论法权形态异化的本质及其法律矫治

应然的法权关系中存在着"权利"与"权力"两种法权形态.权利反映的是平等民事主体之间对称、互惠的权利义务关系;权力来自于法律,是凝结在法律中的人民权利,人民是权力的唯一合法源泉.权力本应从属并服务于权利.法权形态的异化导致权力权利化、权利权力化,形成权力与权利功能的二律背反,不仅损害了社会公共利益,而且侵犯了公民的合法权益.防止权力及权力异化的途径是明确权力和权利的边界,加快民主法治的进程,建立法权关系的制约机制.     

刑事诉讼的价值与冲突

刑事诉讼是司法者以国家名义追究行为人刑事责任的活动，其价值是实现国家的刑罚权，而刑事诉讼法是制约司法者的行为规则。其价值是保障司法公正，维护法制的社会基础。这种矛盾根本上是由于人之存在的有限性与个体性而决定的司法主体的二重性。赋予被告人、被害人等诉讼参与人以诉讼权利，是基于客观的认识规律与体现公民宪法权利的需要。司法权力的分工是基于以权力制约权力的要求。无罪推定是对司法者的行为规则，而并不是刑事诉讼的价值原则     

对《行政许可法》关于构建有限政府理念的思考

已实施的国家《行政许可法》,第一次以法律形式明确政府与市场、权力与权利的关系,确立了构建有限政府、保障合法权利、依法民主行政的新理念。对这一理念可从两个角度进行诠释:其一,用法律制约权力,该法从限定行政许可事项范围、控制设定行政许可的权限等四个方面来限制政府权力,保障市场主体权利;其二,以权利制约权力,该法赋予公民、法人和其他组织陈述、申辩、救济、听证等诸多权利,还有保障以上权利得以实现的权利,从而实现制约政府权力、构建有限政府的目的。     

论检察权定位中的制约因素

检察权在国家权力中的定位受到诸多因素的制约,因此,考察这些制约因素,对正确界定和理解检察权就显得十分重要。其中,国家因素的制约作用主要体现在:国家意志是检察权产生和发展的原动力,国家任务是根本要求,国家权力结构模式是具体影响;人民因素的制约作用体现在:人民主权是检察权产生的理论基石,人民权利的让渡是现实需要,人民合法地决定检察权的地位源于一切权力属于人民;社会因素的制约作用体现在:社会权力与检察权的分离与契合,市民社会权利的让渡赋予了检察权的监督职能。     

现代经济法的法权结构论纲

法权结构是指包含于法之中的权力和权利两者之间的关系,由主体认知、法律规定和现实表现三个层面有机组合而成。本文认为现代经济法的法权结构的本质是"互动",体现为三个基本层次:应然态;法定态和实然态;表现为三个具体特征:经济权力的多元化和"经济元权力"的制度化表达、经济权利的自治化与规范化的制度构建、社会经济权力和权利的勃兴与经济权限制约机制的型构。     

监督行政的基点、机制及其实现

实现行政法治的基本途径是通过有效的监督机制对行政权进行监督制约。为此 ,必须确立行政权是一种有限的权力之观念。对行政权的监督应当从“以权力制约权力”和“以权利制约权力”两个方面着手 ,确保监督权力的独立性、可行性 ,并制定相应的监督程序以保障     

对当代行政法主体双方地位平等的认知——从行政相对人的视角

在我国当代行政法中 ,行政相对人与行政主体之间多样化行政法律关系的出现 ,形成了行政相对人同行政主体之间相互关系的总体平衡结构 ;行政相对人权利的全面扩展 ,展现了行政相对人权利与行政主体权力已具有的对称性 ;而行政相对人对行政主体积极作用的形成和发挥 ,则显示了行政相对人与行政主体之间的均势形态。所有这些都表明行政法主体双方地位总体平等的发展走向 ,这也是行政活动走向法治化、民主化的具体体现。     

论侦查阶段撤销案件的监督和制约机制

侦查阶段撤销案件缺乏监督和制约,存在着撤案权滥用和撤案程序异化的严重问题,应当予以重视。撤案程序的实质是解决程序纠纷,平衡撤案程序参与主体之间的利益冲突。应当将检察机关引入撤案程序,充当中立裁判者,发挥监督和权力制衡作用,并赋予其他撤案程序参与主体相应的程序权利,以权利制约权力。     

比例原则的再思考——以税收保全为例

比例原则不仅在价值层面体现了法律的精神,而且在方法论层面体现了制度的理性。在税收保全中,折射了比例原则作为制度建构的指导思想,有助于理顺立法、执法、司法三者之间的关系,实现权力之间的合作与制衡;同时也为权力与权利之间的相互制约创造了条件。     

论我国法治建设的成就与法治变革的友好型环境

从＂权力＂与＂权利＂之间的关系来看法治演进的轨迹,法治建设主要有三个阶段：＂以权力制约权利＂的法治阶段、＂以权力制约权力＂的法治阶段、＂以权利制约权力＂的法治阶段。作为社会主义国家,我国人民享有广泛的、真实的民主,法治建设适宜＂以权利制约权力＂,以实现人民监督政府与政府服务人民的有机统一。改革开放30多年来,我国法治建设虽然取得了巨大成就,但也存在着诸多不足,而推进法治建设的步伐,必须营造法治变革所需要的友好型环境。     

Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality

Abstract.   The article begins with an outline of the balancing construction as developed by the German Federal Constitutional court since the Lüth decision in 1958. It then takes up two objections to this approach raised by Jürgen Habermas. The first maintains that balancing is both irrational and a danger for rights, depriving them of their normative power. The second is that balancing takes one out of the realm of right and wrong, correctness and incorrectness, and justification, and, thus, out of the realm of the law. The article attempts to counter these objections by showing that there exists a rational structure of balancing that can be made explicit by a "Law of Balancing" and a "Disproportionality Rule." These rules show, first, that balancing is not a danger for rights but, on the contrary, a necessary means of lending them protection, and second, that balancing is not an alternative to argumentation but an indispensable form of rational practical discourse.     

‘Private jurisprudence’ and the right to be forgotten balancing test

Upon receipt of a right to be forgotten request, private actors like Google are responsible for implementing the balancing test between competing rights of privacy and data protection and free expression and access to information. This amounts to private jurisprudence that data subjects, lawyers, and interested parties could, theoretically, game to their advantage. This paper critiques this process and argues two separate, but related points. (1) Search engines have become the sole arbiter of the rights to privacy and data protection under Articles 7 and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, when safeguarding should be a responsibility of state authorities. (2) As private actors face litigation if their decision is not acceptable to the data subject, the right to access information and the public's right to know is compromised. Search engines exert considerable power over access to and Internet usage, yet nevertheless benefit from frameworks that permit a lack of adherence to similar human rights standards as public actors or agencies. As such, empowering search engines as decision-makers over conflicting fundamental rights is problematic. Rather than allow the content of the right to be forgotten to be fleshed out by private actors, the significant body of existing jurisprudence should form the basis for public guidelines on how to implement the right to be forgotten. An analysis of case law of national courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU reveals two related matters: it is possible to reverse engineer how search engines determine which requests will be actioned and those which will be denied. This paper argues a) collectively the body of jurisprudence is of sufficient standing to develop a public and transparent balancing test that is fair to all stakeholders and b) private actors should no longer be resolving the conflict between competing fundamental rights. The paper closes by positing a framework, loosely based on ICANN's Uniform Domain Resolution Procedure for resolving conflict between conflicting cyber property rights that provides transparency and accountability to the right to be forgotten and removes search engines as arbiters of the balancing test in select cases.     

权利之间的界限——以美国宪法第一修正案为中心

表达自由与其他宪法权利的规范语句只是作为一种预设存在,它们在水平效力的延展上都是有限度的,彼此之间也是有界限的,所谓的界限主要通过对于权利范围的限制来体现,而在对权利作限制时,其核心部分不应受到憾动。在个案情形下,任何一方的胜出,都会对另一方构成限制,而任何一清晰的主张完全可能会被确认,也完全有可能会被驳倒,指望在两个权利之间划定一条什么固定不变的界限好方便断案是不现实的,权利之间的界限有赖于法益衡量。     

论变迁中的当代中国法学核心范畴

权利义务的核心范畴地位获得了法理学教材体系的普遍认同,但宪法学和公法学教材对它的认同度不高。近二十年来,法理学者在研究现实法律问题、甚至做全局性论述的时候,逐渐形成了放弃权利义务中心,代之以权利权力中心的选择倾向。新倾向的出现对于我国着力认识权力、合理配置权力,以及对权力的合理运用和制约监督,都有现实意义。本文作者并不赞成以权利权力作为法学的核心范畴,而是主张把反映和记录人们对权利权力共同体的认识的法权概念作为法学的核心范畴。     

制约权力与保护权利的统一——《治安管理处罚法》的价值取向探究

现代法治社会的目标之一是限制公权,尊重和保障私权。《治安管理处罚法》从赋予权力、规制权力、保障权利等方面寻求这两者之间的平衡点,合理配置公安机关权力与行政相对人的权利,平衡公安机关权力行使和行政相对人权益保护之间的关系,从而实现制约权力与保护权利统一的价值取向。     

权利的结构：以商法为例

权利的合成、分解和单纯结构变动是商法中的常见现象，这些现象呼唤一个权利结构方面的理论。结构是权利的重要参数，具有无限性、独立性和整体性等特征。权利的合成、分解和单纯结构变动既可能诱发权利的质变，又可能改变权利的功能，这两点已经被商法广泛运用。权利结构的设计应当是商法乃至整个私法的基本问题之一。     

劳动权的防御权功能与国家的尊重义务

防御权功能是劳动权的首要功能,以防止国家权力的干预、为公民创设"自由空间"为旨趣。公民劳动权的起始之处,即国家权力的终止之所。防御权功能属于"主观权利"范畴,公民享有"不作为请求权"、"停止侵害请求权"。尽管我国《宪法》未规定劳动自由,然而,从"事实"与"规范"二维度看,防御权功能亦是我国劳动权的题中之义。劳动权的防御权功能之实现仰赖国家履行"消极不作为"的"尊重义务"。尊重义务是劳动权保障的根本义务,立法机关和司法机关是尊重义务的主体,行政机关在一定程度上具有尊重义务的主体资格。     

The AIDS epidemic and gay bathhouses: a constitutional analysis

Some legal scholars propose that the right of privacy articulated by the United States Supreme Court should be extended to protect homosexual activity. In light of the advent of AIDS, should that extension include constitutional protection for homosexual men who frequent gay bathhouses? The author argues that although the government has the power to close the baths in the name of public health, it should not do so without careful and conscious balancing against the privacy rights infringed upon by its actions. Balancing the tension between public health policy and individual rights applies not only to the specific situation of the baths, but also to insurance companies' aim to test all single, young, male life and health policy applicants for exposure to the putative AIDS virus; to potential health department releases of names of those testing antibody-positive for HTLV-III; to the military's rumored plans to discharge all personnel suspected of having AIDS; and to school districts seeking to exclude children with AIDS.     

论消费者权之法律边界

消费者权的行使可能会损害经营者的经营自由,权利冲突意味着权利的限制与边界,确立消费者权法律边界的理论依据主要有权利冲突理论和权利不得滥用原则。过错责任是消费者权利与经营者经济自由平衡保护的重要机制,特殊消费侵权行为适用无过错责任时,也应遵循法益衡量规则。     

Morgentaler v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Morgentaler v. R., the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code. In a five to two split, a majority of the Supreme Court judges found that section 251 offended a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of her "life, liberty, and security of the person." Sheilah Martin reviews the three majority judgments and focuses on the decision written by Madame Justice Wilson. She believes that Madame Justice Wilson's opinion merits special attention in several regards: her conclusions on the constitutional rights of pregnant women; her recognition and validation of women's perspectives on abortion; and her approach to balancing women's interests in reproductive self-determination against the state's interest in regulating reproduction. Sheilah Martin concludes that this decision will reverberate far into the future. Even though it fails to establish clear guidelines concerning governmental power to control access to abortion, its principles outline the legal framework in which future litigation will occur, and it will limit and shape the terms of any ensuing political debate. In addition, Madame Justice Wilson's judgment holds great promise for those looking to the Court to promote the rights of women and other historically disadvantaged groups.