合;而拉兹则是从整体上对法律制度的框架进行了深入和系统的研究;制度法学强调从哲学和社会学两种意义融合的角度来对待法律制度。     

分析实证主义法学的法律制度观

奥斯丁认为法律制度由主权者颁布的命令构成；凯尔森第一次提出用联系的观点看待规则之间的关系并将法律制度看做是等级森严的规则体系；哈特则主张构成法律制度的是主要规则和次要规则的有机结合；而拉兹则是从整体上对法律制度的框架进行了深入和系统的研究；制度法学强调从哲学和社会学两种意义融合的角度来对待法律制度。     

哈特的法律体系自治性理论分析

法律体系自治性是哈特法律理论的核心命题。为了证明其合理性,哈特运用分析和描述的方法,提出了初级规则和次级规则相结合的法律体系自治性理论。但通过对于其法律体系自治性中支撑性概念——承认规则的分析后,发现哈特想要证明法律体系自治性的目的并没有达到。     

哈特社会规则理论的限度

哈特以社会规则理论为核心阐释法律的概念,使规则区别于习惯,并将法律视为初级规则与次级规则的结合。同时,社会规则理论也具有一定的限度,这集中表现在,根据哈特的理论,在法体系之下,作为法律规则的初级规则的成立并不以其具有社会规则这一身份为必要条件。被制定出来的法律规则能够经由通过法体系效力判准的检验而在其被真正实践之前就成立,因此,有些法律规则不是社会规则,社会规则理论不能适用于所有的法律规则。     

作为法律规范性来源的惯习性规范——基于麦考密克的法律制度理论

对法律规范性来源的回答构成不同法律理论学术传统之间的区别,也是法律领域中认识法律现象、展开深入讨论的基础。在延续法律实证主义对法律的权威与效力进行强调的进路之下,在对法律实证主义者尤其是哈特"社会规则理论"分析与讨论的基础上,麦考密克的法律制度规范性理论通过分析规则与习惯的关系,以及由此生发出的"惯习性规范"概念,填补了规则与习惯间的缝隙,为认识法律的规范性来源问题做出了贡献,也推动了法律理论的发展。     

从命令到规则:哈特对奥斯丁的批判——读哈特《法律的概念》

哈特试图以法律的规则学说取代奥斯丁的法律命令理论,这一理论努力的背后所隐含的正是法律实证主义的某些深刻且基本的问题意识。通过分析哈特对奥斯丁的批判,我们比较了两种版本的法律实证主义在法律的存在方式以及检验法律的标准这两个问题上给出的不同回答,在此基础上提出,哈特的规则学说并没有能够真正地取代奥斯丁的命令理论,规则与命令所表明的可能是法律存在方式也即法律与社会生活方式联结的不同方面。     

对“承认规则”的一些思考——读《法律的概念》有感

“承认规则”是哈特法律理论中一个极其重要的概念,可以说是哈特所描述的法律的基石.“承认规则”包含了规则和事实两个面向,但其本质是实践,由此,“承认规则”便具有了开放性,且不存在效力问题.哈特不承认德沃金的批评,认为“承认规则”同样可以识别原则,同时又划清了“承认规则”和凯尔森“基础规范”之间的界限.     

西方法学家的法律诠释观(上)

在西方,法律诠释学与法律诠释活动一样古老,尤其是近现代,西方法学家的法律诠释观更是丰富多彩.其中,萨维尼的法律诠释学说主要体现在他对法律诠释要素的揭示和论述上;哈特的理论创新和贡献则在于他把法律界定为是由主要规则和次要规则所构成的逻辑体系;德沃金却把法律称之为“诠释性概念”,这一命题表明,法律乃是通过人们、特别是法官的诠释而实现其生命的……     

Back to Basics: A Theory of the Emergence of Institutional Facts

In order to account for the mode of existence of social rules and norms, the author develops a theory of the emergence of institutional facts. Just as other kinds of institutional fact, rules and norms are meanings. Therefore, insight into the emergence of social rules and norms can be achieved by studying the recognition and the communication of meanings. Following accounts of meaning and factuality, institutional facts are characterized as unquestionable shared typifications. It is argued that, in becoming an institutional fact, a typification goes through two phases. First, it becomes a social habit. Second, this habit turns into an obligation by being objectified.     

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念的四重意蕴

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念具有四重意蕴：一是整合性意蕴,是对既有的法律有效性概念尤其是哈特和德沃金的法律有效性概念的总结和整合;二是超越性意蕴,哈特和德沃金将法律的事实有效性和规范有效性对立起来,而哈贝马斯的法律有效性概念则将这两个维度统一起来;三是反思性意蕴,他将现代法律理解为行动系统,是建制化和合法化的统一,揭示出现代法律的实质是“事实性和有效性之间的社会媒介”,法律之“应该”最终体现在法律之“是”上;四是批判性意蕴,哈贝马斯只是在“程序”这一维度上作出了自己贡献,现代法律的有效性应该是哈特的“形式”、德沃金的“内容”和哈贝马斯的“程序”这三者的融合。     

In Defense of the Practice Theory

Hart proposed that law is made possible by the practice among legal officials of observing conventional social rules, the most important being rules of recognition. This view has been dubbed the practice theory, and it has been attacked by many legal theorists. This paper argues that many criticisms of the practice theory fail because they misunderstand the nature of the organizational challenge to which rules of recognition are the solution. The challenge of constituting a legal system is essentially the challenge of constituting a group agent, and when viewed through Pettit’s account of group agency, the practice theory can easily be defended.     

Norms,Institutions, and Institutional Facts

Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding (‘conventions’); some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: ‘rules’, explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, ‘institutional facts’ depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either ‘absolute application’ or ‘strict application’ or ‘discretionary application’, depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion can be guided by values, principles standards. Pervasiveness of institutions and institutional facts, especially but not only in relation to institutions of state-law, including constitution and state-institutions. Searle's and Ruiter's theories of institution, institutional fact, considered: ‘constitutive rule’ rejected in favour of ‘underlying principle’, structure of ‘institutive, consequential and terminative’ rules explained and defended. Ruiter's conception of ‘institutional’régime' considered and adopted, validity of norms and normative 'régimes' considered and differentiated from truth of statements of institutional fact.     

Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment

I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so‐called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution to the problem—the puzzle can be recreated with other plausible closure principles. The problem can be solved by restricting the social facts thesis to legal rules, rather than applying it to all legal propositions. Properly construed the social facts thesis does not apply to facts about what legally ought to be the case.     

Sources,Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution (and all the norms derived from it) are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch.

     

依法促進中國委託公證人制度科學發展

中國委讬公證人制度是委讬公證人對發展生在香港地區的法律行爲、有法律意羲的事實和文書，依照法定程序對其合法性、真實性予以證明後發往內地使用的一種法律制度，是委讬公證人辨理委讬公證事项必须遵循的规程凖则，是中國特色社會主義公證制度的重要组成部分。實踐證明，中國委讬公證人制度有效地解泱了一個國家内部不同法律制度下公證文書的使...     

How Do Base Rules Constitute a Virtual World?

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The classic theory of rules and norms rooted in John Searle’s theory of institutional...