Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China

Leaders use both coercion and engagement as leverage against other nations. Recent literature suggests economic sanctions are more effective than deployed sanctions to attain intended foreign policy goals. This paper examines a case of threatened coercion—the threat to remove China's most favored nation (MFN) status following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989—where engagement would have produced better human rights in China. We show that the American threats to sanction China were counterproductive, while cooperative statements and MFN renewal proved to have a more beneficial impact on Beijing's human rights policies. This paper suggests that economic sanction threats are not directly linked to China's human rights behaviors. Instead, China uses accommodations to manipulate diplomatic relations with the U.S. As a result, engagement with China would have been a more productive policy when dealing with human rights issues.     

奥巴马的外交政策与中美关系展望

奥巴马成功当选美国总统，美国政治步入“奥巴马时代”。本质上属于自由主义的奥巴马具有“现实的理想主义”外交理念，在确保美国全球霸权地位的前提下，他会在安全、经济、民主以及全球性问题等对外政策领域有所调整。奥巴马对华政策的延续性将大于变革性，有理由对未来中美关系的发展持谨慎乐观的态度。     

U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges,Practical Opportunities

The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.     

布什政府的外交遗产

布什总统任期即将结束，盘点布什政府的外交政策，留给继任者的负面遗产不少：阿富汗战争和反恐依然任重道远；伊拉克战争善后并不容易；美俄关系需要重建；伊核、朝核问题依然艰难；中东和平进程需要有所突破。但布什政府8年的亚洲政策是其外交中的亮点。     

中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that “nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced” among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.     

Availability ray

As Director of the Office of Population in the U.S. State Department, Dr. Ray Ravenholt is a controversial figure. In an interview with New Internationalist Dr. Ravenholt agrees that economic development will reduce family size in developing areas as it has in industrialized countries but the availability of contraception is of primary importance. He believes the U.S. should be training gynecologists from developing countries in modern methods of contraception, including sterilization operations, but he does not believe in involuntary sterilization or coercion. In Greenland, for example, the birth-rate fell from 48/1000 in 1964 to 19/1000 in 1977 because the Danish Health Minister introduced family planning. No coercion was used. Contraceptives were made available. Although he sees value in redistribution and equal distribution of resources, Dr. Ravenholt claims that if you make information and family planning services available you control population growth in advance of solving the resource distribution problem. In China, where a strong attempt has been made to distribute resources equally, a very powerful planned birth control program was found necessary. Politicians may argue that the U.S. should limit its consumption of resources but they are the same people who are working to emulate the same amount of consumption.     

导致1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素分析

1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援是1965年柬埔寨与美国断交的前奏,它连同柬埔寨与美国断交一起对冷战时期东南亚地区的历史产生了重要的影响。柬埔寨在1963年拒绝美援是邻国因素、美国因素、中国因素和柬埔寨自身因素等要素合力的结果。对影响1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素的分析将有助于我们较好地理解亚洲冷战的复杂性,更好地理解制约美国亚洲冷战战略得以有效实施的因素。     

From Israel with Deterrence: Strategic Culture,Intra-war Coercion and Brute Force

This study contributes to the debate on the role of nonnuclear (conventional) deterrence in international security by examining the Israeli practice of this strategy. By analyzing a case outside of Western strategic thought, which traditionally has dominated deterrence theory, it demonstrates how strategic thinking evolves differently in various ideational realms. The article highlights the impact of strategic culture on the Israeli conceptualization of deterrence, explores its deficits, and yields lessons for theoreticians and practitioners from the challenges of intra-war coercion operations. The study introduces the innovative term “culminating point of deterrence,” calls for improving analytical techniques for deterrence evaluation, claims that successful conventional deterrence perpetuates political conflict, stimulates the adversary's dangerous innovations, and argues for a tailored approach not only for formulating deterrence strategy, but also for exploring deterrence policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Israeli case and are relevant to actors utilizing coercion strategies.     

U.S. Policy Towards Southeast Asia

Greater East Asia is expected to be the next theatre for world politics. 1 East Asian cooperation is rapidly developing through the channels of ASEAN Plus Three （APT） and East Asia Summit （EAS）, both driven by ASEAN. Southeast Asia is a region of diverse states and cultures that brings together all the major powers of the Asian-Pacific in a myriad of strategic interests. It is thus an open arena with the potential for a variety of strategic game-playing, options, and uncertain outcomes.2 In recent years, China＇s developing relationship with Southeast Asia has undergone a significant shift as the U.S.＇ distraction elsewhere and neglect of the region have created opportunities for an increased Chinese diplomatic and economic role in Southeast Asia.3 U.S. analysts are concerned about what may lie behind this shift in China-ASEAN relations, how it may affect American interests in the region and how best to react to the changes. Some have expressed concerns that to avoid becoming distanced from the region the U.S. should pay more attention to Southeast Asia, rather than just watching from a distance. This paper attempts to analyze the possible changes of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia in the current context of East Asian Cooperation and its implications for China.     

试析2008年大选后的美国对外政策走向

美国总统大选在即，从候选人当前辩论的焦点看，两党政策主张既有一定差别，也有趋同迹象。从外交方面看，美国单边主义外交政策将会进一步收敛，对外（特别是同盟国）协商与合作将会得到加强。美国对华政策取决于其国家利益的需要，中美关系发展的内在动力将会主导双边关系的发展，不会因美国总统的更迭而发生逆转。     

Geopolitics of Nuclear Hypertrophy. America,the Bomb and the Temptation of Nuclear Primacy

The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.     

Quantum Sensing's Potential Impacts on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare

This article examines the impact of quantum sensing on strategic deterrence and modern warfare. It has two related objectives. The first is to highlight quantum sensing as an important area of research for the policy communities considering the role of emerging technologies on strategic deterrence and countering weapons of mass destruction. The second aim is to present the potential warfighting implications of quantum sensing if employed by either the United States or its adversaries. While quantum sensing technologies offer opportunities to transform modern warfare, they also present challenges and risks. The article contends that the quantum sensing investment, research, and development should be prioritized within the Department of Defense's quantum science modernization agenda to ensure that the U.S. military does not cede technological advantage to competitors, such as the People's Republic of China, who are actively investing in quantum sensing applications that could upend the United States’ existing deterrence and warfighting capabilities.     

Constructive Development of Sino-U.S.Relations:Intrinsic Logic and Vision Constitution at Non-interest Level

International relations are interactions mainly between states and between international organizations. Since states and organizations are made up of people, these interactions are influenced by human nature. This is the same for Sino-U.S. relations as can be seen by recent developments which show the influences of human thinking and cultural values. The improvement seen in their relations has been cemented by a fostering of mutual understanding and commonality of cultural values. Positive development acquired during diplomatic interactions offer useful lessons for future cooperation. Relations between China and the U.S. can be further improved by learning from history, having a clearer perception and building mutual trust.     

论当前中美俄三边关系新特征和新趋舅

国际金融危机以来,中美俄三边关系进入以合作为主的新阶段。在普京重新出任总统后,美俄能否在欧洲反导问题上形成共识,将成为影响美俄关系发展的重要因素。未来,中美俄三边关系将会是各国在争取自身战略利益的过程中不断寻求妥协,将彼此间的竞争控制在规则允许的范围内。基于美国实力相对衰弱、俄中实力上升、解决全球性和地区问题上需要合作等因素,三国关系仍可能以继续保持建设性合作的基本态势向前发展。     

从“重返”到“再平衡”——奥巴马政府第二任期的东南亚政策

美国总统奥巴马2009年上台后,对东南亚表现出浓厚的兴趣并高调"重返",推出了一系列加强在东南亚存在的举措。2013年连任后,他将在未来4年继续把东南亚作为"亚太再平衡"战略的着力点。同时,奥巴马政府意识到其东南亚政策也需要进行"再平衡",应放缓军事"重返"脚步,在经济、政治、安全等领域全方位投入,均衡化、长期化地推进东南亚外交。国内财政限制、中东等地区外交挑战和外交人员人事变动等因素会对美国新一届政府的东南亚外交有所制约,但其未来政策走向仍将对中国周边外交和中美关系产生持续影响。     

试析未来美国对外政策的走向

奥巴马国家安全团队组成人员基本上都是经验丰富的温和务实派，体现了美国外交和国际安全问题上的现实主义倾向。美国外交将改变布什政府的单边主义，注重多边合作。中美关系不会过于偏离正常轨道，但在诸如知识产权、汇率、人权、应对全球气候变化等问题上，中国可能面临更多的压力。     

美国国家安全委员会变迁探析

美国建立了世界上第一个国家安全委员会,历经67年世势风云的洗礼,美国国家安全委员会已成为美国处理所有国际事务的中心,作为美国国家安全事务的咨询与协调机构,它在美国国家安全决策过程乃至世界外交局势的演变中都持续发挥着重要的影响力。历经各任领导者对其地位与角色的不同定位,美国国家安全委员会的职能、制度、运行及决策程序在不断修改与调整中走向稳定与成熟。其机构和人员的设置既审时度势、灵活多样、顺应时代变化,又逐渐探索确立了富有特色的部际协调机制,将各法定成员、法定顾问、国家安全事务助理以及非法定成员有效地组织起来,通过形式各异的正式程序、非正式程序以及秘密程序的分析、评估与协调会议,为总统的国家安全事务决策提供必不可少的支持。美国国家安全委员会变迁与改革的每一步都伴随着法律及行政法令的颁行与修订,授权与监督,体现了法制先行的特点。美国国家安全委员会戏剧性的发展历程中积累的经验与教训,为中国建立不久的中央国家安全委员会提供了借鉴。     

利益、战略及美国台海政策的矛盾性

外交领域里的利益、战略与政策是相互关联、相互影响的一组变量。美国维持台海“不统、不独、不武”的政策是美国实现其台海利益最大化的战略意图。“不统”是美国实现霸权的必然选择；“不武”才能维持东亚和平的基本态势：中国制止“台独”的意志和决心使美国不得不以遏制“法理台独”来防止武力冲突。美国的台海政策本身就是自相矛盾的。     

Building a U.S.-Soviet working relationship

Conclusion The crucial determinant of U.S. and Soviet security, and the security of the world, will not depend on technological development, breakthroughs in deterrence theory, or even on agreements the two countries might sign at the summit talks. The future depends on whether the two governments are able to work together.Both the United States and the Soviet Union have developed procedures for solving conflicts with other governments, even former enemies, without hostilities or threats of force. The essential difference between these relationships and the U.S.-Soviet relationship lies not in the degree of difference in cultural heritage or security interests, but in the way the two governments approach their problems—through consultations and dispute resolution procedures, or through conflict and recrimination.The process of interaction is the essence of a working relationship. It means the difference between hostile confrontation and constructive collaboration, between fear and security, between war and peace. The summit meeting provides an opportunity to change the nature of the relationship, to change the focus of U.S.-Soviet interaction from antagonistic bargaining over divisive issues to constructive collaboration on possible solutions and working procedures. Roger Fisher is Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, 523 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.Scott Brown is Associate Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project.