Structuration Theory and Wrongful Imprisonment: From ‘Victimhood’ to ‘Survivorship’?

Building on existing research from a zemiological approach, this article seeks to contribute to a more ontological understanding of the production and reproduction of harms associated with wrongful imprisonment in England and Wales. Drawing from Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration, it is argued that whilst the harms of wrongful imprisonment are both complex and devastating, victims need not be perceived as entirely passive. Rather, victims of wrongful imprisonment can be viewed as knowledgeable agents with the intrinsic capacity and agency to strategically cope with and even survive the harms that they experience. The article concludes with personal accounts by victims of wrongful imprisonment that form an identifiable ‘survivor’ discourse to highlight some of the key critical factors that are vital in helping victims of wrongful imprisonment to re-structure their lives after release.     

The Good,the Bad,and the Klutzy: Criminal Negligence and Moral Concern

One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal negligence. Although not interested in legal issues herself, Arpaly has a well-developed theory of moral agency that explains moral concern in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons. Introducing her work to the ongoing scholarly debate will be helpful for two reasons. First, while a definition of negligence in terms of moral concern is recognized as one proposed solution to the negligence–blameworthiness problem, authors promoting it have yet to give a systematic account of moral concern and its relation to blame. Borrowing Arpaly's account will help clarify the idea of moral concern so that both proponents and critics of a concern approach to negligence can have a better-defined debate. Second, her theory of blameworthiness is especially suited to defending the blameworthiness of negligent actions, because it does not have recourse to a special quality of choice or self-control that must be active to render conduct blameworthy. To make this second advantage clear, the article argues that reliance on choice or self-control problematizes blameworthiness for negligence. Those who wish to defend blameworthiness for negligent acts should base their work on an account of moral agency that does not rely on either choice or self-control to explain when an action is blameworthy.     

The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law

According to the principle of full compensation, tort law seeks to put the victim in the position he was in before the tort. This position is generally considered to be the situation where the victim does not suffer any harm at all. We consider an alternative interpretation. If an injurer takes due care, the victim is faced with expected harm. This can be considered the victim's expected harm in the situation he was in before the tort. Thus conceived full compensation requires a negligent injurer to pay damages which bring the (potential) victim ex ante in the same position as the victim was in the case where the (potential) injurer takes due care. We investigate the consequences of this restated negligence rule. For due care levels larger than efficient care, the standard negligent rule may lead to excessive care, whereas the restated negligent rule always leads to efficient care. Furthermore, the activity level under the restated negligent rule is greater than the activity level under the standard negligent rule, which itself is greater than the efficient activity level. Social welfare under the restated negligence rule can either be higher or lower than social welfare under the standard negligence rule.     

医师注意义务的概念及其与医疗过失行为的关系--医师的注意义务系列研究(1)

医疗过失问题,是医患纠纷的焦点.医师的过失行为本质是一种客观过失,是对医师注意义务的违反,因为任何医师在自己从事特定的医疗行为时都必须达到相应的医疗水准.医师的注意义务是指医师在医疗行为时依据法律、法规、规章制度和具体操作规程,以及职务和业务上的习惯和常理、接受期约或委托的要求等保持足够的小心谨慎,以预见医疗行为的结果和避免损害结果发生的义务.     

Conduct and its Consequences: Attempts at Debiasing Jury Judgments

Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her conduct and not by the consequences of that conduct. But several studies have shown that a cognitive heuristic known as hindsight bias can skew post hoc judgments of some prior behavior. Thus, jurors who must evaluate the actions of a defendant may be influenced inappropriately by the consequences of those actions. A complementary problem arises when jurors must evaluate the injuries incurred by the plaintiff. Here, jurors' knowledge about the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct can proactively influence their assessment of the plaintiff's injuries and determination of damages. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of two procedural techniques intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight bias in negligence cases—multiple admonitions from a judge about the proper use of evidence—and bifurcation (actually withholding irrelevant evidence from jurors). We presented a re-enacted automobile negligence trial to 355 jury-eligible adults drawn from the community, varied the evidence and instructions that they heard, and measured liability judgments and damage awards from individual jurors both before and after deliberating, and from juries. Results showed that admonitions were generally ineffective in guiding jurors to the proper use of evidence but that bifurcation was relatively more effective. Deliberations had no curative effect on jurors' misapplication of evidence.     

The concept of harm reconceived: A different look at wrongful life

In wrongful life litigation a congenitally impaired child brings suit against those, usually physicians, whose negligence caused him to be born into his suffering existence. A key conceptual question is whether we can predicate “harm” in such cases. While a few courts have permitted it, many courts deny that we can, and thus have refused these children standing to sue. In this article the author examines the wrongful life cases and literature enroute to a broader consideration of harm. This literature, and philosophical discussions of harm generally, rely on a definition which ascribes harm by comparing an individual's current condition with that in which he would otherwise have been, but for the allegedly harmful event. The author shows this definition to be conceptually and morally flawed. A superior general definition is offered which, when then applied to wrongful life cases, shows that we can easily ascribe harm in these cases and can find clear potential for tort liability.     

共同过失犯罪行为理论研究——兼论行为理论的重构

两人或者两人以上基于相同的过失共同造成损害结果即为共同过失犯罪,但现有的共同犯罪理论和行为理论并不能合理解决这类行为的定罪量刑问题。重构行为理论,将行为理解为"行为人运用一定的主客观条件作用于特定的人或物的存在状态的过程",过失共同犯罪就是行为人之间在相互利用对方行为之际,应当控制而没有控制,最终造成了实际损害结果,所以应当分别按照过失犯罪定罪处罚。     

Wrongful life actions: the legal and ethical hurdles

This article discusses the various legal and ethical issues arising out of the cause of action for wrongful life. This action involves a claim by a child that but for the negligence of the doctor, hospital or other medical institution, his or her mother would have terminated the pregnancy and he or she would not have been born. The courts have generally rejected this cause of action on the basis of legal, ethical and policy considerations. The author proposes that the legal hurdles can be overcome and that the ethical and policy considerations do not outweigh the desirability of upholding wrongful life claims.     

Suicide cases in civil law: do the legal tests make sense?

The legal 'tests' for suicide liability in negligence and workmen's compensation law have developed along parallel, but not identical, lines to the tests for criminal responsibility. Current legal precedent has shifted the focus from cognitive awareness and irresistible impulse theories to the ability of a negligent act or injury to cause an abnormal mental state. The courts, in their variable interpretation of these mental state tests, leave no clear guidelines for the psychiatric expert asked to address suicidal behavior from the standpoint of responsibility.     

行政法规范之违反与过失实行行为之认定——基于新过失论的阐释

讨论行政法规范之违反与过失实行行为之认定的关系,对于我国过失犯罪,特别是业务过失犯罪的认定,有重大意义。对此,应当从不同的过失犯构造理论出发,做体系性思考。立足于行为无价值的新过失论,将过失实行行为定义为违反结果回避义务,不仅能合理限制过失不法的范围,理论立场上也更为首尾一贯;而且通过注意义务的类型化,更能贯彻刑法的自由保障功能和法益保护功能。在新过失论的框架下,行政法规范上的义务和刑法上的注意义务在范围、性质上均有不同,但也存在相同之处:前者的危险防止义务是以定型的危险为前提而课予一般人的义务,后者则是以个案事态为前提而课予(处于行为人地位的)一般人的义务。违反不以避免构成要件结果为指向的行政法规范上的义务,并不构成对刑法上注意义务的违反。而违反以避免构成要件结果为指向的行政法规范上的义务,如果该义务对于个案中的结果回避是必要的或不足的,则构成对刑法上注意义务的违反;如果该义务对于个案中的结果回避是不必要的、可替代的,或者会起消极作用,则不违反刑法上的注意义务。     

医疗过失简论

传统过失犯理论(旧过失论)实质是以“结果无价值论”为其理论基础的。对医疗过失的认定方式无异于对医务人员课以事实上的绝对责任,不利于医学的发展及社会生活的进步。以容许危险理论为基础的新过失论,不仅重视结果无价值,更引入了行为无价值,从而缓和了过失犯的成立,对医疗事故的责任认定方式具有指导意义。     

论医疗损害赔偿的法律适用标准

本文论述了关于医疗损害赔偿法律适用的3种观点,认为医疗损害赔偿既不能适用限额赔偿标准,也不能适用或参照《医疗事故处理条例》的规定,只能适用《民法通则》及有关司法解释等民事法律规范,希望对司法实践有所借鉴意义,并能作为最高院制定医疗纠纷司法解释的参考。     

英美法对医疗过失的判定原则及对我国的启示

过失是医疗损害责任认定中最为重要的条件,如何确定过失是医疗纠纷和诉讼中最为关键的问题。我国在该问题上的研究及实践均存有欠缺之处,而英美国家在过失判定原则中,其注意义务标准的设定和认定具有一定的合理之处,对我国医疗过失理论研究和司法实践均有借鉴作用。     

Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty

In this paper we modify the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty. That is, we assume that neither party knows in advance whether she will be the victim or the injurer when an accident occurs. When the standards of care of the two parties are set at the socially optimal levels, only pure comparative negligence and the equal division rule guarantee efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division (other than a 50:50 split) may produce inefficient equilibria. Since pure comparative negligence splits liability between negligent parties according to each party's degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one's role-type. This produces its efficiency advantage.We extend the model to the choice of vehicle size, as a factor determining who will be the injurer and who the victim in motor vehicle collisions. In the extension we analyze various standard negligence-based liability rules, and tax rules, as instruments to mitigate inefficiency resulting from the vehicle size “arms race.” We also examine two strict liability rules, one of which incorporates a comparative negligence feature; this rule prevents inefficiency from both role-type uncertainty and from the “arms race.”     

The risk of birth defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and parents' right to know.

This Article discusses the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Jacobs v. Theimer that the parents of a defective child had a cause of action for damages against a physician for alleged negligent failure to inform the mother during pregnancy that she had contracted rubella and therefore might have a defective child, thereby causing her to lose the opportunity to have an abortion. The Article raises a number of questions that post-Jacobs courts probably will confront concerning the duty of physicians and genetic counselors to keep their clients informed; describes some social and medical developments--including recent progress in medical genetics and prenatal diagnosis--which are likely to make Jacobs a significant precedent; evaluates the court's decision to allow a damage suit only for the costs of treating and caring for the child's defects; and briefly addresses the question of whether the Jacobs case comes within the sphere of suits for what has come to be known as "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life."     

共同过失犯罪的概念及特征

共同过失犯罪,是指负有共同注意义务的二个以上的行为人,由于共同的不注意,共同实施或促成了违反共同注意义务的行为,造成危害结果发生的一种共同犯罪形态。过失教唆犯、过失帮助犯能够成立共犯,即使在立法中予以确认也不会导致处罚范围的扩大和刑法谦抑原则的违反。在共同过失犯罪中,数人实施或促成了违反共同注意义务的共同行为,并且数个行为人都负有防止危害结果发生的共同注意义务,导致了危害结果的发生;在主观方面,各行为人在主观上都是过失,各行为人对危害结果所抱的心理态度也基本相同。     

论过失犯形态的原因自由行为

相对于认定故意犯形态的原因自由行为有诸多疑难而言,在过失犯形态的原因自由行为之中承认原因行为的实行行为性并没有太多争议。但无论如何,过失犯形态的原因自由行为至少在表象上有别于一般的过失犯,其特点就在于可以划分为原因行为和结果行为这两个阶段,而在结果行为阶段又的确是丧失了责任能力甚至是行为能力。相关判例印证了在自陷无责的情形中构成要件模式的正确性,即原因自由行为实质上并不是一种需要特殊归责的构造,而只是一种现象上有独特之处,但完全可以被包括在一般的归责形态(无论是过失犯还是故意犯)之中的说明形式(说明实行行为到底在何处)而已。要成立过失犯形态的原因自由行为,关键在于如何在具体情况下认定行为人的过失心理,它可能有三种表现形式。     

错误的刑事羁押与国家的赔偿责任

刑事诉讼中的错误羁押与刑事错案常常相伴而生,但二者并非同一概念。错误羁押以刑事程序法为认定依据,即使没有错案发生,羁押行为违反《刑事诉讼法》的规定亦照样构成错误羁押。与错案相联系的错误羁押或合法羁押都应当导致刑事司法机关的国家赔偿责任,而未构成错案但构成错误羁押并因此导致当事人合法权益损害的,国家也应当有条件地承担赔偿责任。国家对无错案条件下错误羁押承担赔偿责任,有利于增强刑事司法机关的程序公正意识和人权保障意识,防止和减少羁押的滥用。     

共同过失命题之证伪

共同过失这个命题是共同侵权制度据以扩张解释的一个理论假设。然而目前所有关于共同过失的观点及其论证都是不成立的。共同过失就其实质而言,属于无意思联络的数人过失侵权,按照目前侵权责任法的规定,数人应对受害人承担按份责任。然而共同过失这个理论假设不适当地扩张了共同侵权行为的范围,并导致了连带责任制度被滥用。     

What Is The Wrong Of Wrongful Disability? From Chance To Choice To Harms To Persons

The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing or future person––cannot account for that wrong since the choice to produce such a child cannot, under the logic of the nonidentity problem, harm that child. The authors propose that we supplement the person-affecting approach with an “impersonal” principle that takes the form of their well-known principle N. In this paper, I argue that the authors are mistaken to suppose that a plausibly articulated person-affecting approach cannot account for the wrong of wrongful disability. We can retain an intuitive, comparative, “worse for” account of harm and still identify serious harms imposed by the choice of wrongful disability. In particular, I argue that harm, both to the impaired child and to others, comes not in the form of that procreative choice’s procreative effect but rather in the form of its many distributive effects. I also argue that the rare, residual case in which a person-affecting approach would approve of the choice of wrongful disability does not function as a counterexample to that approach. As a separate matter, I address legal claims for wrongful disability, which are closely akin to claims for wrongful life. The legal claim is brought by the impaired child, not against the parents, but rather against health care providers whose negligent failure to diagnose or inform parents of an increased risk of a genetic or congenital impairment results in the birth of the impaired child. The authors’ treatment of the moral wrong that is done as impersonal in nature suggests that courts are correct to dismiss any such claim. Once we identify harm, however, the person-affecting approach can identify a clear foundation in the law for the wrongful disability claim.