核学习与印巴核威慑的稳定性分析

在西方国际政治学界 ,自 2 0世纪 70年代后期以来 ,有关学习理论及其在外交上的应用 ,一直是热门话题之一。约瑟夫·奈提出的核学习概念即是学习理论的重要成果之一。本文借助他对核学习的论述 ,来考察印巴之间的核学习及其对印巴核威慑稳定性的作用。文章认为 ,印巴之间所经历的六年多时间的核学习 ,在一定程度上促进了印巴之间核威慑的稳定性。但是 ,印巴核学习还有很长的路要走 ,而随着核学习进程的不断深入 ,印巴之间的核威慑关系将会更加稳定。     

中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

南亚安全形势新变化

冷战后,随着印度的崛起,印的地区大国地位更加巩固,其大国化也正日益受到关注;美国布什政府最近出台的亚洲新战略,将亚洲视为其全球战略中的重点,"印度牌"在其中的作用引人注目;1998年核试之后,印巴两国已成为事实上的核国家,但核威慑并未给南亚带来稳定,却使两国在南亚的战略对比出现严重失衡,印巴对抗正朝着越来     

核威慑新论

核武器无疑是20世纪留给本世纪最重要的"军事遗产",而由其派生出的核威慑是半个多世纪以来国际安全与战略理论研究的重要内容之一,今天仍被认作是维系大国关系稳定和维护国家安全的重要支柱,但内涵现已发生深刻变化.随着核技术普及与扩散,人类社会正面临前所未有尴尬:核武器及放射性物质一旦落入非国家行为体或不负责任国家手中,其威胁度要比核武器国家更可怕.在此背景下,建立无核武器世界的倡议又被重新提及,但实现这一倡议的最大障碍之一就是奉行了多年的核威慑思想,因而有必要对核威慑进行重新认识.     

美俄核威慑的演变及趋势

冷战时期，随着核武器的不断增加，美苏两国对核武器和核威慑的依赖程度则不断下降，从最大程度的依赖到较大程度的依赖，然后再到较小程度的依赖。冷战后，美俄核威慑战略所针对的对象、目标发生了变化，所依靠的核力量结构发生了变化，核力量对比的态势也发生了变化。在今后２０年内，有核国家将仍然坚持和十分重视核威慑战略，最终彻底消除核武器和实现“无核世界”的愿望及趋势，仍显得比较艰难和遥远。     

俄罗斯的核威慑政策

俄罗斯的核威慑政策是俄核政策的核心,它随俄国内外安全环境的交化而变化,表现出一定的阶段性特征,经历了由不成熟到较为成熟的发展过程.尽管俄罗斯的核威慑政策在完成政策目标方面的效能有限,但却是俄维护其核心利益不可或缺的手段.中国与俄罗斯有某些类似的安全境况,因此,俄罗斯核威慑政策实践对中国有一定的启示意义.     

试论西方核威慑理论

西方核威慑理论的建立,始于美国第一颗原子弹的试爆成功。时至今日,核威慑概念已形成了较为完整的理论休系,成为西方国际关系理论中一个重要组成部分。在实践中,核威慑理论不仅早已成为美苏调整核战略关系的依据,而且对整个国际关系和人类的和平与发展,都具有重要影响。     

南亚核态势新发展初析

1998年印巴核试验改变了南亚地区安全格局,南亚核态势出现新的变化。南亚核态势发展变化的主要动因是南亚地缘政治因素,但同美国的南亚政策密切相关。奥巴马"无核世界"的构想,特别是2010年不扩散核武器审议大会,各方在核裁军、核不扩散、和平利用核能等重大问题上共识增加,使印巴这样的"体制外"有核国家面临压力。南亚安全形势错综复杂,如何在维护核不扩散体系有效性的同时,推动印巴两国不断改善关系,走出安全困境,考验着国际社会特别是印巴两国的智慧。     

再论核禁忌

“核禁忌”作为一种道德规范是具有感召力的。然而,“核禁忌”理论本身存在诸多矛盾和谬误之处。不使用核武器并没有成为一种普遍的禁止性规范,“核禁忌”也无法削弱核威慑的意义。从历史经验看,尽管自广岛、长崎之后核武器再也没有被使用过,但许多决策者都有过使用核武器的想法。只是根据理性分析、权衡利弊之后放弃了这一选择。而从政治心理学的层面分析,“核禁忌”理论显然夸大了单一规范在决策过程中的影响力。尤其在不同的利益相互冲突的场景下,国家安全往往具有压倒性的地位。事实上,冷战后的全球核态势发展并没有受到这种禁忌的束缚,却时而出现倾向于使用核武器的势头。近年来,美国正对其核武库进行现代化升级并积极研发新型核武器。以美俄为代表的核大国也通过调整自身的核战略为可能实施的核打击大开方便之门。似是而非的“核禁忌”实际上反而增强了核威慑的必要性。虽然“核禁忌”在推动一系列核军控条约以及扩大无核武器区的建设过程中起到了一定的作用,但单纯依靠观念的力量并不能引领人类走向无核世界。只要引发地区冲突和安全困境的政治根源得不到化解,核武器作为战争的工具之一就有可能被使用。而为了确保国家安全和战略稳定,核威慑的必要性在短期内仍然无可替代。     

"9.11"事件后的印巴关系与南亚地区安全

“9. 11”袭击事件及其后续发展对南亚的地区安全产生了重要影响 ,印度与巴基斯坦间的争端成为美国在阿富汗的反恐怖主义战略必须考虑的重点。随着印度遭到两次严重恐怖袭击 ,印度进行了大规模军事调动准备报复 ,印巴对抗的升级和核冲突的危险使克什米尔问题再度成为全球关注的热点。由于印巴两国在克什米尔问题上立场不同 ,南亚的反恐怖主义成为一个错综复杂的难题。近期在印度的压力和国际社会促使下 ,巴采取了积极措施打击国内教派极端主义和越界恐怖主义势力 ,骤然变化的局势也为印巴之间采用政治方式解决克什米尔问题提供了难得的机会。     

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that “nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced” among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.     

U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation

Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.     

The conceptual essentials of minimum: explaining Pakistan's rationale of minimum deterrence

Very little is known about Pakistan's nuclear policy and, in particular, about its adoption of minimum deterrence, given the existence of nuclear ambiguity and the absence of public, official documentation of Pakistan's understanding of minimum deterrence. Therefore, despite its innocuousness, ‘minimum’ remains a vague and complex phenomenon short of definitional concreteness when it is brought to a real conceptual test. On the one hand, minimum is regarded as a small number of deterrent forces arguing against expansion and arms competition, while, on the other hand, it is viewed as a relative, and therefore continually evolving, concept depending on the region's fast-changing strategic environment. A conceptual basis for the concept of minimum is explored, leading to the question: why does Pakistan pursue minimum deterrence? It traces out the rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence as conceptualized following the 1998 nuclear tests. This rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence is then analysed in light of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to see whether it is consistent with the basics of minimum as conceived here.     

On Extended Nuclear Deterrence

This analysis discusses the central challenges that countries face when they practice extended nuclear deterrence. One key problem has to do with credibility: potential aggressors may not believe that a country would fight to defend an ally, particularly if doing so risks a nuclear attack against its homeland. Countries might be able to address this issue by forging formal alliances with protégés or by stationing nuclear forces on the protégé’s territory. Do these measures discourage third-party aggression? Defence pacts involving nuclear-armed states effectively bolster extended deterrence. One risk of extending nuclear protection from the American perspective, however, is that it might pull the United States into unwanted wars by risk-acceptant protégés. Yet, in a nuclear context, the risk of alliance entrapment is generally overblown. Placing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does much less to bolster extended deterrence than one might initially think. Although foreign nuclear deployments may reassure allies and promote non-proliferation to some degree, their value for extended deterrence is fairly minimal. The United States continues to deploy nuclear weapons in five European countries, but the case for maintaining these deployments is decidedly weak.     

Nuclear proliferation and ‘realistic deterrence’ in a new century

Deterrence became an all‐purpose theory and policy solution during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has caused theorists and policy‐makers to ask whether deterrence is still either practicable or theoretically compelling. The prospect of additional and angry state and non‐state actors armed with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), together with long‐range delivery systems, threatens to shake the foundations of deterrence stability. In this article we consider whether this is so. First, we examine some of the theoretical arguments for a benign world with nuclear proliferation and some reasons to be skeptical about those arguments. Second, we consider the current status of nuclear weapons spread and some of the particular challenges presented to deterrence and arms race stability by nuclear proliferation.     

Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution

In light of ongoing work to improve nuclear attribution capabilities, policymakers could be tempted to consider a nuclear terrorism deterrence doctrine relying strongly on the ability of those capabilities to support retaliation against states that supply materials used anonymously in an attack. Although the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution capabilities, at the very least to support response actions after an attack, prospects for deterrence are uncertain. To accommodate these uncertainties, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism.     

Do nuclear weapons affect the guns-butter trade-off? Evidence on nuclear substitution from Pakistan and beyond

Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. I contest this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, under-developed state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, I show Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir. More generally, I show nuclear substitution should happen only rarely: when a state is satisfied with the territorial status-quo, and its security challenges are amenable to pure nuclear deterrence. An empirical overview of conventional postures in Britain, China, France, India, Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States shows these conditions are met rarely, and never sustained. The argument has implications concerning the marginal welfare effects of nuclear weapons, the stability-instability paradox in South Asia and the standoff between Iran and the West.