The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal

During the 2016 United States presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to “renegotiate” the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The deal does not prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and in some ways actually makes it easier for Iran to go nuclear in the future. The mere continuation of the current deal could undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and its global non-proliferation policy. How then can the Donald Trump Administration work to renegotiate the deal? This analysis provides a strategy that the Trump Administration can follow to improve American policy toward Iran, namely do what Iran is doing to the United States: abide by the strict terms of the agreement, whilst competing in all of the ways not covered in the deal. From an American perspective, increasing pressure on Tehran will constrain Iran’s destabilising influence in the region. Over time, Washington can leverage the pressure to force Iran back to the table to strike a renegotiated agreement that eliminates, not just delays, the Iranian nuclear and missile threat.     

A Fine Balance: India Walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States

India confronts the conflicting imperatives of Indian domestic politics and its strategic interests when dealing with Iran. As India's global profile has risen in recent years and its ties with the United States have strengthened, this conflict has come into sharper relief. India's traditionally close ties with Iran have become a major factor influencing how certain sections of U.S. policymakers evaluate a U.S.-India partnership. India has tried to balance carefully its relations with Iran and the United States; however, due to intense American pressure, especially after the signing of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, India has moved closer to the United States concerning the Iranian nuclear program. But strong domestic constraints remain that will prevent India from completely abandoning its ties with Iran, even as a re-evaluation of India-Iran bilateral ties is long overdue.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

Why Does the United States Keep Helping Iran?

Since the Jimmy Carter administration, Iran has been America’s most consistent enemy. Strangely, however, the United States repeatedly helps its opponent. Following the 9/11 attacks, Washington aided Iran’s interests in six episodes: toppling the Taliban; overthrowing Saddam Hussein; suppressing the ISIS caliphate; backing the Saudi intervention in Yemen; withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, and assassinating the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Of course, Washington does not deliberately assist its opponent. Rather, the United States unintentionally helps Iran by creating power vacuums, into which Tehran steps, and triggering power surges, or coercive campaigns against Iran, which also tend to backfire and bond Iran more closely with third parties.     

Notes on Italian foreign politics

The relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran both shapes and is shaped by a new Middle Eastern “Cold War”. The United States and the Islamic Republic should transcend the prospects for hegemonial conflict or strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, along the lines of the realignment in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China that took place during President Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House. The article examines the imperatives for a comprehensive and strategic realignment of US–Iranian relations from the standpoint of Iranian interests and foreign policy concepts as well as from an American perspective. It also evaluates the actual prospects for US–Iranian rapprochement.     

“To Have a Friendly Co-Operation between Canadians and Americans": The Canada–United States Relationship Regarding German Prisoners of War, 1940–1945

This analysis focuses on the Canadian–American relationship during the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1946, both Allies held over 400,000 German prisoners of war [POWs] in hundreds of camps spread across their territory. The presence of these “Hitler’s soldiers” on the North American continent quickly became an issue of close collaboration between the two Powers. Exploring the complex intra-Allied negotiations and collaboration via the Canada–United States exchanges on German POWs, this exegesis challenges the general argument that as a middle Power, Canada found exclusion from Allied policy-making on POWs. Although differences existed between the two detention systems, Canadian and American policy-makers consistently viewed the war captivity as an intra-Allied object of concern. They exchanged security information, shared their experience, and organised visits in camps. This collaboration indicates that Ottawa played a pivotal role in German POW captivity.     

Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas

Numerous analysts have criticized George W. Bush's Middle Eastern policies for their strong ideological content. This article agrees with a core premise of these critiques, but it does so for very different reasons from most analyses. Ideological rigidity on some issues, paradoxically, prevented the Bush administration from taking advantage of the full range of ways in which ideologies shape international relations. There were three major opportunities to advance US interests in the Middle East during Bush's presidency that were created by the effects of ideologies. First, liberalizing parties in otherwise illiberal regimes tended to be significantly more supportive of US interests than other ideological groups in the same country at the same time. Second, major ideological differences among different types of illiberal enemies of the United States enhanced America's ability to adopt “wedge” strategies toward various hostile coalitions. Finally, the existence of different types of ideological enemies in the Middle East created incentives for some illiberals to align with the United States because of mutual ideological enmity for a third ideological group. The Bush administration, however, failed at key times to take advantage of these openings. If Bush administration officials had been less ideologically dogmatic while, somewhat paradoxically, making better strategic use of ideologies’ major international effects, America's security would have been significantly advanced in critical cases.     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

The convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran

Between 1996 and 2012, cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on Iran sanctions underwent a dramatic shift from open disagreement to almost unanimous consensus. Whereas the US preferred negative sanctions throughout this period, the EU opted at first for using economic incentives and dialogue. The EU’s diverging approach exemplified the overall preference for multilateralism and engagement strategies over unilateral coercive measures. Beginning in 2005, however, European sanction policy towards Iran converged with that of the US. In this article, I argue that the convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran cannot be understood without the pressure employed by Washington. The US pressure campaign consisted of secondary sanctions against European companies. As necessary condition, US pressure has been a key external factor that complemented the EU’s internal developments fostering a more coercive approach towards Tehran after the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 and the breakdown of the E3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) negotiations in 2005.     

The United States–EURATOM Agreement of 1958: The Cold War Impact

Drawing on declassified sources, this analysis examines how the Cold War influenced United States policy towards the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM]. In the 1950s, “the peaceful atom” became a crucial sector of the Cold War. To maintain American nuclear leadership, the Dwight Eisenhower Administration invited Western Europeans to enter into an active collaboration with the United States on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States encouraged the creation of EURATOM by promising that the Community would obtain more assistance in the nuclear field than any individual state. The Soviet launch of Sputnik provided additional impetus to the signing of the United States–EURATOM agreement, having strengthened American interest in a joint programme with EURATOM that would bring together American and Western European scientific and technical resources to counter the Soviet Union. The exegesis contributes to recent studies on the interaction between the Cold War and European integration.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

海洋话语与国际秩序转变

国际关系的演进表明,海洋话语转变是国际秩序转变的重要风向标。文章对海洋话语进行了概念分析,并将其细分成海洋硬话语与海洋软话语,明确其包涵因素和互动关系。战争、谈判、国际会议、条约及协定等是国家争取战略主导权、在国际权力格局中占据优势的重要手段,可作为海洋话语与国际秩序之间的互动机理。海洋话语与国际秩序转变主要经历了欧洲主导时期和美国主导时期,且美国主导时期延续至今。在“百年未有之大变局”时代,海洋世界多极化趋势显著,海陆联动明显,“泛海洋时代”到来;海洋话语的话语主体、结构设计、海缘范畴及议题领域等均在经历多维嬗变,国际海洋新秩序建构的可能性和必要性在不断提升。中国需把握好角色定位与策略选择,优化中国海洋战略,树立新海洋安全观,踏实构建海洋话语,在国际海洋新秩序的构建中发挥积极引领作用。     

日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

Project Plowshare versus the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

In 1957, representatives from the United States Atomic Energy Commission, the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, and other centres involved in nuclear research established Project Plowshare, a programme to apply the atom to what they called “peaceful nuclear explosions.” Although those involved in Plowshare proposed a variety of projects, they devoted most of their resources to the construction of a sea-level isthmian canal that would replace the existing Panama Canal. Turning that proposal into reality, however, ran into numerous roadblocks, amongst them the 1968 Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By 1970, the canal project had collapsed, and not long thereafter, Plowshare itself came to an end. But one desire of Plowshare scientists, that of creating “clean” nuclear explosives, may be in the offing. If developed, such devices could pose a threat to the existing non-proliferation regime.     

美俄印欧的欧亚地缘战略对“一带一路”建设的影响

“一带一路”建设是中国以新兴发展中大国的姿态建设性参与全球秩序重塑的过程。在此过程中,“一带一路”与既定地缘政治格局中某些国家的利益和战略之间存在一定程度的冲突和博弈。为此,本研究试图从“一带一路”与美俄印欧版“一带一路”之间的互动关系中,考察美俄印欧基于各自地缘政治经济利益而制定的地缘战略,以及客观上所形成的地缘挑战,提出中国的应对举措。本文认为,源自于特朗普弱化美国国际领导责任的地缘战略,“C5+1机制”对“一带一路”并不具有反制的地缘战略效果;中俄互信固然达到了前所未有的高度,然则受地缘政治变化带来的地缘战略不定性的影响,不可忽视欧亚经济联盟与“一带一路”之间存在地缘利益失衡的潜在风险;印度“印太构想”等互联互通战略和“大国梦想”背后的地缘战略考量,势必削弱“战略对接”在人们预想中的相关积极功能;欧版“一带一路”反映出欧盟试图通过所谓的“可持续”亚欧联通战略提升在亚欧大陆话语权的地缘战略考虑,但其内部的认知分歧,使其无法摆脱中国对其“分而治之”的疑虑。     

U.S.–Iran Nuclear Track Two from 2005 to 2011: What Have We Learned? Where Are We Going?

This article reviews and assesses United States–Iran track two diplomacy over the nuclear issue from 2005 to 2011. It asks why during what should have been a “ripe” moment for discussions, in the first years of the Obama Administration, track two processes were able to contribute so little to any official progress on the issue. The article concludes that the moment was not so ripe, after all, and that officials on each side were less willing to receive the ideas generated by track two than their rhetoric would have indicated.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.