Unfinished business: The united states and Franco's Spain, 1944-47

'Unfinished Business' examines American and British postwar policy toward the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain. Although the emergence of the cold war eventually altered that policy from one of strenuous opposition to one of grudging acceptance, the continuing desire of the Western allies to alter or remove the Franco regime illustrates the persistent influence of anti-fascism after World War II. In retrospect, the eventual alignment of Franco with the West seems a foregone conclusion, but in the fluid context of the years immediately after World War II policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to determine their interests in a world no longer defined by the war and not yet in the grip of the cold war.     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

Unfinished business: The united states and Franco's Spain, 1944–47

‘Unfinished Business’ examines American and British postwar policy toward the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain. Although the emergence of the cold war eventually altered that policy from one of strenuous opposition to one of grudging acceptance, the continuing desire of the Western allies to alter or remove the Franco regime illustrates the persistent influence of anti‐fascism after World War II. In retrospect, the eventual alignment of Franco with the West seems a foregone conclusion, but in the fluid context of the years immediately after World War II policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to determine their interests in a world no longer defined by the war and not yet in the grip of the cold war.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.     

Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict

The India-Pakistan conflict is one of the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War era. Thus far, it has witnessed four wars and a number of serious interstate crises. The literature on enduring rivalries suggests that the India-Pakistan dyad contains factors such as unsettled territorial issues, political incompatibility, irreconcilable positions on national identity, and the absence of significant economic and trade relations between the two states, all cause the rivalry to persist. In this article I present a crucial neglected structural factor that explains the endurance of the rivalry. I argue that the peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the two antagonists for over half a century has made full termination of the rivalry difficult in the near-term. Truncated power asymmetry is a causal factor in this rivalry's persistence, as rivalries between a status quo power and a challenger state that are relatively equal in their capabilities at the local level are the most intractable and nearly impossible to resolve quickly. The duration of many other asymmetric rivalries can also be explained using a framework of global superiority versus local parity in power capabilities that exist between the antagonists.     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Theoretical foundations for the collection of major power‐minor power war data

Two basic theoretical considerations underlie the collection of data on major power‐minor power conflicts. Both perspectives have major power‐minor power relations at their core, and are developed more fully in The Onset of World War (Midlarsky, 1988). First, an hierarchical equilibrium structure consists of two components: (1) two or more alliances (or other loose hierarchies such as loosely‐knit empires) of varying size and composition but clearly including a great power and a number of small powers within each, and (2) a relatively large number of small powers not formally associated with any of the great powers. Time periods during which the hierarchical equilibrium was obeyed did not experience systemic war, while those in which it was violated experienced this type of warfare. The second major theoretical basis is the overlap between great power conflicts exclusively, on the one hand, and great power‐small power conflicts on the other. This combination was a major contributor to the onset of World War I as well as other systemic wars such at the Thirty Years’ War and the Peloponnesian War.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism,the Balance of Power in Europe,and America's Decision for War in 1917

According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.     

Grand Strategy after the Vietnam War

The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.     

A More Turbulent and Troubled World

The year 2016 marked the 25th anniversary of the end of the Cold War and the 15th anniversary of the 9/11 attack.Though international relations are constantly adjusted,the world is by no means more stable and orderly.International order reshaping triggered by the 2008 financial crisis is deepening,with chaos of various kinds popping up here and there.In the sociopolitical field,the "Trump phenomenon" and Brexit indicate serious weakening of the authority of traditional political systems and elites.In major country relations and international security,the world is witnessing the rise of emerging countries and the and fall of the West,fiercer US-Russia and Sino-US wrestling of strategic significance,and greater global and regional security risks.In global governance,while adjustment of UN-centered global governance is laboring along,national rivalries touch core issues,making global governance more urgent.     

Civilizing interventions? Race,war and international law

Over the past decade there has been an explosion in literature on imperialism and international law. This scholarship has focused on the use of force, especially humanitarian intervention and the war on terror. These accounts foreground the issue of race, arguing that these legal arguments reproduce the dynamic of the civilising mission. This article argues that such analyses miss some key elements. Contemporary interventions must be counterposed to the First Iraq War, which was enabled through the uncontroversial authorization of the Security Council. Humanitarian intervention and the war on terror emerged in reaction to the fear that other states would veto Security Council resolutions. Consequently, the ‘racial’ discourse around intervention cannot simply be read as ‘othering’ the peripheries, but was also a response to inter-imperialist rivalry. The article then advances a conception of the arguments as an attempt to articulate hegemonic coalitions against emerging rivalries, and reads racialization in this light.     

Evolution of Maya Polities in the Ancient Mesoamerican System

The analysis of politics in antiquity presents new opportunities for political science and international relations, particularly the ancient New World ( c . 2000 B.C. to A.D. 1521). Governance through leadership and institutions, collective action, war and peace, alliance dynamics, regional hegemonies, interstate rivalries, and other universal patterns of world politicsexisted in Mesoamerica, antedating the modern state system. We report findings from a study to record systematically the rise and fall of Maya polities in the Mesoamerican political system, using sources from archaeology and epigraphy. Based on tests of competing hypotheses and new distribution statistics and hazard rates (survival analysis) for 72 Maya polities, our findingssupport a model of Maya political dynamics based on Preclassic origins, punctuated phases of development, multiple cycles of system expansion and collapse, and weaker political stability for increasingly complex polities. We draw two main implications: (a) a new theory of the Maya political collapse(s), based on their failure to politically integrate; and (b) confirmation for a newperiodization of Maya political evolution, different from the traditional cultural periodization, based on several cycles of rise-and-fall, not just one. Our findings may also make possible future investigations in areas such as the war-polarity and war-alliances hypotheses.     

世界大变局与中美日三国战略选择

在世界大变局中,战后国际格局重大变化的主要标志是“世界老二”易位。苏联、日本皆不例外;21世纪以来欧盟也由盛转衰。未来国际格局可能有三种前景:1.中美两极对抗体制;2.中美竞争合作的“两极多元体制”;3.世界各大力量多元并存,构建多元一体的人类命运共同体。这要看世界潮流是走向和平多边主义还是暴力多边主义。中国实现伟大复兴后的战略选择是“济弱扶倾”,为世界可持续发展与可持续安全做贡献。日本面临的战略选择是:继续在《日本国宪法》下走和平发展道路,还是修改宪法,成为“能战国家”的一员,加入暴力强权的多边主义?坚持开放的地区主义与国际协调,还是搞排他经济集团,远交近攻,以中国为竞争对手?利用中美对立从中渔利,还是促进中美协调而避免在中美之间“选边站”?妥善处理中日两国围绕钓鱼岛归属认知争议和台湾问题,还是重走历史老路?囿于冷战思维和传统权力政治的现实主义决策逻辑,同中国搞战略对抗,还是树立共同、综合、合作、可持续安全的新安全观,与中国加强合作?这些战略选择将关乎未来30年的中日关系。     

Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

Wars of Succession

I analyze a model of bargaining, war, and endogenous leadership turnover in which (1) leader attributes affect war outcomes and (2) war can insulate settlements from renegotiation. Shifts in bargaining power caused by leadership turnover are endogenous and discontinuous, but sufficiently decisive war outcomes can solve the associated commitment problem. In contrast to other models where the shadow cast by a hawkish successor encourages moderation toward a dovish incumbent, the foreign state attacks instead—despite a dovish incumbent’s known preference for peace—using war to lock in a settlement that would otherwise be lost to future leadership turnover. I discuss the theory’s implications for widening the empirical scope of the commitment problem explanation for war to limited wars over relatively lower stakes and for integrating the politics of leadership turnover with the study of strategic rivalries.     

Where We Get Thucydides Wrong: The Fallacies of History’s First “Hegemonic” War

Thucydides’ History remains the basis for numerous claims within International Relations Theory, contributing to defining concepts from the security dilemma to the dynamics of bi-polarity and hegemonic transition theory. But the historical record that underpins Thucydides’ History provides a more complex view of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. This analysis argues that basing explanations for the Great Peloponnesian War on the premise of Spartan “fear” is incomplete. A bi-polar, hegemonic rivalry did not lock-in the two states; they existed in a complex multi-polar system. This multi-polarity allowed other actors—notably Corinth—to play a key role in the outbreak of war. It was consideration for alliances, empires, and political rivalries within the context of multi-polarity, rather than a prosaic Spartan “fear,” that were at the heart of the war. These unique characteristics combined with the misrepresentation of the historical record, make generalising from the Peloponnesian War dangerous.     

Not 'by those old books of international law, but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War

Prevailing understanding of the Ottoman entry into Word War I has focused on the role of Enver Pasha and the so-called pro-German faction in the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This article examines Ottoman views on international relations and the future of the Ottoman Empire in contemporary Ottoman publications. The article concludes that substantial parts of Ottoman society viewed war in 1914 not only as an acceptable course of action, but as a morally justified, potentially liberating, and unifying experience for many Ottomans. Ottoman views, therefore, form part of a much wider non-Western response to Western expansion, and Ottoman entry into World War I is best understood as a reaction against the international system which the Ottoman leaders thought had betrayed them.