国家能力与国内冲突的复发

国家(汲取)能力对国内冲突复发的影响是非线性的和条件性的。这个关系受到方向相反的三个机制的影响:从长远来看,国家能力的提高会增加反叛者军事挑战政府的难度和机会成本;但在短期内,强化汲取能力的努力会增加纳税人的经济负担,导致他们对政府的怨恨和对潜在反叛者的同情;大量增加税收会降低国家和平承诺的可信度,危及冲突后的和平局面。作者通过大样本统计分析证实了这一基本假设。经验检验还发现国家能力对冲突复发的影响基本上是一个国内政治过程。前一轮冲突结果对之的影响尤其强烈。相反,国际维持和平行动和外来援助不仅无助于巩固国家能力对和平的积极作用,反而可能抑制国家能力独立的积极影响。     

“冲突陷阱”研究述评

国内"冲突陷阱"的影响因素大体分为四种类型:一是冲突性质,主要由族群、领土争端和意识形态等来判定;二是冲突历史,指前一(几)轮战争的结果、持续的时间、伤亡人数等;三是冲突解决方式,常用解释变量包括协商解决和以维和行动、第三方监督为主的国际干预;四是战后的发展,涉及政治和经济—社会两个方面,前者主要指民主化、权力分享、领土分裂、军事重建和转型正义;后者则集中于经济增长和妇女参与。从内容上看,现有研究存在的不足和拓展空间主要有六个:一、混淆了冲突复发和冲突扩散在概念和经验上的区别,削弱了关于冲突复发知识增长的质量;二、掐断了冲突发生和复发的联系;三、需要大力扩展关于"冲突陷阱"形成的"机制"分析;四、建立解释"冲突陷阱"形成的统一模型;五、对于社会的和平建设作用探讨不足;六、严重缺乏对"积极和平"的探讨。     

国际战争与国内族群政治——伊拉克库尔德人运动的历时比较研究

以往对族群冲突的国际维度研究忽视了国际战争对国内族群政治产生的影响,因而对库尔德人运动这类深受国际政治和国际战争影响的案例难以给出令人信服的解释。鉴于此,本文提出了一个新的理论分析框架以弥补这一不足。该理论分析框架认为:国际战争将导致母国对内控制力下降、国内少数族群政治诉求更为激进、敌国干预族群政治的动机上升,进而增大族群冲突爆发和升级的可能;这一因果机制受到了敌国的干预能力、少数族群的战略价值、少数族群的动员能力以及少数族群的动员意愿等四类因素的调控。通过对比分析伊拉克在1946-2000年间经历的六次国际战争对其境内库尔德人运动的影响,本文验证了该理论分析框架的解释力。     

国际秩序转型与族群冲突研究

大国竞争和大国实力的变化是国际秩序转型的主要变量,它们影响着族群冲突。大国实力下降造成国内统治力减弱,届时国内各族群为争取权力而进行族群动员,引发族群冲突;同时大国实力下降会收缩其在国际控制范围,进而出现权力真空,由此引发族群对于权力的竞争和冲突。大国间竞争也会引发族群冲突。大国在某一地区或国家的经济竞争会引起族群间的收入不平等,进而引发或加剧族群间的竞争和冲突;大国在政治上的竞争,尤其在地缘政治上的争夺会引发族群冲突;大国在意识形态上的竞争为族群竞争提供思想支持。数据显示,1946-2015年间的族群冲突与苏联和美国的实力变化存在一定的趋势匹配。当美苏之间实力变化不大、竞争缓和时,族群冲突也相对减少;当两国之间实力起伏较大、竞争加剧时,族群冲突便有增长趋势,特别是苏联解体后,权力由苏联转向美国的几年,族群冲突异常激烈。1961-1991伊拉克库尔德人族群运动与苏美间的竞争息息相关,苏联通过支持伊拉克,以获得其在中东地区的影响力。美国为了减少苏联在海湾地区的影响力,确保丰富廉价的石油供应,唆使库尔德人反对伊拉克,并利用伊朗和伊拉克边界争端,通过支持伊朗来制衡伊拉克,进而削弱伊拉克,以确保其在该地区的影响力。正是美苏对该地区石油、地缘战略和意识形态阵地的争夺,让该地区复杂的族群、宗教矛盾成为它们全球争霸的工具,加之库尔德人自身的诉求,最终酿成长达三十多年的族群冲突。     

论国际政治与国内政治的非对称结构对族群冲突的影响：一种结构与认知的互动角度

在国际秩序转型与大国战略竞争加剧的背景下，非对称国际关系持续构成民族国家进行国族塑造与政权建设的外部结构性压力。由族群问题引发的国际与国内冲突日益频繁，从国际政治中的等级现象着手理解族群武装冲突是一个重要的研究路径。国际体系中非主导国与主导国所形成的国际非对称结构会导致非主导国国内非对称结构的极化、重构或紊乱，由此构成不同类型的双重非对称结构。双重非对称结构是解释不同非主导国族群武装冲突呈现差异的关键变量。菲律宾、尼日利亚和土耳其三国族群武装冲突的案例显示，双重非对称结构重塑了非主导国及主体族群原先对少数族群的负面认知并使其呈现低等化、对立化、极端化与安全泛化，进而使非主导国族群武装冲突呈现差异化演进趋势。国际非对称结构也可能会直接激化非主导国的族群武装冲突或对其冲突烈度形成控制。而少数族群内部政治结构则会对上述传导机制起到催化/缓冲、加强/抑制的作用。发展中国家的族群武装冲突将呈现怎样的发展趋势仍有待深入研究。     

索马里冲突的根源与解决途径探析

1991年以来,索马里一直处于部族纷争、军阀混战的无政府状态。经过15年的演变,索马里局势目前发展到了过渡政府和伊斯兰法院联盟对峙的阶段。族群分裂是导致索马里冲突久拖不决的内因;国际危机管理失效、大国干预失当,以及邻国干涉等因素是外因。解决索马里冲突是一项需要多边参与的系统工程。索马里和平进程的关键是从国内入手,通过培育超部族政治力量,实现民族和解。同时,适当的国际治理措施亦有助于解决冲突。     

当代国际冲突中的宗教因素

宗教文化的对立与冲突是冷战后国际和地区冲突的焦点之一 ,具体表现为宗教因素引发民族冲突与地区冲突 ,以及宗教极端主义与国际恐怖主义的结合破坏世界和平。但是 ,宗教冲突决非纯粹的宗教战争 ,宗教冲突的真正根源在于政治与经济之间的矛盾运动 ,在于各种政治集团和社会力量围绕利益问题所做的争夺。注重宗教因素与国际冲突的关联 ,客观分析其间的互动规律 ,并由此制定相应的文化策略 ,应该成为国际问题研究和宗教问题研究的共识     

欧盟在巴以冲突中的外交政策

欧盟主张依靠国际合作机制 ,以和平手段解决国际争端 ,目的在于获取更多的有利于自身发展的政治资源和经济利益。在对待巴以冲突问题上 ,欧盟的外交政策主要表现在 :与巴、以两方关系由经济领域向政治领域拓展 ;强调依靠国际合作机制 ,通过合作与对话解决争端。欧盟在巴以冲突中的外交政策为其赢得了较好的国际声誉。欧盟希望靠自身强大的经济实力、共同的外交路线和独立的防务能力 ,努力实现它“说话算数”的世界一极的目标。     

美欧冲突及其启示

美国与法国、德国在最近的伊拉克战争问题上发生了严重冲突。伊战虽已结束,但这种冲突并未消除。美欧冲突的根源与核心不是相互政治文化差异和经济利益争夺,而是其战略安全利益的歧异。只要美国坚持和强化基于独超强势地位的单边主义政策,美欧之间的矛盾和冲突就不会止息,且可能进一步上升与发展。这对美国的全球战略、美欧联盟和整个大国关系势必产生深远影响。美欧冲突的深刻启示是:国际政治的根本驱动力不是经济利益,而是政治战略利益;大国之间的根本矛盾是政治权力之争;一个国家的经济力量不会自动转化为军事力量,更不能替代军事力量;美欧的矛盾冲突不会形成全面对抗,但也具有一定的不可调和性质。     

中越和平政治经济学与和平的制度保障

本文采用政治经济学的分析方法，文中的政治，具体来说，就是提供公众所需要的物品与服务，即公共物品与服务。文中的经济指的是经济学的分析方法，其核心就是成本——收益分析方法。其前提假定是经济人假设。所谓经济人假设，就是假设人在面临选择时，都会追求自己的最大利益，即权衡利益得失，采取一种对自己最有利的行动方案。而在国际关系中，具体的国家也和个人一样，会尽可能少地承担公共物品的费用，尽可能多地从公共物品中获得收益。在国际关系中，国家间的和平、地区的安全、国家间的经济合作安排都是一种公共物品.     

Strategies,capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts

The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945–1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century.     

Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity

This research note examines how domestic institutions can moderate the relationship between domestic and interstate conflict involvement. Previous work has found that military dictatorships are more likely to become involved in either domestic or international conflicts, compared to party-based autocracies. We argue that the same institutional explanations for why military autocracies are more conflict-prone also make them less capable of successfully carrying out multiple conflicts at the same time. Analyzing interstate and domestic conflict involvement on a sample of dictatorships over the period 1947–2004, we show that military autocracies dealing with internal armed conflict are less likely than their nonmilitary counterparts to become involved in an international conflict.     

Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries

Enduring rivalries represent the most difficult challenges for policy makers seeking to promote international peace and security. Once in place, enduring rivalries account for a disproportionate number of crises, militarized disputes, as well as wars, and include conflicts that are more likely to escalate than those falling in other conflict contexts. Unfortunately, we know very little about conflict management in enduring rivalries from either a theoretical or policy perspective. This study seeks to account for why some rivalries are successfully managed while others persist at high and unabated levels of conflict In addressing these concerns, we explore 35 enduring rivalries over the period 1945–1992. We find that although enduring rivalries are quite resistant to influences that produce changes in their dynamics, both endogenous and contextual influences can exercise a significant impact upon the prospects for conflict management between enduring rivals.     

Arab national security in the 1980's. Threats and strategies

Scholars increasingly are accepting the empirical generalization that democracies almost never go to war with each other, and infrequently even engage in militarized disputes with each other. It has not been clear, however, whether the rarity of conflict between democracies is caused by some aspect of being democratic, or whether it is caused by some other variable or variables that may be correlated with democracy. Using data on all independent states for the period 1946–1986, we examine the effects of political system type, distance, wealth, economic growth, alliances, and political stability. The results suggest that, although most of the other variables do have an effect, as hypothesized, there still seems to be an independent effect of political system type: democracies engage in militarized disputes with each other less than would be expected by chance. The effect may be enhanced by political stability; that is, states which can be perceived as stable democracies are less likely to be involved in disputes with other democracies.     

Struggling in the Street and at the Table

Two scholar practitioners of conflict intervention and social movements present case histories of mediated conflicts involving complex choreographies of contention and negotiation. Both processes, while differently structured and facilitated, have led to improvements in the dynamics of identity‐based conflicts in urban communities. The authors raise theoretical questions and propose improvements to practice.     

The G7, International Terrorism and Domestic Politics: Modeling Policy Cohesion in Response to Systemic Disturbance

This work probes the variability in G7 cohesion in response to relatively new disturbances in the international system. Using a domestic politics model, we argue that G7 cohesion weakens in the face of international terrorism in the context of variable domestic consequences to common foreign policy responses to this systemic disturbance. We compare the predictions from our model with predictions stemming from neorealist and liberal/institutionalist explanations. We find that, consistent with the domestic politics explanation, G7 foreign policy cohesion declines as internal terrorism increases.     

Means,Motives and Opportunities in Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization

Building on the most important theoretical tools from the literatures on social movements and nationalism, we propose a model of the intensity of nationalist political behavior in which a community's means, motives, and opportunities assume the central roles in the initiation and escalation of nationalist contentious politics. We then test this model using multinomial logit on original data from the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain over a twenty-year period. The results demonstrate that the means, motives, and opportunities assume vital, yet nonlinear, roles in determining a community's level of electoral, violent, and nonviolent contentious activity. The findings also show that there are crucial differences in what accounts for the moves to electoral contention, to protest, and to rebellion. Several of these factors are uniformly escalatory on the intensity of contention—especially repression, social mobilization, and regime change—while others, most importantly democracy, have a moderating effect on the generation of conflict. The results further imply processes of a diffusion of rebellious activities and of an organizational-level substitution effect between violent and nonviolent forms of political behavior. At the aggregate community level, however, escalation in contention involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a classic “substitution effect.”     

Dimensions of Chinese foreign conflict and cooperation: A research note

Key mediation attributes, such as mediating actors, the strategy they choose, and previous mediation experiences, are widely thought to influence the nature of a conflict management outcome. But how and when these features shape outcomes is not a straightforward matter, and a standard analysis of these factors does not lead to their widely anticipated results. Why? We develop a new analytical framework that argues that a dispute's intensity alters the conflict management processes. Furthermore, in order to observe this variation, we also need to expand the traditional, dichotomous notion of conflict management outcomes (success or failure) to include a fuller range of observed results. Using the most recent International Conflict Management data set and our new analytical framework, we analyze the effect on conflict management outcome of mediator (a) identity, (b) strategy and (c) history. We find that directive strategies and international mediators are effective in resolving high intensity conflicts, procedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in resolving low intensity conflicts, and that mediation history always affects resolution. Our results have implications for both the study and practice of international dispute mediation.     

The Effects of Perceived Procedural Justice on Conflict Management between Spouses,and the Mediating Role of Dyadic Adjustment

In this study, we examined the role that perceived procedural justice (PPJ) plays in the conflict management behaviors that intimate spouses adopt and endorse. In this context, PPJ has been defined as the degree to which one perceives that his or her spouse makes decisions fairly, considerately, and in a participatory manner. To test the impact of perceived procedural justice on conflict resolution behavior, we applied the dual‐concern model of conflict management style. In an experiment in which participants read fictional scenarios and predicted spouses’ responses, we found that perceptions of strong PPJ enhanced the prediction of integrating (problem solving), compromising, and, to a lesser degree, obliging behavior. Perceived procedural justice also caused a reduction in avoidance behavior, but no effect we found on dominating (competing) behavior. In a following correlational study, we also found that PPJ positively correlated to enhanced integrating, compromising, and obliging behaviors, and these correlations were partially or fully mediated by the degree of “dyadic adjustment,” which is a measure of relationship health. In addition, in this second study, we found no correlation between perceived procedural justice and dominating or avoiding behavior. In both studies, participants either predicted or chose collaborative behaviors more than non‐collaborative ones. We conclude that the perception that one's partner is behaving in a procedurally just way can enhance active and egalitarian collaboration in marriage and other intimate partner relationships, but that the absence of PPJ does not seem to encourage active non‐collaboration, particularly not highly self‐centered dominating behavior.