Protesters,Parliamentarians, Policymakers: The Experiences of Australian Green MPs

This article details the distinctive style and political commitments that Green members of parliament (MPs) bring to representative democracy in Australia. Based on in-depth interviews with 16 sitting federal and state Green MPs, it examines the extent to which the political culture, grassroots organisation and values of this left-libertarian party influence the parliamentary role orientations and legislative behaviour of its MPs, and how this fits with existing research on parliamentary representatives. The analysis reveals mixed results: while the legislative priorities and representative focus of MPs appear to be influenced more by previous social movement and parliamentary experience rather than overarching party orientations, the party's culture has had a strong impact on MPs' views regarding issues of conscience and their style of representation. Drawing on the comparative experience of Green parties throughout Western Europe, this article utilises the prism of role orientations to assess the conflicting imperatives Australian Green MPs face in staying true to their movement origins while their party becomes increasingly professional and influential in the parliamentary arena.     

Parliamentary party groups and their parties: A comparative assessment

This article presents a comparative study of the interrelationship between parliamentary party groups and their extra‐parliamentary party organisations in liberal democracies. Starting with a historical overview of the most important party changes that have taken place since the 1960s, a typology of parliamentary party/party organisation relations is suggested. The following variables are identified as being of particular importance in shaping the structure of power in political parties: position of parliament in the political system; (non‐)existence of the incompatibility rule; effects of the electoral system; competition structure and degree of polarisation of the party system; political culture; conditions under which parties emerged; (non‐)existence of public funding for parties; degree of professionalisation of the political elite.     

浅析民国初年的政党政治实践

政党政治是资产阶级共和国建立之初,国内政治发展的大势所趋.资产阶级民主革命派企图通过建立政党政治使中国走上近代西方式的议会民主之路.从1912年初到1914年1月袁世凯非法取缔国会的短短两年时间里,各种政党组织纵横捭阖,离合分化.但由于北洋军阀和旧式官僚等独立于政党政治实践之外的政治势力的干扰,以及从事政党政治实践的各党派缺乏必要的群众参与,加之成员自身政治素质低劣等内外因素,民国初年的政党实践最终以失败而告终.这证明,在这个充满数千年传统包袱又遭到近百年列强侵凌割据命运的东方大国里,西方式的政党政治无法顺利展开并解决中国的问题.此后中国数十年革命实践证明,哪个政党能够更成功地扎根于社会,更细致地把握社会的脉搏,宣传和动员起作为本党目标的物质基础,哪个政党就会取得最后的胜利.     

Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis

The level and causes of party unity are under-researched topics in parliamentary democracies, particularly in comparative perspective. This article presents a non-formal model explaining party unity in legislative voting as the result of individual legislators' decisions reacting to the incentives and constraints created by their respective institutional environments. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested against empirical data on party unity in 11 western parliamentary democracies since 1945. On the system level, central party control over nominations and intra-parliamentary resources as well as the strength of parliamentary committees with regard to policy decisions are shown to affect party unity as expected by the model. On the level of individual parties, governing parties are less unified than opposition parties and larger parties show higher unity than smaller ones. Both results shed doubt on frequent claims in the literature.     

Intra-party delegation in the Portuguese legislature: assigning committee chairs and party coordination positions

In European parliamentary democracies political parties control candidate selection, maintain cohesion in the legislature and support governments. In addition to these classic functions, parties also organise the legislature delegating power to legislators, specifically as committee chairs and party coordinators. Delegation is inherently dangerous, involving potential agency loss. Parties, however, have ex-ante and ex-post institutional mechanisms to deal with agency problems. In this paper, a case study is made of the Portuguese legislature, arguing that parties make use of their pivotal role in selecting legislators as committee chairs and party coordinators to keep tabs on legislators to thwart shirking from the party line. This paper finds that political parties use incumbency as an ex-ante screening mechanism of committee chairs and party coordinators in looking for reliable signals of past behaviour to decrease uncertainty. Additionally, evidence suggests that extra-parliamentary party structure is used as an institutional arena for ex-post control of party coordinators.     

Limiting Party Representation: Evidence from a Small Parliamentary Chamber

Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the party‐controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent‐dominated elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and legislative behaviour.     

Democratic Incongruities: Representative Democracy in Britain

This essay discusses the rationale guiding legislation dealing exclusively with political parties. The analysis is based on examination of party laws in Austria, Finland, Germany, Israel, Poland, Spain and Venezuela. The manner by which a particular legislature applies the general features of party law‐ legislation (general declaration regarding the role of parties in democracies, definition of parties, registration requirements, the democratic character of association in parties, regulation of party finance, legal sanctions) is demonstrated in reference to the Israeli party law, the most recent case of an established democracy whose legislature passed a parties law in 1992.

Throughout the analysis, the study addresses a question of principle: should a legislature comprised of representatives of political parties undertake to legislate laws regulating the activities of political parties in a democratic parliamentary system? It is suggested that a partial response to this question is found in the fact that, with the exception of Finland and Israel, democratic polities that have chosen to legislate party laws had previously experienced a collapse of their democratic systems. In the process of reforming their democratic structures, the legislatures in these polities enacted parties laws that would ensure that political parties perform functions commensurate With the goals and practices of modern democracies.     

Transferability of parliamentary experience: The Russian example

The article looks at the development of parliamentary institutions and procedures in Russia and the extent to which Russian politicians have been interested in learning from ‘mature’ democracies.

There are few examples of parliamentary practices being transplanted without significant adaptation. The debate in Russia on the role of parliament indicates that the idea of imitating foreign models has to compete with the powerful notion of rediscovering a national democratic tradition and both are used rhetorically to support particular interests. Parliamentary rules and practices are organically linked with party organisation, with the balance of parties at any given time, with electoral law, and with the relationship of the executive to the legislative branch. Changes in political habits take time.

International contacts are valuable because they lend confidence and authority to those who are working to build on democratic habits, but it is more important that parliamentarians and officials should find solutions which are internally consistent, which work with the grain of their own slowly evolving political culture and which reflect the most positive of their own traditions, than that they should assemble best practice from around the world.     

Party Cohesion in the Danish Parliament

This article formulates a comprehensive and systematic taxonomy of micro level explanations of party cohesion; party cohesion being understood as party group members acting in unity externally. This apparatus is used in an analysis of party cohesion in the final divisions in the Danish Parliament, where cohesion figures are among the highest in the liberal democratic world. The investigation is based on interviews, survey data and data on voting behaviour. The main explanations of the high level of cohesion are the absence of disagreement in the party groups and a moral commitment to the party. Variation among MPs, parties and topics is also documented and discussed. The cohesion of each party and the compliant behaviour of individual MPs are related to the importance MPs ascribe to representing their party. Furthermore, divisions on moral issues, EU integration and local matters show lower than normal degrees of cohesion.     

Bonding in Pursuit of Policy Goals: How MPs Choose Political Parties in the Legislative State of Nature

How do MPs in nascent legislatures choose a political party? We argue that MPs self‐select into groups of like‐minded colleagues to achieve favored policy outputs. MPs identify colleagues with similar preferences based on observed behavior and informative signals such as socioeconomic status, cultural background, and previous political experience. We test this explanation in the first democratically elected German parliament, the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848, that developed a differentiated party system in the absence of electoral and career incentives. Our statistical analysis shows that MPs were significantly more likely to join parties that were similar to them with regard to ideology, age, regional provenance, confession, noble status, and previous parliamentary experience. Qualitative evidence suggests that major changes in the party system were driven by disputes over policy. Our findings are particularly important for countries with more turbulent paths towards parliamentarization than those witnessed by archetypical cases like Britain or the United States.     

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

In parliamentary systems, why do party groups of the government camp initiate their own bills instead of going through the cabinet? This article suggests that such governing party group bills occur for three reasons: (a) cabinets hand out bills to the parties on the floor; (b) party groups or MPs want to signal to constituencies; or (c) parties on the floor are dissatisfied with cabinet policy making. Arguing that the absolute and relative importance of these explanations varies with institutional context, country-specific hypotheses with regard to the number of governing party group bills in Germany are tested. As expected, mechanisms (a) and (c) are especially important in explaining the occurrence of governing party group legislation in Germany.     

Parties' Influence during Government Policy Negotiations: Parliamentary Dynamics and Spatial Advantages in the First Italian Republic

As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing the cabinet bargaining process, although they do not necessarily shape its outcome to the same extent. Being a member of the invested government, for example, should increase the leverage a party enjoys when bargaining over the cabinet programme. Nevertheless, depending on institutional and political conditions, non-cabinet parties may also play a role in affecting cabinet policy positions. Despite being widely recognised in the theoretical literature, this point has received considerably less attention in empirical studies. By focusing on cabinet bargaining outcomes during the First Italian Republic, the article shows that spatial advantages associated with parliamentary dynamics, including those possessed by non-cabinet parties, can be no less significant in capturing policy payoffs than government membership, even after controlling for other relevant institutional and behavioural factors.     

Political parties, political corruption, and the economic theory of democracy

Many prominent cases of political corruption in Western European democracies have involved political parties, yet the link between theories of political parties and theories of political corruption has not been explored. This article seeks to examine this link from the perspective of economic theories of democracy. It is argued that the economic model of party organisation is liable to encourage corrupt behaviour on the part of politicians, and that modern party organisations are coming to resemble this model, making political corruption more likely to emerge. It is suggested that this hypothesis finds some empirical support in the evidence of systematic corruption amongst Southern European socialist parties. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Party Legacies and Institutional Gravity: The Dynamic between Members of Parliament and Assembly Members in Wales

What does the creation of sub-national legislatures entail for the work of parliamentary representatives, and by what guidelines does the cross-level relationship evolve? This article considers the issue in the context of British devolution, relating the analysis of parliamentarians to the question of how parties adapt. The empirical analysis, drawing on a series of interviews with Assembly Members (AMs) and Members of Parliament (MPs) from Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, shows that the infrastructure for communication between AMs and MPs differs considerably between the parties. Moreover, there are also key differences between parties with regard to how relations between individual representatives are resolved. Drawing upon insights from the institutionalist literature, the paper argues, first, that the creation of sub-national legislatures challenges party cohesiveness and, secondly, that how this challenge is met by the parties is guided by their distinct ideational and organisational legacies with regard to devolution.     

How Strong Should Our Party Be? Party Member Preferences Over Party Cohesion

In this article, we seek to explain when and why political parties pressure their members to vote with the party. We model party cohesion as an endogenous choice of preference alignment by party members. Couched in Krehbiel's (1996, 1998) pivotal politics model, the formal theory advanced here shows party cohesion to be related to the initial preference alignment of party members, the divergence in preferences between parties, the cohesion of the opposing party, the party's size, and the party's majority or minority status. We solved the model analytically for generalized‐partial equilibrium results and further analyzed it through computer simulations. We tested the model's predictions in the U.S. Senate using Rice party cohesion scores from the 46th through 104th Congresses. The data analyses show strong support for this theory of endogenous choice of party pressure.     

Question Hour Activity and Party Behaviour in India

Based on a unique data set of Indian legislators and their behaviour during Question Hour over a 30-year period (1980–2009), the paper establishes that there is a substantial gap in the volume of questions asked by legislators from national and subnational parties, even after accounting for party size and other covariates. Thus, despite increasing subnational party prominence in the electoral and executive arenas, national parties dominate activities to do with legislative oversight. The paper also explores mechanisms that may explain the difference in legislative activity between national and subnational party legislators.     

Executive Particularism and Ministerial Selection in India

Why do political parties in parliamentary systems undertake actions, such as joining a coalition government, that will entail significant costs for their members in subsequent elections? Recent research points to the incentive structures faced by differentially positioned members of a parliamentary party: unlike backbenchers, MPs who hold a ministerial portfolio can use the prerequisites of executive office to shield themselves from the costs of governance. This article tests the theory of executive particularism by examining the electoral fortunes of government ministers in India. Sitting government ministers are found to outperform other candidates; however, tests of causality fail to demonstrate that holding a ministerial portfolio causes this electoral benefit. Instead, it appears that a candidate’s electoral performance enhances the likelihood of being granted a ministerial portfolio in the first place. This finding raises questions about the generalizability of claims that party elites can use ministerial office to shield themselves from the costs of governing.     

Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate

Political parties and legislators use legislative debates to establish their reputation, challenge rivals, and engage in coalition management, among many other tasks. Yet, existing theories on parliamentary debates have abstracted away from the need for information and expertise, which are costly to acquire. Drawing on the “informational” perspective on legislative organization, we address this problem by arguing that party leaders use committees as training arenas for their backbenchers. They task their assigned members with acquiring specific expertise and then rely heavily on those members during the corresponding debates. We turn to the Portuguese legislature, from 2000 to 2015, to discuss how saliency, government dynamics, and party size affect the use of experts. We test this theory using a novel approach to classify speeches that leverages the texts of legislation as training data for a supervised approach.     

Lobbying Across Arenas: Interest Group Involvement in the Legislative Process in Denmark

Interest groups may approach political decision makers in two phases of the legislative process: the pre‐parliamentary, administrative phase, in which bills are prepared by bureaucrats; and the parliamentary phase, in which bills are discussed and possibly revised by parliamentary committees. The article investigates the factors that lead groups to engage in these phases based on group proceedings for 225 bills presented to the Danish parliament in the 2009/2010 session. We conclude that resourceful groups are clearly more active in both arenas, but the parliamentary arena is also a venue for voicing discontent and defending gains achieved in the administrative arena.     

House Party Switchers and Committee Assignments: Who Gets “What,When, How?”

What are the political consequences for members of Congress who switch parties? Roll‐call and electoral consequences of congressional party switching have been studied, but other implications of party defections have yet to be systematically explored. In this article, I examine the committee assignments of House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee assignment data from the 94th House (1975–76) through the 107th House (2001–02), I show that party switchers are more likely than nonswitchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority norm. The findings from this article are of interest to students of political parties and legislative institutions, and fill a gap in the literature on party switching. When you joined the Republican Conference on August 6, 1995, the elected leadership …determined that your accumulated seniority in the Congress would be credited when you joined the Republican Conference…. Therefore, the Republican Steering Committee's Seniority List ranks you nineteenth in overall conference seniority and designates May 22, 1980, as the beginning of your tenure in the House for purposes of Republican seniority. Letter from Speaker Dennis Hastert to party switcher Billy Tauzin, April 4, 2000.¹