Unfinished business: The united states and Franco's Spain, 1944–47

‘Unfinished Business’ examines American and British postwar policy toward the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain. Although the emergence of the cold war eventually altered that policy from one of strenuous opposition to one of grudging acceptance, the continuing desire of the Western allies to alter or remove the Franco regime illustrates the persistent influence of anti‐fascism after World War II. In retrospect, the eventual alignment of Franco with the West seems a foregone conclusion, but in the fluid context of the years immediately after World War II policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to determine their interests in a world no longer defined by the war and not yet in the grip of the cold war.     

印(尼)马对抗时期美英的外交矛盾与协调

印(尼)马对抗问题背后所体现的美国冷战政策与英国非殖民化政策,是影响战后东南亚政治发展的两大要因。美国为防止印尼倒向共产主义阵营,防止印支问题复杂化,极力回避美英特殊关系及《澳新美安全条约》所要求的军事援助义务,力主对苏加诺奉行和缓政策。而英国为维持既得利益,防止澳新偏离英联邦外交轨道,一方面通过《英马防务与互助协定》、《澳新马防务协定》加强对印尼军事防御,另一方面则力图联合美国共同承担战争责任,压制苏加诺接受马来西亚联邦。为此,美英两国在对印尼政策上不断采取外交协调,但在印尼九·三○事件发生前美英关系中的矛盾性始终无法调和,为此美国又联合日本共同实施对印尼援助政策,由此逐步降低英国在东南亚政治发展中的影响力。印(尼)马对抗时期美英的外交矛盾与协调在一定程度上反映出亚洲冷战发展中大国政治关系的分化与重组。     

Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

American foreign policy analysts have generally viewed World War II as the most important of the six wars the country fought in the twentieth century. By entering this war, so the argument goes, the United States prevented the gravest geopolitical threat to its security—German and Japanese hegemonies in Eurasia—from materializing. Careful reexamination of the best case for U.S. entry into World War II, made by Nicholas Spykman in 1942, demonstrates that the traditional view is misplaced: the United States could have remained secure over the long term had it not entered the war and had it allowed Germany and Japan to win. Its standard of living and its way of life, however, would most likely have suffered. Avoidance of those two outcomes was the real reason to have entered the war. The implications of this analysis for balance of power theory and current American grand strategy are spelled out.     

Early American Views Regarding European Unification

This article examines the origins of US foreign economic policy in the post-1945 period and the major challenges posed to US policy by European economic integration and the establishment of a multilateral trade regime. US post-war economic planning began in the early stages of World War II. The US promoted bilateral trade agreements based on reciprocity and most-favoured-nation principles. During the war, US policy makers debated the merits of various plans to provide economic and financial assistance to Europe based on the assumption that Nazi Germany would be defeated. The plans for economic reconstruction of Europe were made under the premise that US economy would benefit from the creation of export markets in Europe. However, US policy makers were also concerned that the creation of a unified European market could potentially constitute a challenge to US economic hegemony and perhaps a political threat should Europe fall under another tyrannical regime. US policy therefore pursued twin tracks: it promoted economic reconstruction and integration in Europe; at the same time, it facilitated the establishment of an international trading regime that would promote principles of liberalised trade, support US economic growth and contribute to the development of a free enterprise capitalist trading system. This article illustrates that US economic planners in the 1940s were aware of the benefits and risks of European economic integration, seeking to balance European economic reconstruction with the establishment of a robust multilateral trading system.     

Limiting America's Engagement: Roger Hilsman's Vietnam War, 1961–1963

This article examines the role of Roger Hilsman, an important State Department official in the Kennedy administration, in the formulation of American policy towards the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1963. Hilsman was one of the leading opponents of a conventional military escalation of the war in Vietnam, frequently clashing with the Pentagon and the American military establishment in order to limit United States' engagement. Hilsman was convinced that “victory” in Vietnam was possible if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. This perception was forged by his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in World War II. Perceived to be one of the main architects of the coup against President Diem in 1963, and vilified by elements in the United States military, he was removed from office by President Johnson early in 1964.     

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse).     

Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960

This article argues that the Franco–American antagonism of the 1960s, which culminated with France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, stems from French president Charles de Gaulle's decision in the aftermath of the failed May 1960 Paris Summit to radically redirect French foreign policy away from its post-World War Two Atlantic orientation to a more European one. By linking the failed summit to de Gaulle's new perception of the Cold War, this article moves de Gaulle scholarship away from interpretations of his foreign policy as the product of anti-Americanism or an anachronistic vision of French power to an understanding rooted in his recognition that the changing dynamics of the Cold War required the Western Europeans to reduce their military dependence on the United States. Since American leaders would never willingly relinquish their dominant position in European security affairs, de Gaulle's new design almost ensured a rising Franco–American tension.     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict

The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to defy rationalist explanations. This paper contends that the escalation of the war, from an isolated border clash to the largest conventional war of the past decade, has its roots in the domestic politics of each of the two states. Quasi-democratisation in both countries created environments in which political elites were able to bolster their popular legitimacy by utilising nationalist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric. The Eritrean leadership believed that a rapid escalation of the border clash to full-scale war would undermine domestic popular support and topple the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. War escalation had the opposite effect, strengthening the EPRDF domestically and provoking a massive Ethiopian retaliation. War thus served nation- and state-building goals in both countries. This paper provides a theory of the domestic political roots of international conflict in transitional regimes and applies this theory to explain the escalation of a localised border conflict into a highly destructive, full-scale war.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907–20

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures

"Streetcar" interpretations of world politics emphasize the significance of contingent catalysts vis-a(c)-vis structural variables and multiple, nonlinear chains of causation, among other things. Ultimately, though, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of catalysts in the absence of systematic data on war precipitants that would allow one to compare the effects of catalysts and other factors. More concrete but under conceptualized is the explanatory payoff associated with examining nonlinear interactions among multiple rivalries in bringing about wars that spread more widely than anticipated. World War I is a good case in point. A very large number of interstate rivalries contributed in various ways and over a number of years to the outbreak of a world war that no one sought precisely in the way in which it emerged. Focusing on the structure of their interactions also facilitates the synthesis of a number of alternative interpretations of why World War I began. Examining the effects of interconnected and "ripe" rivalry fields in other major power war contexts should prove to be equally beneficial.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.     

The Rise of Policy Institutes in the United States, 1943-1971

In the period after World War II, an eclectic assortment of scholars, policymakers, and managers presided over the creation of academic centers for the study of war. This article examines the intellectual and administrative assumptions of many of these actors. Made up of academic scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, and economics, they advanced a vision based on what might be called “instrumentalist-positivist social science,” but in appeals to donors they employed basic scientific language.¹     

Managing Asylum and European Integration: Expanding Spheres of Exclusion?

During the last decade, thhe European Union intensified its efforts to define its external borders in conjunction with its efforts to evolve into a coherent, frontier-free political territory. European policy-makers slowly shaped new norms and rules pertaining to asylum, with increasingly stronger mechanisms to enforce the policy decisions. In the case of asylum and refugee protection, Europe's efforts are nested in the broad global institutional framework negotiated through and carried out by international organizations. However, these developments raise the specter of deteriorating refugee protection in Europe and beyond. This article reviews the norms and rules on which the post–World War II refugee protection regime rests and then points to the recent developments in refugee protection in Europe, which might undermine the goals of the global refugee protection.     

论斯大林在东欧推行的联合政府政策(1944—1948)

第二次世界大战结束前后,为维护通过战争获取的胜利果实,斯大林奉行大国合作战略。在围绕被解放欧洲国家未来命运问题的一系列国际会议上,斯大林以许诺"自由选举"换取了英美对苏联提出的"联合政府"建议的赞同。反法西斯大国合作是联合政府体制存在外部条件,在当时的历史条件下,斯大林把人民民主制度看成是长期的当时还未用尽其积极潜力的模式。