Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960

In 1959–60, the French Army in Algeria achieved a major tactical and operational military success under the command of General Maurice Challe, in which the French destroyed half of the combat capability of the Algerian insurgency. Rather than adopting a population-centric, or “hearts and minds,” approach to coin, the French Army created an innovative method for military success based on the use of major combat operations against the military power of the insurgency. The success of major combat operations in Plan Challe is omitted or dismissed in most of the Algerian War historiography, which focuses instead on French pacification. An analysis of Plan Challe, however, provides lessons and examples for the conduct of a successful sustained counterguerrilla campaign, a coercive method seldom discussed in current debates over coin warfare.     

Can oil-reliant countries democratize? An assessment of the role of civil society in Algeria

A cursory look around the world shows that few oil-reliant countries can be categorized as democracies, particularly those in the Middle East. In fact, many studies have suggested that oil wealth hinders democratization. The recent “Arab Spring” and subsequent political instability in oil-producing states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria gives rise to questions regarding the prospects for democracy in these types of countries. This article provides an analysis of the possible role that civil society may play in democratization in oil-reliant states by looking at the case of Algeria. I argue that the seemingly meaningless and artificial acts of “liberalization” initiated by the Algerian government in the late 1980s, which initially allowed civic associations to form, have provided an opening for some civic associations to organize and oppose the government. This process of liberalization, regardless of how empty it may have seemed at first, has “opened floodgates” that now cannot be closed. Thus, the recent protests in Algeria, and continued opposition to the government, can be seen as directly facilitated by the government's prior liberalization and opening of the system to civic associations.     

Expert intervention: knowledge,violence and identity during the Algerian crisis, 1997–1998

Civil wars and humanitarian intervention became two of the most dominant security concerns of the 1990s and Algeria was one of the many sites where these discourses were played out, especially during the wave of massacres that claimed the lives of hundreds (if not thousands) of Algerian civilians between mid-1997 and early 1998. The internationalization of the Algerian Civil War was driven as much by the horrific violence as by a lack of certainty as to the identity of those perpetrating the massacres. The indeterminacy of violence in Algeria provided the warrant for experts to fill the void. Yet interpretations of the violence in Algeria, coupled with the generic logics of intra-national armed conflicts and the use of international coercive force for the protection of human rights, produced divergent problematizations of the crisis. This paper thus examines the ways in which Algeria was, and often was not, produced as a civil war and a humanitarian crisis by expert and scholarly knowledge and practice. Through an analysis of the exclusionary effects of the dominant understandings of political violence in Algeria, we are able to understand the conceptual impasse that faced international action against the massacres.     

Associations and democracy in Algeria

What role does associational activism play in political life in the Middle East and North Africa? Have associations been largely co-opted, thus reinforcing authoritarian governance? Or are they part of drawn out democratization processes, emerging over the last two decades, exploding during the Arab Spring? Divergences in responses to these questions have been striking. From initial optimism about the potential of associations to contribute to democratization, much recent literature has been increasingly pessimistic, framing associations as part of the problem of failed political transformations. Algeria, in particular, despite minimal donor funding, has seen a surge in associations over the last 20 years. Yet, these 93,000 new associations have come under scrutiny. Building on extensive fieldwork, this article explores Algerian associations at grass-roots level, after the decade of violence in the 1990s. It analyses how associations challenged the state during the Arab Spring, how they question historical state narratives and challenge government policies. Despite political and structural obstacles, it is found that Algerian civic associations do not inhibit democratic society, indeed they enable it, not necessarily as transformative actors, but as meaningful democratic agents pushing for reform.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

‘Energising’ EU–Algerian Relations

With Algeria still self-excluded from the ENP, unconvinced by the UfM and indeed now seriously questioning the added value of the Association Agreement, EU–Algerian relations could not be at a lower point. Interaction within the EMP has conspicuously failed to lead to a meaningful convergence of the dyad's interests, even if it has encouraged a process of familiarisation of sorts between actors on both sides. Although energy has traditionally been the area where EU–Algerian relations are strongest, reflecting their market-rooted interdependence, it remains frustratingly under-institutionalised at the bilateral level. The conclusion of a ‘strategic energy partnership’ could help overcome the extant sterility of EU–Algerian relations, capturing the specificity of their shared interests and focusing minds on tailored ‘enhanced bilateralism’.     

Stalled democratization of an authoritarian regime: The case of Algeria

Algeria has experienced important transformations since the bloody riots of October 1988. Numerous political reforms have been initiated, due to the pressure exerted by an emerging civil society; also the regime has been subject to fragmentation, thus exacerbating the power struggle among various political clans. The now‐banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), emerging as the most powerful party, eclipsed the old ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). Algerian society today is completely polarized while the intensification of violence since the interruption of the political process, in January 1992, has prolonged the political stalemate. This article deals with the reasons why the authoritarian rulers initiated a process of democratization in the first place: the principal political reforms; the contending parties in the political arena; the reasons for the initial popularity of the FIS and the tactics used by factions of the FLN‐State to prolong the life of the old regime. Also the role of the military in the democratization process and its attitude towards the Islamists; the reasons for the failure of the process; and the nature of the current impasse. This study highlights the difficulty of modernizing a neo‐patrimonial society where the influence of religion is dominant, which has little or no democratic tradition, and where clientelism is all‐pervasive. Our thesis is that democratization failed mainly because it was initiated in an undemocratic manner ‐ and in the absence of prior (negotiated) agreement on the basic rules of the political (and electoral) game.     

暴力方式与民心向背：寻找治理族群叛乱的条件组合

治理族群叛乱的目标既包括土地的控制，也包括人的控制，这是治理族群叛乱区别于其他形式叛乱的特点之一。人的控制实际包含两个内容，既包括人心向背，也包括人员数量的控制。人心向背关乎民众支持，而争取民众支持的必要性在于，虽然拥有民众支持并不必然导致叛乱的平息，但是没有民众支持是不能平息叛乱的。在族群叛乱已经发生的情况下，国家政府只有赢得更多当地民众的支持，才能成功治理叛乱。根据冲突各方的暴力行为方式及其对当地民众支持的影响，成功平息叛乱应具备国家政府有区别使用暴力、叛乱组织无区别使用暴力、当地温和派主导平叛行动等三个必要条件，以争取更多民众支持。这三个条件构成的条件组合，可以有效控制和减少叛乱组织能够招募到的人员数量，只要国家政府的平叛战略能够有效控制叛乱组织所招募的叛乱人员数量，叛乱组织就将走向衰败并最终消亡，也就是说这一条件组合能够成为国家政府成功平叛的一个充分条件。通过对结合俄罗斯、印度和西班牙等国家治理族群叛乱的经验和教训的分析，进一步证实了以上观点。     

The Urban Environment and its Influences on Insurgent Campaigns

For a long time, insurgency was a rural affair. The growing modernization of the modern world, however, shifts conflicts to the cities and requires us to explore the logics of armed struggle in urban environments. This article explores how the urban environment shapes armed conflicts, and argues that insurgents face severe practical constraints when acting in the cities. The urban environment offers the insurgents alternative ways of financing and of operating while close state control impedes them in pursuing a classic strategy of insurgency. Although state control cannot prevent attacks as such, it particularly hampers insurgents in relating to the population and organizing opposition. However, without massive and active support, armed struggle will remain sectarian and, thus, fail to achieve major political changes. This article argues that urban insurgents face a paradoxical relationship with society. While urban insurgents become independent of social support on an operational level, they depend more than ever on spontaneous massive and active social support on a strategic level.     

Amnesty,peace and reconciliation in Algeria

Amnesties constitute the most contentious issue in transitional justice processes. While largely rejected for contravening international law and being morally objectionable, political realities may sometimes force us to accept them in the interest of peace and stability. Determinations about the desirability and effectiveness of amnesties to promote peace thus need to look beyond legalistic claims, and take into account the specific political context within a country, as well as the nature of the amnesty itself. Taking the case of Algeria, where an amnesty was adopted in 2005 with the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, this article argues that although the amnesty can be justified partially by the fragile political context in Algeria and may contribute to reducing levels of violence in the country, its effective contribution to peace and reconciliation will be limited because it has, so far, not been accompanied by other political and economic measures necessary to bring peace and stability to the country, and because it promotes amnesia and largely ignores the plight of the victims of the war.     

Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments

The on-going Kashmir conflict has metamorphosed into a formidable insurgency that has attracted extremist groups fromPakistan and elements of Al-Qaeda. Given Al-Qaeda's modus operandi as an international network based on already existing domestic extremist groups, this article argues for the resolution of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict as an avenue for shrinking the constituency of both Kashmiri domestic extremist groups and, by extension, that of Al-Qaeda's. Feasible options for resolutions are analyzed and an alternative proposition is suggested. An unresolved, or inadequately resolved, conflict is expected to lead the Kashmiri insurgency on a trajectory directed at the Pakistani government, possibly leading to that country's fragmentation and the subsequent expansion of Al-Qaeda's operational base. It is thus argued that the resolution of the Kashmir conflict be viewed as an integral component of the broader U.S. ‘war on terrorism’ and should compromise of delicate American diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir.     

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict: Implications for democratization,internal peace and anti-American violence

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict has been based on the stringent assumption that a choice must be made between a secular government that is prowestern (although corrupt and repressive) and an Islamist regime that is anti-western (although equally repressive if allowed to govern). The article shows that this approach not only works to sustain authoritarianism in Algeria and reinforce a vicious cycle of poverry and civil violence, but also ignores the causal links between the practice of dictatorship in the country and the rise of anti-American violence. In this sense, America's foreign policy towards Algeria is a contributory factor to transnational terrorism. An alternative approach that is based on economic development and democracy promotion is proposed here to achieve sustainable democracy and internal peace in Algeria and weaken the forces that give rise to antiAmerican violence.     

The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate

The most striking aspect of the current scholarly debate over the political effectiveness of non-state violence is that, upon careful examination, there is not much of a debate to be found. Despite seemingly irreconcilable positions claiming that terrorism and insurgency “work” or “do not work,” varying case selection and thresholds for success lie at the root of these debates, not disagreements over the empirical record. Although this previously unrecognized empirical consensus helps to resolve existing disputes, it relies on single-level strategic frameworks that fail to capture the effectiveness of violence from the perspective of those who employ it. This article presents an alternative concept of political effectiveness based on a two-level framework that accounts for the fact that insurgencies are not unitary actors, but are instead marked by armed groups that pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements (such as the overthrow of a regime or the withdrawal of enemy troops), while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves (such as increasing membership or funding). Empirical analysis of eight paradigmatic campaigns common to studies of insurgency and terrorism across time and space reveals that the two-level framework better captures the political effectiveness of non-state violence than existing single-level models and primes the subfield for powerful new theories that explain greater variation in the use and effectiveness of non-state violence.     

同族群平叛优势理论再思考：以印度平息锡克叛乱为例

同族群优势主要包括当地环境、人力情报和民众动员等三个方面,各方都有机会去利用同族群优势,争取在少数族群叛乱与反叛乱斗争态势中的优势。政府平叛策略应强调发挥温和派的作用,从而在同族群因素方面削弱、抵消乃至胜过叛乱组织的相对优势。同族群平叛优势的作用机制在于控制人口和争夺民心两个方面,当政府控制足够多的当地人口时,叛乱组织就无法在族群内部招募到足够的人员,以补充在政府平叛行动中损失的成员;而拥有民众支持的意义则在于,虽然有了民众支持并不必然平息叛乱,但是没有民众支持是无法平息叛乱的,叛乱组织将一直具备持续甚至升级叛乱的民众基础。为了考察同族群平叛优势的效用,根据温和派是否具备相对于叛乱组织的实力优势和是否拥有平叛行动主导权,有四种不同策略下的平叛效果考察框架。结合印度政府治理和平息锡克叛乱各个阶段有代表性的平叛行动,详细解读印度政府、锡克叛乱组织和温和派在各阶段的策略选择,以及如何影响同族群优势的平叛效果。     

Gangsters or Gandhians? The Political Sociology of the Maoist Insurgency in India

This article combines concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to understand the nature of the Maoist insurgency in India. The first section argues that the insurgency should be conceptualized as a state building enterprise rather than organized crime. It demonstrates that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise – i.e., to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas – rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand how Maoist state builders undermine and fragment the Indian state’s monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate. In some areas the state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents at the local level in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.     

Weathering the storm: why was there no Arab uprising in Algeria?

This article re-opens the discussion of why there was “no Arab Uprising in Algeria.” After critically reviewing previous findings, the paper suggests that the stability of the Algerian regime was mainly a result of the non-formation of a cross-class and cross-ideological coalition. Splitting this hypothesis into its two main parts, it will be shown, first, that the working class was the missing element. Two factors explain this: (a) the numerical and strategic marginalization of productive workers – in turn, an effect of the process of de-industrialization that hit the country from the late 1980s onwards; and (b) the presence of an aristocracy of labour in the hydrocarbon sector, from which a tiny minority of workers produced an overwhelming amount of wealth. Secondly, the enduring distrust among opposition groups – a direct legacy of the still-too-recent civil war, as well as an effect of the specific institutional environment that developed from the mid 1990s onwards – prevented the establishment of a “negative coalition” through which all opposition forces could jointly mobilize against the regime.     

The evolution of authoritarian rule in Algeria: linkage versus organizational power

This article draws on the Algerian regimes of Chadli Benjedid and Abdelaziz Bouteflika to critically evaluate Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s dimension of linkage. The paper shows that, despite the intensification of the country’s ties to the European Union (EU) from one regime to the other, the willingness and ability of Brussels to put democratizing pressure on Algiers decreased rather than increased. This development challenges Levitsky and Way’s thesis and the importance they place on linkage in relation to their other dimensions of leverage and organizational power. The article concludes that: strengthening linkage does not always result in greater EU or Western democratizing pressure; the balance of importance Levitsky and Way strike between their dimensions is open to question; and, the EU has grown less willing to press for political change in Algeria.     

The Battle for Baghdad: Testing Hypotheses About Insurgency From Risk Heterogeneity,Repeat Victimization,and Denial Policing Approaches

The Iraqi Insurgency (2003–2011) has commonly been characterized as demonstrating the tendency for violence to cluster and diffuse at the local level. Recent research has demonstrated that insurgent attacks in Iraq cluster in time and space in a manner similar to that observed for the spread of a disease. The current study employs a variety of approaches common to the scientific study of criminal activities to advance our understanding of the correlates of observed patterns of the incidence and contagion of insurgent attacks. We hypothesize that the precise patterns will vary from one place to another, but that more attacks will occur in areas that are heavily populated, where coalition forces are active, and along road networks. To test these hypotheses, we use a fishnet to build a geographical model of Baghdad that disaggregates the city into more than 3000 grid cell locations. A number of logistic regression models with spatial and temporal lags are employed to explore patterns of local escalation and diffusion. These models demonstrate the validity of arguments under each of three models but suggest, overall, that risk heterogeneity arguments provide the most compelling and consistent account of the location of insurgency. In particular, the results demonstrate that violence is most likely at locations with greater population levels, higher density of roads, and military garrisons.     

Political violence in Algeria

It is estimated that over 20,000 people have died in civil conflict in Algeria since January, 1992, and no resolution is in sight. This article analyzes the current state of civil violence in Algeria in terms of a theory of collective rebellious behaviour stressing falsification of public preferences, adapted from the work of Timur Kuran. The theory links social and psychological factors to explain why the outcome of the political challenge mounted by radical Islamic groups has been stalemate rather than an Islamic revolution or the restoration of stable authoritarianism. It suggests that the outcome of the struggle in Algeria is unpredictable.