从六方会谈美朝态度变化探刮美对朝遏制政策

二战后期，美国一直对朝鲜实施遏制政策。第二次朝核危机爆发后，美朝利用六方会谈这一平台，开始进行接触。在六方会谈中，美朝态度逐渐趋向缓和，双方谈判频率加快，在朝鲜弃核、美解除对朝经济制裁以及将朝从支恐名单中去除等重大问题上互有让步。美国在东北亚地区的战略诉求等多种原因促成其态度变化。在可预见的将来，美国对朝鲜的遏制政策会有所松动，会实行以解决朝核问题为主导的低度紧张政策。     

朝美关系的现实与未来

近年来，美朝两国围绕朝鲜发展核武器问题进行了长期交涉，但直至目前，关于核框架协议的落实、朝鲜是否取消发射导弹等问题仍没有取得最终结果。由于朝美双方在处理当前的许多问题时大都采取了短期行为的方式，所以朝美关系的发展近期内仍难以出现突破性进展。     

从封锁到接触:奥巴马政府对朝“新政”

奥巴马政府推行对朝接触政策是美国全球战略调整的一部分,它是美国对朝敌视、封锁政策失败和朝核危机紧迫性增强的必然结果,美国朝鲜问题特使博斯沃思访朝表明奥巴马已经着手对朝新政策。美对朝接触政策的核心目标是解决朝鲜核和导弹问题,而缔结半岛永久和平协议替代停战协议以及实现朝美关系正常化只是实现全面和可核查的半岛无核化的手段。     

奥巴马政府对朝政策评析

作为一个以“伸手”外交著称的美国总统,奥巴马上任至今对朝鲜却一直采取围堵、施压为主的“战略忍耐”政策.究其原因,主要源于美认为朝鲜尚未挑战其核心利益,但美对朝缺乏信任,长期将朝视为敌人,同时希借朝核问题制约与接触中国.未来,只要这些核心条件不发生变化,美国就难以轻易改变对朝“战略忍耐”政策.美国大选结果将会影响美对朝政策.如希拉里·克林顿上台,美对朝“战略忍耐”将会持续;如特朗普上台,美整体战略则可能发生重大调整,地区军备竞赛可能性增大.     

美朝关系的转机与朝核问题

奥巴马政府上台以后对美国的全球战略做出全面调整,并加紧推进其"重返亚洲"的政策,已基本完成了以全面接触为特征的东亚战略布局.在美国战略重心东移的背景之下,奥巴马政府对朝政策也做了调整,而朝鲜新领导人金正恩主政后因国内政局的需要果断再续了与美国的对话,通过美朝高级别对话使双方关系突破僵局并达成了共识.但因美朝双方历史遗留问题较多,相互敌意很深,同时双方在履行协议过程中又不断出现新的"暗礁",因此从目前情况来看,美朝两国关系的改善能够走多远仍是一个未知数,朝鲜半岛无核化进程依然是艰难的课题.     

朝美核框架协议的来龙去脉

布什政府上台后,将朝鲜列为“邪恶轴心”国加以打压,随之两国关系恶化。近期来,随着朝美关系的紧张不断升级和朝鲜采取一连串激烈行动,如宣布退出不扩散核武器条约、解除核冻结、退出半岛无核协议等,人们对更为重要的朝美核框架协议最终是何种命运,不由得给予特别关注。 1994年的日内瓦核框架协议是美国与朝鲜在特殊背景下签订的一个特殊协议。其特殊之处在于框架协议得到国际社会广泛支持,但在美国内却受到各方尤其是国会的强烈质疑和反对。     

美国同意与朝直接对话背后的玄机

9月11日，美国对外宣布做好与朝鲜进行直接对话的准备。美国同意与朝鲜直接对话的原因在于：急于在外交方面寻找“新的突破口”；拖延无助于朝核问题的解决。但美国同意与朝鲜进行直接对话并不意味着美国对朝政策发生改变，美国不会轻易放弃六方会谈模式。此次美朝直接对话即使进行也难以达成具体的成果：实际上，奥巴马政府仍未做好与朝谈判的准备；朝核问题的复杂性使得达成成果绝非易事；对朝不满的民众意见将影响政府的对朝政策。     

朝鲜核危机的症结及走向

当前 ,朝鲜半岛核危机陷于僵局状态。朝鲜核问题长期未能解决 ,再度演变为核危机 ,症结在于朝鲜半岛安全结构转型进程中朝美战略相互冲突。冷战后朝鲜外交战略的核心是缔结朝美“和平协定” ,突破残存的冷战结构 ;而美国的对朝政策取决于其东亚战略的整体设计 ,旨在维持冷战安全结构 ,美日、美韩同盟和美在日韩驻军是其中关键。战略冲突决定朝美之间是零和关系 ,核危机是战略冲突的集中体现。双方力量的非对称性增加了发生战争的可能性。但战争的残酷性起着关键的制约作用 ,使双方不会轻易放弃达成妥协的微小机会。     

在利益与协调之间:朝核问题与中美关系

自 2 0世纪 90年代初第一次朝鲜核危机发生以来 ,中美之间围绕着朝核问题展开了越来越频繁的互动。这是一种既有竞争也有合作的关系。一开始 ,中国对美朝就核问题达成框架协议是“静观其成” ;在美朝双方僵持不下时中国出面斡旋 ,促成了“四方会谈”;当“四方会谈”陷入僵局时 ,中国便与周边利益相关国家一起促成了“六方会谈”。很大程度上 ,可控的朝核危机对于中美之间关于安全合作领域交流机制的形成具有积极意义。但同时 ,也必须认识到中美之间存在的战略层次上的矛盾     

调整中的美国对朝鲜政策

朝鲜问题是亚太地区影响最大的冷战遗留问题，是亚太安全形势中的最不确定因素。朝鲜问题在美国对亚洲政策中一直占据重要位置。１９９４年１０月美朝核框架协议签署后，美国放弃长期对朝封锁和孤立的遏制做法，实行软着陆政策，放宽对朝鲜的贸易和经济限制。美朝关系出现...     

朝核问题与东北亚安全合作框架前景

朝核问题已呈现长期化趋势 ,为在建立东北亚安全合作新框架方面抢得先机 ,美、日、韩等国相应做出政策调整。美国加大了“谈”、“压”的力度 ,但尚未将朝鲜作为战略打击的主要对象。日本对朝政策向右摇摆 ,并寻求在建立东北亚多边安全框架方面发挥独自影响。韩国努力增加美韩联盟的平等色彩 ,谋求在解决朝核问题中发挥主导性作用。抓住朝核问题 ,推动建立东北亚“多极”主导多边安全合作机制 ,中国可以大有作为     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

朝鲜核试爆与重开六方会谈

朝鲜核试爆是美朝新一轮较量的产物。朝鲜核危机的发展仍取决于美朝关系能否发生变化。重开六方会谈是相关各方的共同愿望,但取得实质性进展的可能很小。朝鲜将实际成为“拥核”国家,朝核危机长期化的可能性越来越大。六方会谈并不因为朝鲜核试爆而减弱其历史作用,它依然是解决朝核问题的最佳形式,也是各方为应对和消除朝鲜“拥核”而进行对话、沟通、协商的理想平台,并有可能进而成为实现朝鲜半岛和平机制和东北亚安全合作的合理载体。     

From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: nuclear impasse or diplomatic opportunity?

The recent death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un, as Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leaves the Northeast Asian region at a crossroads. Given the younger Kim’s lack of political experience, it is reasonable to believe that his priority will be on consolidation of his political and military power base in Pyongyang. More recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sent mixed signals with regard to its intentions. On the one hand, North Korea has agreed to a moratorium of its nuclear activities and has even invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities; at the same time, however, the DPRK has also announced its plan to launch a satellite in mid-April, using technology derived from the Taepodong missile. Set against this backdrop, we underline and comparatively assess the importance of the USA, the Republic of Korea, and China, all of which will be going through a political transition in 2012. We conclude that Seoul and Beijing are in the best position to reopen the process of dialogue with the DPRK.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy. ¹ 1. If no particular sources are mentioned, the facts of the case are based on reports of the printed editions of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times and The Wall-Street Journal and the on-line editions of the Los Angeles Times The Washington Post The Korea Herald The Korea Times, The People’s Korea and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)      

绑架问题与日朝关系

最近几年,由于日本和朝鲜在绑架日本人问题上严重对立,使得原本紧张的两国关系更是雪上加霜。日朝两国在绑架问题上坚持各自立场,最根本的分歧在于双方在政治、安全和战略利益方面的巨大差异。日本方面热炒绑架问题,可谓是一石两鸟。日本以防范"来自朝鲜的威胁"为由,不断强化日美同盟和增加军事实力,使军事能力在国家发展战略中的位置和作用不断提升。同时,绑架问题还是日方手中最为重要的筹码,在日朝关系正常化谈判中可以与朝方抗衡,甚至可以对冲朝方提出的"清算殖民统治的历史,进行赔偿"的要求,争取谈判主导权。     

朝鲜的核、导战略态势及其影响

朝鲜实施导弹发射和地下核试验,意在实现核拥有,籍以提高对美战略的筹码。朝鲜开展核战略角逐由来已久,先后展开过以守为攻;“边缘”对应;将计就计;以硬对强四个回合。角逐结果虽不乏战术上的小胜,却丧失了战略上的大胜。此番的导弹试射与地下核试验可视为第五个回合,是朝鲜核、导角逐战略“以攻为守”的转换。朝鲜执意实现核拥有纵有多种原因,却因核、导本身所拥有的“双刃剑”作用,带来于己、于他都不利的负面影响。包括:自食其言,愈加难以取信于国际社会;产生连锁反映,引发新一轮的军备竞赛;挑战核不扩散条约,难免遭到更大封杀;破坏合作气氛,延缓统一进程;置中国于尴尬境地,动摇中朝关系基础。朝鲜的“自行其事”难免遭到国际社会更加严厉的抵制。     

韩国在六方会谈中的多重平衡外交

朝核六方会谈对韩国的国家利益利害关系重大,韩国的应对策略也最为复杂和微妙。韩国既要顾及短期安全利益与长远民族利益之间的平衡,又要弥合国内政治力量之间的政策分歧,并竭力避免其对北政策与对美政策之间出现零和局面,同时还需兼顾联盟政策及其东北亚地缘战略之间的平衡,因此六方会谈事实上成为韩国实施多重平衡外交的一个重要契机。目前来看,这种复杂的平衡外交方针基本是成功的,然而其最终政策效果尚待进一步观察。     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.